


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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

THE SIEGE OF PRAENESTE¹.

The year 82 B.C. heralded a campaign in the Civil Wars which proved to be of vital importance for the future of Rome and Italy, despite the conspicuous, and, one might have thought, almost decisive successes of Sulla and his chief lieutenant, the proconsul Metellus, in the previous year. Sulla's advance along the Via Appia² from Brundisium to

¹ To Dr T. Ashby, Director of the British School at Rome, I must express my sincere thanks for visiting with me the country in the neighbourhood of Praeneste and Mt Algidus and for much help in this attempt to deal with the topographical problems connected with the siege of Praeneste. I must acknowledge also the kindness of Professor J. S. Reid who not only read through this paper, but also made many invaluable criticisms and suggestions, chiefly in relation to the literary evidence, of which I have gladly availed myself.

² Plutarch, *Sulla* 27. It is certain that he went along the Via Appia and not along the road from Brundisium to Beneventum through Canusium and Herdoniae, described by Strabo in full (vi. 3. 7) and by Horace in part (*Satires* i. 5), because mention is made of incidents at Tarentum and Silvium,

stations on the Via Appia. In Appian i. 84 we read πρώτη μὲν ἀμφὶ Κανόσιον τοῖς ἀνθυπάτοις πρὸς Νωρβανὸν ἐγίγνετο μάχη· καὶ θνήσκουσι Νωρβανοῦ μὲν ἑξαισχύλιοι, τῶν δ' ἀμφὶ τὸν Σύλλαν ἐβδομήκοντα, τραυματῆαι δ' ἐγένοντο πολλοί. καὶ Νωρβανὸς ἐς Καπύην ἀνέξευξεν. This corresponds closely with Florus; *primum apud Capuam sub amne Volturno signa concurrunt*. The two go back to the same source and Canusium is clearly a blunder for some name in Campania. The mention of the river Volturnus suggests Casilinum, where the opening skirmishes before the great battle of Tifata may have taken place. Norbanus may have attempted to bar Sulla's course at Casilinum, but, in this case, his line of retreat would be to the W. of the Volturnus not to the E., on which side Capua lay. Nothing is known of the details of the battle of Mount Tifata. Velleius' text

Campania had been marked by no opposition from the Lucanians or Apulians, and, on his reaching Campania, was crowned by his victory over Norbanus at Mount Tifata and the defection of Scipio's army at Teanum Sidicinum. During the winter season Norbanus was kept closely blockaded in Capua and an abortive attempt was made to come to terms with him.

In the spring of the following year the struggle was renewed on both sides with surprising enthusiasm. Its character, too, underwent a decisive change. Instead of remaining, as it had begun, merely a struggle for the possession of government between the leaders of the Democratic and Oligarchical parties, it was transformed into a great national conflict, the expiring effort of Samnium to cast off the yoke of Rome. All the primitive rivalry between Samnite and Latin, all the deepest animosity which had burnt so furiously in the old days before the conquest of Italy, was rekindled into one last gigantic beacon flame, which was but the signal for its own final extinction.

The most advanced and determined leaders of the democracy, Carbo and young Marius, the twenty year old son of the victor of Aquae Sextiae and Vercellae, were appointed to the consulship. The former went north up the Via Flaminia to oppose Metellus and Pompeius in the neighbourhood of Ariminum; the latter, with 40,000 troops under his standards, among whom would be many of the veterans who had served under his father, marched down towards Campania to relieve Norbanus at Capua. But Sulla, leaving a detachment to maintain the blockade, anticipated his arrival and marched up into Latium to meet him. The two armies met somewhere in the Volscian Hills (the Monti Lepini). Whether they were marching along the Via Appia or the Via Latina, the two great military highways between Rome and Campania, is not explicitly stated and a divergence between our two authorities, Plutarch and Appian, forbids a decisive statement upon the

(post victoriam † qua demendes † montem Tifata, ii. 25. 4) is hopelessly corrupt and Halm's reading *defendens*

montem Tifatam seems improbable. Nor do we know who was the second ἀνθύπατος (besides Sulla).

point. Plutarch¹ abruptly breaks away from his account of the surrender of Scipio to say that 'after this Marius with eighty-five cohorts challenged Sulla to battle near Signium.' 'Signium' is undoubtedly the old Latin colony of Signia (the modern Segni) situated on the northern slopes of the Volscian Hills; the Via Latina runs at the base of the escarpment following the level ground in the Sacco valley. Thus the two armies would have marched along the Via Latina from Rome and Campania respectively. But from the narrative of Appian² we gather that after Sulla had captured Setium Marius, who was encamped in the neighbourhood, retreated gradually, but, on reaching what was called the Sacred Harbour (or Harbour of Sacer), arrayed his forces for battle and fought with desperate courage. In this case the Via Appia, not the Via Latina, would have been the road taken by the two commanders. 'Setium' or Setia (now Sezze) stands upon a rocky summit at the southern edge of the Volscian Hills looking down upon the Pontine Marshes, a thousand feet below, through which runs the Via Appia, some four miles further south. Perhaps on general considerations³ it is better to assume that it was nearer Signia

¹ Sulla 28. Ἐκ τούτου περὶ Σίγνιον Μάριος ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ πέντε σπείρας ἔχων προῦκαλεῖτο Σύλλαν.

² Appian B. C. i. 87. Σύλλα Σήτιον καταλαβόντος, ὁ Μάριος ἀγχοῦ στρατοπεδεύων ὑπεχώρει κατ' ὀλίγον, ὥς δ' ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὸν καλούμενον Ἱερὸν λιμένα, ἐξέτασεν εἰς μάχην καὶ ἡγωνίζετο προθύμως. Vell. Pat. ii. 26. C. Marius... apud Sacriportum pulsus a Sulla acie Praeneste, quod ante natura munitum praesidiis firmaverat, se exercitumque contulit. Cf. also Florus, iii. 21. 23, Aur. Vict. Vir. Ill. 68. 75.

³ Our best and indeed only account of the Civil War is given by Appian. We must use his narrative as our foundation and regard Plutarch only as a secondary source. But in this particular instance it would seem that Plutarch is more likely to be correct. Writing considerably before Appian he

derived information from the lost memoirs of Sulla, and, however these may be tainted and falsified by personal caprice, they are more likely to be correct upon a topographical point of this sort than the source (probably Livy) employed by Appian. Plutarch indicates that he used or inspected a number of authors. He mentions Fenestella both in the life of Pompey and in that of Crassus. Sallust, too, was very likely used. Livy's topographical passages are notoriously untrustworthy. Even apart from the relative reliability of our sources the Via Latina seems preferable to the Via Appia. Its line of communication is more natural though more difficult; but, if Sulla advanced along the Via Appia from Tarracina, it is hard to say why he should cross the dangerous Pontine Marshes to capture Setia,

rather than Setia that Sulla and Marius first faced each other. The scene, too, of the engagement at Sacriportus seems to turn the balance of probability in favour of Signia. To reach the generally recognised site of Sacriportus¹ from Signia is merely

which cannot in any way be said to command the Via Appia in the same way as Signia commands the Latina. The Pontine Marshes *par excellence* command the Via Appia between Ad Sponsas and Tarracina, and Horace (*Sat.* i. 5. 3-23) tells us forty-five years later (37 B.C.) that a canal boat rather than a road was used to convey travellers from Forum Appi to Tarracina.

Previously, however, to the construction of the Via Appia from Rome to Capua in 312 B.C., there must have existed a road which ran from Velitrae across the valley to Cori and along the base of the Volscian Hills to Tarracina. The mutineers from Campania (Livy vii. 29) would march up it from Lautulae to the Alban Hills. Setia indeed commands this road, which must have been in regular use even long after the Via Appia was built across the Pontine Marshes, because of the great difficulty of maintaining the military highway in a fit condition for regular traffic. Nerva and Trajan devoted great attention to this dangerous stretch, the Decennovium as it was called. It is generally assumed from the well-known inscriptions (*CIL.* x. 6824, 6839) that the Decennovium was not, like the rest of the Via Appia, paved with *silex* until the time of Nerva and Trajan. The same troubles made their appearance in the middle ages, owing to the increasing damage inflicted by the marshes, and till the end of the 18th century the road running below Cora Norba and Setia was regularly used as a post road. If, indeed, it was Setia rather than Signia that Sulla captured

he would certainly have marched up from Tarracina along this earlier and more natural road. There may be some MS. corruption, but the possibilities of ΣΙΓΝ being changed into ΣΗΤ, or vice-versa, are a matter of palaeography rather than topography. Dr Reid thinks that perhaps *Anagnia* was the town captured by Sulla, as he might have wanted to try a turning movement between Anagnia and Praeneste by way of Capitulum Hernicum, the modern Piglio. This may have been difficult, but quite possible. Indeed, when he was advancing against Rome from Praeneste, he sent parties δι' ἐτέρων καὶ ἐτέρων ὁδῶν. Appian i. 88. 7.

¹ It is generally believed that the *Torre Piombinara* or *Pimpinara* near the modern railway station of Segni marks the site of Sacriportus. (Cf. *Papers of British School at Rome*, Vol. i. p. 280 and v. p. 422.) S. Ilario about 3 kilometres to the west is certainly to be identified with *Ad Bivium* where the Via Latina and the Via Labicana joined; *Compitum Anagninum*, however, much further east may have been the original point of junction of the two roads. It is unfortunate that classical literature does not throw any further light upon the position or nature of Sacriportus. That it was in the neighbourhood of the junction of the Via Latina and the Via Labicana is merely a hypothesis deduced from the relative positions of Signia and Praeneste. On the other hand, if it was near Setia that Sulla and Marius first met, we should naturally suppose Marius to have retreated

a descent of some six miles from the higher ground into the heart of the Sacco valley; but, on the other hand, the difficulty of the mountain paths in the northern Volscian Hills, which hereabouts reach over five thousand feet in the summits of M. Semprevisa and M. Lupone, militates against the supposition that two large armies could have cut across this rugged chain.

However, a decisive battle was fought at Sacriportus. Plutarch's¹ account is embellished with a number of details, in which we can clearly detect the influence of Sulla's memoirs. Marius' troops had occupied all the roads, to the great discomfort of Sulla's advance guard. A heavy storm of rain burst over the combatants. Sulla's lieutenants were urging him to postpone an engagement in order to allow his wearied troops to enjoy a few hours' sleep, but a sudden attack from the enemy roused his men to fury and they repulsed the enemy with great slaughter. Appian² says that the wavering of Marius' left wing spread dismay among the rest. Five cohorts of infantry and two of cavalry deserted to Sulla, while the remainder broke and fled to Praeneste (the modern Palestrina), hotly pursued by the victors. The fugitives who first reached the walls of the friendly city found the gates open, but as Sulla's troops drew nearer, the gates were shut and Marius only

through the valley E. of Velitrae towards Praeneste. In this case Sacriportus must be localised in the valley between Velitrae and the Volscian Hills rather than in that of the Sacco. Nibby (*Analisi* iii. 52) and Gell (*The Topography of Rome and its vicinity*, p. 358) favour the view that the *Torre Piombinara* marks the site of Sacriportus. Bunbury (in *Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geog.* ii. p. 871) places it in a similar position, though the fact that he says that Marius' line of retreat from Setia lay in the opening between the Alban hills and the Volscian mountains does not support his view too strongly. The

Torre Piombinara is surely quite out of the way of the direct line of retreat through the Velitrae valley to Praeneste. Again, the precise meaning of Sacriportus (or *ὁ ἱερὸς λιμὴν* as Appian translates it) cannot be satisfactorily determined. The 'Harbour of Sacer' is very indefinite. In any case junction of the Via Latina and the Via Labicana was of great strategic importance and possibly this fact may really decide the question, for Marius, if he retreated that way, must have seen the necessity of an attempt to maintain communications with Rome.

¹ Sulla 29.

² B.C. i. 87. 6-8.

escaped destruction by being drawn up over the battlements¹ by means of a rope. Those less fortunate were cut down or captured; the Samnites, of whom great numbers fell into Sulla's hands, were massacred in cold blood, *ὡς αἰεὶ χαλεποὺς Ῥωμαίοις γενομένους*. The siege of Praeneste² then began.


There was perhaps no ancient city in Latium whose position was so important strategically as that of Praeneste. From Tibur the escarpment of the Apennines runs straight down in a south easterly direction to join, as it were, the Volscian mountains above Signia, but, at Praeneste, its line suddenly changes to due east and then descends roughly parallel with the present Sacco valley (the ancient Trerus or Tolerus). Between Praeneste and the base of the external crater of the Alban Hills lies an area of undulating ground, at its lowest point 361 metres above sea level. From the base of the hill upon which Praeneste stood this curiously undulating expanse, in which the differences of level are frequent but never serious, gradually rises so that the traveller who walks from Palestrina station towards the Pass of Algidus finds himself imperceptibly rising and gaining from time to time an increasingly magnificent view of Palestrina and the clear cut summits behind. By the time that the Pass of Algidus is reached he has climbed some 200 metres. Between Palestrina and Valmontone the monotonous undulations assume an aspect resembling that of a valley; and the same is true, though in a slightly more pronounced degree, of the Valle Collerano running S.E. from the village of Cave. A distance of some eight kilometres separates Palestrina from the nearest edge of the Alban crater; to the modern village of Artena (possibly the ancient Ecetra)³

¹ It seems absurd to suppose that this was actually the case and that all or nearly all of his followers were put to death. Velleius (ii. 26) more soberly says *apud Sacriportum pulsus a Sulla acie Praeneste, quod ante natura munitum praesidiis firmaverat, se exercitumque contulit*. Diodorus xxxviii. 15 says *ὁ δὲ Μάρκος μάχη τῇ πρὸς Σύλλαν γενναίως ἀγωνισάμενος*,

δύως ἡττηθεὶς κατέφυγεν εἰς Πραίνεστον ἅμα μυρίοις πεντακισχίλοις.

² Livy, *Ep.* lxxxvii. Sulla C. Marius, *exercitu eius fuso delectoque ad Sacriportum, in oppido Praeneste obsedit*.

³ Cf. T. Ashby and G. J. Pfeiffer in *Supplementary Papers of the American School in Rome*, i. 87 seq.



where the Via Latina skirts the N.N.W. edge of the Volscian Hills the distance is eleven kilometres. The low ground between the S.E. edge of the Alban Hills and the opposite extremity of the Volscians is only about four kilometres across, but partakes of the same physical characteristics as that which it cuts at right angles to the south of Praeneste.

Praeneste, like Tibur, was an early outpost against the Aequi. In later times it commanded three roads to Rome, the Via Praenestina, the Via Labicana and the Via Latina. The first ran direct to the capital across the tiny rivulets which fall into the Anio between Tibur and Rome and was prolonged in the other direction to join the Via Labicana¹; the second, after its divergence from the Latina, runs along the northern edge of the Alban Hills; the third cuts through the Pass of Algidus into the plateau between the inner and outer crater edges and emerges into the Campagna below Tusculum. But it was the strength of Praeneste as a fortress no less than the importance of its position in commanding three approaches to Rome that caused Sulla to be at such pains to capture it and the democratic leaders to set such store upon its relief. At the extremity of the spur of the Apennines where Praeneste stood a narrow ridge falls gently from the mountain, sweeps up into a final peak seven hundred and sixty metres high, upon which there is just sufficient room for a citadel to stand, and then sinks rapidly to a slope four hundred and seventy-two metres high. The bulk of the city was built upon this slope. Her arx was an almost impregnable citadel; only starvation could reduce it. In the early struggles her strength as a fortress and her position with regard to the strategic relationships of the surrounding peoples explain the continual series of crises² through which she passed.

¹ For the relations between the Via Latina and the Via Labicana see *Papers of the British School at Rome*, iv., Vol. i. 215 seq., 275 seq., iii. 6 seq., v. 425.

² Strabo v. 3. 11 well describes her position: ἀκραν γὰρ ἔχει τῆς μὲν πόλεως ὑπερθεῖν ὄρος ὑψηλόν, ὅπισθεν δ' ἀπὸ τῆς

συνεχούσης ὀρεινῆς αὐχένι διεξενγμένον, ὑπεραίρον καὶ δυοὶ σταδίους τούτου πρὸς ὀρθίαν ἀνάβασιν. His comment upon her position is well deserved: ταῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλαις πόλεσι πλείστον τὸ εὐεργές πρὸς ἀγαθοῦ τίθεται, Πραινεστῖναις δὲ συμφορὰ γεγενῆσθαι διὰ τὰς Ῥωμαίων στάσεις.

Such, then, was the fortress into which Marius and the residue of his defeated troops barely escaped with their lives. The victor immediately took steps to reduce the city, but by starvation¹ rather than by actual assault. Trenches were dug and blockading walls erected, a considerable distance, as Appian says, from the city itself. Sulla's lieutenant, Lucretius Ofella, superintended these operations. In view of subsequent events they must have been very extensive and carried out with the usual skill displayed by the Romans in making² entrenchments. Leaving Ofella in command, Sulla³ advanced against the capital. Carbo, meantime, who had been operating with but scant success against Pompeius and Metellus round Ariminum, was informed of Marius' defeat at Sacriportus and his position at Praeneste. He saw the necessity for an immediate⁴ attempt to relieve his colleague, but was unable to take steps because Sulla had invaded Etruria in person. The interest of the war then centred round Praeneste.

From Etruria Carbo sent Marcius Censorinus with eight legions to force the blockade of the fortress. But this officer did not even reach the neighbourhood of Praeneste, because Pompey⁵ (apparently somewhere in Umbria) caught him in a defile, defeated him with great loss, and drove him to take refuge upon a neighbouring hill. Censorinus himself escaped,

¹ Appian *B. C.* i. 88. ὁ δὲ Σύλλας τὸν Μάριον ἐς Πραινεστίνων κατακλείσας τὴν πόλιν ἀπετάφρευε καὶ ἀπετείχιζεν ἐκ μακροῦ διαστήματος, καὶ Λουκρήτιον Ὀφέλλαν ἐπέστησε τῷ ἔργῳ, ὥς οὐκέτι μάχῃ παραστησόμενος Μάριον ἀλλὰ λιμῷ.

² Entrenchment work was the Roman soldier's most elementary duty. Marius entrenched his position on the Rhine in 102 B.C. with great thoroughness, while Caesar's lines round Dyrhachium in the Civil war and Alesia in the Gallic war were of enormous extent.

³ Appian, *c.* 88. 7. Σύλλας δὲ στρατὸν ἐς Ῥώμην κατὰ μέρη δι' ἐτέρων καὶ ἐτέρων ὁδῶν περιέπεμπε, ἐντελλόμενος τὰς πύλας καταλαβεῖν, εἰ δὲ ἀποκρουσ-

θεῖεν, ἐπὶ ὅστια χωρεῖν.

⁴ Plutarch represents Carbo as flying to Africa at once without attempting to relieve Praeneste. *Sulla* 28: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἢ μικρὰ προσκρούσαντες οὗτοι μεγάλας συνέτριψαν δυνάμεις τῶν πολεμίων, ὥστε τὸν μάλιστα τὴν ἐναντίαν στάσιν συνέχοντα Κάρβωνα νύκτωρ ἀποδράντα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ στρατιὰν εἰς Λιβύην ἐκπλεῦσαι. But possibly among the victories of Pompeius, Crassus, Metellus and Servilius, mentioned by Plutarch in the previous paragraph of the same chapter, we are to include the success gained by Pompey over the first attempt to relieve Praeneste.

⁵ Appian, *B. C.* i. 90. 3-4.

but his unfortunate followers, regarding him as being in collusion with Pompey, took matters into their own hands. One legion defaulted to Ariminum, other troops went back to their homes, the residue, a mere handful, seven cohorts strong, remained faithful to their general and made their way back with him to Carbo in Etruria.

But a more determined attempt was made from the south. Seventy thousand¹ troops, of whom the majority would be Samnites and other *socii* making their last futile effort against the tyrant city, under Lamponius of Lucania, Pontius Telesinus of Samnium (surely a descendant of the old Samnite general) and Gutta from Capua, marched up the Via Latina with intent to relieve Praeneste. But Sulla, who must have returned posthaste from his successes in Etruria² to forestall this huge host, blocked their passage. Appian's language is ὁ Σύλλας ἐν τοῖς στενοῖς, ἥ μὲν διαβατὸν ἦν, ἀπέκλειε τῆς παρόδου. The locality and nature of these στενὰ constitute an interesting topographical problem, to which it will be more convenient to return later, when the remaining attempts to raise the siege have been described.

Then Marius³, on hearing of these two unsuccessful attempts to relieve Praeneste, entered upon a campaign of active opposition to the besiegers by sallying forth from the gates and erecting a large fort between the city and Ofella's lines. Engines of war and troops were posted there and an effort was made to force the blockade. But all his devices were baffled and he was forced to retire to the city.

Yet a third⁴ attempt was made to relieve Marius. Carbo

¹ Appian, *B. C.* i. 90. 5. Μάρκον δὲ Λαμπώνιον ἐκ Λευκανίας καὶ Πόντιον Τηλεσίνιον ἐκ τῆς Σαυνίτιδος καὶ τὸν Καπυαῖον Γούτταν, μεθ' ἐπτὰ μυριάδων ἐπειγομένους Μάριον ἐξελέσθαι τῆς πολιτορκίας, ὁ Σύλλας ἐν τοῖς στενοῖς, ἥ μὲν διαβατὸν ἦν, ἀπέκλειε τῆς παρόδου.

² These successes are described by Appian, *B. C.* i. 89, 90. 1-2.

³ Appian, *B. C.* i. 90. 6. καὶ ὁ Μάριος ἀπογιγνώσκων ἤδη τὰς ἔξωθεν

ἐπικουρίας, φρούριον ἐν τῷ μεταίχμῳ μεγάλῳ ὄντι ἤγειρεν, ἐς ὃ καὶ μηχανὰς καὶ στρατιὰν συναγαγὼν ἐπεχείρει βιάσασθαι τὸν Λουκρήτιον. πολυημέρου δ' αὐτῷ καὶ ποικίλης τῆς πείρας γενομένης, οὐδὲν ἀνύων ἐς Πραϊνεστὸν αὐτοῖς συνεκλείετο. Livy, *Ep.* lxxxvii. Marium erumpere temptantem reppulit.

⁴ Appian, *B. C.* i. 92. 1. Κάρβων δὲ ἕτερα δύο τέλη στρατιωτῶν ἐς Πραϊνεστὸν ἄγειν ἔπεμπε Δαμασίππον, ὑπερ-

despatched two more legions from Etruria under Damasippus¹ to attempt to break through the blockading lines. But in vain. ἀλλ' οὐδ' οὔτοι τὰ στενὰ διελθεῖν ἐδύναντο φυλασσόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ Σύλλα, as Appian says. Damasippus and his men had no other course but to return whence they came. Despairing of the democratic cause, Carbo then fled to Africa leaving Carrinas, Censorinus and Damasippus to oppose Sulla and his capable officers. These three², in conjunction with the Samnites and others under Lamponius, Telesinus and Gutta, of whom we have heard nothing since their repulse by Sulla from before Praeneste, made a last desperate effort to cut through the blockade. But not even the combined army, which must have numbered nearly 100,000 men, was able to make any impression upon the lines.

Baffled and disappointed they advanced upon the almost depopulated and starving Rome and encamped ἀμφὶ τὴν Ἀλβανῶν γῆν one hundred stades away from the city gates. With the Battle of the Colline Gate we are only concerned in so far that Plutarch³ says that when Sulla was being hard pressed fugitives from among his troops fled to Ofella before Praeneste and urged him to abandon the blockade with all speed, since Sulla was dead and Rome was in possession of the enemy. Thus the siege of Praeneste was within an ace of being raised.

επευγόμενος Μάριον ἐκλύσαι τῆς πολιορκίας· ἀλλ' οὐδ' οὔτοι τὰ στενὰ διελθεῖν ἐδύναντο φυλασσόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ Σύλλα.

¹ Damasippus, otherwise Brutus, was last heard of in c. 84. 4 as Marius' agent in the massacres at Rome (cf. Livy, *Ep.* lxxxvi.). On Sulla reaching Rome, it is most natural to suppose that he fled to Carbo in Etruria and came from the north to Praeneste.

² Appian, c. 92. 5. Καρρίνας δὲ καὶ Μάρκιος καὶ Δαμάσιππος, οἷς εἶχον ἅπασιν, ἐπὶ τὰ στενὰ ἐχώρουν, ὡς ὁμοῦ τοῖς Σαννίταις βιασόμενοι πάντως αὐτὰ πειρᾶσαι. οὐ δυνήθentes δὲ οὐδ' ὥς, ἐφέροντο ἐς Ῥώμην ὡς ἔρημον ἀνδρῶν καὶ

τροφῶν ἅμα καταληψόμενοι τὸ ἄστυ, καὶ πρὸ σταδίων ἑκατὸν ἐστρατοπέδευον ἀμφὶ τὴν Ἀλβανῶν γῆν.

Plut. *Sulla* 29. Ἔσπευδε μὲν γὰρ ἅμα Λαμπωνίῳ τῷ Λευκανῷ (ὁ Σαννίτης Τηλεσίνοσ) χεῖρα πολλὴν ἀθροίσας ἐπὶ Πραινεστὸν ὡς ἐξαρπασόμενος τῆς πολιορκίας τὸν Μάριον. Plutarch proceeds to give an account of the battle of the Colline Gate and so assumes that the Samnites tried not *twice* but *once* only to force their way into Praeneste. Their first attempt is mentioned only by Appian (c. 90. 5); Plutarch mentions apparently only the second.

³ *Sulla*, c. 29, end.

We are now in a position to examine the topographical problem presented by the phrase of Appian ἐν τοῖς στενοῖς, ἢ μόνῃ διαβατὸν ἦν. Plutarch's narrative does not help us at all. Only in connexion with the Battle of the Colline Gate does he say that Lucretius Ofella was in charge of the blockade of Praeneste. Only one attempt at relief does he mention, that on the part of the Samnites, nor does he succinctly state from which direction it came. From the sober and unimaginative narrative of Appian we infer that four distinct attempts were made to raise the siege. With the first, that of Censorinus from the north which came to an evil end in some Umbrian defile, we are not here concerned, for there can be no possible connexion between the στενὰ mentioned in that context (c. 90. 3) and the στενὰ (c. 90. 5 ; 92. 1. 5) which are the subject of our consideration. On the second occasion, when Lamponius, Pontius Telesinus and Gutta made their first effort, we must undoubtedly assume that they marched up the Via Latina from the S.E. They found their passage blocked by Sulla, ἐν τοῖς στενοῖς, ἢ μόνῃ διαβατὸν ἦν. The same fate befell the two legions subsequently despatched by Carbo under Damasippus. But, assuming that Damasippus came from the N.E., as seems highly probable, did he encounter Sulla in the same στενὰ which proved fatal to the Samnites advancing from a diametrically opposite direction? And again, when the Samnites joined forces with Carrinas, Censorinus and Damasippus, did the whole army attack the same στενὰ from one and the same direction, as the narrative would lead us to believe, or did they deliver a simultaneous attack from N.W. and S.E.?

It is generally thought that these στενὰ are south of Praeneste, but it is hard to find an exact spot to satisfy all the conditions. On the south side of Praeneste the nearest locality which justifies the appellation of defile (στενὰ) is the veritable ravine between Anagni and Ferentino through which the railway from Rome to Naples closely follows the course of the Sacco. But to assume¹ that this is the στενὰ in which the last

¹ Fernique (*Etude sur Préneſte in de Rome et d'Athènes,* 1880) recognises that this defile (San Germano) is

three attempts at relief were frustrated by Sulla is absurd, for not only is it much too far from Praeneste (nearly 17 miles), but it is impossible to explain how the relieving forces from the N.W. managed to entangle themselves in it, unless they were at pains to make a long détour either across the heights above Praeneste or round the Alban Hills and across the inhospitable summits of the Volscians.

Such is the nature of the ground between Praeneste and the bases of the Alban and Volscian Hills that we cannot genuinely apply the name of defile to any of the insignificant undulations which are its predominant physical feature. From the N.W. corner of the walls of Ferentinum (the modern Ferentino some 20 miles E.S.E. of Palestrina) a splendid view is obtained of the Sacco valley, bounded on the N. by the Apennines and the S. by the Volscians, right up to Palestrina and Algidus. The lines of hill seem to converge upon the low ground separating these two points. After the steep drop S. of Palestrina the ground presents the appearance of a perfectly straight line which rises very slightly as far as the base of the Alban crater. Although it presents the appearance of a pass it does not seem sufficiently narrow to be genuinely στενὰ. Viewed too, from the N.W. (very conveniently from the station of Lunghezza on the railway between Rome and Tivoli) the same features are observed. We see the same broad pass, generally presenting easy communication, but not entirely innocent of lurking defiles¹ in which an army could be checked.

quite out of the question. He says 'Il ne me semble pas probable, d'après le texte d'Appian, que Sylla ait été attendre l'ennemi au défilé de San Germano, et de l'autre part dans les environs mêmes de Préneste il n'y a pas de véritable défilé: on ne peut donner ce nom au val Pepe, qui s'étend dans la direction de Valmonte, ni à la vallée qui s'étend de Palestrina à Cave.'

¹ The country, indeed, looking from Lunghezza towards Gallicano and Zagarolo is pierced with numerous small defiles, traversed by tributaries

of the Anio. Between the Lago di Gabii and Gallicano the Via Praenestina crosses several ridges and defiles rather sharply. The cut known as Cavamonte below Gallicano (cf. E. Lear, *Illustrated Excursions in Italy*, 1846, p. 2) by which the Via Praenestina is taken through one of these ridges is quite artificial; thence to Palestrina the road runs perfectly straight and easily. These defiles are characteristic of the band of country between Tibur and Praeneste, where the central Apennine chain sinks

There is, however, nothing there resembling the true defiles of the Etruscan plateau, which when viewed from an equivalent height seems to present a perfectly straight and unbroken edge, but to the observer from such a vantage point as Soracte or the Ciminian volcano, is indented with countless gorges and ravines, deep and precipitous, in which many a Roman army must have perished during the long struggle for supremacy in Southern Etruria. Indeed, the famous pass of Algidus at the N.E. edge of the external crater of the Alban Hills through which the Via Latina passed is the only true defile in the vicinity of Palestrina, but to hold it alone would be quite inadequate, for while blocking the Via Latina it would leave open the Via Labicana and the Via Praenestina. It has been held probable by authorities¹ who have had opportunity to examine the country that the high ground between Palestrina and Cave is the best place to forestall any movement of an enemy endeavouring to relieve Praeneste. But though this locality is admirably suited for the prevention of an attack from the S.E., it leaves the line of advance from the N.W. entirely open, and, however gently we are to treat Appian's use of the word *στενὰ*, it must be acknowledged that this locality fails to satisfy two important conditions.

A consideration of our literary and topographical evidence allows us to venture the hypothesis that the word *στενὰ* used² by Appian here refers to the whole of the broad pass between the spur of the Apennines upon which Praeneste stood and the N.E. and N.W. extremities of the Alban and Volscian Hills respectively. This was *par excellence* the *στενὰ*, ἡ μόνη διαβατὸν

finally into the plain. But they could be easily turned and could not seriously interfere with the advance of an army from the N.W.

¹ Cf. Appian, *B. C. i.*, edited by J. L. Strachan-Davidson, pp. 93, 94, note 5, where the opinions of G. McN. Rushforth (late Director of the British School at Rome) and St Clair Baddeley are given.

² Appian is probably copying from Livy, and it is not improbable that the

word used by Livy which Appian has rendered by *στενὰ*, did not convey exactly the same meaning of a narrow defile as is to be derived from the Greek. If the word used by Livy were *saltus* it would apply quite well to an open valley with sides not at all precipitous. The real equivalent of *στενὰ* would be *angustiae*. *Saltus* is occasionally but loosely applied to such a place.

ἦν, because any army marching to the relief of Praeneste would necessarily have to enter this broad pass between the hills whether it came along the Via Labicana or Praenestina from the N.W. or along the Labicana from the S.E. We suggest that Sulla's lines extended right across the undulating ground from the pass of Algidus to Praeneste (see sketch map, p. 7). A cohort stationed near the Pass could well hold the position against great numerical odds, while observers upon M. Castellaccio just to the north of the defile would have no difficulty in detecting a relieving army in its advance from the S.E. or the N.W. From a point at the bottom of the escarpment we might assume that the blockading lines took two general directions, namely N.N.E. and E.N.E. The former would frustrate any attack from the side of Rome, the latter from the side of Campania. On nearing Praeneste they might curve inwards and terminate at the foot of the escarpment N.W. and S.E. of the hill upon which the city stands. Praeneste, thus, would in a sense be the centre of the base of a triangle formed by blockading lines, whose apex was below Algidus. Only by supposing lines of such a nature can we explain the facility with which Sulla baffled the attempts at relief. Furthermore, the facts that the interval between Praeneste and the blockading lines was so large (*ἐκ μακροῦ διαστήματος*, Appian, i. c. 88. 3; *ἐν τῷ μεταίχμῳ μεγάλῳ ὄντι*, *ibidem* c. 90. 6), and that Marius was able to plant a fort some distance from the city seem to favour the hypothesis that the lines radiated out from near Algidus, like the two arms of a triangle. It is possible, of course, that the whole country was much more extensively wooded than at present. This contingency would considerably modify the conditions of the blockade and give much support to the theory that one of the small valleys, S.E. of Praeneste, which are at present in no sense στενὰ, ἡ μόνη διαβατὸν ἦν, may be that which was so successfully blocked by Sulla.

In the case of the fourth and last attempt to raise the siege it seems extremely probable that a combined attack was made upon the blockading lines, by Carrinas, Censorinus and Damasippus, from the N.W. and by the Samnites from

the S.E. Otherwise, if, as we suppose, Sulla held the whole of the ground between Algidus and Praeneste, no invading army from the N. could attempt to relieve Praeneste from the S. side except by making a détour round the Alban Hills and coming up the valley from Velitrae. Upon the failure of this effort we read that the combined armies marched upon Rome and encamped ἀμφὶ τὴν Ἀλβανῶν γῆν¹. The scene of this encampment must be somewhere on the lower western slopes of the external Alban crater, within the triangle formed by the ancient Bovillae and the modern villages of Castel Gandolfo and Marino. To reach it we may assume that the democratic leaders, attacking from the N., retreated down the Via Labicana and then struck across towards the Via Appia, whereas the Samnites who were endeavouring to break through Sulla's lines on the S.E. side could not but march down to Velitrae where they would soon strike the Via Appia.

The Battle of the Colline Gate secured the fall both of Rome and Praeneste. The heads of Carrinas and Censorinus were sent by Sulla to Ofella with instructions that they were to be paraded in triumph round the walls. Just as Hannibal realised that his cause was lost when the head of his brother Hasdrubal was thrown by the consul Nero before his lines in Apulia, so the brave people of Praeneste realised that further resistance was hopeless when they beheld the grim emblems of Sulla's victory. They, too, could expect no better fate, if they further provoked the relentless anger of their conqueror. Seeing no further prospect of relief, for everywhere the democratic forces were at their lowest ebb, the rank and file broken and shattered, their commanders either dead or in exile, they surrendered the city to Lucretius Ofella. Marius, in endeavouring to escape through one of the drain² passages

¹ The modern village of Albano rose upon the ruins of the camp established there before the time of Septimius Severus, who quartered in it the second Parthian legion. In the later republican days Albanum had become

a stereotyped name for a villa on the slopes below the Alban lake. Alba Longa should be placed near Castel Gandolfo. (Cf. T. Ashby, *Journal of Philology*, 1899, xxvii. p. 37 sqq.)

² Plut. *Sulla* 32. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ

beneath the city was captured and committed suicide. His head was sent by Lucretius to Sulla, who, casting it down in the Forum before the rostra delivered with cynical brutality the proverb ἐρέτην δεῖ πρῶτα γενέσθαι πρὶν πηδαλίοις ἐπιχειρεῖν.

A grand inquisition was held at Praeneste. According to Plutarch¹ Sulla began to judge and condemn each man privately and upon his individual merits, but, as such a procedure was too lengthy, all the captives to the number of twelve thousand were herded together and summarily executed, his host alone being spared. Appian² gives a slightly discrepant version. Ofella either imprisoned or executed all senators who had served under Marius; but the survivors of these met with instant doom when Sulla arrived from Rome. Thereupon the population and the rank and file were marched out into the plain before the city, unarmed and helpless. Sulla followed the example of the five men³ of Lacedaemon, who enquired of the captive Plataeans if in the course of the war they had served Sparta and her allies to any good purpose; but, unlike them, he was actuated more by private enmity than public spirit, for he spared only those 'who had been useful to himself in any way.' Those who had not been so fortunate were divided up into three companies, Romans, Samnites and Praenestines. The Romans were pardoned, even those whose execution would have been justified, but all the rest were cut down. The city was given over to the pillagers, who doubtless

Μάριος μὲν ἀλίσκόμενος ἑαυτὸν διέφθειρε. App. B.C. i. 94. 1. τὴν πόλιν τῷ Λουκρητίῳ παρέδοσαν, Μαρτίου καταδύντος ἐς τάφρους ὑπονόμους, καὶ μετὰ βραχὺ καὶ ἀνελόντος ἑαυτὸν. Livy, Ep. lxxxviii. C. Marius Praeneste obsessus a Lucretio Ofella Sullanarum parte viro, cum per cuniculum captaret evadere, saeptus ab exercitu mortem sibi conscivit. id est, in ipso cuniculo, cum sentiret se evadere non posse, cum Pontio Telesino fugae comite stricto utrimque gladio concurrit; quem cum occidisset, ipse saucius impetravit a servo, ut se occi-

deret. Strabo v. 3. 11. πρὸς δὲ τῇ ἐρυμνότητι καὶ διώρυγι κρυπταῖς διατέτρηται πανταχόθεν μέχρι τῶν πεδίων ταῖς μὲν ὑδρείας χάριν ταῖς δ' ἐξόδων λαθραίων, ὧν ἐν μιᾷ Μάριος πολιορκούμενος ἀπέθανε.

¹ Sulla 32.

² B.C. i. 94.

³ Thucydides iii. 52. 3-4. With regard to Sulla's trick of enquiring whether prisoners had done him any good, cf. Plut. Sulla 30, where some are asked to earn their pardon by attacking their former comrades.

revelled in the magnificence of its public and private treasures. Gallant Praeneste had fought its last fight.

[NOTE. This article was written in December 1913. The years between have confirmed the impression that the blockading of these *στεινὰ* by armies so trained in the construction of field works as those of the Romans was a very ordinary feat. Earth-works, wide trenches and barricades presented a formidable obstacle to troops who were without the support which artillery has given to human courage and physical effort. In modern warfare an attack on an entrenched position invariably succeeds, granted perfection in preparations. In ancient times, however, a defending force, securely established in the field works of the period, whatever their nature may have been, stood an excellent chance of holding out against great numerical odds.]

ROBERT GARDNER.

ON THE LEX IULIA MUNICIPALIS.

Prof. Reid's recent article on "the so-called Lex Iulia Municipalis" (J. R. S. vol. v, part 2) had been looked forward to with some interest. He was known to have regarded the inscription as an enigmatical document, but there was always the chance that, out of the special study he was devoting to it, he would evolve some conclusions, more or less definite, on the most essential questions which require answers. It cannot be said that these anticipations have been fulfilled. With the exception of a new hypothesis as to the identity of the *professi* in the opening lines of the Table, Prof. Reid's conclusions are all negative or destructive. If he found the document enigmatical, he has left it a disconnected medley. Apart from the opening section, to which a probable date may be assigned, we have, it appears, to deal with incoherent extracts, often abominably reproduced, from undatable laws or projects of law. No connexion and no common purpose is to be detected in these *disiecta membra*, no one throws any ray of light upon any other, and the question, why they are all found together on a tablet discovered at Heraclea, is regarded as too insoluble to be approached at all.

I may frankly explain why I am desirous of dealing briefly with some of Prof. Reid's main points. If they are accepted, or allowed to pass unchallenged, all the more constructive portion of my own article (J. R. S. vol. iv, part 1), always courteously referred to by him, would fall to the ground. I was of course never sanguine enough to expect any wide acceptance of my conclusions in a region littered with shattered or obsolete hypotheses, but I am reluctant to allow Prof. Reid's unqualified verdict of 'unacceptable' to go forth against them without some criticism of the arguments on which that verdict rests. I shall

therefore, without any unnecessary restatement of my own position, make an attempt to disarm the fresh objections made to it, and then ask the perhaps very small public, sufficiently interested in the discussion, to re-examine my paper in the light of criticisms made and replies offered.

THE PROFESSI.

With regard to the first section of the Table, and especially its relation to Caesar's reform of the *frumentationes*, I may perhaps be allowed to refer to a restatement of my own interpretation in the *Classical Quarterly* (Jan. 1917) in connexion with a theory put forward by Prof. Jefferson Elmore (J. R. S. vol. v, part 1). I am glad to find that Prof. Reid rejects that theory on grounds which do not differ essentially from those used by me. As far as its bearing upon the nature of the whole document is concerned, I should be well content with the hypothesis which Prof. Reid substitutes for that which we both reject, for, if I understand him rightly, he regards lines 1—19 as forming part of the law in accordance with which Caesar's *recensus* and corn reforms were carried out. That is also my view. But I cannot agree with the hypothesis, now for the first time put forward, as to the persons who are to make the *professio*, and whose names and declarations are to be recorded in the public archives and posted up in the forum.

According to Prof. Reid they were the *domini insularum*, through whose agency Caesar is said by Suetonius (*Iul.* 41) to have effected the *recensus populi* in the city district by district (*vicatim*)¹. I quite agree that the selection of the *domini insularum* to carry out the *recensus* is a proof that for the future there were to be no recipients of corn outside the tenants in the *insulae*. Accordingly, we are told, the first step in Caesar's reform was to disqualify from the receipt of corn all owners of

¹ It will perhaps be convenient to quote the passage of Suetonius. *Recensum populi nec more nec loco solito sed vicatim per dominos insularum egit atque ex viginti trecentisque milibus accipientium frumentum e publico ad*

centum quinquaginta retraxit; ac ne qui novi coetus recensiois causa moveri quandoque possent, instituit, quotannis in demortuorum locum ex iis, qui recensenti non essent, subsortitio a praetore fieret.

house property in Rome, as well as all those who, as occupants of separate houses, could have no equitable claim on the score of narrow means (p. 218). I do not discuss the question here whether the legal disqualification of these classes was necessary, or whether the *frumentationes* had always been for the poor alone, since Prof. Reid admits that the well-to-do had all along been practically excluded by considerations of social respectability and pride.

It was therefore to the inhabitants of the *insulae* only that the *recensus* was applied, but instead of the persons affected having to present themselves before a magistrate, Prof. Reid believes that the owners of the *insulae* were required to make a *professio* of all their tenants who were Roman citizens domiciled in Rome, the aliens and minors being omitted from the returns. Any owners of *insulae* absent from Rome, when the returns had to be made, could make their declarations through business agents, while those still in the position of *pupilli* or *pupillae* could make them through their legal guardians. In this way the passage of Suetonius is brought into connexion with the Table. The *professi* of the latter are the *domini insularum* making returns of their tenants, while all those persons, whose names are thus returned, are the *recensi* of Suetonius. I will merely note at this point that, if this explanation takes full account of the words *per dominos insularum*, it seems to ignore the word *vicatim*. If that word means anything, it must mean that the *domini* made their returns locally, that is, in each *vicus* where they had property, whereas the *professiones* of the Table are clearly all made to the same central magistrates.

Putting this however on one side, we are told that the most radical part of Caesar's reform was the reduction of this total number of persons enumerated (*recensi*) or returned to a fixed maximum of 150,000. But this reduction, according to Prof. Reid, followed upon, and formed no part of the *recensus*. The latter was a mere enumeration of those returned by the *domini*, while the former, he argues, must have been effected by a *sortitio*. This method would involve the least break with the hitherto accepted principle of equal claims for all, and is also indicated by the use of the term *subsortitio* in connexion with the annual

maintenance of the number. Again, the *recensus* and the *sortitio* which followed it were, in Prof. Reid's view, processes which took place once and once only. All the *recensi* were so far on an equality that they were all admitted to the *sortitio*, but those failing to secure a place among the 150,000 would remain permanently excluded, for there was no reason why any citizen should have more than his one chance. Vacancies in the list of recipients, caused by death or removal, were to be annually filled up by means of a *subsortitio*, applied solely to persons who had not been enumerated at all, *ex iis qui recensenti non essent*. At first sight it might seem difficult to find such persons, and the difficulty, as I have shown, is fatal to Prof. Elmore's system, but Prof. Reid declares them to have been those who had either become adult, or had domiciled themselves in Rome during the current year. These persons, like the original tenants in the *insulae*, we must suppose to have been presented to the praetor who managed the *subsortitio* through a *professio* made by the *domini insularum*, but somewhat arbitrarily we are forbidden to regard them as *recensi*. Presumably too the principle of one chance only would be applied to these annual applicants for a place on the list. The various hypotheses involved in this explanation not only, it is contended, bring the statement of Suetonius into intelligible relation to the Table, but get rid of three great stumbling-blocks, the penalisation of the *professi* by exclusion from the *frumentationes*, the mention of *pupilli* and *pupillae*, who are seen to be, not would-be corn recipients, but owners of *insulae*, and the necessity, involved in some other explanations¹, of supposing something like 170,000 names to have been posted up in the forum.

That this explanation is a great improvement on Prof. Elmore's, with which however it has more than one point in common, I do not deny. But it is not only, as its author admits, unsupported by evidence, but, while introducing fresh difficulties of its own, is not consistent with a satisfactory interpretation of Suetonius. According to this theory, Caesar's reform, resulting in the restricted list of 150,000 recipients of corn, consisted of

¹ This difficulty is inherent in Prof. Elmore's view, but not, as Prof. Reid seems to assume, in mine. This will appear below.

three stages: (1) the preliminary disqualification of all owners of house property and all occupiers of separate houses, (2) the enumeration (*recensus*) with the help of the *domini* of all citizens domiciled in Rome and living in *insulae*, and (3) the application of a *sortitio* to these *recensi*, involving the permanent exclusion of all save the prearranged number of 150,000 on whom the lot fell. Now this view obviously depends on the assumption that the *recensus* was pure enumeration, with no element of selection, and therefore not what Dio calls it, an ἐξέτασις, and further, that both the *recensus* and the *recensi* dropped out of all relation to the *frumentationes* when once the supposed *sortitio* had taken place.

But why should a *recensus* any more than a *census* signify a mere counting of heads? Why should it not connote a process first of reaching a total by means of enumeration, and then of reducing it by some selective method to a smaller total? Surely Prof. Reid cuts the ground from under his own feet by first declaring that there is no difference between *recensus* and *recensio*, and then admitting that the latter can be used to describe the censorial register. In every passage where the word *recensus* is used (Suet. *Iul.* 41; *Aug.* 42; Liv. epit. 115)¹ it is not only in connexion with the corn distributions, but is closely associated, if not identified, with the reduction in the number of recipients. That the *recensus* and the reduction were not only parts of the same scheme, but involved one another, seems to me certain from the first sentence quoted above from Suetonius. Again, if Caesar adopted the method of selective exclusion in the case of the owners of *domus* and *insulae* (and Prof. Reid says that he did) is it not reasonable to assume that he would have adopted some analogous method with the 320,000, found by the *recensus* to be present recipients? Or are we to assume that the differences between comfortable and straitened means within that number were so slight as to be negligible? But, if we are justified in giving this wider scope to the *recensus*, and in regarding it as really an ἐξέτασις, and not a mere enumeration, then it would seem far more natural to understand by the term *recensi* not the first list gained by counting, but the reduced list

¹ I have discussed the passages fully in the *Classical Quarterly*.

of 150,000 persons, which after all was the final cause of the whole process.

Nor is there any validity in the inference from the use of the term *subsortitio* that there must have been a previous *sortitio*. The word simply means the appointment of substitutes by lot, and is therefore exactly appropriate, where it is not the creation of a list *de novo* that is in question, but the filling up of gaps in a list already existing, however that list was originally formed. I may add that the attempt to link up the *subsortitio* with a preceding *sortitio* is peculiarly unfortunate on Prof. Reid's theory, because the two processes are applied to essentially different categories, the persons submitted to the *sortitio* being absolutely ineligible for the *subsortitio*.

Once more, if the *recensus* was over and done with as soon as the total of 320,000 *recensi* was arrived at, how was it that Caesar foresaw in future years the possibility of disorderly assemblies *recensionis causa*? This phrase, which Prof. Reid only notices in remarking that *recensus* and *recensio* are identical, is really fatal to his theory. It proves that the *recensus* was not a process which took place once and once only, since the *subsortitio* is represented as a contrivance for making the *recensio* in future years more orderly. The passage also proves that those *qui recensi non essent* were eager to become *recensi*, and if so, the *recensi* must have been something more than a mere enumerated total; they must have been a select class with privileges attached to it.

I may notice here that Prof. Reid never makes it clear whether in his view the 320,000 persons of Suetonius represent the total of all burgesses domiciled in Rome (i.e. for him, the total of potential recipients) or merely the total of those dwelling in the *insulae* (a total practically co-extensive with actual recipients). If the former, his *recensi*, to whom the supposed *sortitio* was applied, would be appreciably less than 320,000. If the latter, there would have been no need to disqualify the *domini insularum* etc., since they were already outside the total which Suetonius declares to have been that of recipients up to the time of the *recensus*.

But apart from what seems to me the misinterpretation of

recensus, *recensi*, *recensionis causa* and *subsortitio*, let us see whether the identification of the *professi* with the *domini insularum* makes the first section of the Table easier to understand. The names of the *professi* as well as the contents of their declarations (*ea quae professus erit*) are not only to be preserved in the public archives, but also posted up legibly in the forum at the place where corn is distributed. We know that in the fourth century A.D. there were in Rome over 44,000 *insulae*, but it is obvious that no safe inference can be drawn from this as to the number of *domini insularum* in Caesar's time. Indeed, though we may have some misgivings, there is little to be said for or against Prof. Reid's contention that their number was sufficiently small for the list to be manageable and of practical utility. But a much greater difficulty lies in the fact that along with the names of the *domini insularum* (if these were the *professi*) there had to be published the contents of their returns, *ea quae professus erit*. This would mean, if Prof. Reid's view of the *recensus* is correct, that each *dominus* would have to return at least the names, if no other details, of all the eligible tenants in his *insula* or *insulae*, so that even if the number of *domini* was manageable, the list would have to include the names of 320,000 tenants. Prof. Reid admits that the magistrate would be obliged to have these names for the purpose of the *sortitio*, and of course the complete list might well be placed in the *tabularium*. But how could they be contained on a notice-board in the forum so as to be legible to the public? To meet this, Prof. Reid, disregarding the provision of the Table that the lists in the archives and in the forum were to be duplicates, suggests that the latter was a mere summary, containing the names of the *domini*, and under each the number of those returned by him in this or that *insula*. Even if we were justified in taking such a liberty of interpretation, it is difficult to see how such information would interest the public, for whom the notice was clearly intended. What the people would be anxious to know was not how many tenants each *dominus* had, but whether their own names were duly submitted to the *sortitio*. Nor is the clause excluding the *professi* from the *frumentationes* more but less intelligible on this hypothesis. For not only does it assume that the *domini insularum*

as well as occupants of separate houses have already been specifically disqualified, but, even if they had not been, the nature of the *professio* made by the former so clearly put them outside the ranks of the *recensi*, who alone were entitled to the *sortitio*, that this additional safeguard, as Prof. Reid calls it, would be quite unnecessary.

With regard to the stumbling-block caused by the mention among the *professi* of *pupilli* and *pupillae*, Prof. Reid surmounts it neither more nor less successfully than Prof. Elmore. If these minors were not applicants for the *frumentationes*, but either owners of tenement houses registering their tenants, or owners of property making an annual return of it, it is of course natural that their names and statements should be lodged in the *tabularium*, but why, if as minors they were ineligible for the corn distributions, should they appear in the forum list, and share in a prohibition, which in their case was *ex hypothesi* superfluous?

In dealing with the *subsortitio*, Prof. Reid has his own explanation of the statement of Suetonius that it was applied each year to those *qui recensenti non essent*. The *recensi*, i.e. those enumerated in the *recensus*, had all had their chance in the *sortitio*, and all but 150,000 had lost it, and lost it permanently. However many vacancies occurred in the privileged list, they were hopelessly left out in the cold. This is what Prof. Reid regards as a system involving the least possible break with the older régime, in which all citizens had been on an equality. But each year saw minors becoming adult, and fresh citizens domiciled in Rome from outside, and these were the *non recensenti* to whom the *subsortitio* was applied. If Prof. Reid thinks that such an arrangement would have prevented the disorderly assemblies which, according to Suetonius, Caesar hoped to prevent by the *subsortitio*, I cannot agree with him. Would the older citizens, many of whom had shared in the corn doles for years, and perhaps needed them no less than those favoured by the lot, be content quietly to stand aside and see the coveted vacancies filled by these youths and interlopers, or can we ascribe to Caesar an arrangement so inequitable and so provocative?

Prof. Reid finds in Suetonius a clear implication that the persons admitted to the *subsortitio* were few in number. I fail

myself to discover this implication. But, if, as I believe, the *recensus* was the whole process by which the list of 150,000, the *recensi*, came into existence, not by lot, but by some sifting and ἐξέτασις, it is not necessary to suppose that all the excluded, *qui recensi non essent*, perhaps something like 170,000 in number, were allowed to register themselves as candidates for the *subsortitio*. The *recensus* would have revealed, and perhaps classified, degrees of poverty, and the same selective method, which had marked out the 150,000, would also decide each year, taking account of the number of vacancies, how many and who might properly make the *professio* as candidates for the *subsortitio*. That the number of *professi* was somehow limited, is shown by the phrase in line 1—*quem profiteri oportebit*. As probably most of those whose names appeared in the forum had received corn in the past, and all had equal hopes of a lucky draw, there might be a risk that careless magistrates might anticipate the *subsortitio*, and it was to meet this risk that the prohibiting clause was inserted. On the whole, it seems to me that this new hypothesis, though in some respects preferable to that of Prof. Elmore, is not in harmony with the evidence, and creates more difficulties than it solves.

The questions involved in the second section of the Table in connexion with certain aedilician duties it is not necessary to re-open, as I find myself in substantial agreement with all that Prof. Reid says. He does not indeed accept the very slight positive indications of Caesarian date, but he admits, I think, that no period was more appropriate to such regulations.

It is when we come to the three divisions of the third section, dealing (*a*) with qualifications and disqualifications for municipal office, (*b*) with the municipal *census* in Italy, and (*c*) with instructions to commissioners sent to *municipia fundana*, that Prof. Reid finds my position unacceptable,

SECTION III (*a*).

I confess that I find it hard to discover any positive conclusion at all, or the solution of any difficulty in Prof. Reid's treatment of this division of the Table. He starts with the assumption that in this, as in the following sub-section, we are

dealing with "extracts from laws or contemplated laws dealing with municipal affairs in Italy," but declines to regard the two sets of provisions as belonging to the same law, or to accept for either any indication of date except the reference to the Sullan murder agents, which points for sub-section (a) to a date later than 64 B.C. He is however clearly averse to the Caesarian date, especially for sub-section (b), and therefore, we must assume, would place both the original laws between 64 or 62 B.C. and the opening of the civil war¹. I must point out at once, though I may have to return to it, a noticeable inconsistency in Prof. Reid's position as to the treatment of Italian municipalities after the Social war. On the one hand, he is explicit in holding that no general obligatory law was ever passed interfering with the internal affairs of the Italian cities which accepted the *lex Iulia*, while he reiterates his assertion that it was by spontaneous assimilation, and not by legislative compulsion, that municipal institutions were developed. On the other hand, it appears that, even before we come to the legislative activity of Caesar, there are extracts from at least two general obligatory laws² interfering very drastically with the internal arrangements of Italian towns, and enforcing their regulations with severe sanctions. I do not know whether it is a consciousness of this contradiction that presently induces Prof. Reid to withdraw his assumption, at least as far as sub-section (a) is concerned, that it is an extract from an actual law³. "The category of circumstances, presented in the *Tabula*, which shut out men from municipal honours, bears in its front no sign of having been extracted from a statute, but rather the opposite" (p. 235). What leads to this conclusion is the unexampled slovenliness of the document, which points to

¹ It is inferred that sub-section (a) is later than 64 because it was in that year that Sulla's exemption of his agents from the charge of murder was ignored by Caesar (Suet. *Iul.* 11). With regard to the census regulations, it is inferred from *pro Arch.* 11 that they were probably later than 62.

² That they were both general laws in the sense of binding all Italian com-

munities, is sufficiently obvious. As both sub-sections are "extracts," there is a presumption that both laws contained other compulsory provisions.

³ The hypothesis of a contemplated law seems unjustifiable, unless it can be suggested how an extract from an abortive law found its way on to a bronze at Heraclea.

the production of an amateur, not of an expert legislator. This slovenliness is illustrated in several ways. (a) By surplusage of expression, of which however only three doubtful instances are given. In l. 132 we have *comitiis conciliove*; in l. 98 *comitiis* alone. Prof. Reid cannot explain *concilio*, therefore it is otiose. In l. 107 we have *neque dicere neve ferre sententiam*, and he gives reasons, perhaps good ones, against the usual distinction drawn between these phrases. In l. 122 we have in connexion with rewards received by Sulla's agents *qui cepit ceperit*, and it is argued, with no point that I can see, that, as provision against the repetition of such an act would be futile, the engraver must have inadvertently, through familiarity with the collocation of the two tenses, inserted the word *ceperit*¹. (b) Clauses seem occasionally to be omitted. Only a single instance however in this sub-section is given, though another is suggested in the census regulations after l. 156. Very much the same matter is dealt with in ll. 98—107 and 126—134, and yet the sanction, which concludes the former provisions, is absent in the latter. Surely such points, even if there were more of them, are negligible as arguments to show that we are not dealing with "a certified copy from an original source." (c) A good deal more puzzling is the fact that, while in ll. 83—88 and 108—125, the restrictions and prohibitions apply to *municipia*, *coloniae*, *praefecturae*, *fora* and *conciliabula*, the intervening lines 89—107 omit the two last classes, so that, as the document stands, there was no reason why a *praeco* should not be a *decurio* in a *forum* or *conciliabulum*².

¹ I do not understand why so much importance is attached to this point, or why I am so pointedly reproved for expressing a confident opinion which unfortunately differs from his own. At any rate, his reasons for rejecting *ceperit* seem wholly irrelevant. "It is difficult to believe that any legislation would be directed against a repetition of the horrors consequent upon the Sullan edict"; and "to enact a penalty in anticipation of such an event would be obviously futile" (p. 233). But the object of the legislation on the Table

was not to prevent the repetition of any of the moral or legal delinquencies enumerated, nor to enact penalties for them. It simply declared that persons who had done certain things, or should do them in future, were ineligible for municipal senates. If *ceperit* were omitted, the receivers of blood money in future proscriptions would not be affected, and as proscriptions were admittedly in the air, no legislator, least of all Caesar, would have neglected the eventuality.

² Prof. Reid regards this as a *re-*

I will only say with regard to this somewhat striking inconsistency that, if it is due to slovenliness, the fault is more likely to have lain with the engraver than with an amateur draftsman, while, if the variation is intentional, however the reason for it may elude us, it points to more method about the composition of the document than Prof. Reid allows for. (d) But what he lays most stress upon is "the chaotic character of the disqualifications in lines 108—125." It is impossible to believe them drawn up by a Roman legislator, or passed into law by the *comitia*, since "as they appear on the *Tabula*, they bear the guise of a collection of notes jotted down as the framer chanced to think of them, or had come across them in study or experience." I think that any one who takes the trouble to refer to the list, will agree with me that the absence of order is much exaggerated. No doubt we should have expected to find condemnation in criminal courts placed along with the other cases of conviction at the beginning of the list, while taking the gladiatorial oath is curiously sandwiched in between disqualifications of quite another character. But with these exceptions, there is a certain method and order, and even if there had been less, the person responsible for the document was more likely to have been carelessly citing or copying an original than inserting his own random notes in what at least purported to be a legal provision. This last point is proved by the opening words of the clause immediately following the list of disqualifications: *Quod hac lege in municipio colonia praefectura foro conciliabulo senatorem...esse...non licebit* etc. (l. 126).

But it is not only the chaotic classification of the disqualifications that Prof. Reid depends on. He argues, if I understand him rightly, that legal disqualifications to office were in themselves contrary to Roman usage. According to that usage, the admission or rejection of candidates at elections was a matter

ductio ad absurdum, but may it not suggest a possible clue to the difficulty? The restrictions on *adlectio* (ll. 83—88) and the disqualifications on moral grounds (ll. 108—125) apply to all communities, large and small. But the restrictions as to age and occupa-

tion are tacitly left more elastic in the smaller places, where a narrower circle would be available for municipal office. This would be somewhat analogous to the exceptional eligibility of freedmen in the *colonia Iulia Genetiva*.

not of law but of custom, being left to the discretion of the presiding magistrate, who might, if he thought fit, ask the advice of the senate. This is of course true, and if the clauses in question had purported to affect Rome, the objection would have been to the point. But what was left to magisterial, and especially censorial, discretion at Rome might well be reinforced by legal sanctions in Italian towns, where there were no censors, and where the magistrates had no authority comparable with that of the holders of *imperium* in the capital¹.

But even where Prof. Reid, contrary, I think, to his real view, speaks of this sub-section as if it were an extract from an actual law, he still maintains that there is no indication of date, and that the only reason for assigning it to Caesar's time is the fact that other provisions on the Table may reasonably be referred to that period. This brings us to Cicero's letter to Lepta (*ad fam.* 6. 18), written at the beginning of 45 B.C., which I have argued, as against Legras, to be conclusively in favour not only of Caesarian date, but of Caesarian authorship. Prof. Reid sweeps away the inference, which so many scholars have held and hold to be irresistible, with an off-hand and arbitrary pronouncement that though there is evidence in the letter that Caesar drafted a law bearing on qualifications for local senates, and some presumption that such a law was passed, "it affords no proof whatever that this portion of the *Tabula* was extracted

¹ Another argument used by Prof. Reid illustrates the danger of quoting from memory. He declares (p. 233) that a clause in the *lex Malacitana* (c. 54) provides that disqualifications are to be as at Rome, no special enactment being mentioned. This last point, it is argued, would be inconceivable, if a law so important as a *lex Iulia* had been in existence, specifying the disqualifications. In the first place, the *lex Iulia municipalis* did not affect Rome at all, and therefore on Prof. Reid's citation of the passage, we should not expect it to be mentioned. But, as a matter of fact, the clause in the *lex Malac.* says nothing about

Rome, but declares candidates to be ineligible, in whose case there is any impediment *propter quam, si civis Romanus esset, in numero decurionum conscriptorumve esse non liceret*. This certainly points to a general and compulsory rule being in force in Domitian's time with regard to the senates of burgess communities in Italy or the provinces. This need not of course have been the *lex Iulia municipalis*, which under the imperial system had probably long since become obsolete, but the disqualifications alluded to may for all that have owed their origin to that law.

from the law." The disability of *praecones* was of long standing, as proved by the regulations made by Claudius Pulcher for Halesa in 95 B.C. (*in Verr.* 2. 49. 122).

Cicero's words prove nothing except that Caesar's projected law was to make no change in this respect. But is Prof. Reid sure that the disability, as stated on the Table, i.e. limited to those actually carrying on the trade of a *praeco*, was of long standing? He may have grounds for his statement which he does not produce, but the words *de quaestu quem qui fecisset ne legeretur*, show that at Halesa at any rate the disability was not so limited. When therefore Prof. Reid talks of Caesar's projected law making no change, he is begging the whole question, viz. the identity or non-identity of the provision on the Table with Caesar's provision, for he assumes that the provision on the Table was earlier than Caesar, and that he merely repeated it in his law. It is obvious that he can only escape from this dilemma by proving that this carefully defined disability was older than Caesar. On his view, Seleucus, a *praeco* or *ex-praeco*, must have known of the existing regulation, that *praecones* were ineligible only till they relinquished the trade, but feared that the new law might make the disability more stringent. In view of Caesar's well-known policy with regard to admission to the Roman senate this seems improbable. If Caesar contemplated changes, all would expect not greater stringency but greater liberality. Seleucus, it seems to me, must have heard rumours that the old disability was to be modified, and it was his anxiety to get first-hand evidence on the point which led up to Cicero's letter to Lepta. If we take into account all the indications available, the balance inclines to the view that Caesar's provision, as reported by Balbus to Cicero, was a change and a concession, and not, as Prof. Reid thinks, the retention of an old rule. If so, the coincidence, so often insisted upon, between the information given by Balbus and line 94 of the Table is far too striking to be other than conclusive.

But there is more to be said. If the provision on the Table was in existence before Caesar's dictatorship, why should he have legislated on the subject, and if he did pass a law about the qualifications of *decuriones in municipiis*, what title was more

appropriate to such a law than *lex Iulia municipalis*? Prof. Reid can only answer these questions by putting forward an hypothesis for which there is no solid basis whatever. There is nothing to show, he declares, that the projected law of Caesar was of a general character, i.e. like the clauses on the Table, applicable to all Italian towns. Even from this I fear I must dissent, for the antithesis between *in senatum Romae legerentur* and *in municipiis decuriones esse* surely marks the latter as a generic phrase. But, it is urged, Seleucus is a Greek name, and we know from Strabo that 500 distinguished Greeks received the nominal citizenship of Novum Comum in 59 B.C. Therefore Seleucus probably belonged to Novum Comum, and Caesar's projected law may have been one of a series of special enactments for Cisalpine Gaul, such as the *lex Rubria* and the *Fragmentum Atestinum*. The only thing to be said for this hypothesis is that, if accepted, it would get Prof. Reid out of a difficulty. I will merely point out, (1) that the distinguished Greeks, who had received the citizenship of Novum Comum 14 years before, were non-resident, and would therefore have no interest in these disqualifications; (2) that, if Seleucus was a *praeco*, he could not have been one of the distinguished Greeks specially honoured by Caesar in 59; and (3) that there is no evidence whatever for a series of special laws for Cisalpine Gaul in addition to the *lex Rubria*, the *Fragmentum Atestinum* being almost certainly part of the latter law¹; (4) that, if qualifications and disqualifications for office were not likely to be defined by legislation in Italian towns, there seems no reason why the case should have been different in the towns of Cisalpine Gaul.

As the result of the foregoing considerations, I cannot accept Prof. Reid's two main conclusions with regard to this sub-section; (1) that in all probability it is not an extract from any law actually passed; and (2) that, even if such a law was passed, there is no indication, either in the letter of Cicero or elsewhere, that it was passed by Caesar, or in the Caesarian period.

¹ On this point I may be allowed to refer to my article on the *lex Rubria* in the English Historical Review, July, 1916, pp. 377-8. On the hypothesis that

the last paragraph of the Table refers to *municipia fundana* in Cisalpine Gaul only, see below.

SECTION III (b).

This sub-section, which provides for a census of Roman citizens in all *municipia*, *coloniae* and *praefecturae* of Italy, whenever a census is held in Rome, need not detain us long. Prof. Reid regards it as an extract from a law or contemplated law, but not from the same law as that which contained the previous sub-section, and he insists that there is no point of connexion or coherence between these two parts of the Table. I do not see that this consideration has any weight, for, though I assume both chapters to belong to the same law, I do not suppose them to be consecutive chapters, and therefore we need not look for more logical connexion between them than between any other two parts of the Table.

I had ventured to lay down three points about the census scheme of the Table, (1) that its object was to secure the simultaneous census of all Italy, (2) that the amount of labour, combination and organisation involved in it would have been such that few statesmen besides Caesar would have faced it, and (3) that even Caesar stopped short at Italy, and shrank from the task of co-ordinating in one vast simultaneous census all the Roman citizens domiciled in colonies, *municipia* and Latin communities throughout the empire. Prof. Reid does not like any of these suggestions. (1) The object was not a simultaneous census, for "that was already provided by the system which required all burgesses to be registered at Rome. Its purpose was rather decentralisation" and is comparable with the plan of Augustus for allowing the Italian colonies to send their votes to Rome at elections instead of attending the *comitia*. I agree with all this except the statement that a simultaneous census was already provided for. It was probably just because the *frequentia Italiae*, carried out for the last time in 70, had proved impracticable that decentralisation by means of a simultaneous census was resorted to. (2) It is argued that the simultaneous census, even if it had extended to the provinces, would have been far less complex than the republican practice and that it is therefore not necessary to postulate as its author a statesman of Caesar's calibre. I reply that it was the differ-

ence between a cumbrous, unworkable method with no system, no guarantee of complete registration, and no adequate organisation, and a systematic and thorough handling of the problem which, though involving innumerable officials and immense labour, was calculated to achieve its object. To what statesman after 62 B.C. other than Caesar would Prof. Reid attribute so wide reaching a measure, and if it was Caesar's law, was any date so probable as during the dictatorship¹? (3) But "it is strange that Caesar, if he was the author of the scheme, should have confined it to Italy. He was the first Roman leader who carried out on a large scale the policy of multiplying Roman communities abroad, and for these decentralisation was more important than for Italian cities." Undoubtedly the scheme on the Table took no account of Roman citizens domiciled in urban communities outside Italy, and would therefore not produce an exhaustive census. But neither would it have produced an exhaustive census, if it had belonged to the period between 62 and 49 B.C., for not only would one or two Spanish colonies and Narbo in Gaul have been omitted, but the important burgess colonies in Cisalpine Gaul, and the ever increasing number of Roman citizens domiciled in the Latin towns of the Transpadane country. As for the far more numerous Roman colonies, Latin colonies and *municipia civium Romanorum* in Caesar's time, there may have been several reasons why he did not include them in his simultaneous census. Not the least would be, as I suggested, the greatly increased labour and organisation required, if the returns from Gaul, Spain, Africa and even remote colonies in the East had to reach the censor at or about some fixed date. No doubt decentralisation would be essential, but its method might vary from that adopted within Italy. It would be more natural for the governor of each province to be made responsible for the census being carried out, and ultimately to forward the returns received by him and his staff to Rome. It

¹ The theory of the careless engraver is surely pushed to its extreme limit, when the significant phrase *censor aliusve quis magistratus* is eluded by the suggestion that it is "a mere

mechanical and inaccurate imitation" of the same phrase used in the second section of the Table. I merely note the suggestion which, as an argument, can convince no one.

would be easier in this way to make allowances for differences in distance and means of communication. If Prof. Reid thinks that the regulations on the Table could have been supplemented by the addition of a few words so as to make them applicable to the provinces, I fancy that an attempt to draft such a supplement would convince him of his mistake. As a matter of fact, Caesar's scheme for extra-Italian colonisation was perhaps only in its infancy in 45 B.C., and he may well have intended to wait for its further development before making the simultaneous census universal and imperial instead of Italian.

SECTION III (c).

The last sub-section, evidently forming the conclusion of the Table, contains a provision that commissioners, who have been empowered to frame *leges datae* for *municipia fundana*, may within a year after the passing of the law make additions, changes and corrections in their charters. Prof. Reid considers this, as I do, to be the most important portion of the Table, but he apparently only means by this that it raises the most important and perplexing questions. To the clause itself no importance whatever seems to be assigned, and no explanation of its object is suggested.

The first of these questions is concerned with the meaning of the term *municipia fundana*, but though the discussion raises some interesting points, it throws little light upon the clause in the Table, because it is contended that the term, as employed in it, has some special and exceptional meaning which no attempt is made to determine. Apart from this special sense, whatever it may be, and as applied to Italian towns, the term would seem to denote either towns which had accepted or become *fundi* to the *lex Iulia de civitate*, or towns which had accepted the whole of the Roman *ius civile*. I prefer the latter interpretation, though the former would not upset my conclusions as to the document as a whole. Prof. Reid apparently at one time took the same view himself, for he says in the Municipalities of the Roman Empire (p. 113) that a *municipium fundanum* was "a town not originally Roman, which had accepted the Roman franchise and a Roman form of law." He has now however

come to the conclusion, contrary to what he admits to be the almost universal belief, that Italian towns, on accepting the *lex Iulia* and becoming communities of Roman citizens, did not commit themselves to the necessity of substituting Roman law for "the law by which they had been previously governed," and that more probably the acceptance of the *lex Iulia* left their internal codes untouched. A couple of quotations will make his conception sufficiently clear. "To me the idea that a great number of communities first had their laws made identical with those of the Romans, and then that the function of the *lex data* was to introduce differences, such as certainly existed at a later date, seems unnatural" (p. 239). Again, in remarking on my suggestion that probably there was not much activity in sending out commissioners earlier than 59 B.C., he asks what was the position of the towns up to that date. "Were they tightly bound to Roman law for the thirty years between 89 and 59 B.C., and then did the commissioners introduce relaxation? Did laws passed at Rome during those thirty years become automatically part of the local code, or was it still needful for the communities to give express assent to them? Did the acceptance of the *lex Iulia* put an end to the freedom of legislation within the local communities?" (p. 240). I venture to think that all the difficulties and anomalies which these passages conjure up are purely imaginary, and are wholly due to the confusion between 'Roman law' and 'Roman laws,' and to the loose use of the term 'codes.'

When I say that Italian towns, on accepting the franchise, became *fundi* to Roman law, I mean that, as communities of Roman citizens, they naturally and *ipso facto* adopted the whole body of the Roman *ius civile*, and became subject in the last resort to the praetor's supreme jurisdiction. In the sense that there could be no option about this adoption of Roman law by Romans, the change was compulsory, but the *innumerabiles de civili iure leges* already voluntarily adopted, and the manifest advantages of the adoption both to individuals and communities¹,

¹ A few Greek cities might prefer the *libertatem foederis* (a phrase surely implying the alternative of compul-

sion), but there is no other indication of reluctance to accept either the franchise or Roman law. The point of

would make the obligatory aspect fade out of sight. The towns then were, if Prof. Reid likes the phrase, tightly bound to Roman law (not from any yearning for uniformity, but from the inherent conception of a common citizenship) and the commissioners with their *leges datae* introduced no differences, and made no relaxation in this respect. The *leges datae* were not municipal codes of law, but municipal charters, regulating the political constitution and preserving or creating a miscellaneous collection of local administrative bye-laws, in which, while there was probably general uniformity, there was room for many differences of detail. The position of a town therefore before a commissioner was sent to it was one in which, while subject of course to the *ius civile*, and to any new *leges de civili iure*, it was free to retain, if it chose, its existing ordinance, political and municipal. As for new laws, other than those *de civili iure*, potentially the *municipia fundana* would be bound by them, that is, as far as the scope of the law affected them, but I should doubt the propriety of saying that these laws became part of the municipal codes. Where laws affected national or imperial interests, *de nostra republica*, *de nostro imperio*, *de nostris bellis*, *de victoria*, *de salute*, there had never been, even before the enfranchisement, any option of accepting or rejecting them (*pro Balb.* 22)¹.

Though it did not appear to me to be open to any doubt that all burgess communities would be *ipso facto* subject to the Roman *ius civile*, I indicated four incidental proofs of it. Prof. Reid's treatment of these calls for some reply. (1) I cited Cicero's words (*pro Balb.* 21) *ipsa denique Iulia, qua lege civitas est sociis et Latinis data, qui fundi populi facti non essent, civitatem non habent*. He denies their relevancy on the ground that *fundi* has no wider application than to the *lex Iulia* itself. As a matter of fact, the words quoted are inconclusive apart from their context, and I now rest my position not on them so much as on their place in Cicero's whole argument in sects. 19

law at Arpinum diverging from Roman usage is surely one of the exceptions that prove the rule. Cato would never have mentioned it if it had not been exceptional.

freedom of legislation within each community," it appears from extant *leges datae* that whatever corresponded to legislation was in the hands of the *decuriones*, and that it still continued within the limits set by the charter.

¹ As for what Prof. Reid calls "the

to 22. It would be out of proportion to discuss here at length what for my present object is a minor point, but if my readers will look at a paper in the *Classical Review*, August, 1917, they will see that I do not shirk it. I will only note, as emerging from the argument, (a) that only federate states (*Latini et socii*), and not burgess communities, are spoken of as becoming *fundi* to Roman laws, the reason being surely that the latter were already subject to them. (b) The essence of the term *fundus fieri* is voluntary adoption, a point ignored by such expressions as "tightly bound to Roman law," and "having their laws made identical with those of the Romans." (c) The reluctance of Heraclea and Naples to accept the citizenship is unintelligible, if its acceptance "merely entitled the cities to the privileges of Roman citizens, and left their internal codes untouched" (p. 239).

(2) I declared that the whole meaning and object of the *lex Rubria* implies that the enfranchised towns of Gallia Cisalpina had adopted the Roman *ius civile*. Prof. Reid's question—if the complete Roman code had been accepted, why pass the *lex Rubria*?—makes me wonder what his conception of the *lex Rubria* can possibly be. My own is contained very fully in the *English Historical Review* of July 1916. If I am asked how the law indicates that the Transpadane cities, on becoming Roman, adopted the entire Roman code, I adduce the following points. (a) The directions for judicial procedure contained in it are applicable in all the communities of the enfranchised province. (b) The magistrates may set up a *iudicium* for *damnum infectum*, a process of Roman civil law, applying a formula from the praetor's *album*. (c) They may also conduct a *legitimum iudicium*, possible only between Roman citizens, for *certa pecunia credita*, an action notoriously peculiar to Roman law. (d) There is under specified conditions, e.g. if more than the sum of 15,000 sesterces is at stake, provision for a *revocatio Romae*. (e) This *revocatio Romae* is shown by the *Fragmentum Atestinum* to have been non-existent before the enfranchising *lex Roscia* of 49 B.C., which is obviously the dividing line between two different juristic systems. (f) The fact that such extreme steps as *ductio*, *missio in possessionem* and *proscriptio bonorum*

are reserved for the praetor, is inconsistent with the supposition that the towns retained their own internal codes. (g) It is provided in the *Fragmentum Atestinum* that certain cases of delict are to be tried in Rome, except where in cases involving less than 10,000 sesterces the defendant desires the case to be tried in the municipal court.

(3) I argued that many of the disqualifications for admission to municipal senates imply the validity of Roman law in Italian towns. Prof. Reid is not able to deny this, but he cryptically replies that this is not sufficient, since there should have been complete identity. I am quite at a loss to understand his point unless he means that nothing short of what logicians call induction by complete enumeration would justify the inference I have drawn.

(4) Apparently very much the same fallacy underlies his answer to my last instance. I cite the case of the Roman citizen at Salpensa, who is unable to manumit a slave, as the Latin citizen can, before the municipal *IIvir*, and has to go before the proconsul. I regard this as an indication that the Roman citizens lived under Roman law, while for the Latins there was their own municipal code. To object that this does not prove an identical form of manumission for all Roman colonies, and that even if it did, the proof relates to one process of law only, seems to me irrelevant.

Another proposition which Prof. Reid is very reluctant to accept is that the newly enfranchised towns of Italy, the *municipia fundana*, were compelled to receive *leges datae*, charters, or as he prefers to call them, municipal codes, at the hands of official commissioners. "I do not believe in the generally accepted notion that every Italian community, on agreeing to become Roman, received from Rome a legislator, who drew up for it a *lex data* or new municipal code" (p. 241). Three classes of Italian towns are distinguished, the colonies, the small units raised to full municipal honours and the old-established states which became parts of the Roman body politic. For the first two classes it is here admitted that *leges datae* were necessary. It is also admitted that, owing to special conditions, the newly enfranchised towns of Cisalpine Gaul, and the burgess and Latin

communities in the Western provinces, would also have commissioners and *leges datae*. These admissions certainly clear the ground, and leave only the long-established states in Italy. For these, he declares, apparently quite unconscious that he is begging the question, there was no need for commissioners or *leges datae*, because their machinery was long-established. At the same time he guards himself against awkward instances by suggesting that in the event of internal dissensions, they might voluntarily call in an arbitrator to play the part, it might be, of an official commissioner¹.

Presumably Prof. Reid would include under this class the cities which accepted the franchise under the *lex Iulia*, but there was surely a great difference between their case and that of states like Arpinum which had one by one become *municipia civium Romanorum*. The latter were comparatively few, entered the Roman body politic at different times, and, if they had not all passed through the intermediate stage of imperfect *municipia*, had probably more or less thoroughly already assimilated Roman forms. In these circumstances and at that period, the absence of system, in which Prof. Reid sees so much merit, may have been in place. But the *lex Iulia* marked a new epoch for Italy, and one that may well have called for greater uniformity. In the enfranchised communities the process of assimilation to Roman forms had reached very various stages; in some probably it had hardly begun at all. But the new conception of a *communis patria* and an *Italia tributim discripta* would call for something like a general acceptance of a *forma communis* in municipal government and administration. To bring this about, the system of *leges datae*, long since applied, as Prof. Reid admits, to important categories of towns, would seem the natural means. There is no need to assume that the system involved coercion or compulsion, since so much indulgence was shown to local anomalies and *consuetudo* that there was no motive for resistance, and there is no shred of evidence that the commissioners were

¹ In the case of Puteoli there was probably no official *lex data*, but, if he intends to apply his hypothesis of mere internal reform to Tarentum and

Heraclea, or even to Arpinum, he has nothing tangible to support him, and in the case of Tarentum positive evidence against him.

unwelcome. He himself suggests that Heraclea and Naples came in by a vote of the majority of citizens.

It is of course true that of particular and actual *leges datae* between Sulla and Caesar there is little evidence. I call attention however to three points which in one way or another he evades. (1) The phrase in what the Digest calls the *lex agraria* of Caesar *qui h. l. coloniam deduxerit municipium praefecturam forum conciliabulum constituerit*, whether the law was passed in 59 or not, points to *leges datae* being at least contemplated not only for colonies, but for the other communities enumerated as well. He gives no explanation of, and indeed ignores the point entirely. (2) The last paragraph of the Table implies that commissioners had been sent to draw up *leges datae* for *municipia fundana*. Prof. Reid, as we shall see below, escapes the natural inference by arbitrarily relegating the *municipia* to Cisalpine Gaul. (3) We have evidence of primary importance in the fragment of the Tarentine law. It is surely remarkable that in an article of 41 pages on the *lex Iulia municipalis* this document is only mentioned in two lines of a foot-note. The remark made on it is still more extraordinary: "The *lex Tarenti* is in Latin, but that is no cogent reason for supposing it to be a '*lex data*'." I think, if my readers will refer to l. 9, they will find in the words *in diebus XX proximeis...post h. l. datam* a sufficiently cogent reason for the supposition.

The question as to the object and necessity of a general municipal law I do not propose to reopen. Prof. Reid energetically restates Mommsen's latest view, but as he does not think it worth while to notice my arguments as against both Mommsen and Legras, I will leave my readers, if they will, to weigh them for themselves. Any hint of compulsion or system in Roman law or administration is anathema to Prof. Reid, and from his standpoint it seems surprising that the Romans should have bound either themselves or others by any laws at all. With regard to my suggestion that Cinna may have passed a general law to embody the *forma communis*, and to serve as a guide to commissioners, I admit that his criticism has deprived it of all reasonable support from the inscription of Poetelia. I still think however that the presence of *quattuorviri* at Larinum before

Sulla's dictatorship is significant, and I entirely disagree with the pronouncement that Cicero's virtual identification of the enfranchisement of Transpadane towns with their election of *IIIIviri* has little bearing on the matter. He declares it to be most improbable that enfranchised communities "were required to use particular titles for their magistracies." He has so keen a scent for compulsion that he finds it in words of mine which he has actually just quoted, and which were carefully framed to exclude the idea of compulsion; "defining the normal titles of magistrates, but no doubt leaving room for local varieties in certain cases." That the titles *IIviri* and *IIIIviri* were recognised by legislation as normal, it is futile to deny in the face of the *lex Tarenti*, the *lex Rubria* and the Table of Heraclea. In view of the discretionary varieties which I assume, it is not a very successful point to object that in creating praetors in the short-lived colony at Capua Cinna's friends overrode his law. Prof. Reid promises some further consideration of topics arising out of the Table. May we hope that he will include a fuller discussion of the chapters assigned in the *Corpus Gromaticorum* to a *lex Mamilia Roscia Peducaea Alliena Fabia*, and by a passage in the Digest to an agrarian law of Caesar? The problem of the five names I did not attempt to solve, but I suggested that, if the phrase *qui hac lege coloniam deduxerit, municipium praefecturam forum conciliabulum constituerit* really occurred in Caesar's agrarian law, that law must have contained provisions for the 'constitution' of Italian towns by means of commissioners and *leges datae*. He rejects this with much contempt, but makes no attempt whatever to explain the phrases in question, nor does he throw any light on the identity of the *lex Iulia* referred to in *cap.* 97 of the *lex Ursonensis*. It is certain that the three *caps.* preserved in the *Corp. Grom.* are extracted from some law dealing on general lines with matters appropriate to a *lex data*, and that it gives instructions to commissioners to see to these matters¹. Does he believe that it was a Caesarian law, and if

¹ It seems to me futile to argue that *cap.* 104 of the *lex Ursonensis* need not have been copied from the *lex Iulia*, because rules about bounda-

ries were of such long standing as to have become traditional. Why then were the rules embodied in a chapter of a general law, and when they were

so, what sort of law was it, and when passed? I cannot think that the views expressed on p. 247 as to the agrarian law of 59 are well considered. I do not go into the question whether there were two laws or only one, though I think the evidence is against the latter view, but in any case Cicero's conversational phrase *Campana lex* must either mean the provision in the law about the Campanian land, or, if it does mean a law limited to that land, we must suppose that Caesar's main and general law was the first, and that the second law, alone alluded to by Cicero, was for the immediate appropriation and division of the *ager Campanus*. The admission that Caesar's law contained a provision affecting the lands of Volaterrae and Arretium is at once fatal to the contention that the agrarian legislation of the year was limited to the *ager Campanus*. Is it conceivable that, after two such comprehensive schemes of land purchase and Italian colonisation as those of Rullus and Flavius, the former containing the design of Caesar himself, the programme of the coalition would have thrown overboard everything but the Campanian land? It would have been far more in keeping with the situation if the legislation was much wider in space, time and content than any previous measure.

It is unfortunate, considering the importance which he assigns to the concluding paragraph of the Table, that Prof. Reid's treatment of it should be the least convincing portion of his article. In the first place, unless his contention that commissioners were not sent to the enfranchised towns of Italy after the *lex Iulia* is to be given up, it is necessary to attach some limited application to *municipia fundana*, and above all, to exclude them from Italy. What this limited application may be, or why it is assumed for a term which is ἀπαξ λεγόμενον, we are not told; but what seems to him the most probable account of the law to which this provision belongs is that it was one of a series of special measures by which Caesar dealt with the peculiar conditions of Cisalpine Gaul. Now for this series of special measures there is no evidence whatever. The three principal reasons which, it is argued, called for special so embodied, how could they be made applicable to particular communities except by means of its *lex data*?

legislation as well as for the sending of commissioners with *leges datae* were (a) the fact that so many communities were newly enfranchised (a fact not calling in the case of Italy, according to Prof. Reid, for either general legislation or *leges datae*), (b) the large size of the Transpadane *territoria* requiring special delimitation (a matter which had probably been attended to by the *lex Pompeia*), and (c) the system of 'attributed' tribes within the territories of many communities. One piece of special legislation of course there was, the *lex Rubria*, but it had nothing to do with the size of *territoria*, and Prof. Reid goes out of his way to say that the *attributae regiones* were not regarded by it. Another piece of special legislation, gratuitously suggested for Cisalpine Gaul, is the projected law dealing with qualifications of *decuriones*. I have already dealt with this hypothesis, and I will only ask whether this provision would have a place in the *leges datae* of the Cisalpine *municipia fundana*. Prof. Reid could hardly deny that it would, and is therefore committed to the position that a general municipal provision is made applicable to individual towns by means of their *leges datae*, precisely the situation I argue for in Italy.

So far there is surely no reason worth serious consideration for referring this last paragraph of the Table to Cisalpine Gaul. But, as Prof. Reid points out, the commissioners alluded to are *functi officio*, and are called upon after an interval to resume their work. But, as there is no provision in the clause for replacing any commissioners who might have died during the interval, the space between the original *lex data* and its proposed revision must have been a very brief one. On this ground he rejects my suggestion that perhaps most of these commissioners had been sent out in 59 and the following years, and gets a much shorter interval by taking the enfranchisement of Cisalpine Gaul in 49 as the occasion. I do not myself think the difficulty of the longer interval very serious, but, as my reasons are not acceptable to Prof. Reid, I will not repeat them. I must point out however that his own theory is open to precisely the same difficulty, since commissioners appointed in 49 may have died before 45, and though such cases might be fewer, we should equally expect to find them provided against. If "it would

have been easy to provide by a few words for replacing the commissioners" who may have died, I do not see why the carelessness of the engraver should not be called to the rescue once more¹.

But surely if these commissioners had drawn up their *leges datae* after the enfranchisement of Cisalpine Gaul in March 49, there must have been some special reason why they were called upon to revise them four years later. What sort of additions, changes and corrections were to be made? To this question Prof. Reid has no answer; he can only admit that the omission of the purport of the ordinance is most extraordinary, as is also the contrast between its vagueness and the detail of the preceding clauses of the Table. If so much has to be admitted, I think it is pertinent to ask where is the importance attributed to this concluding paragraph. It seems in Prof. Reid's hands to throw no light on anything, least of all on the connexion of the Table with Heraclea.

We are told that the solution of this last point "unless further relevant ancient material should come to light,...must for ever elude the grasp of scholars" (p. 248). Nevertheless scholars will probably go on suggesting solutions, and Prof. Reid himself has been unable to resist the temptation of adding another hypothesis. I shall conclude this article by briefly comparing it with my own explanation which is declared to be 'most unacceptable.' Though the grounds of this disapproval are not stated, I imagine that it is mainly directed against the assumption, that commissioners were sent to the enfranchised towns of Italy, and were not confined to those regions outside Italy which, like Cisalpine Gaul and subsequently other provinces in the West, presented special and exceptional problems. My own theory is, that the last paragraph of the Table, so far from standing out of all relation, and even in strong contrast to, the

¹ Prof. Reid says that a few words would have been enough to provide for the replacing of a deceased commissioner by a substitute. If this is so, I suggest that the few words may have been inscribed in the law, but

omitted in the Table, not through the carelessness of the engraver, but because at Heraclea the original commissioner, being still alive, did not think it necessary to insert them.

other sections (being confined to Cisalpine Gaul, while they refer to Rome or Italy) is not only organically connected with the two sets of provisions immediately preceding it, but gives the clue to the whole document. I assume it to be the concluding clause of the same general municipal law to which the clauses on municipal honours and the Italian census belonged¹. It implies that commissioners had been authorised at certain unspecified dates in the past to frame *leges datae* for a number, unspecified again, of Italian towns, and they are now instructed to make within the next year certain changes and additions. I suggest that these would be primarily any innovations contained in the municipal law itself, such as the two inscribed on the Table, and perhaps others contained in the lost portion of it, but there might also be included other arrangements, which the commissioners in their discretion might deem it advisable to introduce.

Now assuming, what seems not improbable, that Heraclea received a *lex data* in the same period in which Tarentum received one, I suggest that, when Caesar's municipal law was passed, with the novelties as to qualifications for office and the census, which with perhaps other changes were to be inserted in municipal charters within the next year, the commissioner of Heraclea, whether the person originally appointed or some one to replace him, decided to give a public notification to the town of the changes and additions to be made in the local charter. He therefore caused to be engraved on the back of an obsolete bronze tablet the two provisions from the municipal law together with the clause on the authority of which he was acting, and quite possibly other provisions from the same law, now lost with the bronze containing the earlier part of the document. In addition to this, he may have thought it appropriate to the circumstances of Heraclea to incorporate certain parts of Caesar's recent legislation for Rome, especially

¹ In these clauses the towns, as already 'constituted,' are *municipia*, *praefecturae* etc. In the last clause, as communities for whom *leges datae* were prepared, they are generically

municipia fundana. Quite possibly there was a separate clause providing that the additions and changes should be made also in the *leges datae* of colonies.

the new system of *frumentationes* and the new regulations as to streets, traffic and open spaces.

I claim for this theory that it at least supplies a reasonable explanation of the facts. If the document is what I suggest, its heterogeneous character is accounted for, since we should not expect to find "linked together into an organic whole" a set of ordinances merely intended to amend or fill up gaps in an existing charter. At the same time, it does connect organically the concluding clause with the rest of the document, and in doing so, makes concrete and specific the "additions, changes and corrections" which it enjoins. When Prof. Reid declares that these changes "touch on affairs which would certainly have been left to the discretion of the municipalities," he strangely forgets that by his own admission the provisions as to municipal office and as to the Italian census were extracts, if not from actual, at least from contemplated laws, while there are several provisions in the brief fragment of the Tarentine law closely analogous to those on the aedilician duties¹.

Let us now turn to the explanation which Prof. Reid considers "far easier, though not free from difficulties." He agrees with me, it seems after all, in thinking that the document may have been a notification to the people of Heraclea of certain proposed reforms. But in his opinion it was a scheme of internal reform, and the person responsible for the Table was presumably either a party leader in Heraclea, or an arbitrator called in by the citizens; at any rate he was not a commissioner *lege plebeive scito permissus*. Though there is no evidence, and no analogy, except possibly at Putëoli, to support this hypothesis, it works smoothly enough, so long as we look only to the first two sections. But then Prof. Reid's difficulties begin, though he is apparently not conscious of them till he reaches the final clause. After remarking that the regulations at Rome in connexion with corn distributions and the policing of the streets

¹ As Prof. Reid, in spite of the words *post hanc legem datam* (was this too an addition of the engraver?), refuses to accept the Tarentine law as a *lex data*, I should be content to

cite the provision which it has in common with the *lex Ursonensis* and the *lex Malacitana*, on the dismantling of houses.

might well be voluntarily adopted by Heraclea, he declares that the same may be said of the rules for municipal office and membership in the senate. Yet there is this difference, which seems to be overlooked, that the latter rules, as published at Heraclea, purport to be part of a legal enactment, already binding upon Heraclea as a *municipium*. How can a measure, by which Heraclea was already bound, belong to a programme of internal reform subsequent to 46 B.C.¹ It will not help Prof. Reid much to call the provision an extract from a contemplated law, for how did such an extract from an abortive scheme of pre-Caesarian date reach the Heracleian reformer in 45 B.C.?² It hardly looks as if there was much feeling in Italian towns against compulsory legislation, when Heraclea, a more than usually non-Romanised town, is supposed to go out of its way to adopt coercive regulations abandoned by the central government.

As to the provision for a simultaneous Italian census, which Prof. Reid thinks may have been in the air at the time when the Table was engraved, he may take his choice of regarding the law as passed or only contemplated. If it was passed, we have the absurdity of supposing a compulsory administrative law, binding on all Italy, belonging to a programme of voluntary reform at Heraclea. If it was not passed, we have the still greater absurdity of a reformer making elaborate provision for his town to take part in a scheme, which was not only non-existent, but had been abandoned by its promoters³.

"The last paragraph about *municipia fundana* is the hardest to account for on the hypothesis of internal reform." It certainly needs some ingenuity to explain why, in a city which had never

¹ It must have been subsequent to 46, since clauses dealing with the reform of the *frumentationes* appear in the same notice.

² He has definitely rejected the Caesarian date for the provision, and must therefore place it, whether contemplated or passed, before that time.

³ I do not understand how the census scheme could have been in the

air in 45, unless Caesar was about, or was believed to be about, to propose it. But Prof. Reid definitely declines to regard the scheme as Caesar's, so that its contemplation and failure to pass must have been some appreciable time earlier than 45, when, we are told, it was in the air. It seems to me that this part of his hypotheses has been very imperfectly thought out.

had either a commissioner or a *lex data*, this vague and isolated extract from a law dealing with special conditions in Cisalpine Gaul should have been brought before the notice of the public, together with certain proposals of internal reform. Nothing is conveyed as to the matters originally dealt with by the *leges datae* to be revised, nor is there the slightest indication as to the nature of the revision. How hard put to it Prof. Reid finds himself, is shown by the following perplexing suggestion: "What interested the person who ordered the inscription to be engraved seems to have been the mere fact that certain towns were undergoing a fresh revision of their statutes after a very short interval, not the purpose of the fresh revision. This fact, even if, as I think, it concerned only Cisalpine Gaul, might have its use as an argument in a party conflict within the town, if a section of the citizens were urging changes of importance a little while after other changes of importance had been made." I am content to leave this net-work of hypotheses within hypotheses to speak for itself, only remarking that it deprives the clause, which Prof. Reid declares to be the most important, of all weight or meaning as part of the inscription, without throwing light on its meaning for Cisalpine Gaul. At any rate, in pronouncing Prof. Reid's solution of the enigma to be 'unacceptable,' I have felt it incumbent on me to examine it in detail, and I leave it to my readers to prefer his or mine, or to reject both.

E. G. HARDY.

THE CHANGE FROM THE ANCIENT TO THE MODERN GREEK ACCENT.

I. *The nature of the accent and the scope of inquiry.*

Most philologists and scholars are now in agreement with regard to the nature of the accent of ancient Greek, which was predominantly musical, denoting pitch or the rising and falling of tone. This can be seen in the versification, which seems to take no account of the accent, and in the vocalism, which in the literary language of the classical period shews no weakening or loss of vowels through the influence of accent; all this was summarised long ago by F. Blass in his *Über die Aussprache des Griechischen* and has been demonstrated more recently and in greater detail by H. Ehrlich in his useful work *Untersuchungen über die Natur der griechischen Betonung*. On the other hand Modern Greek has a kind of stress accent, though experimental phonetics has shewn that the musical element is not altogether absent, particularly in uneducated speakers (cf. H. Pernot, *Phonétique des Parlers de Chio*, p. 50 ff. in *Études de linguistique néo-hellénique*)¹. I have purposely said a 'kind of stress accent,' because it is not quite like the expiratory accent, with which we are familiar in English, German, and Italian. The accent, which has somewhat less force than that of Italian, is accompanied by a certain voice-duration, i.e. the accented vowels are uniformly 'half-long,' except when final. The problem of voice-duration will be treated below. The Modern Greek accent is accompanied by the phenomena which usually go with stress, among which we note the following:

(a) Loss of unaccented syllable:

¹ It varies also according to district. A Greek friend tells me that the Greek spoken in Corfu for instance sounds sing-song to Athenian ears.

i. After a liquid, when the same sound precedes: as *παρκαλῶ*, *σκόρδο*, *κορφή*, *περπατῶ* &c. Cf. the common pronunciation of English *every*, *several*.

ii. Initial vowels, especially *ι* and *ε*, and more rarely *ο* and *α*: as *γεία* or *γιά* (from *ὑγεία*); *μέρα* (from *ἡμέρα*); *πάγω* (from *ὑπάγω*); *ψηλός* (from *ὑψηλός*); *μάτι* (from *ὀμμάτι*); *βρίσκω* (from *εὔρίσκω*); *δόντι* (from *ὀδόντι*) &c. Aphaeresis is not, however, a fixed law of the language, since the unaccented initial vowel is retained in some words, as *Ἑλλάδα*, *ἰδέα* &c.

(b) Confusion of vowels: as *γιομίζω* for *γεμίζω*; *γιοφύρι* for *γεφύρι*; *κρεββάτι* for *κραββάτι(ον)*; *ξουράφι* for *ξυράφι(ον)* &c. We may compare the approximate identity of vowel-sound in the unaccented syllables of English: *harbour*, *doctor*, *bitter*, *altar*, *Arthur*.

(c) Unaccented *i* and *u* sometimes pronounced *ī* and *ū* respectively, as *μοιάζω* (pron. *myázo*); *γιός* (from *υῖός*); *λιοντάρι* from *λεοντάριον*; *παλιός* from *παλαιός* &c.

Of course, the pronunciation of Modern Greek varies according to locality; the vowel reduction is more complete in the north than in the south (see Thumb, *Handbook of Modern Greek*, p. 9). In connexion with the change of vowel-quantity the Latin transliteration of Greek words, like *sofía* for *σοφία*, *ídolum* for *εἶδωλον*, *blásfēmus* for *βλάσφημος*, *sélīnum* for *σέλινον* &c. is interesting, since it illustrates the pronunciation by a people, whose natural accent we know to have been expiratory. These words were borrowed probably after the Greek accent had begun to change its value; nevertheless by their likeness to Modern Greek pronunciation, they are useful as demonstrating the stress element in the latter—which some philologists perversely deny or think has yet to be proved! Two other words in Latin *talentum* and *Massilia* are seen by the vowel-weakening in the second syllable to have had the accent originally on the first; they must, therefore, have been borrowed early and while that accent was still natural to Roman ears.

All the Indo-European languages, as we know them, except Vedic Sanskrit and Ancient Greek, have a stress accent; but all alike shew evidence of having passed through a period, when the prevailing accent was musical. In Greek this change of

accent has taken place in historic times and it is a fascinating task to try and trace its origin and follow its extension over the whole Greek-speaking area. As all will admit, the change is of a most sweeping character and ought to supplement, or, at least, reflect historical conditions or events; for language is the most fundamental thing in civilisation and culture and its study ought increasingly to throw light on other subjects. We must, however, recognise from the beginning the difficulty of our investigation: we are dealing with a matter of pronunciation unaided by contemporary observations; we are dependent on written records, which are and must remain very incomplete and variable according to locality. Nevertheless, the position is not altogether desperate; for we do find many attempts at phonetic spelling on the Egyptian papyri, especially among the private documents and letters of the uneducated; we also find to a less extent the confusion and interchange of long and short vowels on inscriptions; and lastly we have verse inscriptions shewing 'false' quantities and later still, and of much less importance, a change in the principle of construction in artistic verse. Phonetic spelling might have gone far and yielded rich results in such an investigation as this but for the reactionary Atticists, who, unlike the advocates of a spelling reform at the present day, insisted on an obsolete and meaningless orthography, which still survives in Modern Greek.

As we shall see, when we consider the evidence in detail, the change of accent is found in the vulgar¹ earlier than in the educated speech, and, as the Greeks themselves conjectured, it began in the pronunciation of Greek by foreigners. If Glaucus of Samos is right, when he tells us that there were, as many as six different pitch accents in Greek, we can form some idea of the difficulty which it presented to foreigners, especially if, as usually happened, they were accustomed to a different kind of

¹ Some further investigation of the vulgar language in the chief dialects of antiquity (e.g. Attic and Ionic) is desirable; for it ought not only to elucidate some of the linguistic problems of Modern Greek but also to

throw a new light on Ancient Greek itself. Nachmanson's *Beiträge zur Kenntniss der altgriechischen Volkssprache* (*Humanistiska Vetenskaps-samfundet*, Bd 13, Hfte 4, 1910) is very incomplete and unsatisfactory.

accentuation; the difficulty must have been a good deal greater than that which the tonic accent of French presents to the average Englishman or German. Thumb (*Die griechische Sprache im Zeitalter des Hellenismus*, p. 143) had the idea that the change of Greek accentuation should be found to have its origin at a special place and at a particular time; but the examination of evidence and a consideration of the language-conditions on the borders of the Greek-speaking area of antiquity indicate that the peculiarity existed in several linguistically unconnected areas outside the mainland, until some unifying influence gave it a vogue and the impetus to spread, wherever Greek was spoken.

The dividing line in the history of the Greek language is the time of Alexander the Great, when the local dialects began definitely to give way to a common Greek speech or *κοινή*. The papyri and inscriptions, as we shall see, when we consider the evidence afforded by them for the change of accent, illustrate continuous tradition from the *κοινή* to Modern Greek. In reference to this Hatzidakis (*Revue des Études grecques*, 1903, p. 220) with perhaps a little exaggeration says "la langue communément parlée aujourd'hui dans les villes diffère moins de la langue commune de Polybe que cette dernière ne diffère de la langue d'Homère." The *κοινή*, of course, was not homogeneous any more than any other natural language. In addition to local variations there must have been a distinction between the vernacular and the literary speech. This has been summarised, so far as present research on the subject made it possible, by A. T. Robertson in his *Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the light of historical research*. To sum up the scope of our inquiry, we shall be concerned chiefly with the language between the time of Alexander the Great and the ii/A.D., when the new accent first began to appear in the speech of Greece proper; our chief interest will be with vernacular documents and with the unconventional spellings on inscriptions, which earlier editors grouped as 'mistakes' or emended. Having collected evidence for the change, we shall proceed to examine the causes.

II. *Evidence for the change.*

If we can trust the well-known fragment of the comic poet Amphis (No. 30 in Kock's *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta*, II. p. 245), in which he represents the fisher-folk as saying 'ττάρων βολῶν γένοιτ' ἄν and 'κτὼ βολῶν, the pronunciation with a stress accent accompanied by a tendency to drop the unaccented syllables began in vulgar speech in Attica as early as the iv/B.C. Though the poet is, no doubt, exaggerating in comic fashion, there must have been some evidence for such a form of speech. Moreover, it has support from the inscriptions on Attic vases, in some of which short vowels are lost, as ποίησν and ποίεσν for ἐποίησεν, and on the Panathenaic Prize Vase (Br. Mus. 569) τῶν Ἀθηνήθν ἄθλων εἰμί, where the final ν must represent η. The confusion of ει (= ē) and ε, and ευ and υ, as Ηείος for Ἔως, Μείμνων for Μέμνων, Νηρύς for Νηρεύς, Θησύς for Θεσεύς, is common on vases before it is found on stone inscriptions. (A convenient collection of vase inscriptions is Kretschmer's *Die griechischen Vaseninschriften*.) The confusion of long and short vowels in the Defixiones (*C. I. A. Appendix*) is well known; we find ε for ει in Χαρικλέδου 102 b, ἐκένος &c. 107; ο and ω in Σοκράτης 26. 2; ε and η in Ηρμῆν 91. 3. 5, κατήδησεν 46. 4, γίνησθαι 90 a. 6, and ε for η in αὐτέν 90 a. 3, δικατερίφ 94. 16, μέθ' (for μήθ') 94. 17. It is a little difficult to weigh the evidence which the Defixiones afford; some of them are very old, while others may shew a misunderstanding of the Euclidean alphabet or, again, an attempt at an archaistic spelling. We find, however, a definite trace of the vulgar speech in the assimilation of ε to a following accented ι in Ωφιλίων (for Ωφελίων) 71. 1, and Ωφιλίμη 71. 1, so that the vowel-confusion in some cases may also reflect popular pronunciation. Now the state inscriptions of Attica do not shew a frequent confusion of vowel quantity until the ii/A.D., from which we may conclude that a stress pronunciation was not recognised by the educated there until about that date. The language of the lower class people was due to a large foreign element and to the easy intercourse between these and the natives, which, as Pericles tells us, was the pride of Athens. In the v/B.C. the author of the pseudo-Xenophontine *Constitution of*

Athens, I. 12 notices this equality: ἰσηγορίαν καὶ τοῖς δούλοις πρὸς τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἐποιήσαμεν καὶ τοῖς μετοίκους πρὸς τοὺς ἀστούς; and at II. 8 he notices the variety of Athenian speech: οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες ἰδία μᾶλλον καὶ φωνῇ καὶ διαίτῃ καὶ σχήματι χρῶνται, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κεκραμένη ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων; and again at II. 8 he says φωνὴν πᾶσαν ἀκούοντες ἐξελέξαντο τοῦτο μὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ τῆς, which, of course, is not literally true, but records the impression of a contemporary superficial observer.

That the change began early in the Greek of Egypt is well known from the common confusion of long and short vowels on the papyri from the iii/B.C. From this date we find the interchange of ε and η¹ (e.g. Δεμήτριος (dated 260 B.C.), αὐθεμερόν (Herodian, I. 491 (papyrus dated 260 B.C.)), ἐκπεπεδηκότος (dated 246 B.C.), διὰ τὸ μὲ (= μή) ἔχειν (iii/B.C.); η for ε in νήον (dated 119 B.C.), δήοντα (162 B.C.), χρήος (116 B.C.), ἐνδηγῆς (255 B.C.), ἡαρινά (225 B.C.)), ο and ω (e.g. πόποτε (= πώποτε) in the iii/B.C., ἐπίδομεν (for ἐπιδόμεν) papyrus dated 153 B.C.); from the ii/B.C. αι and ε (e.g. ἐκτέτατε (for ἐκτέταται), αἰγών (for ἐγών)), οι and υ (e.g. ἀνύγω (for ἀνοίγω), ἀποστρύφν (for ἀποστρύφει)), οι and ι (as ἀσπερμοί for ἀσπερμί), and η and ι, thence also η for οι (as ἀφήκετο (for ἀφίκετο) (dated before 161 B.C.), ἔθικεν (for ἔθηκεν) (i/B.C.), ἦνον (for οἶνον)). From these examples it is seen that the interchange occurs quite irregularly in both accented and unaccented syllables. We should have expected *a priori* to find the long vowel in the accented and the short in the unaccented syllable; but the statistics, which Mayser (*Grammatik der griechischen Papyri*, pp. 140–141) has drawn up, lead us to the conclusion that the confusion is equally common in accented and unaccented syllables. This indicates a loss not only of quality of sound (we observe that a closer pronunciation of all vowels and diphthongs is at least well on the way to being universalised) but also of quantity, which mechanically corresponded with accent; the symbols lost their meaning and but for the conservatism which is inherent in language the Greeks of Egypt would have abolished the dual representation of the

¹ These two letters must then have been identical in *quality*. In modern Greek the ε-sound is open and η close.

same sounds and adopted a simple spelling. Another proof of a stress accent in Egyptian Greek is seen in the substitution of ϵ for unaccented α from the iii/B.C., ϵ for unaccented ι especially in the neighbourhood of ρ , and of ou for unaccented ω (o), as $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{o}\upsilon\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$ for $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\acute{o}\upsilon\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$, $\pi\iota\rho\acute{\iota}$ for $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ (on papyrus dated 117 B.C.), $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ for $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\acute{\iota}\delta\omega\varsigma$, $\omicron\ddot{\upsilon}\delta\epsilon$ for $\acute{\omicron}\delta\epsilon$ &c., which all indicate a weakening of the vowel-sound. It is further illustrated by the occasional loss of initial unaccented vowels, as $\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\delta\epsilon\lambda\phi\omicron\acute{\iota}$ for $\omicron\acute{\iota}$ $\acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon\lambda\phi\omicron\acute{\iota}$ (papyrus dated 165 B.C.), $\kappa\omicron\acute{\iota}\delta\alpha$ for $\omicron\ddot{\upsilon}\kappa$ $\omicron\acute{\iota}\delta\alpha$, $\kappa\eta\varsigma$ for $\omicron\ddot{\upsilon}\kappa$ $\eta\varsigma$ &c., and by the syncope of unaccented vowels, as $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\kappa\tau\acute{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\iota$ for $\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\kappa\tau\acute{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\iota$, $\beta\alpha\lambda\eta\eta\omega\nu$ for $\beta\alpha\lambda\alpha\nu\acute{\epsilon}\iota\omega\nu$, $\delta\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$, $\delta\acute{\iota}$ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}$, $\kappa\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma$ for $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma$ &c. The origin of $\kappa\alpha$ from $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}$ and $\mu\epsilon$ from $\mu\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}$ is probably due to their accentless proclitic use; the form began originally before dentals (cf. $\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ &c. on inscriptions); thus $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\acute{o}\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\nu$ became * $\kappa\alpha\tau$ $\tau\acute{o}\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\nu$ and then $\kappa\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\acute{o}\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\nu$. Many of the peculiarities of vocalism in the Greek of Egypt are further illustrated on the inscriptions, though, as we should expect, these are of later date, belonging to the time of the Roman Empire; the interchange of o and ω , ϵ and η is frequent, as $\delta\acute{\omega}\mu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ for $\delta\acute{o}\mu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ (Boeckh, *Corpus*, vol. III. no. 4708), $\acute{\eta}\chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\eta$ for $\acute{\epsilon}\chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\eta$ (*ib.* 4729); the loss of syllable we find in $\pi\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\nu$ for $\pi\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\nu$ (i.e. $\pi\lambda\omicron\acute{\iota}\nu$) (*ib.* 4712 b), $\nu\omicron\upsilon$ for $\nu\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\nu$ (*ib.* 4716 b); this loss of the unaccented syllable is even commoner in the inscriptions from Nubia and Upper Egypt, as $\pi\rho\sigma\kappa\upsilon\mu\alpha$ (*ib.* 4988), and $\pi\rho\sigma\kappa\upsilon\nu\mu\alpha$ (*ib.* 5016) for $\pi\rho\sigma\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta\mu\alpha$; $\tau\omicron\nu$ for $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\upsilon$ (*ib.* 5015), $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\kappa\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ for $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\kappa\lambda\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ (*ib.* 5126).

By this brief summary of well-known peculiarities of popular Greek orthography in Egypt we are reminded how closely the pronunciation of the vowels must have resembled Modern Greek. We shall now turn to some of the Greek-speaking areas of Asia Minor and observe some peculiarities of orthography there, which may be traced to a pronunciation with a stress accent. Unfortunately we have no private letters, but must gather such evidence, as exists, from the inscriptions on stone, which, of course, always lag behind the popular language. Nevertheless it is safe generally to conclude that apparent irregular spellings, which persistently recur, represent not the idiosyncrasies of individuals or of a special class, but habits established for the

whole community. We shall briefly summarise the confusions of letters on the Greek inscriptions found in Phrygia, Lycia, Lydia, Caria, and Syria¹. From places in Phrygia and Mysia (e.g. Pergamum) we find the confusion of *ει* and *ε* from the iii/B.C., *η* and *ι* from Alexandrian times but more frequently later, *η* and *ε*, *ο* and *ω* very commonly from the iii/B.C., *ει* and *ι* from the middle of the ii/B.C., *ει* and *ι* from Roman times, *ε* and *ι* in the popular language, which we shall see below was due to foreign influence, and somewhat later *ε* and *αι*, as *αΐαντῶ* for *εΐαντῶ* (Boeckh 382 b), *ἔσ τε* for *ἔσ ται* (Boeckh 3902 f.). These changes occur in both accented and unaccented syllables and are to be explained in the same way as those in Egypt. The loss of the unaccented syllable seems not to occur until Roman times, as *φθάνμεν* for *φθάνομεν* (Boeckh 3833), *ἡρῶν* for *ἡρῶων* (*ib.* 3896), *φρῶν* for *φρονῶν* (*ib.* 3822 c), and perhaps *μέχω* for *μὲν ἔχω* (*ib.* 3943). Similar confusions are found in the inscriptions from Lydia (including the numerous Greek records from Magnesia); *η* and *ε* from about 200 B.C.; *ο* and *ω* from the beginning of ii/B.C.; *αι* and *ε* from Roman times; *η* for *ι* on an inscription of ii/A.D. (*Κορνιλίου* for *Κορνηλίου* (Boeckh 3118)); *ι* and *υ* in *φιλή* for *φυλή* of the time of Tiberius (Boeckh 3451), and *γυναικός* for *γυναικός* (*ib.* 3018). The loss of unaccented syllables is spasmodic in its appearance; we find *σόριν* for *σόριον* (Boeckh 3270) and in some proper names the interesting loss in connexion with liquids, as *Βερνείκη* as well as *Βερενείκη*, *Μελιτίνην* as well as *Μελιτίνην*; we shall discuss this phenomenon in relation to accent below. We find also *Δέκμος* as a transliteration of Latin *Decimus*. The confusion of vowels is found also in Lycian and Carian Greek inscriptions from before i/A.D.; the loss of the unaccented syllable also occurs, as *εὐφμία* for *εὐφημία*, *εὐφσύνου* for *εὐφροσύνου* (Boeckh 4209) on a tomb-stone belonging to the

¹ New and revised editions of the Greek inscriptions from these places are a pressing need; for most of them we are dependent on Boeckh's old edition (*Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*). Fortunately there are two exceptions: the inscriptions from Pergamum, which have been edited by Max Fränkel—

discussed by E. Schweitzer (now Schwyzer) in his *Grammatik der pergamenischen Inschriften*, and those from Magnesia edited by Otto Kern (*die Inschriften von Magnesia*). There is, of course, Dittenberger's small selection *Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones selectae*.

early Roman age, unless these are merely careless mistakes on the part of the engraver, and *γταύτης* for *ἐκταύτης* (*ib.* 4224). On the Greek inscriptions from Syria the confusion of vowels is frequent from the Syro-Macedonian period. We also find from at least the Roman period such shortenings as *κίτιν* for *κίτιον*, *Εἰκόνιν* for *Εἰκόριον* (Boeckh 4472). Comparing the inscriptions from Asia Minor with the papyri of Egypt, we notice that the loss and weakening of unaccented vowels is commoner and that the close pronunciation of vowels is earlier in the latter. In general, the orthography of the papyri indicates that the pronunciation of Greek changed earlier in Egypt than elsewhere; this is not due altogether to the nature of the records themselves, but in part is due also to the peculiar character of the Hellenism of Egypt, which flourished by the side of a native civilisation and was constantly subject to its influence. The causes of the pronunciation in Egypt and Asia Minor will be discussed below.

As we have already noticed, the confusion of long and short vowels is not found on the inscriptions from the Greek mainland, until much later than from Egypt and Asia Minor. In Attica it first became frequent in the ii/A.D.; we find there the confusion of *ε* and *η* in *Ἀθένας* (*C. I. A.* III. 281 (117–138 A.D.)), *Φαλερέως* (*C. I. A.* III. 1132 (166 A.D.)), *ἡγημῶν* (*C. I. A.* III. 1112 (175–8 A.D.)); *ο* and *ω* in *Σώλωνος* (*C. I. A.* IV. 11 (174–8 A.D.)), *Θεωδώρου* (*C. I. A.* IV. 2593), *Μαραθόνιος* (*C. I. A.* III. 1120 (150 A.D.)). It is true that a few examples which must be assigned to the iii/B.C. or ii/B.C. occur; but they hardly represent an established or recognised pronunciation, and, as we suggested in connexion with the Defixiones, they may be due to a misunderstanding of the Euclidean alphabet. We also find frequently after 150 A.D. the interchange of *αι* and *ε*, as *διφθέρες* (*C. I. A.* III. 48 (iv/A.D.)), *φέδιμος* (*C. I. A.* III. 173 (iv–v/A.D.)), *εῖται*, *στρατόπαιδον* (*C. I. A.* III. 48 (iv/A.D.)); *ει* is found for *ι* from 100 B.C. to 100 A.D. and *ει* for *ι* after the ii/A.D. The loss of unaccented vowels especially in names begins from the ii/A.D., as *Βερνίκη*, *Βερνικίδης*, *σκόρδον* for *σκόροδον*; but it is not at all frequent.

Another, though less trustworthy, source of evidence for the

change of vocalism is the MSS. of the New Testament (see Robertson, *op. cit.* c. VI.). A few examples are: ϵ and η in many words ending in $-\epsilon\mu\alpha$ for $-\eta\mu\alpha$, ϵ and $\alpha\iota$ in the endings $-\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ and $-\sigma\theta\epsilon$, which are found interchangeably; η and ι in $\delta\eta\nu\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\omicron\nu$ for $\delta\iota\nu\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\omicron\nu$; this however may represent only a change in quality and be unaccompanied by a change in quantity, such as we find indicated by Byzantine $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{\eta}$ for $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{\iota}$; o and ω in $\pi\acute{o}\rho\alpha$ (1 Cor. 10. 4 and Heb. 9. 10), $\sigma\upsilon\kappa\omicron\mu\omicron\rho\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\nu$ (from $\mu\omega\rho\acute{\epsilon}\alpha$) (Luke 19. 4); and ι and $\epsilon\iota$, of which interchange there are many examples in the New Testament and the Septuagint. We find also other confusions of vowels, which, as in the papyri of Egypt, may be due to a weakening or indistinct pronunciation in the unaccented syllable; examples are a and ϵ in $\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\gamma\alpha\rho\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\omega$ for $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\gamma\alpha\rho\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\omega$ (Mt. 5. 41, Mk 15. 21); a and o in $\mu\epsilon\sigma\alpha\nu\acute{\upsilon}\kappa\tau\iota\omicron\nu$ for $\mu\epsilon\sigma\omicron\nu\acute{\upsilon}\kappa\tau\iota\omicron\nu$ (Mk 13. 35); ϵ and ι especially in connexion with λ and ν .

From these facts, which are so well known, that perhaps even this brief summary of them needs an apology, we conclude that the interchange between long and short syllables took place much earlier than the complete loss or the weakening of the vowel; both the latter phenomena are limited and appear rather spasmodically during the earlier centuries of our era. The complete vowel-reduction of northern Greek at the present day, whereby e becomes i , o becomes u , and i and u disappear in the unaccented syllable, producing forms, like $pl\acute{o}$ for $\pi\omicron\upsilon\lambda\acute{\omega}$ (i.e. $\pi\omega\lambda\acute{\omega}$), $k\pi\acute{\iota}$ for $\kappa\omicron\nu\pi\acute{\iota}$ (i.e. $\kappa\omega\pi\acute{\iota}$) $f\acute{t}\acute{o}$ for $\beta\omicron\eta\theta\acute{\omega}$, $f\acute{e}nt\acute{i}$ for $\phi\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ &c. (see further examples in Kretschmer *Der heutige lesbische Dialekt*), which the classical scholar can hardly recognise, must be due to some later influence, which caused a more energetic accent and affected the north only. With this second change in accent, which seems to be due to some foreign immigration but of which the exact origin and period are still quite uncertain, we are not concerned; for it is not connected with the great accentual change of Greek, which we shall see did not spread directly from the north to the south.

The change in the accentuation of Greek is illustrated also by the verse. As we should expect, artistic poetry continued for several centuries after the change was established to adhere to the old principles of construction. On verse inscriptions, how-

ever, we find the neglect of quantity early. For the most part these are private tomb-stones and vary in accuracy according to the culture of the people who had them erected. Moreover, old formulae are very often used and new names forced into the verse almost without regard to metrical difficulties. It is clear that such material can only be quoted as illustrative. In general, these 'false quantities' would indicate that the people concerned had lost something of their sensitiveness to quantity; otherwise how could they have tolerated *μεμνᾶμένοι* (from Cyprus; Deecke, No. 71), *ἐπόμενός τοι* (Cauer, *Delectus*², 277), *Καλλίστρατος* (*Ἐφημερίς Ἀρχαιολογική*, 1885, p. 198) &c. ? The influence of the stress pronunciation on the construction of artistic verse was not felt until the iv/A.D., when Nonnus, an Egyptian by birth, first began to reckon with accent. As all know, his system was a compromise between quantitative and accentual verse; in the *Dionysiaca* he arranged that in the first half of the hexameter the accent should be on the penultimate before a masculine and on the antepenultimate before a feminine caesura, and that in the second half it should not fall on the antepenultimate. The end of the verse and the strong break in the middle are the points where the nature of the verse is most perceptible. Nonnus is influenced by popular versification; in the *στίχοι πολιτικοὶ* of the Byzantines the accent fell on the antepenultimate or the last syllable in the first colon and on the penultimate in the second colon of the verse. Nonnus has tried to introduce endings of this kind in verse, which is otherwise written on the principles of the pure quantitative classical hexameter. Like most compromises, the result is not very satisfactory. The choliambics of Babrius shew a similar concession to the principles of popular versification in the regular recurrence of the accent on the penultimate at the end of the verse. From a consideration of these new laws adopted by Nonnus and Babrius we may draw two conclusions: first, that vowel-quantity apart from accent was already felt to be artificial; secondly that the distinction between the acute and circumflex accents had been lost.

III. *Causes of the change and its extension.*

From the evidence of the vocalism, which we have reviewed, it is clear that as early as the iii/B.C. the pronunciation of Greek with a stress accent and voice-duration had begun in Egypt and Asia Minor—that is in regions, which, so far as we know, were in that period united by no close bond of linguistic influence. In each case the reason for the peculiar pronunciation must be sought in the locality itself. For the natives Greek was an acquired language, while even the Greeks themselves, who were unable to visit the country of their forefathers, would in a very few generations lose the purity of their accent through their intercourse with the rest of the population. We must remember, too, that many of them were merchants, to whom language had little more than a utilitarian value. In Egypt we know that not only were there Greek mercenaries in the army of Ptolemy but that through the intercourse between the natives and the Hellenic settlers a new civilisation arose by the side of the old. The influence of Coptic pronunciation on the Greek of Egypt is clearly seen in the confusion of mediae and tenues (g and k, b and p, d and t); for instance we find on the papyri: ἐξενηκεμένοι (papyrus dated 161 B.C.), ἔκραψε (later), γναφεύς (for κναφεύς) (160 B.C.), πασιλλῆς (for βασιλλῆς) (108 B.C.), ἄφθιδος (for ἄφθιτος) (161 B.C.), δέλος (for τέλος) (137 B.C.); it is seen also in the loss of intervocalic γ, as ὀλίο (for ὀλίγῳ) (160 B.C.), ἐπιονῆς (for ἐπιγονῆς) &c. These are undoubted examples of native influence on Greek pronunciation; yet literal accuracy is fairly easy to acquire in a foreign language. How much greater must have been the influence of the native accentuation! We observe that the Coptic accent from the period, when that language is known to us, was expiratory and so strong that all unaccented vowels are uniformly reduced. For an earlier period we may refer to old Egyptian. The strong accentuation there is not so marked, nor does it yet shew the formation of word-groups with only one accent and the regular weakening of all other syllables; nevertheless there are early traces of stress accentuation, especially in the shortening of the demonstrative and the auxiliary verb (see A. Erman, *Ägyptische*

Grammatik, §§ 133-4). Though, as Thumb pointed out (*Hellenismus*, p. 174), we must distinguish the Egyptian *κοινή* from the jargon of the non-Hellenised Copts and Nubians, who in their attempt to speak Greek produced such barbarisms, as τὰ ποταμοὶ ὕδατα, πᾶσαν χάρτας &c., yet the boundary is not sharply defined and there can be no doubt, that the pronunciation of Greek with a stress accent in Egypt is due to native influence. The problem of voice-duration we shall leave for the moment.

An attempt to estimate the influence of the native languages of Asia Minor on Greek pronunciation is not so easy a task, first, because the languages are so numerous, and secondly, because so little is yet known about each. Of course, we are concerned only with the most important languages, which were early in contact with Greek, viz. Lycian, Lydian, and Phrygian. Of Lycian we know very little and the material is at present too scanty to make any theories on that language quite sure. Nevertheless there are certain phenomena which would seem to indicate a stress accent; we notice the doubling of consonants and the syllable-forming nasals and liquids, as *hrppi*, 'ἐπί,' *ñte*, 'ἐνδόν,' *epñ*, 'πρός.' These might be remnants of prehistoric changes and have no bearing on the nature of the living accent, if we could not supplement them by the loss of the unaccented syllable in the transliteration of some Greek words, as *tr̃nnili* for *Ταρμίλαι*, *Pulenjda* for *Ἀπολλωνίδης*. Lycian is an interesting example of a language, which gave way before the influence of other tongues, especially Greek; from the time of Alexander the Great it seems hardly to have existed. Strabo, XIII. 4. 17, says τέτταρσι δὲ γλώτταις ἐχρῶντο οἱ Κιβυράται, τῇ Πισιδικῇ, τῇ Σολύμων, τῇ Ἑλληνίδι, τῇ Λυδῶν, from which we must conclude that they did not speak Lycian. In Lydian also there is unfortunately much that is uncertain in spite of the discovery of bilingual Greek and Aramaic inscriptions. (For the latest work on this language see Enno Littmann, *Sardis*, vol. VI. and *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, XXXVII. (1917) pp. 77 ff. and 219 ff.) It is a little dangerous to draw any conclusions from a language, of which so little is known; nevertheless, as Littmann points out (*ib.* p. 65), there are very clear indications that the accent was expiratory; it is seen especially in the loss of the vowel of

the suffix in *akmūt* from *akmūt*, 'if it' (the postpositional *-it* seems to have had a generalising force); in *faktin* for *fakitin*; in *Ib̄sis* for **Ib̄sis̄is* (i.e. Ἐφεσος) if *Ib̄sim̄sis* the Lydian name for Artemis means the 'Ephesian (goddess),' and in *Timlelid* (No. 26) the adjective from a **Timleś*, if the latter is the Lydian form of Τιμόλαος. Littmann thinks that the versification of the metrical inscriptions, which is not on the principle of the regular recurrence of accented syllables, may militate against a stress accent for Lydian; but the whole question of the verse is uncertain, and we may, in any case, compare Avestan, in which the metre is the mere counting of syllables without regard to accent, and Latin with its quantitative verse¹. Of much wider extent and influence in Asia Minor than either Lycian or Lydian was Phrygian, of which we have fragmentary inscriptions in the native alphabet from the vi/B.C. and in the Greek alphabet from Roman times. The change of *u* (i.e. *ū*) to *i* (or *e*), which is found in the Greek of Asia Minor several centuries before it occurs in the Greek of the mainland, is due to Phrygian (cf. the name Βρύγες with Βρύξ, Βρύγοι &c. and see Thumb, *Hellenismus*, p. 139). Hardly less influential must have been the Phrygian accentuation, which seems to have been expiratory. This is concluded from the tendency in old Phrygian to drop the final *-av*, which is seen in *bonok* for **bonokan* (accusative), cf. Boeotian Βάνα 'γυνή,' and φανακ, which Sir W. M. Ramsay (*Bezenberger's Beiträge*, 14, p. 308 ff.) with great probability interprets as ἄνακτα, and in the ending *-is* for *-ιος*. Of course, the latter might be merely a remnant of a prehistoric sound-law, as in other languages; but, since we find it also in Roman times in such names as Αὐρήλις for Αὐρήλιος, Γαῖς for Γαῖος, Φρύγης for Φρύγιος &c., we can only conclude that it was due to a living stress accent. We may compare the Modern Greek κύρις for κύριος (especially in compounds καβυροκύρις, νοικοκύρις &c.), Γιώργης for Γεώργιος, καβαλλάρις, κυνηγάρις &c. As we have already observed, the Greek culture of Asia Minor was different from that of Egypt, because the former was the result of a fusion

¹ The stress-accent often on the short syllable, however, helped to give variety and a certain swing to the Latin

hexameter of the Classical period. See also *Class. Rev.* xxxi. (1917) p. 125.

of the Hellenic and native elements. The very scantiness of the remains of the native languages is an illustration of this. We know also from the narrative of Herodotus how the Ionian colonists united with the Carians and Lycians. Doubtless the peculiarities of the pronunciation of Greek were more fixed and permanent in Asia Minor than in Egypt; but, as we have seen, in both regions Greek was affected by the native languages, of which the natural accent was expiratory. This influence must date back to the time when these foreigners first entered into close relations with the Greeks and began to speak their language; that is, it must be much earlier than the iii/B.C., when we find the first traces of the new accent in the written records. The pronunciation with a stress accent, however, probably remained isolated provincialisms in the districts where the population was mixed, and had little or no influence on the neighbouring communities, which were of more pure Hellenic descent, and none at all on Greece proper, until some other force all but universalised it.

This force came from Macedonia with the conquests of Alexander the Great. With the much disputed question of the origin of Macedonian we are hardly concerned here. The remains of the language are too fragmentary to enable us to form any clear idea of either its accidence or its syntax; but to the unprejudiced observer the phonology certainly resembles Greek and especially Thessalian. We cannot, however, agree with all that Hatzidakis in his *Περὶ τοῦ Ἑλληνισμοῦ τῶν ἀρχαίων Μακεδόνων* says in support of the contention that it was Greek. Though Macedonian was at bottom Greek, it was Greek which had absorbed barbarian elements to an extent not found elsewhere in ancient times. Thessalian immigrants into a Thraco-Illyrian area succeeded in subduing but not in exterminating the native population; the civilisation and language of Macedonia were the result of the fusion of the two elements. The influence of the native languages on Macedonian is seen in the interchange of *e* and *i*, the substitution of the mediae *d*, *b* for the aspirates *dh*, *bh*, the *r*-less nominative, the syncope with liquids and in the accentuation, which we shall shew to have been stress. Apart from these important changes and the occurrence of foreign words, Macedonian seems

to have been a Greek dialect and most closely akin to Thessalian. Our knowledge of Macedonian is drawn from single words collected by the grammarians, superscriptions on coins, and words, mostly official terms, which have been preserved from historical works; for the most part these belong to the fourth or third century before our era. From these remains, though they are so scanty, we may from general linguistic considerations form some idea of the sound-laws of the language. Thus it is pretty certain that the natural accent of Macedonian was expiratory. This is shewn first in the loss of syllables, especially the second of a dissyllabic preposition. Apocope is, of course, found in all the Greek dialects; but it is limited in application except in Thessalian, and seems everywhere to be the relic of a prehistoric stress accent. In Macedonian, on the other hand, it appears, so far as we can judge from the material, to be a rule of the language. Examples of this are: ἄγχαρμος from ἄνα χάρμαν the command for a bayonet charge belonging to the age of Philip and Alexander the Great; ἐδέατρος, which Athenaeus explains as “ἐπιστάτης τῆς ὅλης διακονίας,” seems certainly to be a word of Greek origin; see O. Hoffmann (*Die Makedonen*, pp. 78–9), who with great probability derives it from *ἐπιθέατρος through *ἐπδέατρος and *ἐδδέατρος and compares Xenophon’s *θεασάμενος τὸ στράτευμα* (*Cyroped.* v. 5. 1) for this sense of the root. A second peculiarity of Macedonian, which is to be connected with accent, is the common loss of a short vowel between a liquid or nasal and a consonant. The Macedonian words for head are κεβαλά and γαβαλά, of which the latter seems to be native and the former an imitation or borrowing of the common Greek form; from Hesychius’ gloss κέβλος· κυνοκέφαλος, κήπος we may conjecture a third word κεβλά with loss of the unaccented syllable¹. This loss of the unaccented syllable is found also in proper names: Βέρδας preserved by the Roman historian Curtius (see vii. 6. 12 and viii. 1. 7) is the short form of Βερέδαμος, of which name the true Greek form is Φερέδαμος; Βλίτωρ for *Μλίτωρ is from Μελίτωρ (the change of μ to β before λ is the same as we find in Greek βλώσκω); and the name Κύρνος is

¹ κεβλήπυρος (red-head) the name of a bird (Aristoph. *Aves*, 303) is probably of Macedonian origin.

perhaps from Κοριναῖος the Macedonian equivalent of the common Greek σκότιος and Laconian παρθένιος. Of this sound-change, which is found also in old Thracian (cf. Σπάρδοκος for Σπάραδοκος which must have been accented thus, there must be many more examples among the remains of Macedonian; but the derivations are too uncertain to be useful for our inquiry. It is extraordinary that philologists have denied that the loss of a short vowel in connexion with a liquid is due to a stress accent in the preceding or following syllable; for not only does it occur in ancient languages among other phenomena which are certainly due to a stress accent, but it is found in modern languages, especially English, German, and Modern Greek, which certainly have a stress accent. The affected syllable by weakening and assimilation became *r*, *l*, *n* and then was lost. (Cf. the common Northern or Scotch pronunciation of the word *milliner* as *millner* or *millner*). It is interesting to find that this is often accompanied in the same period by the opposite phenomenon, viz. anaptyxis. (Cf. the vulgar pronunciation of English *umbrella*, *rheumatism* &c.) This insertion of a 'glide' before or after the accented syllable is due to the anticipation or the carrying forward of the muscular intensity¹ used in the pronunciation of the accented syllable and seems no less than the loss of a syllable to be a characteristic of stress accent. We find it sometimes also in Attic vase inscriptions (as 'Ερεμῆς for 'Ερμηῆς, 'Επίδρομος for 'Επίδρομος &c.), which, as we have already seen, shew a strong foreign influence from early times. Some examples seem also to occur in old Macedonian: *κάραβος* (cf. Hesychius *κάραβος*· ὑπὸ δὲ Μακεδόνων ἢ πύλη) is from a common Greek **σκάρφος*; cf. *Il.* II. 532 *Σκάρφη* the name of a town meaning originally 'a mountain pass, or gate' (for a discussion of this highly probable derivation of *κάραβος* see Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen*, p. 28); perhaps *κυνουπέυς* (Hesych. *κυνουπέυς*· ἄρκτος. *Μακεδόνες*) is connected with the root **κνωπ*- (cf. *κνωπόμορφος*

¹ In some languages this muscular effort tends to preserve the syllable following the accent, so that the loss of syllables in this position is less frequent than of those which precede.

R. L. Turner (see his paper on *The Indo-Germanic Accent in Marathi* in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1916) finds this in some of the Modern Indian dialects.

Lycophron, 675, and the name Κνωπος). There are perhaps other examples; but they are uncertain. To return from this digression to a consideration of other characteristics of Macedonian which indicate a stress accent, we find *a* for *ai* in ἀδῆ from the root of αἰθήρ, ἀδαλός connected with αἶθαλος and a few others; *o* for *eo* in the name Κλονίος (see Diodorus, 34. 22) for Κλεονίος, and in σκοῖδος, an officer in the army who was in charge of the baggage, if it is really derived from *σκευο-φιδος (see Hoffmann, *op. cit.* p. 83 ff.). Some deny that this simplification of diphthongs is due to stress and quote the variations in the Greek dialects in Θεοκλῆς and Θεοκλῆς, ὀρτή and ἐορτή &c. But these doubtless go back to old variants and must be distinguished from changes which are due to conditions still living in historic times. Although the simplification of diphthongs is not so universal in ancient Macedonian as it is in Modern Greek, it nevertheless occurs so often in unaccented syllables and so regularly in the case of the *i*-diphthong that it may be claimed to support our contention that the accent was strongly expiratory. Another change, which is found in old Macedonian and which may possibly represent a vowel-weakening, is the substitution of *ε* for *ι* before *ρ* in the unaccented syllable; examples are κερρός for κιρρός 'pale yellow' (cf. Hippocrates οἶνον κιρρόν) and ἄργελλα for ἄργιλλα (quoted for the Cimmerians by Strabo, v. 244. See Hoffmann, *op. cit.* p. 60). Cf. the same change in Modern Greek.

These examples are sufficient indication of the stress value of the accent of old Macedonian. It is interesting to notice that the first signs of the pronunciation of Greek with a stress accent on the official records in Asia Minor occur a little after the time of the conquests of Alexander the Great. A peculiar pronunciation owing to the accent, as we have seen, must have existed as a provincialism in many localities; but it required the invasion of Alexander's hordes of Macedonians, Thracians, Illyrians, and Greeks and the subsequent founding of colonies throughout Asia Minor and in Egypt to give it a vogue, and, as it were, some official sanction. The Asiatic Greeks and natives found that the Macedonians, when they spoke the common Greek language, had an accent resembling their own, which

thus received a new impetus and in a comparatively short period, perhaps a generation or two, a stress accent in the pronunciation of Greek was universalised in Asia Minor. Now we have noticed that, in accordance with the evidence furnished by the confusion of long and short vowels, the accent as in Modern Greek was not simply stress but was accompanied by a certain voice-duration. At this point I would suggest a reason for this peculiarity. Voice-duration seems to be a compromise between a pure pitch and a pure stress accent. It represents an attempt to reproduce the pitch accent resulting in a *lento*-pronunciation with stress owing to the speaker's being accustomed to use some muscular effort in uttering the accented syllable. We find the same phenomenon in the *sentence* accent of Modern English, when pitch and emphasis are united. Thus surprise seems to be indicated by a *lento*-pronunciation with a rising tone (acute accent) and emphasis, as in *Are you going?* and *Réally! This is strange*; a complaint or a sneer is expressed by a *lento*-pronunciation combined with a rising-falling or circumflex accent, as in *Dôn't do it!* and *Brutus is an honou^{re}able man*.

Although Macedonian is of such importance in the change in the nature of the Greek accent, it had practically no influence on the forms of the *κοινή*. Attic, with some modifications, had been gradually becoming the *lingua franca* of the Eastern Mediterranean long before the time of Alexander, in fact, ever since the establishment of the Delian Confederacy. To this Alexander, who spoke and wrote his letters not in his native dialect but in Attic, gave a greater impulse by the publication of his decrees in it. Foreigners of all races would begin to learn this official language; but, for the most part, they would not trouble about the finer nuances of pronunciation and more especially the pitch accent, which was most difficult to acquire and for which many would not have a sufficiently sensitive ear. In his encouragement of Greek, the existing *lingua franca*, Alexander shews that he realised, what many conquerors have forgotten, that language is the chief bond of union in an Empire. Likewise it was the bond of union in his colonies, which were usually formed from several nationalities; for instance, in Alexandria four nations were represented in large numbers: the Egyptians, who were perhaps

the poorest, the Jews, the Greeks who held high positions in the army and civil administration and who were also the merchants and 'professors,' and the Macedonians, who formed a military aristocracy.

It was not until several centuries after Alexander the Great that the confusion of vowels due to the new pronunciation found its way into the official records on the Greek mainland. This can hardly be accidental, but indicates that the stress accent was not officially recognised for a long time. We have already observed that the speech of the lower class citizens of Athens through their intercourse with the slaves, who were foreigners from Illyria, Thrace, Asia Minor and other parts of the Mediterranean, shews a stress accent as early as v/B.C.¹ The commercial class also by their relations with foreigners probably adopted the new accent as soon as it became universal in Egypt and Asia Minor; but the more conservative people, the educated, the professional and the farming classes, appear to have retained the traditional pronunciation for a long time. At the present day Tsakonian, which is derived from old Laconian and is the only example of a dialect of Modern Greek derived from an ancient dialect, is a good illustration of the conservatism of the country people. Of course, none of the inscriptions at any time are completely phonetic in spelling any more than Modern Greek is; nevertheless, when the confusion of long and short vowels becomes frequent in different inscriptions of the same period, it must represent a change in pronunciation; and when it occurs repeatedly on official records, it must be at the will of the state and not due to lapses into carelessness on the part of the engraver, who doubtless was given a full copy of the text before he began to carve the stone. It is interesting to notice how the Greeks of the mainland stood outside the Macedonian movement in speech as in everything else. They clearly regarded them-

¹ An interesting but extreme parallel to this is seen in the influence of Turkish servants on the loss of Greek dialects in Asia Minor at the present day; for instance Mr Dawkins (*Modern Greek in Asia Minor*, p. 14 f.) suggests

that the loss of the dialect of Férték is in part due to the employment of Turkish charwomen, which necessitates the use of the Turkish language in the house.

selves as the partners not the dependents of the conqueror. When Greece at last adopted their new pronunciation, it was no longer composed of even nominally free states, but was a part of the Roman Empire. While Greece had not even a shadow of her former importance, some places in Asia Minor, especially Rhodes and Pergamum, were still flourishing and vigorous. Whence and how exactly the new pronunciation won official recognition on the mainland, it is impossible to say. It was not a sudden change; but, as in art and all other matters, so in pronunciation the Hellenic in time had to give way to the Hellenistic.

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APOLLONIUS III.

And last, I devoutly trust.

i 5. τοῖν γὰρ Πελήης φάτιν ἔκλυεν ὥς μιν ὀπίσσω
μοῖρα μένει στυγερὴ τοῦδ' ἀνέρος ὄντιν' ἴδοιτο
δημόθεν οἰοπέδιλον ὑπ' ἐννεσίησι δαμῆναι.

What does *δημόθεν* mean? "From among the people" is very poor sense, especially as Jason was the heir to the throne. Look at ii 1019:

ὅσσα μὲν ἀμφαδίην ῥέζειν θέμις, ἥ ἐνὶ δήμῳ
ἥ ἀγορῇ, τάδε πάντα δόμοις ἐνὶ μηχανόνται.

Here *δήμῳ* means clearly "in the country" as opposed to "in the agora," which is equivalent to "in the city." The use is not Epic but comes from the Attic, the *demes* being opposed to the city. Aristoph. *Ach.* 33, *στυγῶν μὲν ἄστὺ τὸν δ' ἐμὸν δῆμον ποθῶν*, Aristot. *Poet.* 1441^a 36, *οὔτοι μὲν γὰρ κώμας τὰς περιουκίδας καλεῖν φασὶν Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ δῆμους*. And Ap. is simply reproducing Pindar, who says:

τὸν μονοκρήπιδα πάντως ἐν φθλακᾷ σχεθέμεν μεγάλη,
εὖτ' ἂν αἰπεινῶν ἀπὸ σταθμῶν ἐς εὐδείελον
χθόνα μόλη κλειτᾶς Ἰωλκοῦ.

So *δημόθεν* means the same as *αἰπεινῶν ἀπὸ σταθμῶν*; all the country about Iolcus being mountainous, it comes to the same thing.

i 75. καὶ ἐπαῖξαι μετόπισθεν
εὖ δεδαῶς δῆροισιν ὅτε κλίνωσι φάλαγγας.

κλίνωσι MSS., a hardly possible reading since the mood is wrong and no decent sense can be got out of it without violence. *κλίνει φάλαγγα* can only mean "he turns to flight the enemy's

line," not "he turns and flies himself." Brunck was right in adopting κλίνειε "ex schol. Par.," and not only the Parisian but also the Laurentian scholia (though indeed it is the same thing) are aware of no reading except κλίνειε. "λείπει δὲ ὁ καὶ, ἢ ᾗ, καὶ ὅτε κλίνειε φάλαγγας, εἰς φυγὴν τρέψειεν." The alleged omission of καὶ is absurd, but plainly the author of the note knew nothing of κλίνωσι.

i 101. Θησέα δ' ὃς περὶ πάντας Ἐρεχθεΐδας ἐκέκαστο
Ταινάρην αἰδήλος ὑπὸ χθόνα δέσμος ἔρυκεν,
Πειρίθῳ ἐσπόμενον κεινὴν ὁδόν.

So L rightly; other MSS. κείνην, or κοινήν. It is indeed possible to explain κείνην as meaning either *that famous journey* or *that mentioned in the last line*, but κεινὴν is more poetical, more pointed, and the reading of the best MS. It might be argued that Ap. would have written *κενεήν*, if it were not that *κεινὰς* is found in iii 1346 where the metre guarantees it; and *κεινὸς* is a Homeric form besides. *κοινήν* is as feeble as *κείνην* though less prosaic here.

i 134. Ναύπλιος. ᾗ γὰρ ἔην Κλυτονόου Ναυβολίδαο.

To the instances of this nearly forbidden rhythm given in *J. P.* No. 65, p. 3, add Empedocles 184 (Karsten), and Dionysius *Orbis Descriptio* 291, 308, 464, 550. For a molossus before the bucolic diaeresis Dionysius 911, 1086.

i 605. τοῖσιν δ' αὐτῆμαρ μὲν ἄεν καὶ ἐπὶ κνέφας οὖρος.

One expects ἐπὶ κνέφας to mean "throughout the night," but the context forbids it. The Argonauts sail from Athos to Lemnos during the whole of one day, but the wind falls at sunset (607) and they have to row into the harbour at nightfall. So ἐπὶ κνέφας here must mean "till night" or rather "till twilight," the proper sense of κνέφας, and καὶ is "even." So at 650, ἰόντας ἡματός ἀνομένοιο διὰ κνέφας, "as they came through the gloaming," which passage finally settles the time of their arrival.

i 755. τὸν δὲ μέτα δρομάδην ἐπὶ Μυρτίλος ἤλασεν ἵππους.

Mr Samuelsson is right in so dividing μεταδρομάδην; for ἐπὶ cannot here govern τὸν, the meaning being "after," not "against."

But the context shews ἤλασεν to be an impossible tense; read ἤλαεν, like ἔλαεν in iii 872¹.

i 873. εἰσόκε Δῆμνον | παισὶν ἐσανδρώσῃ.

So odd. with all MSS. but G, which has ἐπανδρώσῃ. As the sense is *re*-plenish, G must be right, for ἐπὶ in compounds frequently has this force whereas ἐς has not.

i 942. καὶ τὸ μὲν ὕβρισταί τε καὶ ἄγριοι ναιετάουσιν
Γηγενέες.

That the scansion is wrong is obvious; as for the tense, nobody seems to care about that in Apollonius either here or anywhere else. All these Giants were dead centuries before he wrote; Ziegler alone sees this, but his *ἀνέρες εἶχον* cannot be right because they were not *ἀνέρες* at all. Bentley's *ἀμφινέμονται*² will do very well, if improved into *ἀμφενέμοντο*. So Ziegler also rightly reads *ἡερέθοντο* in 944; at 1160 *ἡερέθοντο* and *ἡερέθονται* both have authority, but the present is there better in itself and better supported; at 1097 *πεπότητο* must be right, not *πεπότηται*. At iv 779 we must read *παῦεν* for *παῦσεν*, the aorist there being quite wrong.

i 955. *εὐναίης* here clearly means the rope to which the stone was fastened; the same sense suits in several other passages.

i 1216. Θειοδάμας ἀνίῃ βεβολημένος.

Theiodamas, father of Hylas, was ploughing when Heracles killed him. That a king should be doing this himself is very extraordinary; Nausicaa may do the washing, but the Homeric king does not do the ploughing, he stands and watches it *γηθόσυνος κῆρ*. The only hero who *does* plough, so far as I am aware, is Odysseus, and he only ploughed the sands, affecting to be mad. To say that Theiodamas was *ἀνίῃ βεβολημένος* does not account for his behaviour, nor is the second syllable of *ἀνίῃ* short in Epic poetry. To the last objection indeed one might

¹ Such forms survive with difficulty. Twice did Quintus write *ἐτόλμαεν*, twice did the scribes prefer to violate the metre rather than hand it

down correctly.

² "Sic certissime emendavit Rich. Bentlei (*sic*) in egregia nota ad Callim. H. in Jovem 87." Brunck.

reply by referring to Panyasis 5, but it is certainly never short in Homer, Apollonius or Quintus. Merkel's ἄτη is a violent change and after all meaningless; μανίη seems to me to be indicated, though as we know nothing of the circumstances it must remain very speculative. That Quintus three times has βεβολημένος ἦτορ ἀνίη may be a point in favour of the MSS., but clearly amounts to little enough.

i 1262. κελαινὸν here is not an epitheton ornans of αἶμα, but is pathological; cf. iv 1516.

i 1297. ὄστλιγγες.

Read ὄστλιγγες, for Herodian expressly says παρὰ μὲν Ἀπολλωνίῳ καὶ Φιλητᾷ διὰ τοῦ α̃. Schol. Laur.

ii 17. εἰ δ' ἂν ἀπηλεγέοντες ἐμὰς πατέοιτε θέμιστας,
ἧ κέν τις στυγερῶς κρατερῇ ἐπέψετ' ἀνάγκη.

ἀνάγκη ἐφέπεται τινι is not Greek. "ἔπει κακὸν vetus scriptura Od. M. 209," says Merkel, but he knows it is not the vera scriptura, and he does not know apparently that ἔπει and ἔπεται are two different things. G is right again with κρατερῇ—ἀνάγκη. Cf. the famous verses of the Stoic:

ὥς ἔψομαί γ' ἄοκνος, ἦν δὲ μὴ θέλω
κακὸς γενόμενος οὐδὲν ἥττον ἔψομαι.

Hecuba 346, ὥς ἔψομαί γε τοῦ τ' ἀναγκαίου χάριν θανεῖν τε χρήζουσα. Odyssey xiv 298, τῷ ἐπόμεν ἐπὶ νηὸς, οἰόμενός περ, ἀνάγκη. Had Ap. wanted to use the nominative, he would have said ἐπικεῖσεται ἀνάγκη; cf. Iliad vi 458.

ii 113. ὑπὸ ζώνην θόρε χαλκὸς.

One hero thrusts at another with his spear; the verb θόρε is a silly one to use, especially as the spear was not thrown; read τόρε, coll. Iliad xi 236.

ii 139. τῆμος here, as at iv 1400, means "that day."

ii 326. μηδ' αὐτως αὐτάγρετον οἶτον ὄλησθε
ἀφραδέως ἧ θύνετ' ἐπισπόμενοι νεότητι.
οἶωνῳ δὴ πρόσθε πελειάδι πειρήσασθε
νηὸς ἄπο προμεθέντες ἐφίμεν.

Μὴ followed by ἧ is of course not impossible, but neither is

it elegant as a matter of grammar nor good from the point of view of sense. "Do not perish recklessly *or* rush on like young men as you are" is a false antithesis, because both prohibitions mean the same thing. Read ᾗ: "Do not court death *as* you are now doing."

The next two lines are a familiar puzzle. L gives *πειρήσασθαι* as a variant, and one explanation, adopting this, makes the meaning "trust it to a dove to try the passage." Madvig's *προμεθέντας ἐφίεμαι* is—well, it is Madvig's, and Samuelsson's *προμεθέντας ἐφίεμεν* is no better. Mr Mooney has a most ingenious suggestion, to "take *ἐφίεμεν* as used intransitively of the dove *committing herself* to the breezes, or else as used absolutely in the sense of *ταρσὸν ἐφείς πνοιῇ* (934 *infr.*). We might also compare *τέμνε* used absolutely of the flight of Iris in iv 771, and for a time I was inclined to acquiesce in this. But now I think the true remedy is to put a colon after *πειρήσασθε*, and translate: "make trial first with a dove as an omen; letting her go send her ahead." The rhythm and the intended impressive effect is copied from *Iliad* xvi 87, *ἐκ νηῶν ἐλάσας ἵεναι πάλιν*; there also we have an imperative, *πείθεο*, followed by an infinitive of command, and such a sequence is to be found elsewhere in Apollonius.

But the collocation of the participle and infinitive of ἵημι is still displeasing, though not impossible, and the compound *ἐφίεμεν* is not very good. Still I think this is the best thing to be done. Can *ἐφίεμεν* mean "speed after her"?

ii 367. μετὰ τὸν δ' ἀγχίρροος Ἴρις.

Read τὸνδ'; Ap. hardly ever allows δὲ to stand third in a clause.

ii 375. τρηχεῖαν Χάλυβες καὶ ἀτειρέα γαῖαν ἔχουσιν,
ἐργατῖναι· τοὶ δ' ἀμφὶ σιδήρεα ἔργα μέλονται.

When Ap. uses an article with δὲ in this way, he is changing the subject; I doubt whether a fair instance of τοὶ δὲ = οἱ, or anything of the kind, can be found in him. Read then *ἐργατῖναι*, τοί τ'. We have also thereby corrected another point; when a word like *ἐργατῖναι* is explained by a periphrasis in Epic poetry, the explanation is introduced by a relative, *κηρεσσιφορήτους*

οὓς κῆρες φορέουσιν, and so on. Therefore the relative τοί τε is right here, the demonstrative τοὶ δὲ is wrong.

ii 395. ἐπὶ σφίσι = *post se*; read ἐπὶ σφισι, *post eos*.

ii 399. ἡπείροιο = "plain": this sense here and elsewhere in Ap. comes from misinterpretation of *Odyssey* ix 49 coll. 66.

ii 530. παντῆμαρ is the right reading, for the sense required is "all the forty days during which the Etesian winds were blowing" and this cannot be got out of Dorville's πᾶν ἡμαρ. Brunck calls παντῆμαρ "vox nihili," but cf. ἐννῆμαρ, ποσσῆμαρ.

ii 551. ἀνακλύζεσκεν, "washed back," cf. schol.

ii 557. θελήμονα ποιήσαντο εἰρεσίην.

This means "paddled gently," like ἔχετ' αὐτοῦ νῆα θελήμονες at iv 1657, "hold her up at rest." The sailors are to keep Argo stationary or nearly so till the time come for making a dash to pass the Symplegades, and then, ἔπειτα in 558, to spurt hard. θέλημα· ἥσυχος says Photius, and Suidas ἐθέλημος· ἥσυχος. The scholiast blunders, but he too knows what θελήμονα ought to mean.

ii 593. ἔνθεν δ' αὐτίκ' ἔπειτα κατηρεφὲς ἔσσυτο κύμα.

For four reasons it is necessary to follow Merkel in reading *καταρρεπὲς* from a glossary in Cramer's *Anecdota*. (1) It is inserted in the glossary with this line appended, and in such a case the authority of the glossary is much greater than that of our MSS. (2) Its corruption into *κατηρεφὲς* is easy, whereas the opposite process is most improbable. (3) It is a word so rare that it is not known from any other source. (4) It makes much better sense; had the wave been *κατηρεφὲς* the Argo would infallibly have been swamped, for she was caught by it broadside on, but as it was not overarching but only "sloping downwards" it could carry her into the midst of the strait unharmed, as it did.

ii 607. οἱ δὲ που ὀκρυόεντος ἀνέπνεον ἄρτι φόβοιο
 ἡέρα παπταίνοντες ὁμοῦ πέλαγός τε θάλασσης
 τῇλ' ἀποπεπτάμενον. δὴ γὰρ φάσαν ἐξ Ἀίδαο
 σώεσθαι· Τίφυσ δὲ παροίτατος ἤρχετο μύθων.

This punctuation is absurd. Look at the tense of ἀνέπνεον, ask yourself what ἄρτι means, and punctuate with commas after ἀποπεπτάμενον and σώεσθαι. "They were just recovering when Tiphys spoke."

ii 925. Σθενέλου τάφον ἀμφεπένοντο·

χύτλα τέ οἱ χεύοντο καὶ ἤγνισαν ἔντομα μίλων.

Punctuate thus, for the χύτλα and ἔντομα together make up the ceremony, and τε—καὶ = both—and. Then χεύοντο is the wrong tense; Brunck was right in proposing χεύαντο. The form χεύοντο can scarce be called in question, for in i 565 χεῦον has the overwhelming support of L, of schol. Ven. Π 183, and of the Et. Mag., and the imperfect there follows the preceding aorists quite naturally; why the editors read χεῦαν I hardly know, but certainly there is much confusion of these forms in MSS.

In 928 ἐφλεγον is another imperfect naturally following an aorist, the regular thing in epic.

ii 978. ἐνδοθι means "penetrating (the hilly ground through valleys)": cf. iv 1235.

ii 1042.

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἦρως

Εὐρυτίδης Κλυτίος πρόπαρ ἀγκύλα τείνατο τόξα,

ἦκε δ' ἐπ' οἰωνὸν ταχυνὸν βέλος, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα

πληῆξεν.

I can have no doubt that Gerhard was right in restoring ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν for ἀλλά μιν and πρόπαρ for πρὸ γὰρ. But αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα has been vainly attacked hitherto; if right it must mean "but at once" (see Mr Mooney's note), but this is very feeble. Epic usage leads us to expect to be told in what part the bird was hit; as it was flying above the ship, it would be hit below the body; and the wound was a deadly one. Qu. then αὐτὰρ ὑπ' ἥτορ? Hardly ἐπ' ἥτορ, I think, for I doubt whether a poet would say πληῆξεν ἐπ' ἥτορ, nor does Aesch. Ag. 783, ἐφ' ἥπαρ προσικνεῖται, really defend it, and it would be displeasing after ἐπ' οἰωνόν. ὑφ' ἥπαρ perhaps may seem preferable to some.

ii 1067. σὺν κελάδῳ σακέεσσι πελώριον ὄρσετε δοῦπον.

This does not mean "make a noise with the clashing of

shields," because *δουπεῖν σὺν κελάδῳ* is not Greek for "make a noise with clashing"; what it *does* mean is "along with your shouting (see 1063) make a noise with your shields."

ii 1176. ἀλλ' ἵππους δαίτρευον, ἐπηετανὸν κομέουσαι.

The question in this "Wardour street Greek," as Mr Bywater was fond of calling it, is not what is the real derivation of *ἐπηετανὸν* but what Ap. thought it meant. The phrase here is modelled on *Od.* vii 128, *ἐπηετανὸν γανώουσαι*, and the meaning there is pretty clearly "all the year," the gardens of Alcinous enjoying eternal spring. Ap. means then that the Amazons kept horses luxuriously for a year and sacrificed them at the end of it; the present participle is the right tense because they had the habit of doing so. Compare now the Aswamedha, or sacrifice of a horse, in the East, as told by Southey in the *Curse of Kehama*, viii 2:

A year and a day the steed must stray
Wherever chance may guide his way
Before he fall at Seeva's shrine.

Some echo of such an Oriental rite may have reached Alexandria or Rhodes. I abstain from the *Golden Bough*.

ii 1180. οἳ τε θεουδέες οὐδὲ δίκαιοι.

Sense required: "who are god-fearing and who are wicked." To read *ἡδὲ* for *οὐδὲ* (Stephanus) does not give this; to read *οἳ τ' ἀλιτηροὶ* (Matthiae) is violent. Merkel rightly says that the phrase is equivalent to *οἳ τε θεουδέες καὶ οὐ δίκαιοι*; he should rather have said *καὶ οὐ δίκαιοι*. For cf. iii 130, *ἥπαφες, οὐδε δίκη περιέπλεο*, "you have deceived him and unjustly overcome him."

ii 1254. οὐ γὰρ ὃ γ' αἰθερίοιο φυὴν ἔχεν οἰωνοῖο,
ἴσα δ' ἐνξέστοις ὠκύπτερα πάλλεν ἐρετμοῖς.

"Had not the form of a bird of the air"; so say the translators concerning the Promethean vulture. I should like to know what form he had then; perhaps of a bat or a mole or a translator? *φυὴν* here refers to size and nothing else, and that is shewn by the following line, which means "but his wing-feathers were as long as oars."

There is another passage where *φυήν* really is puzzling, iv 683. The Argonauts there are astonished by the strange monsters who attend upon Circe and,

Κίρκης εἷς τε φυήν εἷς τ' ὄμματα παπταίνοντες,

have no doubt she is sister of Aectes and daughter of Helios. They might guess this from her ὄμματα easily enough, because the children of the Sun had a peculiar brightness of eye, but I cannot see what her *φυή* has to do with it. Neither in form nor in size, that I know of, was that race pre-eminent. Add that the rhythm | -- | - ∪ | ∪ - | is rather avoided at the opening of a line by the Greek hexameter; there are only 25 instances of it in the *Argonautica* apart from this line.

What is the connexion between the monsters and the recognition of Circe as daughter of Helios? The children of Helios are notorious for magic arts, and it is obvious how easily τέχνην, "her handicraft," would become τε φυήν. At the same time τε φυήν might mean a general resemblance to Aectes; but then the addition of "daughter of Helios" is otiose.

iii 61. τὸν μὲν ἐγὼν, εἰ καὶ περ ἐς Ἄϊδα ναυτίλλεται...
ρύσομαι.

In a future condition of this sort we expect not a present but an aorist subjunctive. Read ναυτίληται. At *Od.* iv 672 ναυτίλεται is only read by one MS., so far as we know at present, and that probably by accident, but ναυτίλλεται is there of course quite impossible. The form ναυτίληται is correct for Ap.

An interesting passage is iii. 1052 seqq., ἐπήν ζεύξης... ἀρόσσης... ἀνασταχύωσι. The aorists here mean "when you have yoked and ploughed," the present "when they are coming up."

How Ap. spelt νίσσομαι it is perhaps vain to enquire, but I certainly think that we should write either ἀπονεισ- or ἀπο-νισόμεθα as a future at iii 899 and ν(ε)ισόμεθα as an aorist subjunctive at iv 257. In the latter passage we want neither a present indicative nor a future, but a hortative subjunctive. The same correction is required in Manetho vi (iii) 5, μέχρις ἂν κ' ἐπὶ πείρατα νίσσομαι οἴμης, for even the author of that book does not use μέχρις ἂν with a future.

- iii 690. τοῖα κατακνώσσουσα μιννυθαδίῳ νέον ὕπνῳ
λεύσσω ὀνείρατα λυγρὰ.

νέον λεύσσω could only mean: "I lately saw and still see," but Medea cannot really mean that, and Mr Mooney's suggestion, that "the dream is still vividly present," does not appear to me plausible. Rather Ap. wrote λεύσσω ὀνείρατα, and haplography did the rest.

Brunck actually reads λεύσσω, on quite wrong grounds it is true, but read it he does. Then comes Merkel with his followers and obliterates it.

- iii 954. ἦ θαμὰ δὴ στηθέων ἐάγη κέαρ, ὅππότε δοῦπον
ἦ ποδὸς ἦ ἀνέμοιο παραθρέξαντα δοάσσαι.

Medea is waiting for Jason; that her heart should be broken whenever her ear catches a sound is ridiculous. In such a case any sound might "make her jump," but nobody breaks his heart so cheaply. Besides does any Greek talk of ἄγνυμι κέαρ¹? We feel a sort of constriction about the heart at any sudden sound when we are listening intently or highly strung, and the verb for this would be ἐάλη. Cf. 471, ἐόλητο νόον.

I do not quite know what to make of στηθέων. Mr Mooney can only produce two parallels for this "local" use, and unluckily neither of them justifies it. νειοῖο in iii 1056 may be and probably is ablative, χθονὸς in iv 1478 depends upon τηλοῦ, "far away in the land," which makes a great difference. Herwerden's στήθεσφ' does not look like Apollonius to me.

- iii 1208. νήησε σχίζας, ἐπὶ δ' ἀρνειοῦ τάμε λαιμόν,
αὐτόν τ' εὖ καθύπερθε τανύσσατο.

Extraordinary as it may appear, the animal referred to is a ewe, a "female ram," reminding us of the female bull of the astrologers. It is described in 1199 as θῆλυν ὄιν and in 1032 as θῆλυν ἀρνεῖον. I have long marvelled at ὁ θῆλυς in Aristotle and later writers, but this is far worse.

- iii 1287. κυνέην δ' ἀποκάτθετ' ἐρείσας.

This does not mean that Jason took off his own helmet; why should he? He was carrying the serpent's teeth in another

¹ Certainly Homer says κατεκλάσθη ἦτορ.

helmet, and this it was which he leant against his spear to prevent the teeth falling out when he tackled the bulls. *αὐτῇ σὺν ἀσπίδι* in 1288 of course does not mean "with shield alone," but simply "shield and all." At 1321 he picks up again the helmet "full of sharp teeth."

iii 1295.

ἄ τε σπιλὰς εἰν ἀλλὶ πέτρῃ
μῖμνει ἀπειρεσίῃσι δονεύμενα κύματ' ἀέλλαις.

Unconstruable, since ἄ τε cannot take a verb; Merkel rightly restores *μῖμνει*, and the same construction then recurs at 1391: *αἶματι δ' ὀλοὶ | ἥντε κρηναῖαι ἀμάραι πλήθοντο ῥῶσιν*.

iv 246. The context imperatively demands *τῇ γὰρ* for ἡ γὰρ.

iv 311.

ἀμφὶ δὲ δοιαί
σχίζονται προχοαὶ. τὴν μὲν καλέουσι Νάρηκος,
τὴν δ' ὑπὸ τῇ νεάτῃ Καλὸν στόμα· τῇ δὲ διαπρὸ
"Αψυρτος Κόλχοι τε θωώτερον ὠρμήθησαν,
οἱ δ' ὑψοῦ νήσοιο κατ' ἀκροτάτης ἐνέοντο
τηλόθεν.

τῇ δὲ should mean "but by the other way," read *τῇδε*, "by this latter way," no connecting particle is here required or even to be endured. The Colchians then went by the southern stream and so got ahead; Argo came after them *ὑψοῦ*, by the northern channel, going further round and so ascending the river *τηλόθεν*. But what is *νήσοιο κατ' ἀκροτάτης*? It can only mean "down from the highest point," i.e. southwards from the north-east angle. So at 329 *ποταμοῖο κατήλυθον* is not "down the river" but "down from it" into the Adriatic.

iv 408. οὐδ' ἂν ἐγὼ Κόλχοισιν ὑπέξομαι πτολεμίζειν.

So L, *ὑπέξομαι πτολεμίζειν* G. Gerhard's *ὑπέξω μὴ πολεμίζειν* is now generally adopted, but it will not do, because the rhythm | υ -- | - | υ υ -- | is not allowed by Apollonius at the end of a line; at ii 146 the right reading is indisputably *δεῦρο κόμισσε*, but ii 1209 certainly sails very near the wind with *ὃν αὐτῇ Γαῖ' ἀνέφυσεν*. I think this rhythm is generally avoided by the epic writers; even in Homer, so much less particular than

later poets about such minutiae, it is not common¹. A dreadful instance of it is the line εἰ μὲν δώσετε μισθὸν αἰείσω, ὦ κεραμῆες, which some miscreant has put into Homer's mouth. Secondly, why do the MSS. spell πτολ? Because the word was originally preceded by a short vowel, as Brunck observes, and he is right so far with ὑπείξαιμι πτολεμίζειν. But in the days of Brunck 409 had not yet been put straight by Gerhard, and in consequence he read καὶ δ' with four MSS. for οὐδ'. Read οὐδ'... ὑπείξαιμι πτολεμίζων.

iv 603.

ἀμφὶ δὲ κοῦραι

Ἑλιάδες ταναῆσιν ἐελμέναι αἰγείροισιν

μύρονται κινυρὸν μέλαι γόον· ἐκ δὲ φαεινὰς

ἡλέκτρον λιβάδας βλεφάρων προχέουσιν ἔραζε.

Gerhard's ἐελμέναι is the most celebrated emendation in Apollonius, and there cannot be much doubt that it is right. Five MSS. read αἰείμηναι, others ἐειμέναι, ἐφήμηναι, ἐλιγμέναι. But an imitation of the passage has been hitherto overlooked. Dionysius, *Orbis Descriptio* 292 :

ἐνθα δὲ Κελτῶν παῖδες ὑφήμηναι αἰγείροισι

δάκρυ' ἀμέλγονται χρυσανγέος ἡλέκτροιο.

Here again is great diversity of reading, other MSS. giving ὑφείμηναι, ἐφήμηναι, ἐψείμηναι. It is clear that Dionysius did not read ἐελμέναι in his Apollonius, but either ὑφήμηναι or ἐφήμηναι, probably the latter, which he perceived to be nonsense; then changing the subject to the "children of the Kelts" he made a new sense for himself by also changing the participle to ὑφήμηναι. The corruption of ἐελμέναι to ἐφήμηναι is thus at least as old as the Augustan age or thereabouts, but we are now familiar with the antiquity of our variants.

Brunck at one time thought of reading ὑφήμηναι in our passage. He also remarks that "*Indutae* esset ἐφειμέναι," and that would be satisfactory in itself, but does not account so well for the discrepancies of reading as ἐελμέναι; nor is the dative

¹ I reckon only eleven real instances in the whole *Odyssey*, including viii 236 and xx 52; in seven of them the monosyllable is an elided trochee, which

seems to make a difference. I do not of course include lines in which the monosyllable is enclitic.

found with ἐφειμέναι elsewhere in epic verse, so far as I know.

iv 657. τεύχεα θέσκελα κείνων.

Something was shewn in the island of Elba called the "arms of the Argonauts"; τεύχεα is the right reading, and I have had the good luck to find the explanation of it in Suetonius *Aug.* 72: "qualia sunt Capreis immanium beluarum ferarumque membra praegrandia, quae dicuntur Gigantum ossa et arma Heroum." These arms of the Argonauts were therefore bones, probably of rhinoceros and hippopotamus, remains of both of which are found in Elba along with those of other smaller animals: see Haug, *Traité de Géologie*, tom. ii, p. 1866.

iv 1409.

νώσατο δ' Ὀρφεὺς

θεῖα τέρα, τὰς δέ σφι παρηγορέεσκε λιτῆσιν.

στὰς δέ σφε Brunck, grammatically, but στὰς, though in four MSS., is meaningless. ταῖς δέ σφε Schneider, ungrammatically. Those who keep the text explain σφι to mean "for the benefit of the Argonauts," but can quote nothing to make this probable. Read τὼς δέ σφε: there are six other instances of τὼς in Ap.; σφε is corrupted to σφι in the best MSS. at ii 1086 and iii 370; and cf. iii 303, τοίοισι παρηγορέων ἐπέεσσιν.

iv 1583. ἀγκῶνος τετάνυσται ἰθὺς ἀπὸ προὔχοντος ἰούσιν.

Merkel's τέτατ' ἰθὺς ἀπὸ looks plausible, but Ap. is very chary about eliding αι: we find ἔσσετ' thrice at the beginning of a line, i 334, iii 480, 1044; σχήσομ' once, iii 514; eleven such elisions at the weak caesura of the fifth foot, including ἔσσετ' four times; one at the weak caesura of the third, ἔσσετ' again, iii 93; one at the end of the third foot, ii 1164; two at the end of the fourth foot, iii 483, 528. There is not one single instance of this elision at the end of the second foot, and so τέτατ' can hardly be accepted. We must apparently fall back on Brunck's remedy of ejecting ἰθὺς.

The following are still more trifling points: i 895, οὐδ' for οὗτ'. 1323, ἀναπλῆσαι? ii 776, ἐμεῖο is right, for Ap. regularly uses this genitive with words like *father* and *sister*. iii 600,

ἀπάτην for *ἄτην*? 613, *μειλίσσοιτο* seems to me better than *μειλίξαιτο*. iv 1230, *στεινὰς* means "crowded."

Scholía. i 242. Read *ποῖ* for *ποῦ*. 824, *ποῦ* for *που*, "for the natural question to ask was *where* are the younger males." 1204, *κρατύνουσι* for *κρατοῦσι*, and *ῥοιοι* for *τόνοι*; cf. 1191 of the poem. ii 544, *τῷ* for *τὸ*. 653, *μηδένα* for *ἕνα*, *ἐσελθόντα* <δέ> *τινα* for *ἐπελθόντα τινὰ*, and *θύεσθαι* after *ἐκουσίως*; cf. Hdt. vii 197. iv 156, *ιερόν* for *ἴδιον*; the words are elsewhere confused. 259, *τὸν μὲν Ἰστρόν* for *τὸν μὲν Φᾶσιν*; cf. schol. 284. 277, *λινῶν* for *λίνων*. Finally in the *γένος Ἀπολλωνίου* at the end of the scholia read *ὑποστρέψει* for *ὑποστρέφει*.

ARTHUR PLATT.

AESCHYLEA.

P. V. 49.

ἅπαντ' ἐπράχθη πλὴν θεοῖσι κοιρανεῖν,
ἐλεύθερος γὰρ οὐ τις ἐστὶ πλὴν Διός.

Until I come to its conclusion I agree cordially with the note of Sikes and Willson on ἐπράχθη; I cannot see how it can mean, as Dindorf suggested, *permissa sunt*, nor how any other translation can make any sense at all; I agree too that ἐπράχθη is a corruption of ἐπαχθῇ. But the conclusion makes me stare: 'all things are burdensome save to rule the gods.' Is it burdensome then to lie on your back in a punt? Is it the easiest thing to be thought of to rule the gods? And why? Because 'nobody is free except Zeus.' What a reason for what a fiction!

But I do not see how to get any good sense out of ἐπαχθῇ, and hold that it was itself a corruption of ἐπαχθές; anyhow that is the sense we require. 'It is hard for any save the gods to have their own way in everything, for Zeus alone is free.' So says Simonides μηδὲν ἀμαρτεῖν ἐστὶ θεῶν καὶ πάντα κατορθοῦν, so Sophocles μόνοις οὐ γίγνεται θεοῖσι γῆρας, and in general there is nothing the poets are fonder of insisting on than that nobody but the gods can do everything he likes. Nay, Sophocles says that even the gods cannot do so νόσφι Διός (frag. 1129 Pearson). The expression of Aeschylus is illogical, but not too much so for a poet.

ἐπαχθές was attracted to the plural ἅπαντα, and then further depraved into ἐπράχθη.

P. V. 464.

κλύοντες οὐκ ἤκουον, ἀλλ' ὄνειράτων
ἀλίγκιοι μορφαῖσι τὸν μακρὸν βίον
ἔφυρον εἰκῇ πάντα.

There seems no great point in μακρὸν βίον; there is no reason to suppose that the lives of these primitive savages were re-

markable for length, and Prometheus indeed tells us at 496 that they were shorter than now, for *φαρμάκων χρεία κατεσκέλλοντο*. Nor can it mean that they felt their lives to be a weariness to them; *μακρὰ λέγειν* may mean 'to be tedious,' but the adjective in itself never means 'tedious,' so far as I can ascertain. The reading of the later MSS, *τὸν μακρὸν χρόνον*, is perhaps intended to make some such meaning possible. *μαῦρον* is the slightest of changes, and goes beautifully with the context: 'like shapes of dreams in their dim life.' The form *μαῦρος* certainly existed, and the poet is fond of *μαυρώω*. The right way to use *τὸν μακρὸν βίον* may be seen at 553.

Septem 71.

μή μοι πόλιν γε πρυμνόθεν πανώλεθρον
ἐκθαμνίσητε δηάλωτον Ἑλλάδος
φθόγγον χέουσαν καὶ δόμους ἐφεστίους.

The objections to this are many and strong. *ἐκθαμνίσητε* plainly ought to go with Ἑλλάδος, but then *φθόγγον χέουσαν* is senseless; if we take Ἑλλάδος *φθόγγον* together we get pure moonshine for our pains, since this is not Greek for 'the Greek language'; *φθόγγος* means 'voice' or 'sound,' not 'speech'; e.g. at *Antig.* 1217 *τὸν Αἴμονος φθόγγον* is 'the sound of Haemon's voice,' but Creon is too far off to catch the words (1209); and 'the voice or sound of Greece' is senseless. And suppose it could mean 'the Greek language,' even then it is incredible; the enemy talked Greek just as much as the Cadmeans did, and *ἐτεροφώνῳ στρατῷ* in 155 would not support the contrary view even if it were not indubitably corrupt. Again, what a wretched *cheville* is *καὶ δόμους ἐφεστίους*, coming where it does; see Tucker's note also on this. Finally the scholiast says *γρ. καὶ ὄλβον ῥέοντα* for *φθόγγον χέουσαν*: this cannot be an attempt at correction, because it will not construe as the passage stands; it is a genuine ancient reading and quite likely to be as near the truth as our MSS.

What then is the conclusion? That one or more lines have perished after Ἑλλάδος. For example:

μηδ' ἐξαϊστῶσητε δαιμόνων ἔδη
ὄλβῳ φλέοντα καὶ δόμους ἐφεστίους.

All we can do is to mark a lacuna and obelize *φθόγγον χέουσαν*. The more I read this play the more convinced I feel of its desperate and all pervading corruption.

φθόγγον χέουσαν seems to me to be a conjecture parallel to *χρησμόν λέγοντας* in Solon 36, 9 (Bergk), where we now know the original to have been *χρειοῖ φυγόντας*.

Septem 83.

ἔλεδέμας πεδιοπλοκτύπος.

The first four syllables, so written in M, should be expanded into a dochmiac in the opinion of most editors. The scholia talk of τὰ πεδία τῆς γῆς μου, and some accordingly insert γᾶς, e.g. *ιδὲ δὲ γᾶς ἐμᾶς* Wecklein. This seems to me a very doubtful step; the scholiast read *ἔλε δ' ἐμᾶς* and supposed ἐμᾶς to be for ἐμῆς γῆς, but there is no evidence that he had γᾶς in his text, and γᾶς ἐμᾶς πεδία sounds to me quite unlike Aeschylus. Another scholion speaks of τὸ δέμας ἡμῶν τῷ φόβῳ λαμβάνουσα; that confused note is more like the genuine thing to my mind, *ἔλε δέμας* <τρόμος>. The accentuation of M is then right, *τρόμος* easily fell out after *δέμας*, and *δέμας* is a word of which the poet is very fond. I should agree with Dindorf in preferring *εἶλε* to *ἔλε*; both would be written the same in the old alphabet.

For the aorist, cf. *ἔδεια* in 185; for *τρόμος* similar phrases in Homer, especially *Iliad* v, 862, *τοὺς δ' ἄρ' ὑπὸ τρόμος εἶλεν*, xxiv, 170, *τὸν δὲ τρόμος ἔλλαβε γυνῖα*.

Septem 216.

*ἀνδρῶν τάδ' ἐστὶ σφάγια καὶ χρηστήρια
θεοῖσιν ἔρδειν, πολέμιων πειρωμένοις.*

πειρωμένοις M, with *ων* superscribed. If we read *πειρωμένων* it must agree with *ἀνδρῶν* and govern *πολεμίων*, but this is ugly. *πειρωμένοις* looks also more genuine; I apprehend that it is a corruption of *πειρωμένους* by attraction to *θεοῖσιν* or otherwise. The genitive after *πειρᾶσθαι* in the sense of *attack* is common in Herodotus. The sense is: 'It is the business of men to make sacrifices, since they it is who make trial of the enemy.'

Septem 537.

εἰ γὰρ τύχοιεν ὦν φρονούσι πρὸς θεῶν!
αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις ἀνοσίοις κομπάσμασιν
ἦ τὰν πανώλεις παγκάκως τ' ὀλοίατο.

Punctuate as above; a colon after *κομπάσμασιν* spoils the sense, and ἦ τοι certainly need not stand first in its clause.

Ag. 38.

ὥς ἐκὼν ἐγὼ
μαθοῦσιν αὐδῶ κοῦ μαθοῦσι λήθομαι.

There is no attempt whatever at any humorous effect here: the phrase *ἐκὼν ἐπιλανθάνομαι* is not uncommon for deliberate ignoring or keeping silence upon a point; Liddell and Scott will provide examples from Herodotus and Aeschines, to which may be added Origen *contra Celsum* i, 16. *τοῦτο λανθάνει με*, 'this slips me,' *τούτου ἐπιλανθάνομαι*, 'I let this slip,' so 'pass over, ignore,' of which 'forget' is only one variety. So at *Odyssey* xii, 227, *λανθανόμην Κίρκης ἐφημοσύνης*: certainly Odysseus had not forgotten what Circe told him, but deliberately neglected it. *Iliad* x, 243, *πῶς ἂν Ὀδυσῆος λαθοίμην*, 'how can I pass over Odysseus?' Cf. Verrall's note.

ἐκὼν does not really go with *αὐδῶ* at all, for the watchman could not be anxious to talk of the scandal even to those who knew of it. In prose the connexion would be made clearer by saying something like *ἐκὼν τοῖς μὲν ξυνετοῖς λέγω τοῖς δὲ μὴ οὐ*, where the *μὲν* clause would merely lead up to the second. 'Of my own will (though some may understand me) I say nothing to enlighten the ignorant.'

Ag. 117.

ὁ κελαινὸς ὁ δ' ἐξόπιν ἀργᾶς.

Two eagles of two distinct species would not go out to prey together, and it is possible to identify the Aeschylean bird with considerable certainty. The *οἰωνῶν βασιλεὺς*, even if there were no other proof, could hardly be anything but the Golden Eagle, 'by almost universal consent regarded as the "king of birds"' (*Royal Nat. Hist.*, vol. iv, p. 224), and called the Black Eagle to this day in the Highlands and in Central Asia (*kara-*

kush). But further there is only one species of eagle in which the two colours mentioned by the poet could be observed; the mature Golden Eagle is dark all over, but in young birds 'the whole of the root of the tail is whitish or pure white, becoming gradually mottled with grey and brown towards the middle, and only the terminal third of the feathers is nearly black' (*ibid.* p. 225). 'The young Eagles are tended by the parents for some little time after they quit the nest, then they abandon the place of their birth for ever. Before they leave their parents, they may from time to time be seen hunting in company, the old birds apparently teaching them to take and kill their own prey' (Seeböhm, *British Birds*, 1883, vol. I, p. 104)¹.

Aeschylus had seen this in all probability for himself, and like Calchas had marked the difference in colour. But why does this shew that the Atridae and the eagles are *λήμασι δισσοῦς* (126)? Here I enter upon conjecture: the young bird, it may be supposed with much certainty, would be bullied and kept under subjection by its parent, and hence the 'white feather' denotes inferiority and want of self-assertion. That suits the character of Menelaus perfectly; in the *Iliad* he is always dependent upon and guided by Agamemnon, in the *Odyssey* he is ruled by Helen. This contrast between the brothers is all that Aeschylus means; he carefully guards against any supposition that he may be thinking Menelaus cowardly by adding *μαχίμους* to agree with *both* Atridae. But it was natural that the 'white feather' should come also to mean actual cowardice, as it did in Sophocles (*πύγαργος*). The *πύγαργός* of Aristotle is a different species, and has nothing to do with our passage, for two different species would not be hunting together; there may however have been some confusion between the different kinds in the mind of Greek poets and zoologists.

Headlam must be mistaken in making *δύο* agree with *λήμασι*, since *δύο* is not indeclinable in tragedy.

Ag. 349.

ἄφύλακτον εὐδήσουσι πᾶσαν εὐφρόνην.

¹ The last plate in Macpherson's *Home Life of a Golden Eagle* shews the white tail very conspicuous.

This future tense has not been sufficiently noted ; it proves that Clytemnestra does not expect Agamemnon's return upon that day, and that the scholiast is therefore wrong in supposing it. For Aeschylus would never have used the future here, had he intended to bring Agamemnon back before night. Aeschylus knew what every Greek dramatist knew, that there is no time in a tragedy, or otherwise that there is a double time, that occupied by the actors and that totally undetermined one which lies in the background. An unexpected author on such a subject puts it better than anybody else I know when he says: 'The mistake arose through our forgetfulness of the fact that in a drama the element of time is often annihilated for dramatic purposes' (W. K. Parker, *Mammalian Descent*, p. 210).

Ag. 400.

κακοῦ δὲ χαλκοῦ τρόπον
τρίβω τε καὶ προσβολαῖς
μελαμπαγῆς πέλει.

τρίβω and προσβολαῖς cannot refer to a touchstone, because bronze is not so tested. Hence Paley actually suggested χρυσοῦ for χαλκοῦ ; but that will not help us, because gold does not go black when so tested ; it is the mark on the stone which shews the gold to be bad. The real explanation, as I learn from Professor Collie, is this : good bronze has no lead in it ; if lead be present, oxide of lead is formed by contact with the air, and this is black ; even if no lead be there but the bronze is insufficiently smelted, it may blacken through the formation of oxide of copper. Bad bronze blackens at once after polishing, and that is what Aeschylus refers to by τρίβω καὶ προσβολαῖς.

Ag. 715.

παμπρόσθη πολύθρηνον
αἰῶν' ἀμφὶ πολιτᾶν
μέλεον αἶμ' ἀνατλάσα.

This terribly corrupt passage has been very nearly put straight by a series of scholars, if we only combine the scattered suggestions into one orderly whole. For παμπρόσθη Enger proposed γαμβροῖς δῆ, which has been improved into γαμβρούς

θ' οὐ by Paton (*C. R.* xx, 207). For αἰῶν' H. L. Ahrens proposed παιῶν', improved by Schwerdt into παιᾶν', and the same emendation is accepted by everybody at 258. That ἀμφὶ πολιτᾶν is right is proved by the metre, though the corresponding line is corrupt. All that is now needed is to read ἀνέπλησαν for ἀνατλάσα. 'And the kindred who bore the lamentable burden of the dirge over the blood of their hapless citizens.' For ἀνέπλησαν cf. frag. 54 (Dind.) πίμπλησι μέλος. I take the meaning to be that they 'filled up' the dirge by acting as chorus, οἱ μὲν ἄρ' ἐθρήνεον ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο—γαμβροὶ. As they had joyfully sung in the hymeneal song (710), so later they changed their tune to a dirge, and the 'aged city of Priam,' now that she is laid low, reviles them for their earlier proceedings. Aeschylus is fond of using παιᾶν in this ironical sense; cf. 650, *Cho.* 159, *Sept.* 855, and the very words πολύθρηνον παιᾶνα are almost reproduced by Hesychius, παιᾶνι στυγνῶ· θρηνητικῶ ὕμνῳ, though of course his gloss is not on this passage but on Eur. *Tro.* 126.

Ag. 1430.

ἀτίετον ἔτι σὲ χρὴ στερομέναν φίλων.

The corresponding line is ἀπέδικες, ἀπέταμες, ἀπόπολις δ' ἔσῃ, which is plainly right as it stands; to insert τ' after ἀπέταμες is simply wicked. The form ἀτίετος is a favourite with Aeschylus, the second foot should be kept a tribrach if possible, σὲ is unnecessary; so the best change seems to be to read ἀτίετον ἔτι χρὴ.

Ag. 1435.

οὐ μοι φόβον μέλαθρον ἐλπὶς ἐμπατεῖ.

Explain this as 'the expectation of terror walks not in my halls,' comparing τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ φόβου in Thuc. vii, 61, quoted by Headlam in his note. Clytemnestra goes on to say: 'so long as Aegisthus lights the fire upon my hearth-stone'; as the watcher keeps off a wild beast by fire, so fear cannot break into her palace while Aegisthus keeps watch in it.

Ag. 1573.

κτεάνων τε μέρος

βαιὸν ἐχούση πᾶν ἀπόχρη μοι δ'....

Cf. in a fragment of Ehippus (*Athenaeus* VIII, 359 A):
 ἅπαν¹ γὰρ ἱκανόν ἐστι, 'anything will do for me.' Headlam
 justly objects to ἀπόχρη that it is a purely prose word; the
 original was perhaps πᾶν μοι ἀπαρκέσει.

Ag. 1664. A better supplement than any yet proposed
 would be, I think, τὸν κρατοῦντά <τ' ἀγνοεῖν>. The present
 would be the right tense.

Cho. 69.

θιγόντι δ' οὔτι νυμφικῶν ἐδωλίων
 ἄκος, πόροι τε πάντες....

Bothe's οὔτε is an attempt to get the connexion right, τε—
 τε being equal to ὡς—οὕτως as so often in Aeschylus, e.g.
Agam. 333, ὄξος τε—καὶ τῶν. But his οὔτε is in the wrong
 place; the true correction is rather θιγόντι τ' οὔτι.

Cho. 694.

νῦν δ' ἥπερ ἐν δόμοισι βακχείας καλῆς
 ἱατρὸς ἐλπὶς ἦν παροῦσαν ἐγγράφει.

ἐγγραφε schol. πεσοῦσαν Enger. ἀναστρέφειν Dobree. These
 two last are fumbings in the right direction; πεσοῦσ' ἀνε-
 στράφη in the old alphabet is almost indistinguishable from
 πεσοῦσαν ἐγγραφε. Cf. *Pers.* 166, κοίνσας οὔδας ἀντρέψη ποδὶ,
 for the aorist participle and the idea. I hesitated some time
 between ἀνετράπη and ἀνεστράφη; the former is the commoner
 verb, I think, in this sense, but the latter is metrically superior
 and nearer the tradition, and cf. *Pers.* 814; ἐξανέστραπται
 βάθρων.

I also harbour a suspicion that καλῆς should be καλῇ.

Eum. 594.

XO. εἰπεῖν γε μέντοι δεῖ σ' ὅπως κατέκτανες.

OP. λέγω· ξιφουλκῶ χειρὶ πρὸς δέρην τεμῶν.

The scholiast is all at sea over this couplet; the reason why
 the method of killing is so insisted upon is that there is a
 special superstition about the shedding of blood. Primitive
 man commits infanticide by drowning, burying alive, strangling,

¹ ἅπαν Dindorf for ἅπαντα.

exposure, and still more cruel methods, but he always, so far as I know, avoids shedding the blood. One may suppose that the blood somehow was imagined to be essential to setting the ghosts or demons at work to avenge the death of a member of the tribe. Aeschylus is perpetually insisting upon the blood in this connexion, and it is not merely a poetic figure with him, as this passage shews, but a relic of the ancient superstition dimly surviving.

Frag. 99, 1 (Sidg.).

ταύρῳ τε λειμὼν ξένια πάμβοτος παρῆν.

This line is so restored by Weil, but *ξένια παρῆν* is very unsatisfactory. *ξεινήια πορεῖν* is a Homeric phrase, we do not know the construction here and the papyrus is horribly corrupt throughout; for *παρῆν* we should read *πορεῖν* or *πορῶν*.

ARTHUR PLATT.

THE CATHARSIS-CLAUSE IN GERMAN CRITICISM BEFORE LESSING.

Not the least interesting part in the late Ingram Bywater's masterly edition of the *Poetics* is the appendix, containing a synopsis of versions and paraphrases of the clause: δι' ἑλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν¹.

Numerous as are the passages collected there, ranging from 1527 to 1899, they fail to show the name of any German scholar before Curtius (1753) and Lessing (1768). Yet in Germany, as well as in neighbouring countries, the much-debated catharsis-clause passed, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, through an interesting evolution, which it is the plan of this paper to describe.

Four centuries have struggled with the interpretation of these few words: 'incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions².'

Of course, we are not concerned here with Aristotle's real meaning, but only with the explanations which have gained currency in the course of German dramatic criticism before Lessing. These it will be easier to appraise and situate with the help of a short outline of the problem in its broader European aspect.

The formula quoted above, it may be noticed, contains Aristotle's explanation of both the mediate and the ultimate end of tragedy. The arousing of pity and fear is the means of attaining the final object of tragedy: the catharsis of such emotions. Thus the student is confronted with a double problem, the second part of which, concerned with the ultimate end of tragedy, has been the storm-centre of prolonged controversy. The various solutions, all hingeing upon the interpretation of the word *catharsis*, are in the main reducible to two. The most recent of these, usually associated with the names of Weil

¹ 6. 1449^b 27.

² Bywater's translation.

and Bernays, conceives of tragedy as purging, in an almost pathological sense, or relieving the spectator of certain emotions by providing opportunities for these emotions to spend themselves. The implication is not that these emotions are objectionable: they are simply given an outlet in a natural way. This process may be considered as predominantly emotional: emotion being at once its means and its end. In this sense it is essentially a modern conception, and, it may be said in anticipation, one altogether foreign to the moralizing and didactic spirit of Europe from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. Indeed, for the purposes of this study it may safely be left in the background. The older interpretation, prominently championed by many critics from Heinsius to Lessing, and alive to this day, rests on the assumption that certain emotions although not altogether objectionable, stand in need of purification. This purification is most commonly understood as a sort of reduction of their excessive intensity, a process of moderation and normalization which may be brought about by the frequent emotional indulgence which tragedy affords. But opinions differ as to whether this explanation is psychologically sound, Plato e.g. holding¹ that frequent gratification of our emotional faculties does not result in their weakening but in the destruction of the will-power by which they are controlled. It is evident that in the main this process is an ethical one: its mediate end is emotional, to be sure, but the ultimate object implied is the curbing of these very emotions, and what is sought after is not the gratification of the individual but his moral improvement².

There are two further questions connected with the catharsis-problem. The first is concerned with the possibility of separating pity and fear; the second, arising from the syncopated compactness of Aristotle's text, as to whether the emotions to be discharged or purified are exclusively pity and fear, or whether other related emotions are also affected.

¹ *Republic*, Bk x.

² A third explanation, neither emotional nor ethical but intellectualistic was recently defended by O. S. Haupt, *Wirkt die Tragödie auf das Gemüt oder auf den Verstand oder die*

Moralität der Zuschauer? oder Der aus den Schriften des Aristoteles erbrachte wissenschaftliche Beweis für die intellectualistische Bedeutung der Katharsis. Supplement to nr. 3 of the *Archiv f. Geschichte d. Philosophie*, vol. xxviii.

What seems to be the first mention of the catharsis-formula by a German critic dates from 1534, when Joachim Camerarius conceived of tragedy as an imitation etc. contrived '...in such a manner that the several parts may have suitable action, everything ending in pity and terror'. To Camerarius Aristotle's explanation evidently meant nothing more than the *exitus funesti* of Euanthius or the *exitus tristes* of Diomedes. In a somewhat similar spirit Willichius (1545), without actually committing himself on this strange innovation, would seem to consider pity and terror as part of subject-matter².

It is uncertain whether Melanchthon knew the Aristotelian Formula, but his expressed conception of the aim of Tragedy, its subject-matter and its means of appeal would suggest that he did. In his opinion the end of tragedy is to force rude and savage souls into moderation; the subject-matter presented should be so terrible as to strike whole audiences with *horror* and move them with *pity*³. Even in Hans Sachs a suggestion of the catharsis-idea may be pointed out, for does not this worthy, in the preface to the second volume of the folio edition, lure the reader with the promise of 'nit allein...etliche süsz fruchttragende Bäumlein, zur Speysz der Gesunden, sonder Wurtz und Krausz, so resz und pitte zu Artzney, die Krancken gemüter zu *purgieren*, vnd die bösen Feuchtigkeit der Laster

¹ 'Sed haud definiunt [tragoediam] representationem magnarum rerum & horribilium ac incredibilium. Alii breuiter comprehensionem fortunae heroicae. Alii prolixius, imitationem rerum grauium & ingentium, quarum exitus grata oratione explicantur, ita ut singulae partes conuenientem habeant actionem, desinentibus uniuersis in misericordiam & terrores.' *Comm. in trag. Sophoclis*, 1534, p. 6 ro.

² 'Nam id serium esse debet sed cum miseria & terrore.' Jodocus Willichius, *Comm. in A.P. Hor.*, 1545, p. 13 f. This view has actually been defended on the basis of the restitution of the reading *μαθημάτων* as found in the Parisinus (A^o) for *παθημάτων*, the

apographic reading which is now almost universally accepted. Cf. H. Otte, *Kennt Aristoteles die sogenannte tragische Katharsis?* Berlin, 1912.

³ 'Ut rudes ac feros animos...flecterent ad *moderationem* & frenandas cupiditates; ... argumenta ... quorum commemoratione *cohorrescerent* tota theatra. Non enim mouetur populus leuium aut mediocrium miseriarum cogitatione, terribilis species obijcienda est oculis, quae penetret in animos, & diu haereat, & moueat illa ipsa *commiseratione* ut de causis humanarum calamitatum cogitent, & singuli se ad illas imagines conferant." *Adhortatio ...de legendis Tragoedijs & Comoedijs* 1545. The italics are ours.

auszzutreiben' ? (1560). It is not quite impossible that Sachs should have become acquainted with the term *purgatio*, as it had been used in translations of the catharsis-clause from Valla down to Paccius and Segni¹ and only shortly before, in the version of Petrus Victorius (1560). But there was no suggestion in that term or in those versions, of the modern homoeopathic theory, likening the emotions to the humours of the body, which Sachs here clearly expresses. Moreover the fact remains that the second folio-volume is almost exclusively dramatic in contents and that the explanation of its probable effect may thus have had special reference to the drama. The question might well be asked: 'Had Sachs been acquainted with the catharsis-clause, would he not have interpreted it in that same spirit?' Be that as it may, it is curious at least to note that he was probably the first German writer to adumbrate, however faintly, the pathological interpretation of the catharsis.

Schosser² first raises the question as to whether pity and terror may be separated. In his opinion the catharsis may be effected by either one of the emotions or by both³. There is no adequate basis in the *Poetics*⁴ for this view, the insidious effect of which may be easily underestimated because it could be held, as was the case with Schosser, without necessarily showing in the definition. It favoured a mechanical conception of tragedy, as of a conglomeration of incidents each calculated to arouse a certain emotion and it is closely related with the tendency shown by Willichius to consider the emotions as inherent in the subject-matter.

The next year brings another curious instance of the

¹ 1498; 1527; 1549. See Bywater's list of versions and paraphrases of the catharsis-clause, *l.c.* p. 361 ff.

² 'Per misericordiam & metum conficienshuiuscemodi perturbationum purgationem.' Joh. Schosser, *Disputatio de Tragoedia*, 1569, II.

³ The subject-matter, he states, should provide 'vel terrorem vel miserationem vel utrumque.' Corneille, later on (*Discours de la tragédie*) insisted that one of the emotions would

accomplish the tragic effect. Cf. J. G. Robertson, *Lessing's interpretation of Aristotle*, *Modern Language Review*, vol. XII (1917), p. 327.

⁴ Although the passage where the effectiveness of certain discoveries is described might give rise to doubt. See Ch. 11: 'This (i.e. discovery attended by Peripeties) will arouse either pity or fear.' Bywater's translation.

catharsis-clause in a state of diffusion, as with Melanchthon and Sachs, namely Jonas Bitner's definition of tragedy¹.

Again, an interesting point comes into notice with Pontanus. What Maggi had already tried in Italy² is here once more attempted: namely a clearer wording of the end of the catharsis-clause: *τοιούτων παθημάτων*. 'Of such emotions,' writes Bywater. Which emotions? Not all scholars will accept *τοιούτων* as practically equivalent to *τούτων*. Certain translators, Butcher and Gomperz, write 'these emotions.' Did Aristotle mean pity and fear, the very emotions which tragedy is to arouse, or these and kindred emotions, or neither necessarily pity nor fear, but only kindred emotions? Practically all translators have to face the difficulty, but most of them seem not to care to discuss the point. They may simply translate: 'of emotions' following Segni (1549) or Minturno (1559), or 'of that sort of emotions,' as Paccius (1527) and Victorius (1560) and Schosser (1569) did, or 'of similar emotions' as Rossi (1590) and later on Heinsius (1611) and Vossius (1647) suggested. Jacob Pontanus squarely faces the issue and defines the emotions as those 'from which such tragical crimes arise³.' According to this view it is not pity and terror which are affected by the catharsis; but pity and terror are used to free the soul from the perturbing emotions which are the cause of tragic crimes.

Pontanus is the first German critic to show interest in the psychological aspect of the problem: 'How can such a process be other than painful? How can a tragedy built of misery produce delight, as it should whether delight be wholly or in part the aim of poetry, if it fills the soul with pity and terror⁴?'

¹ 'In den Tragoedien sind gewaltige und herrliche Personen der Königen / Fürsten und Tyrannen / und erheben sich erstlich grosse schrecken / furcht und anfechtungen / demnach stimpfliche (sic) / kurtze und vergebne freud / letstlich jämmerliche und erbärmliche zufäll / und ausgänge grosser und fürtrefflicher leüt.' Jonas Bitner, translation of Plautus' *Menaechmi*, 1570.

² 1550. Cf. Spingarn, *Literary Criticism in the Renaissance*, p. 78.

³ 'vt misericordia & terrore animos ab iis perturbationibus liberet, a quibus huiusmodi facinora tragica proficiuntur.' Jac. Pontanus, *Poeticarum institutionum*, l. III, Ingolst., 1594, p. 110.

⁴ 'Sed cum tragoedia rebus luctuosius plena sit, mirum videatur quomodo voluptatem pariat, quam parere

Pontanus meets these objections first by referring to Aristotle's theory of the pleasure derived from mere imitation, a pleasure enhanced in tragedy by the difficulties involved; secondly, by explaining that the faculty of pity is innate in us: 'Quae autem veniunt a natura, ea jucunda sunt¹'; a pity for others which is intimately connected with the egotistic joy in our own security. Finally we are glad to know how to behave should we be overtaken by similar misfortunes.

The argument appeared convincing enough and Pontanus' version found favour with the Giessen professors².

Opitz³, with whom Rist⁴ and Klaj⁵ agreed, is in a sense a disciple of Heinsius, whose poems he had translated and whose glory he had sung. Heinsius, elaborating the conception of Robortelli, Vettori and Castelvetro⁶ had explained the catharsis as the result of repeated indulgence in certain feelings, to which our nature finally grows so inured that they cease to move us more than is fitting. The green recruit is full of fear and terror, whilst the veteran is collected and steadfast; thus he who sees misery frequently will feel pity, but no more than he should⁷. The ideal is one of measure, of moderation, of de-

debet omnino, siquidem delectatio aut finis est aut coniuncta cum fine poseos vt alibi docuimus: quem pro pacto per moesta & flebilis consequemur? Si praeterea terrorem & miserationem incutit animis tragoedia, non utique delectationem.'

¹ See Aristotle, *Rhet.* I, ch. XI.

² *Poetica Giessena*, 1617. They dropped the word *tragica*.

³ 'dann in dem wir grosser Leute / gantzer Städte und Länder eussersten Untergang zum öfftern schauen und betrachten tragen wir zwar / wie es sich gebuehret / erbarmen mit ihnen / können auch nachmals ausz Wehmuth die Traenen kaum zurückhalten; wir lernen aber darneben auch durch stetige Besichtigung so vielen Creutzes und Uebels / das andern begegnet ist / das unserige welches uns begegnen moechte / weniger fürchten und besser

erdulden?' Opitz, tr. of Seneca's *Troades*, 1625.

⁴ *Perseus*, 1634.

⁵ *Herodes der Kindermörder*, 1645.

⁶ Cf. Spingarn, *l.c.*, p. 77.

⁷ 'Tyro autem hostem metuit ac horret donec veteranus animo & affectu consistit. Ita qui miserias frequenter spectat, miseratur, & quidem vt oportet. Qui frequenter ea quae horrorem movent, intuetur; minus tandem horret, & vt decet.' It may be remarked that neither Heinsius' translation of the word *catharsis* by *expiatio* ('per misericordiam & horrorem, eorundem expiationem affectuum inducit,' *De tragoediae constitutione*, 1611, p. 28 ff.) presumably after Minturno (*De Poeta*, Ven., 1559, p. 184) nor the kindred *lustratio* have left any trace in Germany.

corum: *ut oportet, ut decet*. With Opitz this theory became even milder and its non-Stoic character is emphasized: he does not wish for a more or less calloused disposition, neither does he crave indifference, but rather gentle equanimity¹.

The Jesuit Alexander Donatus (1631), who was very popular in Germany, takes a much more decided stand². Quoting Robortello and Castelvetro he arraigns Plato for excluding tragedy from the ideal state on the pretext that '*ut aliquis iaculando fit iaculator, sic pauendo fit pavidus*.' It is not unlikely that the preventive theory of Heinsius was being conceived by contemporaries in an extreme Stoic manner, as Donatus sees need to insist that the emotions are not to be torn out, but merely cured, that is, moderated³.

As to the relation between pity and fear, Donatus would strongly disagree with Schosser. The pleasure of tragedy, Pontanus had said, is partly derived from our joy in our own security, in other words, from not having to fear insecurity. Herein lies the germ of Donatus' theory of the inseparable connection between pity and fear. According to Donatus we 'fear only those things, by which we should justly and laudably be moved.' In other words we fear because they might befall us, since they befell others of our kind. This is also the foundation of our pity, for tragic pity is sympathy and implies the possibility of identifying ourselves with the sufferers. As Aristotle had said: 'pity is occasioned by undeserved misfortune, and fear by that of one like ourselves⁴.' Donatus threw light on the

¹ In the preface to his translation of *Antigone* (1635) he repeats in Latin the substance of his earlier views: 'Et huic fini Tragicorum scripta imprimis producuntur, ut ex contemplatione nimirum fortunae, qualiscunque ea est, alienae, nostram sive florentem bonis artibus retinere diligentius, sive adversam ac jacentem moderatius erectoque animo ferre discamus.'

² '...temperans affectus misericordiae ac timoris.' *De arte poetica*, III, Romae 1631, Colon. 1633, etc.

³ 'Non enim debent ista per Tragœdiam penitus avelli, sed curari... Animi vero perturbationes, non alio modo curantur, nisi ut modum quandam, & moderationem accipiunt.'

⁴ *Poet.* ch. 13. Donatus: 'Nam cum tragoedia alios ob alias causas atque errata in miseriam prolapsos imitetur, advertendo ruinae principia timemus, ne etiam ipsi propter scelera opprimamur, tum commiserando fortunae nostrae prospicimus, ne paria terroris et commiserationis exempla praebeamus. Si enim erroribus im-

Poetics by quoting kindred passages from the *Rhetoric*¹. But this was nothing new. Referring to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* Heinsius had already explained fear in this manner, viz. as personal fear for ourselves² and had been himself anticipated by Robortelli³.

Separation of the tragic emotions is implied by Harsdörfer's quaint attempts at dramatic psychology. Like Pontanus he is worried by the apparent contradiction between the painful feelings aroused by tragedy and the pleasure expected from it. In answering, aided by Pontanus and Heinsius, he refers to the delight of artistic imitation, and of surprise, the human quality of pity and the pleasure to be derived by good men from wise 'sentences'⁴. One may notice that the evident expectation

placati corruerunt reges, quanto magis corruent privati cives. Quo fit, ut ea solum metuamus, quibus iure laudabiliterque commoveri debemus,' *l.c.* The italics are ours.

¹ Thus 'misericordia aegritudo ex miseria alterius iniuria laborantis': cf. *Rhet.* II, 8; also *Poet.* XII: 'metus est appropinquantium et impendentium malorum expectatio, seu futurae aegritudinis sollicita recordatio': cf. *Rhet.* II, 5. In no instance, neither by Jesuits nor by any other German critics, were the important passages from the *Politics* (VIII, 6, and especially VIII, 7) on the cathartic effect of music referred to.

² 'Cujus rei in Rhetoricorum libris reddit rationem Aristoteles. Etenim quae, ne sibi eueniant, metuunt homines, ea alijs cum euenere, miserationem mouent, & hunc gignunt affectum,' *l.c.* p. 97.

³ Explicationes, 1548, pp. 151 ff. As pointed out by Robertson, *l.c.* p. 323, who adds references to Dacier and Louis Racine.

⁴ 'Trauerhändel belustigen vor sich selbst nicht/sondern verursachen Erstaunen und Hermen. *Aristoteles c. 14. Poet.* nennet diese eigentliche Gemütseregungen (*Passiones*)

der Trauerspiele 'Ἐλέον καὶ φόβον: wann man nemlich einen Abscheu vor der Grausamkeit /und eine Mitbetrübniss über der unschuldigen Elend empfindet.' 'Es belustiget aber die kunstschieckliche Nachahmung: Gleichher gestalt uns die Abbildung eines grimmigen Löwens /Drachens oder Tieggers mehr beliebet /als das lebendige Thier selbste. *Heins. de Constit. Trag.* c. 8.' 'Zu dem empfinden wir einen Lust in Erwartung unverhoffter Trauerfalle /und ist unserm Hertze von Natur das Erbarmen eingepflantzet /welches durch diese Spiele erwekket wird: Weil allerhand Tugendlehren mit eingeführet werden /und in Euripide fast jeder Vers einen Lehrsatz begreift /wie *Cicero* 1. 16. *Epist. fam.* schreibt /kan solche Anführung zum Guten den Frommen eine Belustigung heissen.' (Letter to Klaj, prefixed to the latter's *Herodes der Kindermörder*, 1645, p. 57): 'der Poet [ist]...bemühet / Erstaunen /oder Hermen und Mitleiden zu erregen /jedoch dieses mehr als jenes. Durch das Erstaunen wird gleichsam ein kalter Angstschweiz verursacht und wird von der Furcht unterschieden /als welche von grosser Gefahr entsteht; dieses aber von einer Unthat und erschrecklichen

of pleasure to be derived from tragedy is yet, with Harsdörfer as formerly with Pontanus, coupled with the assumption of a didactic aim. But in Harsdörfer's muddled explanations as in certain passages of Klaj's¹ the most noticeable feature is the admission of *Erstaunen* or astonishment amongst the emotions aroused by tragedy.

Aristotle had remarked that the incidents arousing pity and fear 'have the greatest effect on the mind when they occur unexpectedly and at the same time in consequence of one another'.² But Aristotle represented unexpectedness as an element not necessarily connected with tragedy and as merely intensifying pity and fear. Neither does he advocate unexpectedness at the expense of probability, but values it only if logically produced in the normal course of events.

Even mere unexpectedness with its result, astonishment, had in Germany long been considered as valuable in a drama, e.g. by Daniel Cramer³. The first mention of *admiratio* in Germany occurs in a preface to an edition of Seneca⁴. The tragic *surprise*, as Alexander Donatus, inspired by Aristotle, explains it, is something more than the result of unexpectedness: fear enters into it, produced by the fact that, although unexpected, the events are well accounted for, the most convincing example being Oedipus, whose every effort to escape his fate brings him

Grausamkeit welche wir hören oder sehen. Solche Gemütsbewegung findet sich wann wir ein Laster scheuen [sehen?] ernstlich und plötzlich straffen / dasz wir in unsrem Gewissen auch befinden; und wir werden zu Mitleiden veranlasst / wann wir einen Unschuldigen viel Uebel leiden sehen.' *Poetischer Trichter*, 1650, vol. II, p. 84.

¹ Klaj thinks he may try 'den gecreuzigten Christus in einem Trauerspiele vorzustellen / darinnen die Zuhörer zu barmhertzigem Mitleiden geführt werden / wie ihnen hier ein grausames Furchterstaunen [sic] ankommen / als welches die vornemsten Bewegungen seyn / die in Trauerspielen zu beobachten.' *Herodes der Kinder-*

mörder, 1645.

² *Poet.*, ch. 9, Bywater's translation.

³ 'Quis enim non afficiatur magnopere, si quidquam insperatum... accidat: si res laeta, corridemus, si adversa, flemus; quanto... lux maior, tanto gravior sensus percussio: quanto maior rerum *ὑπεροχῇ*, tanto altior mentis elevatio... Atque quo magis re[s] extra omne consilium evenit bene, tanto maius & excellentius de se solet procreare gaudium.' *Plagium*, 1593.

⁴ In Seneca's tragedies, says G. Fabricius, 'excitantur interdum Furiae...; quae imago stans in Orchestra et admirationem et horrorem incutit.' *De Tragœdiarum usu* etc., 1566.

nearer to its accomplishment¹. Klaj perceiving this clearly, as also the close relationship between surprise and fear, devised an entirely new word: *Furchterstaunen*!

In the main then the *admiratio* is an element of the action or plot, produced by the marvellous element in tragedy, the Aristotelian τὸ θαυμαστόν, or sometimes, judging from the reference to Oedipus, a result of the peculiar sense of marvel which goes with 'tragic irony.' That the *admiratio* found its way into the catharsis-clause and stayed there, as we shall see, as late as Gottsched, may partly be due to the dissociation of pity and fear and the liberal interpretation of τοιούτων. The former process had made a breach between the *active* emotions of tragedy, the latter had thrown open the field of the passive emotions, viz. those that were affected by the *catharsis*. The liberal interpretation of τοιούτων in fact generally prevailed at the time: with Gryphius², who may well have been influenced in his theory by Vossius, as he was in his practice by the latter's disciple, Vondel; and with Heimbach, Birken, Masenius a.o.³

¹ 'Admiratio est quaedam pars timoris ex aliqua re, sensu, animove percepta, quae nostram facultatem excedat...Oriri potest...vel ab inanimis, vel brutis, vel hominibus. Ab inanimis cum casu, & fortuna fit, quod consilio factum videtur. (Here the story of the murderer of Itys, killed by the falling of the latter's statue, is quoted. Cf. *Poet.* 9.) A brutis sumitur admiratio, tanquam multa prudenter agentibus... Ex hominibus tragica nascitur admiratio cum vires omnes & animum intendunt, ut aliquo sive lapsu, sive imminente lapsus poena se expediant; nec tamen evitare possunt: idque malum quanto horribilius, tanto mirabilius est. Tale est Oedipi exemplum.' *l.c.*, p. 163.

² 'Die alten...haben diese Art zu schreiben nicht so gar geringe gehalten, sondern als ein bequemes Mittel menschliche Gemüther von allerhand unartigen und schädlichen Neigungen

zu säubern, gerühmet.' *Leo Armenius*, 1650.

³ See the quotations from these authors *infra*. Vossius' singularly 'latitudinarian' view is expressed as follows: 'ad affectus ciendos, animamque ab iis purgandam.' *De artis poeticae. natura ac constitutione* *Quæst.*, 1647, II, p. 46. Further on (p. 47) giving the formula 'purgare ac levare animum ab hujusmodi perturbationibus,' he explains: 'quale est, quod (ut unam e multiplici purgatione affectuum memorem)... etc. The italics are ours, and the words are significant. They probably are the foundation of Corneille's ideas on this point. Vossius, influenced by Scaliger's definition of tragedy, hardly considers the catharsis-clause as belonging to it and adds it as a sort of afterthought: 'Quibus & finem hunc, si voles adde; ad affectus ciendos...' etc., a cavalierly attitude which must have encouraged Corneille.

Gryphius' opinion is the more remarkable as it provides the earliest positive instance in Germany of the modern, pathological or therapeutic interpretation of the catharsis, and although, of course, this was probably not his own discovery, but rather that of some Italian scholar, Minturno or the Jesuit Galluzzi¹, we may greet in him the first German forerunner of Weil and Bernays. The ethical view, was, however, generally predominant, witness Heimbach² or Birken³ or Masenius⁴. Hadewig⁵ copies Opitz; Kindermann⁶ reproduces Pontanus and Harsdörfer. Caspar Stieler makes the reader realize once more that pity and fear have been dissociated, that the aim of tragedy now is to arouse emotions, generally speaking, although presumably strong emotions are considered most appropriate. But the most striking point is that the arousing of emotions is now considered as the aim, no longer as a means, but as the ultimate end of tragedy⁷.

About Dacier, and the stricter views of Batteux and Lessing, cf. Robertson, *l.c.*, p. 338.

¹ Cf. Spingarn, *l.c.*, p. 79; for Galluzzi, Bywater, *Milton and the Aristotelian definition of Tragedy*, Journal of Philology (London), vol. xxvii (1901), p. 267 ff.

² 'Tragoediam jubeat [Aristoteles] esse non solum affectuum concitatricem, verum & moderatricem; ita ut animus, quem horror, dolor etc. effrenem abripuerunt, ex rationis praescripto intra debitum suum gyrum revocetur.' *Otium itinerarium*, 1655.

³ Tragedies, writes Birken, can 'die Feinde des geruhlichen Lebens / Nemlich die Verwirrungen des Gemütes / dämpfen und unterdrücken.' *Androfilo, Nürnberg*, 1656.

⁴ 'Per misericordiam & metum inducens similitum perturbationum purgationem.' Jac. Masenius, *Palaestra eloquentiae ligatae*, vol. iii (1657), p. 5. Also the following explanation: 'Finis Tragoediae est, ut misericordiam & metum in spectatore ad mediocritatem

expurget: Non enim, ut nonnulli male cum Platonice contra Aristotelem hic urgent, ad misericordiae terrorisque objecta saepius proposita, accrescent hae perturbationes, nisi immoderate circa ea versemur: sed potius vitiorum ac poenarum metu, miserendique afflictorum consuetudine affectiones inordinatae, tanquam virtutum remedio, sanabuntur.' *l.c.* vol. iii (1657), p. 7.

⁵ *Anleitung*, 1650, p. 383.

⁶ *Der deutsche Poet*, 1664, p. 240 ff.

⁷ 'Nach dem ist aller Fund zu suchen und zustrecken, wie man dort Freud' und hier Erbar-mung mög' erwecken samt Schrecken, Furcht und Angst, uns was zu solchem Zweck sich lenke sonder Zwang. Der trägt den Preis hinweg, wer des Zuschauers Herz gelernt hat anzufeuern, uns solche Leidenschaft zu mehren, zu erneuern, und zuerhalten weysz.'

Dichtkunst, 1669 (85?), l. 1621 ff. ms. in Copenhagen.

At this point it seems appropriate to look back upon the development of the idea of pleasure. That pleasure might legitimately be, at least in part, the aim of tragedy, was admitted by Pontanus. Yet he did not conceive pity and fear as pleasurable, certainly not the latter, his concern being merely to explain how, in spite of pity and fear, tragedy might afford delight. The source of delight was mainly a general one: the delight in imitation. To this Harsdörfer added the chaste delight in wise 'sentences.' Yet even Pontanus traced some of the pleasure to pity, this emotion being innate in man¹. This seems to have been the entering wedge for the theory of pleasure as the final aim of tragedy. The fact that tragedy must have a delight quite its own, *οἰκεία ἡδονή*, seems to be dimly perceived. Harsdörfer admits a feeling of 'Lust in Erwartung unverhoffter Trauerfälle'; Schottel mentions 'das angenehme Grausen' produced by tragedy². The Jesuits go still further: the editor of Jacob Bidermann's plays speaks of the 'tormentum suavissimum dulcium lacrymarum'³ and A. Brunner, quoting a Latin poet⁴, proclaims 'das Mitleiden im Hertenzen / das Nasse von Augen / reumütige Buszähler und Seuffzer herfür zulocken' as 'das Zihl und End' of tragedy. Quite properly then Rotth distinguishes between the mediate and ultimate end of tragedy⁵. Rotth's conception of the catharsis-theory is derived from Rappolt, who drew his inspiration from Heinsius and Vossius⁶.

¹ 'Dulce quoque & a natura nobis ingeneratum est misereri,' *l.c.*

² *Friedens-Sieg*, 1648, p. 11 f. It may be remembered that Aristotle, *Rhet.* I, xi, pointed out the pleasure arising in our very regrets and lamentations and quoted the *Iliad*, xxiii, 108, 'He spake and in them stirred the love of tears.'

³ Monachi, 1666.

⁴ Whom I have not yet identified: 'est quaedam flere voluptas.' (*Dramata sacra*, Saltzburg, 1684.)

⁵ 'Der End-Zweck (sic!) einer Tragödie ist entweder *intermedius* i.e. ein solcher / der sein Absehen noch auf einen andern Endzweck in der Tragödie hat. Und das ist die Erregung gewisser

affecten. Oder er ist *ultimus*, der kein weiteres Absehen auf einen andern End-Zweck in der Tragödie hat.' *Vollständige Deutsche Poesie*, 1688.

⁶ Vossius' theory of tragedy is closely akin to that of Heinsius, as the following quotation shows: 'Eo autem percellere animum vult, ut eum hisce affectibus, ut medicus, crebro videndo miseros, consequitur, ut non ultra moveatur, quam oportet: ita etiam in tragoedia, spectandis istiusmodi, animus discit affectus suos in ordinem redigere,' *l.c.* p. 65. Cf. Fellerus ap. Rappolt, *Poetica Aristotelica*, 1678, *Synopsis*, p. 11; Rappolt, *Notae ad Troades*, p. 252.

Rotth's definitions of pity and fear are Aristotelian in spirit, the former being based upon our sense of kinship with the victim, the latter emphasizing, as Donatus had done before, that fear may also be a sense of *impending* evil¹. Recognizing without hesitation the possibility that other feelings besides pity and fear may be aroused and purged by tragedy, Rotth declares, however, that the best tragedy would aim only at the two former emotions². With his theory of moderation of the passions he curiously combines something of Plato's conception of the effect of repeated emotions by claiming that tragedy, whilst ensuring against undue sensitiveness also induces a state of normal impressibility. Omeis³ brings nothing new, except that in one instance he mentions pity and astonishment instead of pity and fear⁴.

By this time, indeed, the impression that tragedy shall arouse any sort of emotion has become quite general. The dramatist has reached his goal, says Barthold Feind, when the audience

¹ 'Das Mitleiden wird erregt / wenn man einen unschuldigen in ein Unglück gerathen siehet / dasz wir vermeinen dasz es auch uns oder den unsrigen begegnen könne.' 'Das Schröcken wird verursacht / wenn man ein solch Unglück bevorstehend einführet / da ein Schmerz oder der Tod selbst verursacht werden kann. Als wenn man erdichtet wie einer sol erstochen / den Felsen herabgestürzt werden. Denn nicht allein *res formidabiles* sonder auch *illarum signa*, so ferne sie die Sache als gegenwärtig darstellen / erregen ein Schröcken / als wie etwan ein aufziehendes Wetter / schwere Feindschaft der mächtigen / Verspottung der Tugend etc.' *l.c.* vol. III, p. 218 ff.

² 'Der letzte Endzweck (sic) aber (finis ultimus) in einer Tragödie ist nichts anders / nach Erklärung des *Aristotelis*, als *κάθαρσις τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων* die Reinigung solcher *affecten* i.e. sie mässiget dieselben / dasz sie nicht zu sehr erschrecken noch sich

gar zu jammerig bezeugen / wenn dergleichen Unglück einigen warhaftig zu stossen solte / was sie itzo nur erdichtet sehen / weiter dasz sie auch nicht gar ohn solche *affecten* seyn / sondern auch eine Empfindlichkeit gegen solchemiserabele Personen lernen tragen. Gleichwie aber / ...zuweilen die Tragödien auch andere *affecten* erregen können / so ist auch nicht zuleugnen / dasz auch anderer *affecten* Reinigung der Endzweck einer Tragödie seyn könne. Jedoch bleibet in der besten Tragödie vorbenannter *affecten*. Erregung und Reinigung allemahl der Endzweck,' *l.c.* 1688, vol. III, p. 219. One is here strongly reminded of Lessing's attitude.

³ 'Eine Tragödie...ist ein solches Schauspiel / in welchem eine...Verrichtung...also vorgestellt wird / dasz sie durch ihren Betrüb- und traurigen Ausgang / Schrecken und Mitleiden bei den Zuschauern erwecke.' *Gründliche Anleitung*, 1704, p. 232.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 246.

‘entweder zum Zorn / Furcht / Hofnung / Mitleid oder Rache geleitet wird¹.’ In certain of his dramas—tragedy and comedy have become so confused now that it is no longer safe to be more specific—the aim which Weise has set himself is merely: ‘Stille Veränderung der Affecte².’ This is the key-word of the situation: the ‘affecte’ dominate the period, they have become an end in themselves, they are the object of the one all-engrossing pursuit of a mincingly sentimental time. In this age of pretentious vapidness, the one quality required was unexpectedness, and ‘admiratio’ therefore held its place in the now hopelessly debased catharsis-formula³. It mattered little if the authors, now mostly libretto-writers, were unable to squeeze from the outworn themes of Rome and Greece, the Orient or pseudo-Germanic antiquity any but swiftly-staling ‘episodia’ and threadbare ‘Verwirrungen’; the stage-carpenter was called upon and must soothe the craving for ‘admiratio’ with ‘Veränderungen,’ changes of scenery of the most fantastic sort. With Gottsched, therefore, the inclusion of the *admiratio* amongst the cathartic emotions may almost be said to have a tradition behind it⁴. For *admiratio* is no doubt the word translated by *Bewunderung*. But why not

¹ *Gedanken von der Opera*, 1708, p. 108. Another passage of the same author may be quoted: ‘Die Vorstellung...solte uns demnach billig zu einer gefährlichen Warnung und betrübten Beyspiel dienen: welches dann das gerechte Absehen und Ursache dieser Tragödie gewesen / deren Ende auff eine so klägliche und jammernswürdige Art hinaus läuft / dasz man den Zuschauer mit einer billigen *Compassion* nach Hause zu schicken gedenckt.’ *Simson*, 1709.

² *Nachbarskinder*, *Körbelmacher* and *Liebesalliance*, written between 1694 and 1708.

³ The classical philologist Daniel Triller specifies ‘das Erbärmliche, das Erschröckliche und Wunderbare.’ The latter quality, producing *admiratio*, can ‘den Zuschauer oder Leser ausser sich selbst setzen’ as, in a Passion-

play, for example: ‘die schnelle und ungewöhnliche Verfinsterung der Sonnen, das schreckliche Erschüttern der Erde, die brüllende Zerzeissung der Felsen, die fürchterliche Eröffnung der Gräber, und die unerhörte Auferstehung der Todten machen das Gemüther so bestürzt, bisz endlich nach und nach der Leser zu dencken anfängt, wie ihm damahls würde zu Muthe geworden seyn, wenn er dabey gewesen, welche Gedanken ihm auch so gar eine neue Furcht einjagen können.’ *Hugonis Grotii Leidender Christus*, Leipzig, 1723.

⁴ ‘[Die Tragödie hatte] zu ihrer Absicht...Traurigkeit, Schrecken, Mitleiden und Bewunderung bey den Zuschauern zu erwecken. Aristoteles beschreibt sie derowegen als eine Nachahmung einer Handlung, dadurch sich eine vornehme Person harte und

Erstaunen, the word he used in his remarks on Addison's *Cato*? Indeed there is a certain confusion here, of which subsequently Nicolai and Mendelssohn and others were victims, and which even Lessing did not quite remove. This is not the place, however, to explain its genesis². Suffice it to say that its root lay in the entirely different development of the *admiratio* outside of Germany, and especially in France. In that country, since Corneille, *admiratio* had been conceived not as surprise, but as 'admiration' in the modern sense, and connected, not with the action or the incidents of tragedy, but with its characters. Gottsched, influenced both by the native criticism of Germany and by the theories of France, failed to notice this curious double development: hence his puzzling use of both *Bewunderung* and *Erstaunen*.

All the definitions in the German language use the term *Schrecken*, none the word *Furcht*, i.e. personal fear as Lessing³ had it. As to the Latin terms it may be noticed that the Jesuits, like Lessing, mindful perhaps of Aristotle's remark⁴ on the incompatibility of pity and *terror*, deliberately favoured the milder term⁵. It was clear, however, that pity and fear had now become of secondary importance. Emotion had become the end of tragedy and the paramount passion for a jaded public was astonishment. Pity and fear, once the sacred twain, were actually to be repudiated when Mattheson, a musician and critic of no mean accomplishment, turning against a sentence in Gottsched's *Critische Dichtkunst*, asked with cool arrogance for the letters-patent of 'Its Highness, *Fear*'⁶.

unvermuthete Unglücksfälle zuziehet.' Gottsched, *Critische Dichtkunst*, 1730, p. 507.

¹ 'Wodurch er...das Mitleid seiner Zuhörer erwecket, ja äusserlich Schrecken und Erstaunen zuwege bringt.' *Critische Dichtkunst*, third ed. (1742), p. 712.

² For a full account see the author's *Lessing and the tragic admiratio*.

³ After Stück LXXIV of the *Ham-burgische Dramaturgie*. Cf. Robertson, *l.c.*, pp. 319; 326.

⁴ *Rhet.* II, 8.

⁵ Camerarius and Willichius have *terror*; Schosser, *metus*; Pontanus, *terror*; Heinsius, first *metus*, afterwards *horror* and *terror*; Donatus, *timor*; Masenius, *metus* and *dolor*; Kindermann, *terror*. For the terms used by Boileau, Corneille, Dacier, Brumoy, Breitinger, Curtius and Mendelssohn, cf. Robertson, *l.c.* p. 320.

⁶ 'Den Adelsbrief des hochwohl-geboren Schreckens, welches hier zu den edlen Gemüthe-bewegungen gezo-

With the disappearance of pity and fear from their commanding position, the question of explaining how pleasure might be derived from painful emotions naturally lost all actuality¹. Throughout the period described here the emotions were, of course, considered as primarily connected with the spectator. But there have been curious examples of a different conception. Thus count Moritz of Hessen seemed to differentiate the effect of 'tragic histories' according to the type of man on whom they are brought to bear². More than two centuries later another divergent view was expressed by Dan. Triller, who refers the emotions to the characters in the play³.

After emotion as such had become the aim of tragedy this was a logical conclusion: it became possible to transfer the multiple emotions from the spectator to the characters, and no protest raised, until even Lessing asked whether all the emotions felt by the characters are also awakened in the audience⁴!

Attention might finally be called to the interpretation of ἀλλά before δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου in the Aldine edition, the effect of which was to contrast δι' ἀπαγγελίας with the two following words. Of course, there is no opposition between direct dramatic presentation and the emotions of pity and fear but many

gen wird, mögten wird doch gerne sehen!' *Neueste Untersuchung*, 1744, 36 ff. Cf. *Critische Beyträge*, vol. 1, p. 498.

¹ Only Bodmer showed interest in the relationship of pleasure and pain. Cf. *Discourse der Malern*, 1722, vol. II, p. 151.

² 'Tragicæ historiae pronos ad vitia terrent, alienos a vitiis commovent, vitiis immaculatos confundunt, et virtute deditos quid fugiendum sit monent.' J. Combach, *Oratio etc.* Goedeke, *Grundriss*, vol. II, p. 522.

³ He praises Hugo Grotius' Passion-play, which he translated, because in this drama 'fast die meisten Haupt-Affecten der Menschen...vorkommen. Wir sehen die Rache, Kleinmüthigkeit und Furcht, ingleichen die Reue an

Petro und den andern Jüngern, den Geitz und die Verzweiflung an Juda dem Verräther; den Neid und die Verläumdung und den Hohen-Priestern und Schriftgelehrten; die Grausamkeit, an den Jüdischen Pöbel und Romis. (sic) Soldaten; die Menschen-Furcht, und den Eigennutz an dem Pontio-Pilato; die Beständigkeit an den Galiläischen Weibern; die Geduld und Gelassenheit an der Maria, und was dergleichen mehr ist; also, dasz alle die drey Stücken, welche *Aristoteles* zu einem Trauer-Spiel erfordert, nemlich das Erbärmliche, das Erschröckliche und Wunderbare hier zu befinden.' *I.e.*

⁴ *Schriften*, Lachmann-Muncker, vol. XVII, p. 65.

an honest translator was sorely put to it to make sense of the Aldine text. Schosser translates it literally: 'non per expositionem, sed per misericordiam & metum,' as also did Heinsius; but Masenius, by the deft interposition of the word *dramatic* restores real contrast and conquers the difficulty, even though at the expense of literal truth to his text¹. But otherwise the interpolation which even Lessing still tried to justify had no harmful effects.

In recapitulating the results of this survey the following facts stand out: The interpretation of the catharsis-clause has been, with perhaps one single exception, an ethical one, implying the necessity of curbing and pruning nature; a Christian interpretation, in the narrower sense, in contrast to the pagan conception of pleasure as a legitimate aim. Since Pontanus boldly claimed the purgation of various emotions as the ultimate end of tragedy, the list of those emotions grew apace. On the other hand, the emotions which constituted the mediate end of tragedy, namely pity and fear, having been disjoined already by Pontanus and only temporarily shown to be correlative by Donatus, had to make room for a new element, sponsored by Harsdörfer and Klaj, namely astonishment. Both sets of emotions having thus been broken up and enlarged, their merging was easy enough when, in the latter half of the seventeenth century, the mediate and ultimate end of tragedy were finally confused. Emotion, that is pleasurable emotion, was then to be paramount and the sole end of tragedy. Ever since Pontanus tried to account for the delight of tragedy by naive references to imitation, human pity or wise aphorisms, the attitude of dramatists had grown bolder until finally they openly acknowledged pleasure to be their aim. This development is of course closely connected with the conception of the general aim of the drama. There the battle, which was in its turn only a part of a larger struggle waged by the whole of literature, between the *prodesse* and the *delectare*, resulted at the end of the seventeenth century in the victory of the latter. Not that it was a final victory, by any means. Gottsched was going to be reactionary, although there is many a flaw in his critical armour; and even to Lessing the

¹ '...non enarrando, sed Dramatice per misericordiam & metum...'

catharsis carries a predominantly ethical, if rather vague, implication¹. Still, looking back upon a development of more than two centuries, a definite change is easily discernible.

If the question is now asked: 'When the aim of tragedy became emotional, why did not the "emotional" interpretation now associated with the names of Weil and Bernays, prevail?'—the answer is obvious: this might have happened if the late seventeenth century had been able to 'read' its actual tendencies 'into' the formula, to reconcile its wishes with Aristotle's words. But this was clearly beyond its critical and more still beyond its philological powers. Unable to gauge the possibilities of the catharsis-clause, it could only break it up and maim it almost beyond recognition. To restore to the defaced formula its original shape, to weigh the value of each word by delicate comparison, finally to reconcile the wording of the clause with our modern conception of pleasure as a legitimate aim—this was reserved to nineteenth century philology.

¹ Robertson, *l.c.* p. 332.

JOSEPH E. GILLET.

‘ARCUS.’

My brother, Major H. F. Bidder, suggests to me that in *Hor. Carm.* III, 26, 7, ‘arcus’ means ‘bow-drills,’ which would obviously be ‘oppositis foribus minaces.’ A Latin scholar to whom this was submitted has objected that there is no use of ‘arcus’ in this sense in Latin literature. My brother writes to me, I think justly, that, if ‘arcus’ had never been used before as the name of a bow-drill, everyone would at once have known what Horace meant, and have approved the use of the word.

I venture to expand the argument. The literature which has come down to us from Roman times has been necessarily that which was cared for by literary men: and the libraries of many scholars of the present day might be searched without finding a word about the pneumatic riveter or the acetylene drill, or even an indication of the existence of the slide-rest, on which civilisation is based.

Again, Latin literature gives no trace of any other means of actuating the ‘terebra’; and setting carpentry aside, it cannot be supposed that the enormous amount of marble carved in Augustan times, and the number of hard gems, were all drilled by merely twisting the hand (as with a bradawl or gimlet), or by rubbing a drill between the palms of the hands like an Australian blackfellow. Facciolati, *sub* ‘terebra,’ quotes Columella and Pliny on the injurious heat developed by the ‘terebra’ in boring the stem of a vine, and Pliny on the great heat attained by drills in carving gems. If ‘terebra’ were the ‘gimlet’ or ‘auger’ so frequently given in translation, there would be no risk of burning the wood in boring a vine-stem. But the passage from Celsus also quoted, when taken with that by Columella, shows that the heat is produced by boring with a bit shaped like a common drill (Fig. 1) ‘simile ei quo fabri

utuntur,' which will therefore have a wide-angled cutting edge, and will only bore wood by rubbing it away as sawdust—'scobem faciebat'—when rotated with a high velocity—'perurebatque eam partem, quam perforaverat'.¹ Both authors, and Cato, recommend the 'Gallica terebra,' which is clearly a centre-bit, 'capituli longioris, quod ab acuto mucrone incipit'—that is the point which pierces the centre of the hole to be bored—'deinde subito latius fit'—that is, with an oblique radial chisel-edge, like our centre-bits (Fig. 2): because Pliny



Fig. 1.



Fig. 2.

says 'excavat, nec urit,' and Columella 'Gallica terebra sic excavat truncum, ne foramen inuret: quippe non scobem, sed ramenta facit'—the chisel-edge cutting shavings, where the drill of the sculptor and the smith only tore off sawdust.

Whether we consider the delicacy of the carved gems, the size of the Golden Palace and the Colossus, or the beautiful contrivance and finished workmanship of the mechanism which we know—and do not know through literature—it is quite clear that both the common Italian drill and the Gallic centre-bit were rotated by mechanical means.

Such rotation is effected now in England mostly by bevel

¹ 'The common drill is only a scraper'—*Enc. Brit.* 'Tool,' p. 17.

wheels actuated by hand or power, by an Archimedean stock, or by a carpenter's brace.

A cog-wheel appears to be the received interpretation of the 'tympanum versatile' of Vitruvius; a toothed wheel is in the Museum at Naples, and a toothed wheel, engaging a rack, in the lock of the strong-box in the British Museum (No. 405). The principle appears in the cogs of the great wooden Egyptian wheels (crown wheels) for lifting water, which are stated to be ancient in form. But the expense of making small toothed-wheels by hand would place any contrivance of this kind beyond the reach of the ordinary workman. The same consideration applies to the screw of the Archimedean drill; of this also Tylor (*Anthropology*, chap. viii, p. 202) says 'the still more perfect Archimedean drill is modern¹.' From the beautiful application of the screw to the complicated surgical instruments found at Pompeii (reinvented about 1840, as Dr W. S. Playfair told me, and therefore probably not recorded in the classics), there would be nothing strange if fresh discoveries gave us an Archimedean trephine; but we have found enough sets of tools (I think I have examined six or seven carpenter's rules) to be sure that neither the Archimedean drill nor a wheel-drill was the common implement.

The carpenter's brace, according to Tylor (*Researches into the Early History of Mankind*, chap. ix, *vide* Reclus, *Enc. Brit.*) could be seen in its primitive form used by the Gaucho of the Pampas, who, in order to produce fire, 'takes an elastic stick about 18 in. long, presses one end to his breast and the other in a hole in a piece of wood, and then rapidly turns the curved part like a carpenter's centre bit.' The 'Gallica terebra' was presumably actuated by a brace, since the chisel-edge would only cut one way. But the fact, clearly shown by Celsus and Columella, that the 'antiqua terebra quam solam veteres agricolæ noverunt' had *not* a chisel edge, equally lends strength to the supposition that the mechanical means used for it gave a backward and forward rotation.

¹ *Johnson's Dictionary* (Todd) 1818, under 'Drill, n.s.' says 'An instrument with which holes are bored. It is a

point pressed hard against the thing bored, and turned round with a bow and string.'

We have not (as is pointed out by Tylor, *Anthropology*, l.c.) to go further than the *Odyssey* (ix, 384-387) to read what was the means of rotating the 'antiqua terebra, quam solam veteres noverunt.' To quote Tylor's paraphrase, it was 'by winding round the stick a thong or cord, which by being pulled backward and forward worked the drill.' Liddell and Scott (1869) *sub τρύπανον* explain the passage as describing 'a large borer turned round by a thong through the handle (τρύπανία)'; apparently supposing that the two dock-labourers ran round the drill, using the τρύπανία as a very inefficient pair of capstan-bars. Frazer (*Golden Bough*, 1900, vol. III, p. 272) throws a clearer light on the operation, in the account he quotes from Montanus of the kindling of Midsummer Fire in parts of Germany. 'In some old farm-houses of the Surenthal and Winenthal a couple of holes or a whole row of them may be seen facing each other in the door-posts of the barn or stable...sometimes they are deeply burnt or blackened....About midsummer ...two such holes are bored opposite each other, into which the extremities of a strong pole are fixed. The holes are then stuffed with tow...a rope is looped round the pole, and two young men... pull the ends of the rope backwards and forwards so as to make the pole revolve rapidly, till smoke and sparks issue from the two holes in the door-posts.'

After which account we may note with interest from Liddell and Scott's third paragraph, that Sophocles speaks of τρύπανα ἀχάλκευτα. 'Touchwood' L. and S. translate, or 'fire.' I would suggest that 'drills with no metal in them' would describe at once to any Greek the ceremonial wooden fire-drill, which his priests, like their German and Brahman relations (cf. Tylor, *Anthrop.*, p. 261), twirled by a cord wrapped round it, as the common ancestors of all of them had done before any metal was known.

For the thing is widespread. The Eskimo and their neighbours twirled their fire-drill with a string; but one man sufficed to make the fire, for the string was the string of a bow. This form of drill was used, according to Tylor, also by other savage nations; it is the drill used now for boring in Egypt, India, and the Orient; it was the drill with which the ancient Egyptian

cut his hieroglyphics and carved his statues. Maspero (*Egyptian Archaeology*, transl. A. B. Edwards, 1889, fig. 177) gives a figure of it (Fig. 3). The bowstring is fixed to one end of the bow, but only half-hitched round the other end; near the middle it takes a single turn round a wooden cylinder, the upper end of




Fig. 3. (After Maspero.)

which has a hemispherical cup or cap lying on it. But this drill is 'χαλκευτος'; in the lower end is fixed a metal wire or 'bit' continuing its axis, and the extremity of this bit is hammered out into a triangular plate, one angle of the triangle being the boring point:—the shape of our English 'common drill,' 'simile ei, quo fabri utuntur,' 'terebrā quam solam veteres agricolæ noverunt.'

The bow-drill is called by Tylor (*Anthrop.*, p. 261) 'the common bow-drill of our tool-shops¹.' Potter (*Archæologia Græca*, 1820, vol. II, p. 91) gives a plate showing a fancy picture of two *τρύπανα*—'the only constant instruments used by the ancient Grecians in demolishing walls...in Latin *terebræ*, which were long irons with sharp ends.' He quotes no authority, but the plate represents one *τρύπανον* turned by handspikes, and

¹ 'A bow of steel, with a strong piece of catgut attached to it loosely enough to admit of its being passed once or twice round a pulley, through the centre of which the tool passes'

—Beeton's *Dictionary of Universal Information*, undated, bought 1878, articles brought up to about 1860.—Watchmakers use a similar drill, or did so recently.

one by a bow. Whether he had literary authority for the bow or not, we know that the cord-drill was used in Homeric Greece and among the German tribes from whom are descended the ritual fires, and the Indian tribes from whom the Brahman has derived his religion. We know that the bow modification of it was used by the ancient Egyptians and is used by their descendants, that it was and is used in Europe and Asia and by various uncivilised nations.

Can it be contended that the Augustan Romans, fresh from the conquest of Egypt, imbued with the civilisation of Greece, tasting every luxury from Asia and looking at every new thing from Africa, were ignorant of the cord-drill and its bow? And is there anything they could have called the latter except 'Arcus'?

There is one other name they might have given it, and it is used by Horace four lines later.—In Maspero's figure the string is firmly fixed to one end of the bow—the far end—and temporarily secured round the end held in the hand. This has the obvious advantages of allowing the bow to be slacked when not in use, of enabling its tension to be easily varied, and of allowing the string to be looped round a drill-body of any size, or one of which the upper end is steadied on a dead centre, instead of in a cup held by the left hand. Thus, when not in use, the bow will be an elastic rod, not necessarily curved, with a cord fastened to one end of it. Hence the American name of 'whip drill' (used for this tool by Commander F. M. Barber, U.S. Navy, *Mechanical Triumphs of the Ancient Egyptians*, London, 1900). Hence also, I venture to suggest, when Horace has hung up his 'arcus' on the wall that guards the left side of Venus, he at once begs the goddess 'sublimi flagello' to whip Chloë!

The chastisement of Cupid by Venus with his own bow unstrung has been treated more than once in painting and in verse. Dr J. D. Anderson tells me that in India the bow of the drill is commonly carried with one end of the string loose. The string is of cat-gut, so that it would make an excellent whip.

I admit that the somewhat cryptic coupling of Memphis

with Cyprus in the invocation suggests that the 'arcus' were of Egyptian association; and therefore not, as has been put forward above, the old Italian drill, but a recent importation. Assuming, however, that such a view of the words would commend itself to a scholar, it is not necessary to suppose more than that, from the country where granite and basalt were daily drilled, drills or bows had been brought superior in design or temper to those of Roman manufacture. So that it would be understood that a wealthy and fashionable lock-picker carried an 'Egyptian' drill, as such an one now would carry an American brace, or as till recently we used German dyes: though America did not invent the brace, nor Germany the dyes.

It seems worth while to add a brief note on the alliance, viewed from a mechanical standpoint, of 'arcus' with 'tornus,' and of the latter with 'torculum' and 'prelum.'

Horner, in the *Enc. Brit.* article on 'Tools,' p. 21, writes: 'Space will not permit us to trace the evolution of the lathe from the ancient bow and cord lathe and the pole lathe, in each of which the rotary movement was alternately forward, for cutting, and backward. The curious thing is that the wheel-driven lathe was a novelty so late as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and had not wholly displaced the ancient forms even in the West in the nineteenth century, and the cord lathe still survives in the East.'

I have seen a watchmaker's bow-lathe in Soho, and the common bow-lathe in Egypt. *The Panorama of Science and Art* by James Smith, Liverpool, 1815, gives directions (vol. 1, p. 65) for making a pole-lathe, which it states 'is gradually sinking into disrepute and disuse.' To quote his description (Fig. 4), this lathe derives its name from 'a long elastic pole, fixed at one extremity to the ceiling, and at the other attached to a cord which is coiled once or twice round the body to be turned, or round a pulley which carries that body along with it, and then passes on to the treadle, to which the lower end of it is fastened.'

I have seen at Naples a man turning table-legs with one of these lathes, very rapidly and certainly. The pole was the

elastic tip of the trunk of a tree, perhaps four inches across at the butt and six feet long¹.




Fig. 4. (Modified from James Smith.)

All presumption is in favour of the Roman lathes having been bow-lathes and pole-lathes. The elastic pole bent by winding a cord on a rotating axle, and in reaction forcing the axle to rotate by unwinding the cord, was familiar to Roman engineers in one of the varieties of their 'torculum,' illustrated in the *Casa dei Vettii* at Pompeii, in the series of frescoes

¹ He was in the Basso Porto—a region now mostly demolished—on the ground-floor of a six-foot-wide street of five-storey houses; a street occupied by joiners and turners, next the street

where silversmiths made votive offerings. He was working by candle-light in front of the window at 3 o'clock on a July afternoon.

showing Cupids at sport and at work. One picture shows them making wine, two Cupids forcing a windlass round with handspikes. The 'prelum' is a thick pole standing out nearly horizontally above the 'lacus' (Fig. 5) like the pole over a lathe.




Fig. 5. (After the reproduction of De Luca and Bardellone, Naples.)

The windlass is turned by two handspikes¹ on one of which (*A*) a Cupid is swinging his whole little weight, the other (*B*) a Cupid presses to the ground. The cord comes from the free end of the 'prelum' to the windlass, which is pivoted horizontally between two strong uprights, and the 'prelum' is bent down by the tension of the cord² towards the windlass and wine-vat.

A potter's wheel such as is shown on the vase B.M. 423 (Greek and Roman Life—B.M. Guide 1908. Fig. 183) might be made to serve some of the purposes of a lathe, but the need of a dead-centre beyond the object turned would soon be apparent, and the use of a rope to spin the wheel would become obvious to a nation whose children spun tops. We know that the Romans had lathes, and unless the wheel-lathe be supposed to have been invented by them and disappeared everywhere, it appears necessary that their lathe was driven by the pulling of a cord wound round the axle. If so it is certain that they must have actuated drills by cord wound round the drill-spindle.

¹ 'Vectes ducentes eam versant'
Vitr. 10. 2. *fide* Facc.

² 'Funis se involvendo circa sucu-
lam extenditur' *l.c.*

The step would be inevitable—though it must really have been from the drill to the lathe, not the lathe to the drill.

The Roman lathe, and the Roman drill, were alike actuated by a forward and backward rotary movement imparted by a cord wrapped round them. It is not conceivable that they omitted to invent, or refused to adopt, the convenient use of the ancient Egyptians by which for small work the two ends of this cord were fastened to the two ends of a bent rod, so that one hand operated them both.

G. P. BIDDER.

CAMBRIDGE, Dec. 18, 1917.

NOTES.

'*Terebra*.' In the British Museum *Guide to the Department of Greek and Roman Antiquities* (A. H. Smith, 1912), p. 164, are described:

'Handles for the upper part of a revolving drill.'

Compare with this the drawing (Fig. 3) of the Egyptian bow-drill. Flinders Petrie (*Naukratis*, Part I, Egyptian Exploration Fund, London, 1888, p. 43) similarly identifies 'many rounded pieces of stone with one or more hollows highly polished in them; these are evidently the head-pieces of drill-bows [read 'bow-drills'] in which the end of the drill-stick revolved. They are generally of granite or basalt.' As no date is mentioned, the context indicates that they are found of all dates from sixth century B.C. to A.D.

Petrie also notes at Naukratis (i.e., p. 15) the enormous number of alabaster drill-cores, dating about 450 B.C., being the waste from the use of tubular-drills used in hollowing vases. In *Pyramids and Temples of Gizeh* (2nd edition, London, 1885, pp. 74 *et seqq.*) he shows that, in working the pyramid stones, jewelled tubular drills were used, of 4 inches and even 18 inches in diameter, working under a force to be measured in tons.

Mr A. H. Smith, of the British Museum¹, drew my attention to the fact that the Mycenæan fragments prove that they were drilled. In the upper surface of the chief red fragment (from the façade above the 'Treasury of Atreus' at Mycenæ) a hole cut out to receive a tenon shows at the bottom three circles left by a tubular drill about 1.7 cm. in diameter (see sketch, Fig. 6).




Fig. 6.

The same diameter of drill is shown on the other red fragment, but the green fragment has been worked with a drill of 1.3 cm.

Blümmer (*Gewerbe und Künste*, 1875, ii. p. 344) gives a cut showing a carpenter boring a hole in a slab of wood with a bow-drill; it is taken from a picture with gold ground, on the bottom of a glass vessel probably of the second or third century A.D. Caton (*Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 1914, Vol. 34, p. 116) describes in detail 'a folding drill-bow for driving a trephine' from Colophon, probably of the first or second century A.D., which explained the use of a similar, but broken, instrument in the British Museum. Caton cites Hippocrates, Celsus, and Galen on its use.

τρύπανον. The Nile-Gods on Royal Monuments of the Twelfth Dynasty, each with one foot on the base of the hieroglyphic sign 'sam' (e.g. Plate XXV c, *Bubastis* by Edouard Naville—Egypt Exploration Fund, London, 1891), each hold one-half of a rope, which appears to be a *τρύπανία* revolving the stalk part of the 'sam' in the base. I am too ignorant of the literature to know if this, with its suggestive metaphor, paralleled in most languages, is the received explanation.

¹ I am greatly indebted to the kindness of Mr A. H. Smith for this and other valuable information. He showed me the illustration in Blümmer, and referred me to the paper by Caton and the paper by Paton and Myres. He

also demonstrated to me, on the bas-relief of the Satyr's oil-press, the error of my previous view that the missing hand of the kneeling figure pulled a handspike, since the tips of the fingers can be seen beyond the fracture.

'*Torculum*.' In the fresco from the *Casa dei Vettii*, the two Cupids are playing with an empty '*torculum*' in a vineyard, where other Cupids are gathering grapes in '*quali*'—conical baskets say 18 in. high $\times$ 15 in. top diameter and 7 in. diameter of base. The slab shown in the foreground of Fig. 5 is of stone (coloured like the walls of the vat) and bears a heap of grapes or grape-skins. Its proportions suggest that it may serve the double use of closing the entry to the vat (against splashes) while the grapes are being trodden, and lying across the vat as the press-bed when the grape-skins are under the '*prelum*.' The ground falls away to the right-hand end of the vat, so that there may be taps there to draw off the must (see Smith's *Ant. 'Torculum'*). There is no suggestion of any envelope to contain grape-skins under the '*prelum*,' and in Southern Italy when I saw a rustic wine-press (a simple screw-press) the pile of crushed skins lay upon it without envelope.

The use of the '*prelum*' as a lever-press (on the principle of nut-crackers) is illustrated in the Kalymenos oil-press figured by W. R. Paton and J. R. Myres (*Journal of Hellenic Studies*, xviii. p. 210) and in the bas-relief of a '*Satyr at Oil-Press*' in the British Museum (No. 508, see *Guide to the Exhibition illustrating Greek and Roman Life*, Fig. 220). The free end of the lever was bent down by hand in the Satyr's oil-press, by secondary levers according to Vitruvius (6, 9) and Paton and Myres, and by a screw or screws according to Vitruvius and Pliny, whose newer fashion of a screw in the '*prelum*,' lifting a weight to bear on it (xviii. 31, 74), was (Paton and Myres) just going out of employment in 1896. The Cupids' '*torculum*' shows a windlass pulling the '*prelum*' down, as mentioned (*vide* Facc.) by Ulpian and Cato.

Paton and Myres found the olives put in bags of hair-cloth for pressing; the Satyr has them in a net, the resistance to pressure being given by a rope coiled round the net in about 14 horizontal coils one above the other¹. But Paton and Myres describe the olives as always first crushed with a roller or

¹ In the very good illustration to the *Guide* a net is not given, the olives appearing to be retained only by the rope: but a close inspection of the terra-cotta shows fine chisel-cuts to represent the meshes.

pounded before they are pressed; the Satyr is pressing entire olives.

Is it possible that the rope wound round the olives was a primitive feature, to which was due originally the name 'torculum'? The pressure inside a coiled rope would be discovered almost so soon as any sort of cord was used by man.

'*Prelum*.' In the Pompeian fresco the 'prelum' is represented as standing over the middle line of the wine-vat. Smith's *Antiquities* ('torculum') quotes Wilkinson for an Egyptian painting showing the treaders supporting themselves by taking hold of ropes or poles placed above their heads.

It seems very probable that the 'prelum' was always in this position, and gave this support while the grapes were being trodden. It would be an obvious arrangement to have the press over the vat, so that the juice expressed from the skins could also flow into it, the first trodden juice having been drawn off and the grape-skins lifted out through the opened door of the vat.

This would explain and render natural the use of the word 'prelum' to signify the treaders as well as the press; so that we need not suppose that wine 'prelo domitam Caleno' contained anything but the first cuvée, nor that the product of lever and windlass was ever allowed to enter a cask for Mæcenas!

'*Sucula*' and '*Porculus*.' The translation of *porculus* as 'a hook in a wine or oil press,' given by Lewis and by Facciolati, appears to rest on a statement of Turnèbe (1512—1565) quoted by F. This in turn seems to be a conjectural emendation of a description of 'sucula' by Budé (1467—1510) elsewhere quoted *sub* 'sucula' by F., difficult to construe intelligibly as it stands, but not referring to wine or oil press at all.

Assuming that Lewis is right that 'sucula' never meant originally 'a little pig,' but, as used by Plautus in this sense, is merely a pun on 'sucula' = a windlass—'perhaps root *σεύω*, to drive' (Lewis and Short)—the pun was made before Plautus, since 'porculus' is a serious technical name only a generation later, and the passage in the *Rudens* seems to indicate that it was so already. The squealing of a wooden windlass may well

have been compared to that of a young pig¹; I suggest that the growing coil of rope on the axle of the windlass was nicknamed 'porculus' from its shape, with the understood joke that the lean 'little pig' of the turning (and squealing) axle fattens out into the plump 'porker' of wound rope². Thus the passages from Cato quoted by Facciolati read:—'Make your rope coil on the middle of the barrel' and 'where it shall be convenient to attach your rope for coiling.'

In place of Turnèbe's amendment we may change two commas in F's punctuation and suppose that Budé really wrote:—'Nam in media circiter sucula [erat] batillus, aut uncus, qui figebatur ut teneret funem, qui, dum versabatur sucula, circumplicabatur, [et] porculus vocabatur'—'For at about the middle of the 'squeaker' there was a flat clip, or a hook, put there to hold the end of the rope, which, when the 'squeaker' was turned, became wrapped round and round, and was then known as 'the porker.' This clip would be to hold the end of the rope against the barrel until the second coil gripped it in a half-hitch.

ὄνος and *ὄλκος*. May not the Greek *ὄνος*, besides recognising the patient labour and general utility of a windlass (as in the 'donkey-engine' which now replaces it), also have had reference to the similarity of voice in the animal and the machine? I have a black-on-red fragment of a vase (Heracles at Troy) of about 6th century B.C. showing a movable windlass used in drawing the ship up on the hard. It is a tongs-shaped cap, apparently of wood and leather, fitting on the *ὄλκος* as vertical axis, while an untrimmed pole passes through the head as a lever³. This would utter harsh sounds on a wooden post in hauling up a vessel.

¹ Compare 'barker' for a pistol, 'growler' for a four-wheeled cab, 'buzz-saw' for a circular saw, 'puffing billy' for Stephenson's early locomotives. (Qy. if the hissing over the damp seams helped to name the tailor's 'goose'?) Compare also the 'pom-pom' gun, 'clapper' of a mill, 'clack-valve' of a pump, and 'click'

of a ratchet.

² Compare our 'sow and pigs' of iron. But the image called up by the windlass would be of the 'sucula' or 'porculus' trussed on a horizontal spit and turning over the fire.

³ The crushing power of the coiled rope would be very manifest on this hollow windlass.

POSTSCRIPT.

'*Archetus*.' This (diminutive?) appears in mediaeval Latin to have been applied to many curved things, from a violin-bow to a hoisting-crane. Du Cange quotes its use, in a letter of A.D. 1414, for *picklock*, which at first sight fits line 8 of the ode strangely well, and explains the plural 'arcus.' But—apart from 'Memphin' and 'flagello'—a house-door fastened from inside for the night is in all ages commonly secured with a primitive bar or bolt, against which picklocks are useless.

We should be unable to give any reason why Horace should call his picklocks 'arcus,' whereas the mediaeval burglar carried 'archetos.' In the case of the drill-bow good reason can be offered for the change. Assuming that the Amazon from a Greek vase, drawn in Smith's *Antiquities* ('Pharetra'), is 5 ft. 6 in. high, her bow is 1 metre in length—scarcely longer than the bird-bow of the middle ages (cf. Green's *Hist. of Eng.*, 1898, p. 157, fig.) or the drill-bow for large work. But the war-bow of the Bayeux tapestry is one-third as long again, and the war long-bow of Crécy reached nearly double the length; so that it is not surprising to find the drill-bow named by a diminutive of 'arcus' in modern Latin languages:

Drill-bow = 'Archetto' in Italian ('An Italian Dictionary.'—Hoare, 1915).

'Archèt' in Bolognese ('Vocabulario.'—Berti, 1869).

'Archet' in French (Bellows and others).

SOME HOMERIC AORIST PARTICIPLES.

Thrice does Homer assert that a man ὄρνυτ' ἄρ' ἐξ εὐνήφιν, or εὐνήθεν ἀνίστατο, εἵματα ἐσσάμενος (β 2, δ 307, υ 124). I have looked in vain for any comment upon this extraordinary aorist participle, surely the most extraordinary in Greek one may say. No doubt it was a physical possibility for the Homeric hero to put on his clothes before getting out of bed, but it does not seem probable that he habitually did so; consider too the last eight lines of the first book; nor can we pretend that ὄρτο ἐξ εὐνήφιν is a loose phrase for "came out of his bed-room," because in β 5 and δ 310 that action is mentioned as a later event. The translators whom I have looked at take the natural view that the meaning is "got up and put on his clothes," the editors and grammarians observe a mysterious silence.

Monro writes in his *Homeric Grammar* § 77 that "the Participle of the Aor. is sometimes used to express *exact coincidence* with the action of the principal Verb: as βῆ δὲ αἰξασα *went with a spring*." He adds that this use is especially common when the participle expresses "the manner with which a thing is said or done," quoting Z 54, ὁμοκλήσας ἔπος ηὔδα, K 139, ἀνέγειρε φθεγξάμενος, etc. for participles of speech. Mr Carter discussed a number of aorist participles in *C. R.* v. 3, but some of his instances are doubtful; Mr Whitelaw sought to slay him in the same volume, p. 248, but was slain himself by Mr Carter's retort.

Whatever we choose to call them, the important point about these participles is that they are timeless, whether they agree with the verb, as in ὁμοκλήσας ἔπος ηὔδα, or whether they are governed by it, as in μεγάλ' ἔκλυεν αὐδήσαντος. By one of the innumerable freaks of language this aorist was specially used with verbs of speaking or making a noise. So Aesch. *Ag.* 1332, οὕτως ἀπειπὼν εἶργει μελάθρων "μηκέτ' ἐσέλθης" τάδε φωνῶν, where we have present and aorist combined. (It does not look

as if Aeschylus cared which tense he used in such a case; that Homer was not very particular either is clear from X 62, where ἐλκηθείσας θύγατρας is sandwiched in between νίας ὀλλυμένων and θαλάμους κεραιζομένων; and how much Thucydides troubled himself about the "correct" use of imperfect and aorist may be seen by anyone who will read vii. 57, 58 with attention. We grammarians are always trying to bind the free growth of language in a strait waistcoat of necessity, but language laughs and eludes us.) Pindar has some interesting developments of these aorists of speech: *Ol.* ii. 60, δικάζει λόγον φράσαις, vii. 5, xi. 48, τιμάσαις, "in compliment," ix. 14, αἰνήσαις; *P.* iv. 189, ἐπαινῆσαις, "with thanks," xii. 8, θρήνον διαπλέξαισα. (At *P.* iv. 130 by the way we should obviously read δράπων, like τράπων, etc.; Schroeder imagines that he has defended δραπών by translating it "ut delibaverit"; no doubt he would defend ἐσσάμενος by turning it into "ut se vestiverit.")

Then again there is a peculiar group of timeless aorist participles in Homer which seems to have escaped notice. Ψ 24, μῆδετο ἔργα, ταύσας, γ 303, ἐμήσατο λυγρὰ, κτείνας, λ 429, ἐμήσατο ἔργον, τεύξασα φόνον, ω 199, μῆσατο ἔργα, κτείνασα, *Hymn to Hermes* 120, ἔργον ὄπαζε ταμῶν. These passages are curiously like one another, and how little they have been appreciated by some people at any rate may be seen from the fact that Bergk and La Roche invert the order of γ 304 and 305, following indeed a scholiast on Sophocles *El.* 267, but really because they cannot there understand κτείνας. Aegisthus did not devise evil deeds *after* killing nor *by* killing; the aorist is not modal nor instrumental; if it is to be called anything it seems to me *explanatory*, and in effect is a compendious way of saying ἔκτεινε γὰρ. As βῆ is the more general word and is particularized by the addition of ἀίξασα, so ἐμήσατο λυγρὰ covers wickedness in general and the particular kind of wickedness is specified by κτείνας. Cf. Hes. *Theog.* 565, ἐξαπάτησεν κλέψας, 579,ποίησε ἀσκήσας.

A further stage in the development of these constructions is to be seen at δ 689, οἶος Ὀδυσσεὺς ἔσκε—οὔτε τιὰ ῥέξας ἐξαισιον οὔτε τι εἰπῶν: here the participle may be said to be cut adrift altogether; it is a way of hinting οὔτε γὰρ ἔρεξεν οὔτ'

εἶπεν. Cf. Solon 32, οὐ καθηψάμην, μίανας καὶ καταισχύων κλέος = οὐ καθηψάμην ὥστε μιᾶναι; Pindar *Pyth.* iv. 100, μὴ ψεύδεσιν καταμιῖναις εἰπὲ γένναν.

Another timeless participle, used with still greater boldness, is *ὀνήμενος* in β 33, ἐσθλός μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὀνήμενος. It is agreed that the meaning here is "he seems to me a noble fellow; blessings on him!" Thus the aorist participle here stands for an entirely separate clause, representing *ὄναιτο*. This is going further in the direction of cutting the participle adrift from the verb than any of the others, and may well prepare us for anything in this line. So also *οὐλόμενος*.

To go back then to our starting point, as *ρέξας* at δ 690 practically stands for *ἔρεξε γάρ*, so *ὤρνυτο ἐσσάμενος* is a deplorably loose way of saying *ὤρνυτο καὶ ἔσσατο*. The participle has become tacked on so freely that it cannot be labelled as anything particular. It is altogether different from the three instances which have been quoted from Herodotus (vii. 62, 106, 164), e.g. *κατέλιπε ἄνδρα τοιόνδε Μασκάμην γενόμενον* = ὃς ὕστερον ἐγένετο, the only resemblance being the looseness of attachment. Cf. Pind. *N. i.* 18, ὥπασε λαὸν φύλλοις μιχθέντα = ὃς ὕστερον ἐμίγη.

There is another place in the *Odyssey* where the aorist is perhaps used with the same astonishing looseness, φ 299, διὲκ προθύρου δὲ θύραζε ἔλκον ἀναίξαντες, ἀπ' οὐατά τε ῥίνας τ' ἀμήσαντες, for it would be superfluous nastiness to make an unnecessary mess inside the house, and at χ 474 Melanthius is first brought ἀνὰ πρόθυρόν τε καὶ αὐλήν, and only then ἀπὸ ῥίνας τε καὶ οὐατα τάμνον. So in English it is possible to say "he got up, putting on his clothes," though it may not be a pretty way of expressing oneself: it was good enough for Shakespeare, e.g. *Hamlet* v. ii. 15, "withdrew to mine own room again, making so bold...to unseal their grand commission," and for Cervantes, *D. Q.* i. xxi. "se la puso luego en la cabeza, rodeándola á una parte y á otra."

The most remarkable aorist participle with a future sense (of a sort) which is to be found in Homer is at Π 852:

ἀλλά τοι ἦδη

ἄγχι παρέστηκεν θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταιή
χερσὶ δαμέντ' Ἀχιλλῆος ἀμύμονος Αἰακίδαο.

Indeed I remember being so much puzzled with it that I should have liked to propose *δαμῆναι* if only the last syllable of such forms could be elided. But perhaps it is best explained as a construction *ad sensum*, the sense being *ἀποθανεῖ δαμείς*.

I suppose that that line of the oracle in Hdt. v. 56, *τλήθι λέων ἄτλητα παθὼν*¹ *τετληότι θυμῷ* can be translated by "endure with patient heart after meeting an unendurable disaster," and so *ἀλγήσετε πῆμα παθόντες* in *μ* 27 is "suffer after coming to grief." But I cannot conceive what is to be done with Pind. *P.* iv. 297, *μήτ' ὦν τινὶ πῆμα πορῶν ἀπαθῆς δ' αὐτὸς πρὸς ἀστῶν*. The whole context seems to me to cry out aloud against taking *πορῶν* to mean "having caused in the past"; I can only regard the aorist as timeless, which is really equal to saying that it is a present in sense, "not committing a single act at any time." More difficult still is *ξ* 244, *μῆνα γὰρ οἶον ἔμεινα τεταρπόμενος τεκέεσσιν*, where anyone would suppose *τεταρπόμενος* to mean *τερπόμενος*, as Butcher and Lang do. A cynic might indeed argue, looking at some Homeric uses of *τέρπω*, that the meaning was "after having enough of my children," but can the poet really have meant that? Are *τλήθι παθὼν* and *ἔμεινα τεταρπόμενος* instances of attraction of tense, like *ἔλαθον ποιήσας*? Cf. the precept *λάβε βιώσας*. Such an attraction I find also in Aesch. *Ag.* 957, *φυλλὰς ἵκετ' ἐς δόμους σκιὰν ὑπερτείνασα*, where *ἵκετο* is gnomic: cf. Hes. *Op.* 676, *ὥρινε ὀμαρτήσας*, also gnomic. Hesiod's *πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμὸς* (*Op.* 267) may be regarded as gnomic itself.

At *Persae* 166, *μὴ μέγας πλοῦτος* (leg. *δαίμων* Heimsoeth) *κονίσας οὐδας ἀντρέψῃ ποδὶ ὄλβον*, I should regard *κονίσας οὐδας* as a variation on *πεσὼν*, if *πλοῦτος* were right; cf. *ἔτε πεσόντα* at *Ag.* 1266; but right it cannot be. If we read *δαίμων*, the meaning will be "bring down the fabric with a crash upon the ground."

None of these instances throw any light on that unintelligible phrase in Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* iv. 3, 15, *φεύγειν παρασείσαντι*, referred to in this connexion by Monro, § 77. He does indeed also refer to N 597 there, but this must be an oversight,

¹ Cf. *peressus* in *Aen.* ix. 60.

χείρα παρακρεμάσας in that line being an ordinary aorist of past time. More to the point are *Hymn* xxviii. 12, ὄρουσεν σείσασα ἄκοντα, and Hesiod, *Scut.* 343, ἐν γάρ σφιν μένος ἦκε θεὰ, αἰγίδ' ἀνασείσασα. But both these are simply modal aorists of a single act. The difficulty about φεύγειν παρασείσαντι is, as Mr MacInnes puts it (*C. R.* xxiv. 229), that the participle here refers to action "enduring contemporaneously" with that of φεύγειν.

ARTHUR PLATT.

EMENDATIONS OF MARCUS AURELIUS' COMMENTARIES.

The following suggestions do not attempt, except in one instance, to rewrite notoriously corrupt passages in this author. These are probably beyond recovery without fresh documentary evidence. I merely touch on small points of the traditional text where the ordinary rules of criticism appear to justify correction. The Emperor's style has been well described and emendation of the text justified by Dr Rendall in this *Journal* (xxiii, 1894). The danger is that in following the sense the reader may overlook small corruptions which have crept into the original.

I give in each case the reading of A, i.e. codex Vaticanus Gr. 1950, and below the points of difference in P, the editio princeps, which in the loss of its original is counted as though it were a codex; and in D, i.e. codex Darmstadtinus 2773, which is a sophisticated ms. derived from A or a common original.

Book I, Ch. 9, § 1. καὶ τὸ ἀνεκτικὸν τῶν ἰδιωτῶν καὶ τὸ ἀθεώρητον οἰομένων.

τῶν οἰομένων P. τῶν ἰομένων D.

Suidas quotes this passage omitting the second τὰ.

The author is praising Sextus, Plutarch's nephew, for his family and social virtues. Saumaise and Gataker both observe that the last three words should qualify ἰδιωτῶν; one therefore proposes to read τοῦ ἀθεωρήτου, the other τῶν ἀθεωρήτως. Following this lead I would suggest τῶν ἰδιωτῶν <τῶν> κατὰ τὸ ἀθεώρητον οἰομένων, i.e. tolerance of amateurs whose fancies are not based on scientific knowledge. The next chapter praises Alexander Cotiaensis for similar tolerance of blunders in style. Marcus Aurelius is fond of this construction; see, for example, τὰ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν πλημμελούμενα, II, 10.

I, 16, § 2. καὶ τὸ ζητητικὸν ἀκριβῶς ἐν τοῖς συμβουλίοις καὶ ἐπίμονον ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ προαπέστη τῆς ἐρεῦνης, ἀρκεσθεὶς ταῖς προχείροις φαντασίαις.

Gataker compares the parallel passage: τὸ...φιλότιμον καὶ ὡς ἐκείνος οὐκ ἂν τι ὅλως παρήκε μὴ πρότερον εὖ μάλα κατιδών... VI, 30, § 3, and emends καὶ ὅτι οὐ προαπέστη.... Compare also καὶ ὅτι οὐτε φήθη ἂν... I, 15, § 2. Dr Rendall proposes ὦν ἂν ἄλλος τις προαπέστη. Stich reads ἀλλ' οὗτοι.

Dr Rendall's emendation supplies the missing object to ἐρεύνης but is a little elaborate. Might not τό be a corruption for τινός and the ἀλλά be justified by the abrupt but not impossible change of grammatical construction?

In this same chapter of praise of the emperor Pius there are two passages which should be compared, viz.:—

I, 16, § 7. καὶ τὸ ἔμφρον...ἐν τε θεωριῶν ἐπιτελέσει...καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ δέον πραχθῆναι δεδορκότος....

αὐτὸ δέ P. δεδορκός D. <ὅ ἐστιν> ἀνθρώπου corr. Morus.

I, 16, § 10. τὸ δὲ ἰσχύειν...ἐκατέρω <ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἄρτιον καὶ ἀήττητον ψυχὴν ἔχοντος>.

ἀνδρός...ἔχοντος om. A.

If the second passage is correct, it would appear that we should read in the former ἀνθρώπου ἐστιν. In view, however, of the omission of the words in A, I incline to read ὡς ἀνθρώπου in the first and ὡς ἀνδρός ἄρτιον (omitting ἐστιν) in the second. The ὡς and ἔχοντος would give a homœoteuton. Moreover every reader of § 10 must have been surprised by the novel turn of phrase in the traditional text.

II, 2. The words ἄφες τὰ βιβλία...ἀποθνήσκων are marked by Dr Leopold, the Oxford editor, as out of place.

Probably they got into the margin and were marked as to be inserted not after the first but the second ἡγεμονικόν. They then come in quite correctly: ἄφες τὰ βιβλία· μηκέτι σπῶ. οὐ δέδοται· ἀλλ' ὡς ἤδη ἀποθνήσκων ᾧδ' ἐπινοήθητι· γέρων εἰ κ.τ.λ.

The transition of thought is closely paralleled at the end of chapter 3.

II, 6. οὐκέτι καιρὸν ἔξεις· οὐ γὰρ ὁ βίος ἐκάστω· οὗτος δέ σοι σχεδὸν διήνυσται....

εὖ P. βραχύς D.

The readings of P and D are evident conjectures. Bootius

suggested to Gataker εἰς and this has been accepted by Dr Leopold. Gataker thought of φεύγει γὰρ. The original may perhaps have been not οὐ γὰρ but ὀλίγος; compare ὀλίγος ἄρα χρόνος οὗτος κ.τ.λ. Epict. I, 9, 17.

The following passages are quoted to illustrate the possibility that δεῖ has intruded into the present text (1) to assist the interpretation of an infinitive used imperatively (a very common idiom in this author), or (2) by dittography of or confusion with αἰεί, or (3) by a corruption of ἤδη with an infinitive into δεῖ. If these are intrusions, it will be seen that they go back behind the existing MSS.

II, 9. τούτων αἰεί δεῖ μεμνήσθαι.

Omit δεῖ, comparing Ἀεὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλειτείου μεμνήσθαι IV, 46.

II, 14. τούτων οὖν τῶν δύο δεῖ μεμνήσθαι.

Here I should prefer αἰεί, though the reading of A and D, ἄν (= δῆ), shows the antiquity of the present text.

III, 11, § 3. διὸ δεῖ ἐφ' ἐκάστου λέγειν.

διόδι A. For δεῖ read αἰεί.

IV, 12. Δύο ταύτας ἐτοιμότητας ἔχειν αἰεί δεῖ.

ἔχει A. Omit δεῖ.

V, 6. ναί· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο παρακολουθεῖν. ἴδιον γάρ, φησί τοῦ....

After τοῦτο, δεῖ P.

A and D omit δεῖ, I think correctly. The dialogue carries on the construction of δεῖ εἶναι above. I should also prefer to transpose φησί and to read ναί, φησίν, ἀλλ'....

VI, 26. τούτους δὲ τηροῦντα...περαίνειν.

δεῖ P. περαίνειν A.

δῆ is preferable, I think. Compare Dem. Olynth. II, 13 (p. 21), καὶ δῆ περαίνειν where δεῖ is read by S¹ and vulg.

VII, 56. ὥς ἀποτεθνηκότα δεῖ...τὸ λοιπὸν...ζῆσαι κατὰ τὴν φύσιν.

Read ἤδη for δεῖ; compare

ὥς ἤδη ἀποθνήσκων, II, 2.

Ἦδη τεθνήξῃ, IV, 37.

Dem. Phil. II, 28 (p. 72) ταῦτ' ἤδη λέξω, where S.L. read ταῦτα δῆ.

XII, 24. *τρία ταῦτα δεῖ πρόχειρα ἔχειν.* Read *ἀεὶ*.

These confusions are very common in MSS. From this book we may illustrate as follows:—

IV, 24. *ὄθεν δεῖ. ὄθεν δὴ A.*

IV, 33. *περὶ δὲ δεῖ. δὲ δὴ A.*

V, 10. *τοῦναντίον γὰρ δεῖ. δὴ D.*

VII, 48. *καὶ δὴ. δεῖ A.*

„ „ *ἐπισκοπεῖν δεῖ. δὴ A.*

(Here perhaps we should read *ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀεὶ*.)

X, 9. *δεῖ δὲ πᾶν οὕτω βλέπειν. ἤδη δὲ A.*

III, 2, § 3. *καὶ τὸ ἐν παισὶν ἐπαφρόδιτον τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ σώφροσιν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὁρᾶν δυνήσεται.*

Surely *τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ* and *ἐπαφρόδιτον* should be transposed.

III, 3. *λατρεύων τοσοῦτῳ χείρονι τῷ ἀγγεῖῳ ἢ περίεστι τὸ ὑπηρετοῦν.* ἢ *περ ἐστὶ D.*

The reading of D is accepted by Dr Leopold but then the *ἐστὶ* is very awkward. Moreover *τοσοῦτῳ* suggests *ὅσῳ* as Casaubon emended. It would appear better to read *ἥπερ* and *τοσοῦτον* and to suppose that a scribe took *περ* to be an abbreviation for *περίεστι*.

III, 5. *ἐν δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον καὶ τὸ ἀπροσδεὲς ἔξωθεν ὑπηρεσίας καὶ τὸ ἀπροσδεὲς ἡσυχίας ἢ ἄλλοι παρέχουσιν.*

ἐν δὲ τὸ φαιδρόν P. *τῆς ἔξωθεν P.*

ἔτι δὲ τὸ φαιδρόν (Morus) is generally accepted. The reverse error appears in I, 16, § 10 where Gataker has corrected *ἔτι καρτερεῖν* to *ἐγκαρτερεῖν*. But surely the second *ἀπροσδεὲς* is intolerable. Either it has dispossessed another neuter adj. or an attributive to *ἡσυχίας*. The explanation may lie in the intrusive *φαινόμενον*, meanwhile we should read *καὶ τῆς ἡσυχίας ἦν...* or possibly *τῆς φαινομένης ἡσυχίας ἦν...*

III, 10. *οὐκ εἰδότες οὐδὲ ἑαυτοὺς οὔτε γε τὸν πρόπαλαι τεθνηκότα.*

οὐδέ γε corr. Reiske.

I think we should omit the *οὐδὲ* before *ἑαυτοὺς* supposing that *οὐδὲ* was originally a correction of the common error *οὔτε*.

III, 16. *καὶ τῶν ποιούντων, ἐπειδὴ κλείσωσι τὰς θύρας....*

<ὅτιοῦν> ποιούντων Gataker.

Perhaps τῶν <ποῶν οὐ> ποιούντων. This kind of phrase is a favourite with our author. Compare, e.g., καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα καὶ οἷα ποιεῖ x, 26.

IV, 51. Ἐπὶ τὴν σύντομον ἀεὶ τρέχει.

τρέχε P.

We should read τρέχειν (i.e. *τρέχει*); compare ἐπὶ τῆς γράμμης τρέχειν ὀρθόν IV, 18, and ἔχει IV, 12, περαίνει VI, 26.

V, 1. καὶ οὗτοι (sc. οἱ τεχνίται) ὅταν προσπαθῶσιν οὔτε φαγεῖν οὔτε κοιμηθῆναι θέλουσι μᾶλλον ἢ ταῦτα συναύξειν προσδιαφέρονται.

προσπατῶσιν and πρὸς ἃ φέρονται P.

The accepted reading is πρὸς ἃ διαφέρονται. We should also find an object for προσπαθῶσιν by reading <πρὸς τι> προσπαθῶσιν. Compare καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην χώραν προσπαθῆς Epict. III, 24, 82.

V, 4. ἀναπαύσομαι...πεσὼν ἐπὶ τούτῳ...ὃ φέρει με πατοῦντα καὶ εἰς τοσαῦτα ἀποχρώμενον αὐτῷ.

No one appears to have suggested ἀποπατοῦντα, which would make better sense and correct Greek and be in the Stoic or Cynic manner.

V, 6. ἄνθρωπος δ' εὖ ποιήσας οὐκ ἐπισπᾶται ἀλλὰ μεταβαίνει ἐφ' ἕτερον.

ἐπιβοᾶται P.

The reading of P, which has been accepted (though it looks like a conjecture), would mean "is not exclaimed against" or "hooted." Though it is a violent remedy I suggest ἐπιζητεῖ τι. Compare immediately above μηδὲν ἄλλο προσεπιζητούση and τί πλέον ἐπιζητῶ; VIII, 2; τί γὰρ πλέον θέλεις; IX, 42, § 4.

V, 36. οὕτως οὖν καὶ <ὦδε. Ἐπεὶ τοι γίνῃ καλῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμβόλων. Ἀνθρώπε, ἐπελάθου τί ταῦτα ἦν. Ναί· ἀλλὰ τούτοις περισπούδαστα. Διὰ τούτ' οὖν καὶ> σὺ μωρὸς γένῃ;

A omits <ὦδε...καὶ>.

The point of this difficult passage is that the Stoic will treat ordinary persons who lament their losses in the same way as an old man his foster-child, viz. with a certain sympathy but without sharing their extreme of feeling. But what is the sense of "calling out at the rostra"? I would suggest οὕτως οὖν καὶ

σὺ ὦδε, where the σὺ will complete the homœoteleuton to explain A's lacuna; and Ἐπεὶ τοι <τί> γίνῃ κλάων ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμβάδων; Schenkl, preface to Epicteti Dissertationes (Teubner) p. XL, says "sexcenties confunduntur κλάω et καλῶ." I am supposing ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμβάδων to be a possible equivalent of τραγικῶς. But compare Hesych. I, 723.

VI, 14. τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔτι χαριεστέρων εἰς τὰ ὑπὸ λογικῆς ψυχῆς, οὐ μέντοι καθολικῆς ἀλλὰ καθὸ τεχνικῆς ἢ ἄλλως πως ἐντρεχῆς ἢ κατὰ ψιλὸν τὸ πλήθος ἀνδραπόδων κεκτῆσθαι. ὁ δὲ ψυχὴν λογικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν τιμῶν οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστρέφεται....

post λογικὴν add. καθολικὴν P.

In VII, 64 A gives οὔτε γὰρ καθολικὴ ἐστὶν οὔτε καθὸ κοινωνικὴ διαφθείρει αὐτήν. P reads καθὸ ὑλικῆς. Casaubon who had not A before him emended P to καθὸ λογικῆς and this is accepted.

It appears certain then that the reading in VI, 14 should be οὐ μέντοι καθὸ λογικῆς ἀλλὰ καθὸ τεχνικῆς; and καθολικὴν in P lower down is a gloss on λογικὴν.

The author is introducing a further step into the scala of the Stoical system, i.e. dividing ψυχὴ λογικὴ into ψυχὴ λογικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ (cf. III, 6) and a lower form ψυχὴ τεχνικὴ—more refined spirits admire the objects which fall under the cognisance of the artistic self. I need hardly say that ψυχὴ καθολικὴ means absolutely nothing in the Stoic system nor I think in any other Greek philosophy of this date. ἀνδραπόδων is strange; it would come naturally under plain ψυχὴ, viz. in the realm of organic life. Could ἀνδριάντων be the true reading?

Compare ἐπὶ τῶν κοινότερον καλῶν λεγομένων· οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνικῶν κατασκευασμάτων IV, 20.

VI, 18. τοῦτο δὲ ἐγγύς ἐστι τῷ λυπηθῆναι ἂν ὅτι....

This ἂν is very difficult. Perhaps we should read αὐ?

VI, 21. ζητῶ γὰρ τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

Read ζηλῶ. In VIII, 2 τί πλέον ἐπιζητῶ; becomes ἐπιζηλῶ in P.

VII, 2. δύναμαι περὶ τούτου ὃ δεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν.

Read ὁδῶ. Compare Δύνασαι...ὁδῶ ὑπολαμβάνειν V, 34.

VII, 17. Εὐδαιμονία ἐστὶ δαίμων ἀγαθὸς ἢ ἀγαθόν.

<ἡγεμονικόν> ἀγαθόν Gataker.

What is required is some philological equivalent to δαίμων. I therefore suggest ἡ ἀγαθὸν <θεῖον>. Compare μόνον τὸ ἡγεμονικόν σου καὶ τὸ ἐν σοὶ θεῖον τιμῆσης XII, 1 and passages like Σωκράτης...ἤρετο εἰ οὐχ οἱ δαίμονες ἦτοι θεῶν παῖδες εἶεν ἡ θεῖόν τι, Arist. Rhet. 1419^a 11.

VIII, 3. οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἶδον τὰ πράγματα...ἐκεῖ δὲ ὅσων πρόνοια καὶ δουλεία πόσων;

The contrast is between Diogenes, Heraclitus and Socrates on the one hand and conquerors like Alexander, Julius and Pompey on the other. The proper antithesis to οἱ μὲν is ἐκείνοις δέ.

Compare Demosth. Phil. I, § 46 (p. 53) ἐκείνος S.B., ἐκείνος ἐκεῖ vulg., ἐκεῖ schol.

VIII, 6. πάντα συνήθη ἀλλὰ ἴσαι καὶ ἀπονεμήσεις.
καὶ ἴσαι αἱ ἀπ. P.

Read ἀλλὰ ἴσαι καὶ <αἱ> ἀπονεμήσεις.

IX, 3. καὶ μεθ' οἷων ἡθῶν οὐκέτι ἔσται ἡ πεφυρμένη.
ἐμπεφυρμένη P. ἡ <ψυχῇ> Casaubon.

ἡ appears to represent an interlinear correction of ἔσται, viz. ἔσται^η and the true reading to be ἔση πεφυρμένος.

Compare IV, 19 where A gives ἐχομένην, P ἐχόμενον and Gat. emends to ἐχόμενος, and II, 4 where A's reading suggests οἰχίσεται^η in the source.

IX, 9. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἔτι κρείττωνων καὶ διεστηκότων τρόπον τινὰ ἔνωσις...οὕτως ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ κρείττον ἐπανάβασις συμπάθειαν καὶ διεστῶσιν ἐργάσασθαι ἐδύνατο.

ἐκ διεστηκότων and ἐν διεστῶσιν P, both of which the Oxford text prints. I think that the stars are naturally described as κρείττωνων καὶ διεστηκότων; compare "quae quamquam longo cogit summtota recessu sentiri tamen" Manilius Astron. II, 84-5.

For καὶ διεστῶσιν read κὰν διεστῶσιν. The mistake is common in MSS., see for example Arist. Poet. 1447^a 21 where A^c reads καὶ for κὰν.

IX, 32. ...ταχεῖαν μεταβολὴν ἐπινοεῖν, ὡς βραχὺ μὲν τὸ ἀπογενέσεως μέχρι διαλύσεως, ἀχανές δὲ τὸ πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως, ὡς καὶ τὸ μετὰ τὴν διάλυσιν ὁμοίως ἄπειρον.

Read γενέσεως καὶ.... I suppose that the second ὡς which is awkward is a dittograph.

x, 8, § 4. πρὸς μέντοι τὸ μεμνήσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων μεγάλως συλλήψεται σοι τὸ μεμνήσθαι θεῶν....

The first μεμνήσθαι has clearly intruded from the influence of the second. What is wanted is some word to correspond with καὶ μὲν ἐπ' αὐτῶν μένειν δύνῃ and περικρατεῖς. I would suggest ἔχεσθαι.

x, 15. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει ἐκεῖ ἢ ὧδε.

xii, 36. τίσι διαφέρει πέντε.

P, τί σοι διαφέρει εἰ πέντε ἔτεσιν; Reiske adds <ἢ τρισί>. The accepted reading is P with Reiske's addition which comes from οὐκ εἶπον τὰ πέντε μέρη ἀλλὰ τὰ τρία lower down. There the contrast between the three acts and the five is natural but here it appears ridiculous to ask "what is the difference between five years and three?"

If εἰ be read here we ought to presume a similar haplography in x, 15 where the sense requires "whether there or here."

Is it possible that the true reading in xii, 36 is πέντε ἔτεσιν ἢ πεντήκοντα viz. ε ἔτεσιν ἢ N?

x, 18. καθότι ἕκαστον πέφυκεν ὥσπερ θνήσκειν.

The context is a statement of the constant change, dissolution, decay and dispersal of the elements of which every substance is composed. There is therefore very little point in saying that each being is destined by nature to a kind of death.

I think the true reading ἐπινοεῖν αὐτὸ ἤδη διαλυόμενον καὶ ἐν μεταβολῇ καὶ οἶον σήψει ἢ σκεδάσει γιγνόμενον ἢ καθότι ἕκαστον πέφυκεν ὥσπερ θνήσκον, i.e. dying in a manner (every moment) as it was in a manner born.

For the change in the MSS. compare ii, 3 where A and D read συμφέρειν for the true reading συμφέρον.

NOTE. When writing the above I regret that I had seen neither Dr H. Schenkel's text (Teubner, 1913) nor Mr C. R. Haines' text and translation (Heinemann, 1916). On the whole Dr Schenkel represents the reaction against excision and the desire to respect MS. authority. See especially ii, 4; v, 6. He would not agree with my remarks about the intrusive δεῖ (see ii, 14; vi, 26).

III, 16. Dr Schenkel suggests <τί οὐ>.

V, 36. Mr Haines emends ἔπειτα τί....

VI, 14. Dr Schenkel suggests καθὸ λογικὴ ἐστίν, which Mr Haines rejects.

IX, 3. Both read ἡ <σὴ ψυχὴ> συμπεφυρμένη, after Plato, Phaedo 66 c.

IX, 9. Both omit ἐκ.

XII, 36. Dr Schenkel states that R. read <τρισι ἡ>. Mr Haines reads <ἡ ἐκατὸν>, no doubt relying on IX, 37.

A. S. L. FARQUHARSON.

JUVENAL AND TWO OF HIS EDITORS.

A REJOINDER.

Fair criticism is always welcome. Scholars who follow the laborious and unremunerative path of research can thus promote the discovery of truth, which is the object of their studies. Dissenting criticism, if offered with good-nature, is helpful and encouraging. But the attack which has been made by Mr Housman (J. P. xxxiv. 40 foll.) on certain conclusions of mine is not of this nature. It is unfair, and, especially as it is not the first of such attacks, appears to be designed to damage. It revives the obsolete and discreditable methods of the Dunciad.

In my paper on the Phillipps manuscripts of Juvenal (J. P. xxxiii. 238 foll.) I had occasion to argue in favour of readings found in manuscripts in some disputed passages, and incidentally to take account of views put forward by others and among them by Mr Housman in his clever but paradoxical edition. Mr Housman is dissatisfied that I disagree with him, and is justified in saying so: but his way of doing this will hardly be approved. The gist of his contention is that I do not reach my conclusions by reasoning, or, as he puts it with questionable taste, that I have "access to a higher and purer source of illumination" (p. 40). The collection of facts, of which my article is made up, is my argument and my source of illumination.

I have no desire for controversy, which leads unfortunately too often to irritation and the display of personal vanity. But I feel that it is not right that the misrepresentations contained in Mr Housman's article should pass unchallenged. The method of attack leaves no choice but to reply. I regret this necessity as I recognise Mr Housman's ability and the acuteness with which he has often shed light on obscurities in Latin literature. If he could only be persuaded to discard such bitterness as

I deplore, his work would be appreciated even more highly than it is. I shall content myself with referring to a few points which indicate the unfairness of the criticisms advanced. From them scholars can judge of the rest.

In Juvenal III. 236

raedarum transitus arto
uicorum inflexu

in deference to the complete consensus of the manuscripts, except O and the Phillippus R, I maintained that, as all editors have done except Mr Housman, the word *inflexu* should be retained, because this rare word would seem to be one of many instances of the vocabulary of later Latin appearing betimes in Juvenal. This phaenomenon I supported by several examples of such usage. Therefore, since Seneca was earlier not later than Juvenal, it is irrelevant that, as Mr Housman urges, the text is doubtful in Seneca, *Dial.* x. 12. 4. The disappearance of *inflexus* from Seneca does not affect its later use. The reading *in flexu* in Juvenal (which I noted is found in the Phillippus R) Mr Housman adopted from the 'editiones ueteres,' and, joining my name irreverently with that of the Holy Father, he accuses me of being dogmatic because I follow the practically unanimous tradition of the manuscripts and support my position by argument!

In VII. 184

ueniet qui fercula docte
componat, ueniet qui pulmentaria condit

I showed that this reading is best supported, and that parallels can be found for the variation of construction by which the consecutive form *ueniet qui componat* is followed by (*is*) *qui condit ueniet*, and further that this disregard of uniformity is significant of the colloquial character of Juvenal's language. Mr Housman imputes to me a *petitio principii* because "the very question at issue is whether we have or have not a variation of construction here." But I demonstrated that the reading in question is supported by overwhelming manuscript authority and by linguistic parallels. To describe such a demonstration as a *petitio principii* is palpably false.

In l. 168

inde irae et lacrimae

I argued that the reading *irae*, supported by overwhelming manuscript authority, is to be preferred to *ira* found in a few manuscripts, for two reasons: (1) because *irae* plural is in harmony with Juvenal's frequent use of substantives plural in form but singular in meaning, again an evidence of the later Latin usage; (2) because *irae* is supported by Cyprian's imitation, *Heptat. Genes.* 895, "inde irae et lacrimae et fraus quaesita nocendi." Here is evidence and reasoning. But Mr Housman asserts that "what Cyprian had before him, and what he wrote, has been disclosed to nobody but Mr Owen." No one certainly knows what any ancient writer had before him or wrote in the sense that there is no one alive who saw such a writer writing and can bear witness. All we can do is to be guided by our most trustworthy authority. Here I quoted the line as printed by the best editor Peiper in the Vienna Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum. Peiper prefers *irae* to *ira* because it is found in two of his three good manuscripts, one being the ninth century Laon manuscript, of which Peiper says "ut est omnium plenissimus, ita lectiones eius maiorem in uniuersum fidem merentur quam ceterorum" (p. xv). In Cyprian the reading *ira* rests on one manuscript alone. Mr Housman may prefer to read *ira* in Juvenal, but it is mere impertinence to say that what Cyprian had before him and wrote has been disclosed to nobody but myself.

In XIII. 49

nondum aliquis sortitus triste profundum
imperium aut Sicula toruos cum coniuge Pluton

I naturally inferred from Mr Housman's note "IMI,* om. P, ALIQUIS Ψ" that his surprising conjecture *imi* for *aliquis* was due to the supposed loss of a word for which *aliquis* found in the manuscripts other than P was a stopgap conjecturally supplied. Therefore I showed by examples that the omission of a word such as *aliquis* is a slip common in P, and affords no basis for conjecture. But Mr Housman now says that his objection to the text is that "*triste* is applicable to Pluto's

empire and inapplicable to Neptune's." It is equally applicable to either. It is appropriate to the province of the lord of the sea. The Romans regarded the sea with horror as a tempestuous element causing shipwreck and death (Lucret. II. 552 foll.; Hor. *C.* I. 3. 9 foll., 14. 1 foll., III. 1. 26). The "mare naufragum uentosum iratum" was to them the destroyer of mariners (Hor. *C.* I. 16. 10, III. 4. 46, *Epod.* 2. 6, *C.* I. 28. 18). The epithet *tristis* is applied to the stormy sea (Ov. *H.* 18. 143. 212), and to the stormy winter season (Virg. *G.* IV. 135; Ov. *A. A.* I. 409, *T.* III. 10. 9, *Ib.* 199; Virg. *Aen.* XI. 259, "triste Mineruae sidus"). Hence in Juvenal's expression *triste profundum imperium* the epithet is appropriately transferred to *imperium*, since the sphere which fell by lot to Neptune was a "sors tristis atrox" (Cic. *Mur.* 42), because it was that god's stormy function chiefly to produce tempests and shipwrecks. Prop. III. 7. 15, 62:

'quidnam fracta gaudes, Neptune, carina?'

'in me caeruleo fuscina sumpta deo est.'

Mr Housman rewrites the passage so as to eliminate Neptune and refer the whole to Pluto

nondum <imi> sortitus triste profundum
imperium Sicula toruos cum coniuge Pluton.

But it seems to me necessary that in this catalogue of gods Neptune should be introduced along with Jupiter and Pluto, since these three great gods shared the sovereignty of Saturn between them. It was in this sense that I spoke, perhaps unfortunately, of the "full catalogue of the gods." I did not say "complete." I further maintained that *profundum* 'the deep' must signify the sea, and that to understand it in the sense of 'hell,' or, as Mr Housman expresses it, "the subterranean world," involves assigning to it a forced and unnatural meaning. Mr Housman asserts that "there are half a dozen verses in the Aetna alone where *profundum* signifies the subterranean world; for example 578 'septemque duces raptumque profundo.'" But an examination of the Aetna does not bear out this assertion. In the line quoted the meaning is 'the abyss' or chasm which opened in the ground to engulf

Amphiaraus, as Ellis explains. It does not signify the nether world of Pluto. The author of the scientific poem on volcanoes, the Aetna, conceived the earth as being not solid but containing chasms and full of cavities and passages through which wind passes (94 foll.), and as producing earthquakes through the conflict of wind and air pent up within these arteries (154). In this poem *profundum* signifies sometimes these hollow depths of the earth's interior, as 257 "scrutamur rimas et uertimus omne profundum," so 143, 166, 545, sometimes the crater of a volcano, as 181, 210, 341. Once it is used of the deep sea, 319 "unda profundo terque quaterque exhausta," which I still maintain is its meaning in the passage of Juvenal in question. Never in the Aetna does it signify the subterranean world in the sense of the realm of Pluto.

I will not go further into the matters in dispute. Even if they be "mostly trifles and mostly incapable of decision" I plead that it is improper that one who attempts to decide them should be treated with discourtesy and misrepresentation.

S. G. OWEN.

ON EUDEMIAN ETHICS III v, vi.

Read before the Cambridge Philological Society.

The paper which I am now to read to you has in it nothing at all exciting. I have no paradoxical conjecture with which to startle or to shock you: on the contrary I desire to bring before you several minor difficulties which meet me in *Eud. Eth.* III v, vi, and to invite you to give me, in dealing with them, the benefit of your tact and experience. I shall ask you in each case, not merely, "is my conjectural alteration grammatical?" and "can it be construed?" but also, "does it seem to you natural and idiomatic?" Of course, I always recognize that, even within the limits of our own language we cannot speak at all confidently about the style (say) of the early eighteenth century, and that, *a fortiori*, we must not rashly dogmatize about an ancient language which is not our own. But so long as we continue to make a careful study of Greek literature, it is right that we should cultivate our possibilities, such as they are, and also, if I may use an Americanism, that we should pool the proceeds.

In *Eud. Eth.* III v Eudemus describes Aristotle's *μεγαλόψυχος*. At 1232^a 30 in the words ὥστε καὶ τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ τῷ μεγαλοπρεπεῖ ὅμοιος εἶναι δοκεῖ he sums up the results so far reached. After *δοκεῖ* he starts afresh, and proceeds to establish a resemblance to yet other virtues. Hence substitute a full-stop for Susemihl's comma: and, with Spengel, for ὅτι write ἔτι. The καὶ which follows must be taken, not with ἔτι, but with πάσαις. At 33 Susemihl pronounces τοιαύτ' εἶναι ἡδέα corrupt; Fritzsche conjectures δοκοῦντ' εἶναι ἡδέα: and Rassow for εἶναι ἡδέα would read κρίνειν. For myself, I propose to substitute δοκεῖ for διώκει: "Those things appear to be great which the representation of the best habit in the particular region holds

to be pleasurable, and magnanimity is that best habit. On the other hand a particular virtue judges aright the greater and the smaller as (*ἥπερ*) the judicious man and virtue would prescribe: so that all the virtues go with magnanimity, or magnanimity with all the virtues." Here for *ἄπερ* I substitute *ἥπερ*. I grant that *ἄπερ* might be supposed to have for its antecedent an accusative cognate to *κρίνει*, such as *ταῦτα* or *τοιαῦτα*: but I think that Spengel's instinct is sound when he proposes *καθάπερ*, and that *ἥπερ*, which is palaeographically less expensive, will serve instead of it. Yet another question arises in this sentence. Spengel brackets *καὶ ἡ ἀρετή*; Rieckher pronounces these words corrupt; and Susemihl thinks the text unsound. For myself I am well satisfied with it. According to Eudemus' teaching in what we know as the sixth book of the Nicomacheans, moral conduct depends upon *φρόνησις* and *ἀρετή* taken in conjunction, whereof *ἀρετή* determines the end and *φρόνησις* the means: but neither of them can exist in its perfection if the other is absent. Hence in the present passage the *φρόνιμος* is also *ἀγαθός*, and *ἀρετή* has *φρόνησις* associated with it. This being so, *ὁ φρόνιμος* and *ἡ ἀρετή* are alternative presentations of the moral standard.

That all the virtues go with magnanimity, or magnanimity with all the virtues, appears further in the facts that, on the one hand, the magnanimous man is apt to be contemptuous, and, on the other, each particular virtue makes a man contemptuous of "great things which reason does not account so." The phrase *τὰ παρὰ τὸν λόγον μεγάλα* is an odd one: but we can conceive a dichotomy of *μεγάλα* in which *τὰ παρὰ τὸν λόγον* are opposed to *τὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον*. Then come examples, namely, the virtue of courage, the temperate man, and the liberal man. Spengel has seen that the collocation of one virtue and two virtuous men is intolerable, and has therefore substituted *ἀνδρείος* for *ἀνδρεία*. This seems to me certainly right. For the palaeographical equivalence of *-a* and *-os*, see Bast p. 773, etc. And now I come to the parenthetical sentence about the *ἀνδρείος*: *μέγα γὰρ οἶεται εἶναι τῶν αἰσχυρῶν καὶ πλῆθος οὐ πᾶν φοβερὸν*. Plainly, something is wanting here. Accordingly Mr Solomon supplies *ἡγείσθαι* after *γάρ*, and, if my memory serves, Mr H.

Richards, *τι ποιείσθαι*. I myself propose μέγα γὰρ <οἷεσθαί τι> οἶται εἶναι τῶν αἰσχυρῶν: "he thinks it disgraceful to account anything great, and that not every multitude is formidable." Compare *Nic. Eth.* Δ viii 1225^a 15 where the μεγαλόψυχος is ὁ μηδὲν μέγα οἰόμενος. The next sentence—μεγαλοψύχου δὲ δοκεῖ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ περὶ ὀλίγα σπουδάζειν, καὶ ταῦτα μεγάλα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι δοκεῖ ἐτέρῳ τινί—is translated by Mr Solomon—"But this characteristic [namely, to be disdainful] seems to belong to the magnanimous man because he cares about few things only, and those great, and not because some one else thinks them so." Now at first sight this translation passes muster: but, first, though μεγαλοψύχου δὲ τοῦτο is a satisfactory equivalent for μεγαλοψύχου δὲ ἐστὶ τοῦτο, I doubt whether μεγαλοψύχου δὲ δοκεῖ τοῦτο can stand for μεγαλοψύχου δὲ εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦτο; in other words, I question the subaudition of εἶναι: and, secondly, the clause καὶ οὐχ ὅτι δοκεῖ ἐτέρῳ τινί does not seem to me to fall exactly into its place. Let me try to mend the sentence. First, for μεγαλοψύχου δὲ δοκεῖ τοῦτο write μεγαλοψύχου δὲ δοκεῖν τοῦτο: secondly, for ὅτι before δοκεῖ in line 5 write ὅ τι from ὅστις. We shall then translate: "and [not 'But'] it is characteristic of the magnanimous man to take this view [i.e. to be contemptuous] because he cares for few things, and those, things which are great, and it is not his way to think as some one else does." And now I turn to line 14: οὕτω μὲν οὖν δόξειεν ἂν ἐναντίως ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ εἶναί τε μάλιστα περὶ τιμὴν καὶ καταφρονητικὸν εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν [καὶ] δόξης οὐχ ὁμολογεῖσθαι. So Susemihl. But Π¹ reads τὸ and not τῷ. Preferring as I do myself τὸ to τῷ, Mr Solomon translates—"In this way he would seem to contradict himself; for to be concerned above all with honour, and yet to disdain the multitude and reputation are inconsistent." Clearly Mr Solomon's "and yet" gives us the right meaning. On the other hand, the τε, which in the text closely links τὸ εἶναι μάλιστα περὶ τιμὴν with καταφρονητικὸν εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν καὶ δόξης and makes them into a unity, is wholly out of place. Hence for εἶναί τε μάλιστα, read εἶναι τὰ μάλιστα. Some fifteen lines further on, I am again in difficulties. Here the author distinguishes four characters: (1) the man who is worthy of goods which are

honourable, τῶν ἐντίμων ἀγαθῶν 1232^b 31, on a large scale and thinks himself worthy of them; (2) the man who is worthy of such goods on a small scale only, and thinks himself worthy accordingly; (3) the man who is worthy of honourable goods on a small scale and thinks himself worthy of them on a large scale; (4) the man who is worthy of them on a large scale and thinks himself worthy of them on a small scale only. (My paraphrase is necessarily clumsy, because I must not lose sight of the fact that we are here thinking, not of all goods, but only of those which are ἐντιμα.) My trouble is with the words ἔστι δὲ μικρὰ καὶ ἄξιόν τινα τηλικούτων καὶ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τούτων, 32, 33. Mr Solomon renders: "and again there may be small goods and a man worthy of them and thinking himself worthy." Mr Solomon's version gives us the requisite meaning, inasmuch as he makes τηλικούτων represent μικρῶν: but I have my doubts whether τηλικούτων can have this sense, and the statement that "there may be small goods" is a clumsy superfluity, which adds nothing to τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα κατ' ἀλήθειαν τὰ δὲ μικρὰ at line 28. For myself, I desiderate ἔστι δὲ μικρῶν εἶναι ἄξιόν τινα τηλικούτων καὶ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τούτων: "it is possible that a man should be worthy of these great goods on a small scale and that he should think himself worthy of them." And the change is palaeographically justifiable. For the genitive termination -ῶν, if superposed, might easily be lost: and $a = \epsilon i$, $\kappa = \nu$, are recognized equations. See Bast. For the collocation μικρῶν εἶναι ἄξιον τηλικούτων, compare line 35 μεγάλων ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἐντίμων ἀγαθῶν.

And now I leave chap. v and turn for a few moments to chap. vi. I extend my scheme in this way that I may have the pleasure of calling attention to an acute and learned comment of Ingram Bywater's in an article which he published perhaps two years ago in the *Journal of Philology*. At p. 1233^b 11 we read οἶον τὴν θεωρίαν οὐκ ᾤετο Θεμιστοκλεῖ πρέπειν ἦν ἐποίησατο Ὀλυμιάζε διὰ τὴν προνπάρξασαν ταπεινότητα ἀλλὰ Κίμωνι. Mr Solomon translates "e.g. one thought that the mission conducted by Themistocles to the Olympian games was not fitting to him because of his previous low station, but would have been to Cimon." This rendering seems to me substantially

correct: but, to get it, Mr Solomon proposes (with Spengel) to alter $\phi\epsilon\tau\omicron$ into $\phi\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$. Or perhaps, thinks Spengel, the name of a comic poet has dropped out. Or perhaps, thinks Fritzsche, $\phi\epsilon\tau\omicron$ was used passively, and $\omicron\upsilon\kappa \phi\epsilon\tau\omicron = negabatur$. I venture to suggest that $\tau\iota\varsigma$ has dropped out after $\phi\epsilon\tau\omicron$. At first sight, this conjecture seems highly improbable; and, had it not been for Bywater's note, I should hardly have dared to propose it. But, in the *Journal of Philology* xxxii, 222, 223, Bywater shows that the letter τ —tau with an apostrophe after it—sometimes did duty for $\tau\iota\varsigma$, and that the compendium was occasionally misread as $\tau\epsilon$. Having established this, he proceeds to deal with a passage in Hippocrates I, p. 109, 6 Kuehlewein where some MSS have $\delta\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\iota\tau\omicron \tau\iota\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\nu$, and others, the best, $\delta\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\iota\tau' \acute{\alpha}\nu$. Bywater conjectures that this $\delta\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\iota\tau' \acute{\alpha}\nu$ is compressed from an earlier $\delta\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\iota\tau\omicron \tau' \acute{\alpha}\nu$, i.e. $\delta\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\iota\tau\omicron \tau\iota\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\nu$. I should have liked to point out to our friend, that, if, as I think, $\tau\iota\varsigma$ has been dropped after $\phi\epsilon\tau\omicron$, the parallelism between this passage and his passage from Hippocrates is exact.

If you should ask what the moral of my little paper is, it is, I think, that when we pass beyond the great classical authors who have been studied ever since the renaissance, it is necessary to put the texts under the microscope, not that the inquirer may achieve a palmary emendation, but that he may make the Greek original grammatical, intelligible and idiomatic. My experience is that the writings of Aristotle and his pupils, though they are devoid of literary form, are conspicuously idiomatic.

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CONTAMINATION IN MORPHOLOGY.

By contamination is understood a union of two forms or expressions whereby a third is produced. From various causes, which we shall observe below, it has been of considerable importance in the growth of language. Its influence in the spheres of phonology and syntax has already won some recognition. Contamination, like analogy, is not a sound-law; but in matters of phonology it works in spite of or in opposition to the sound-laws, e.g. Latin *pristrinum* from *pistrinum* by contamination with *pristinum*, *quadriangulus* with *triangulus*, *meridionalis* with *septentrionalis*, in Greek *λύκαῖνα* with *λέαῖνα* &c.; in vulgar Latin **greuis*, which is seen in the Fr. *grief*, is perhaps from *grauis* by contamination with the opposite *lewis*. Very clear examples of contamination are seen also in the rustic German word *Erdtoffeln* from *Erdäpfel* contaminated with *Kartoffeln*, and in the German *Gemältnis* from *Gemälde* with *Bildnis*, and in *doppelt* from *doppel* (cf. Fr. *double*) with *gedoppelt*. (For further examples see Paul *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte*⁴ p. 160.) Contamination is frequently found in the 'irregular' comparatives and superlatives through confusion with the common living forms, as in *πρώτιστος*, *ἀρειότερος*, *pes-sissimus*, nearer, lesser &c. Though much still remains to be done, most philologists and scholars recognise the influence of contamination in syntax, whereby two constructions, which would give practically the same resultant meaning, are mingled together so as to produce a third, which is tautologous and often illogical. Well-known types are: the English colloquial expression *he will not be friends with you* from *he will not be friendly with you* and *you (two) will not be friends*; in the Classical languages *φησί τοι ἄνδρα παρῆναι οὐζυρώτατον ἄλλων* (Homer) by contamination with the comparative; *ante alios immanior omnis* (Virgil) by contamination with the positive *immanis*; *αἰρετώτερον εἶναι τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ*

βίον (Xen.). On the subject of contamination in morphology, however, the philologists have written hardly a word, and it is my purpose in this article very briefly to suggest the necessity of considering this principle in morphological researches.

Before we pass on to consider the details of contamination in morphology, we must notice the causes which have operated in its production. These may be divided into two classes: external or physical and internal or psychological. The former is seen most clearly in the speech of a district, where two language-areas overlap, especially if the languages are of widely different character. The most interesting example in modern times is, of course, Modern Greek in Asia Minor. At Semendré the Turkish endings are found added to the Greek in the 1st and 2nd persons plural of the imperfect middle, as *κέτουν-μιστικ* (*k* being the Turkish ending of the 1st person plural of the past tense), *κέτουνστινιζ* (*-iniz* being the Turkish ending of the general 2nd person plural); at Silli we find *κοιμούμιστινιζ* (1st person plural of imperf. middle), *κοιμάσστινιζ* (2nd person plural of the same tense), where *-iz* is added from the Turkish endings *-iz*, *-siniz*. For a full discussion on these forms see R. M. Dawkins' invaluable work on *Modern Greek in Asia Minor* pp. 59 and 144. Like the adoption of the Turkish system of vowel-harmony, these contaminated endings are a compromise and a testimony of the perennial vitality of the Greek language even amid the most adverse conditions. Confused or contaminated forms may in the same way be the result of conquest; a good example of this is the use of *-s* for the plural in English, which, like the use of *me* (the dative) instead of *min* for the accusative, owes its extension largely to Norman-French influence. A good deal naturally depends on the relative culture of the peoples affected. A comparatively rustic dialect can hardly influence a highly cultivated language in morphological matters, though in special circumstances it may have some weight in matters of pronunciation. I have shown elsewhere (see my article on "The Change from the Ancient to the Modern Greek Accent" in this number of the *Journal of Philology* 1919) that the influence of Macedonian on Greek at the time of Alexander the Great is to be seen only

in the impetus which it gave to certain tendencies in pronunciation and accent. We have, however, some clear examples of morphological contamination in the Greek of this period and a little earlier, caused by the confusion of the dialect and the κοινή forms; for instance, the common form πόλεος is surely due to a confusion of πόλιος and πόλεως, Bœotian ἄως to ᾱς and ἔως, Heracl. *Φείκατι* to *Φίκατι* and *εἴκοσι*; we find also 'Doric' futures with the Attic *ου* in *ποιησοῦντι* &c., and Bœotian *ζώωνθι* for the pure dialect form *δώωνθι* by confusion with the Attic word, and Bœotian *ἐκγόνως* for *ἐσγόνως* in the same way. Perhaps the Arcadian *σφεις* (dat. plur.) is due to a contamination of *σφῖν* and Attic *σφίσι*. An interesting and undoubted example of contamination is seen in the Rhodian infinitive ending *-μειν*, which, as all Hellenists know, was one of the most persistent features of the dialect of that island. This ending is due to the confusion of *-μεν* and the common *-ειν* either within the Rhodian dialect itself or, more probably, through intercourse, especially commercial, with other peoples (e.g. the Athenians, Ionians, and people from N. Asia Minor) speaking dialects with the infinitive ending in *-ειν* only. Further researches in the morphology of the various I. E. languages from this point of view may lead to interesting results. For instance, as Latin spread through Italy, it was probably influenced in its morphology by the other dialects spoken in the peninsula, but of course to a less degree than in its vocabulary; the latter has been to some extent worked out by Ernout (*Les éléments dialectaux du vocabulaire latin*) and others; but the morphology still awaits discussion in this light, though on Latin inscriptions we find such pure dialect forms, as *Minucieis* (nom. pl.) C. I. L. i. 199, *ium* (cf. Osc. *ione*) C. I. L. ix. 782, and *fundatid* (cf. Oscan perfects) C. I. L. ix. 782. The morphological differences between the various I. E. languages may be due in some instances to contamination with the languages of the pre-Indo-European peoples; but in this sphere there is not sufficient material for useful research. Curiously enough some writers on the principles of language-growth have denied the possibility of contamination arising between the grammatical forms of two different languages. For example, Sayce (*Introduction*

to the *Science of Language* vol. I p. 172) says "The borrowing of grammatical forms is of much rarer occurrence [i.e. than that of words and sounds], inasmuch as grammar is the essence and life-blood of language, and to borrow the forms of grammar, therefore, is to intermingle the psychological histories of two separate tongues. It is a metamorphosis of the whole inherited mode of thinking and of viewing the relations of things to ourselves and one another, and to mix two grammars together is like mixing two different and incompatible modes of thought." This somewhat sweeping statement is the *a priori* view of the philosopher, "the exceptions to which even the author himself finds it difficult to explain away. The examples, which we have already quoted, are a sufficient refutation of it. This kind of contamination, of course, is not so common as that caused by confusion of thought; the borrowing of suffixes is not so free as that of vocabulary and can take place only between languages in the closest contact, as Dauzat (*La Philosophie du Langage* p. 102) says "Les emprunts de sons ou de formes grammaticales ne se produisent que dans des circonstances spéciales. Ils supposent, soit la coexistence de deux langues sur un territoire donné," and then quotes interesting examples of the influence of German on forms in old French and of literary French on the patois. Nevertheless it is a possibility that cannot be neglected.

Contamination due to internal and psychological reasons is an important element in the growth of language. In general it may be defined as a process, by which two synonymous forms of expression force themselves simultaneously into the consciousness with the result that neither of them makes its influence felt simply and purely but a new form arises in which elements of both are combined. Like most of the changes in language, what was originally an 'error' or idiosyncrasy on the part of an individual, has sometimes become at last permanent and general in the language. It remains to illustrate this in reference to morphology. The likeness in the meaning of two forms causes an uncertainty and confusion in the mind of the speaker and consequently his utterance is a mixture of the two. Many simple examples, some permanent and others appearing only

sporadically, occur to us, as, for instance, late Latin forms like *doleunt* (C. I. L. III. 336², 10347), *neunt* (Corp. Gloss. 4. 261. 7), with which we may compare the general uncertainty about the ending of the 3rd person plural of the various stems in the vulgar language of the Empire, especially in the provinces; and in the Greek dialects such forms as Heracl. πόλιστος for πλείστος through contamination with πολύς, Elean and Laconian (also in Aeschylus) ἄσσιστα for ἄγχιστα through contamination with ἄσσον. Unlike analogy, contamination in morphology does not often take part in the 'levelling' or reduction of the number of various forms in a paradigm. In fact, it may lead to an increase in the number of forms; cf. the variety of forms found often in the same dialect of Modern Greek and due to contamination (e.g. ἐνός, ἐνοῦ, ἐνοῦς (gen. of ἕνας), and the pronominal forms ἐμένα, ἐμοῦ, ἐμενοῦ, ἐμουνοῦ (gen. of ἐγώ), ἐμένα, ἐμόν, ἐμόνα (acc.), ἐσένα, ἐσόν, ἐσόνα (acc. of ἐσύ).)

Let us consider now some of the forms which seem to be caused by contamination in the nominal, pronominal, and verbal paradigms:

(1) *Nominal*. Contamination between the different stems is not an uncommon phenomenon in some dialect forms in Greek, as Cyprian ἱατῆραν, Rhodian ἀνδρῶναν, Elean ἀγαλματοφῶραν and later in many dialects θυγατέραν, γυναικῶν, νύκταν, where the accusative of the consonant stems has added -ν through contamination with the *ā*-declension. The gen. in -*āo* of the *ā*-stem substantives, which owing to their meaning have become masculine, is due to the addition of the *o*-ending of the gen. of the *o*-stems (-οιο) to -*ās* the proper genitive ending of *ā*-stems; πολίτ^αω is from *πολίτ^αω; in the Arcadian dialect this is extended often to other *ā*-stems, e.g. ζαμίαν, οἰκίαν (final *o* is represented by *υ* in this dialect). In Latin we have very clear examples of the contamination of two different stems in *iter*, *itineris* (cf. the common interchange of *r* and *n*-stems, which is seen for instance in Greek ὕδωρ, ὕδατος (from -ντος)), and *iecus*, *iecinoris*. The Greek πόληι is from *πόλη (cf. the Vedic Skr. loc. *agnā*) extended by -ι from the *o* and *ā*-stems. Perhaps πόλη-ι then became the starting-point for the Homeric πόληος (Attic πόλεως). In Sanskrit especially the different

stems seem to influence each other in this way; e.g. *kāntāyai* (dat.) appears to be due to a confusion with the form in *ī*-stems (like *nadyai* from *nadī*), *kāntānām*, *kāntāni* &c. with the forms in the *n*-stems. Contamination between forms in the same paradigm is also not rare. We at once recall *σκιόειν*, *δακρυόειν*, due to the mas. nom. in *-εις*, in Apollonius Rhodius; in Euphron *βότρυα* presumably from *βότρυν* and **βότρεφα*, and in Herodian *νήδυα*, *ῥφρυα*. On the other hand Attic *ναῦν* appears to be due to *ναῦς*, while the Homeric *νήα* represents the form from **nāyṇ*. The forms of the locative pl. ending in *-ασι*, *-ησι* and found even in Attic inscriptions (see Meisterhans *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*³ p. 121), as *Ἀθήνησι*, *δραχμήσι*, *ἐπόπτησι*, *τῇσι μυρίασι*, *χιλίασι* are clearly due to a contamination of **Ἀθήνῃ* &c. derived from *Ἀθήνησι* in accordance with regular phonetic laws and a new form *Ἀθήνησι* on the analogy of forms in which *-σ-* is preceded by a consonant. The Greek loc. pl. in *-σι*, as has been suggested, may be a contamination of the original ending *-su* (seen in Sanskrit and the Balto-Slavonic group) with the loc. sing. in *-i*. Perhaps we see a similar confusion between the singular and plural in the Cyprian gen. sing. in *-ων*, as *ἀργύρων* instead of *ἀργύρῳ*. The dative pl. *ἄρνασι* must be explained as a confusion of the true form **ἄρασι* and a form **ἄρνεσι* due to 'levelling' in the declension. It is hardly necessary to mention such examples of contamination in English, as the 'double' plurals in *children* (O.E. *cildru*, *cild*), *brethren* (O.E. *brōþor*, *brōþru*, cf. German *Brüder*), and *kine* (O.E. *cȳ*). I have shown elsewhere that an interesting instance of contamination of endings is probably preserved in the Greek adverbial ending *-ως*. (See the next volume of *The Transactions of the Cambridge Phil. Soc.* 1919.)

(2) *Pronominal*. Contamination of the forms and endings is found in the personal pronoun; for example, the accented Greek forms *ἐμέ* &c. are from *με* &c. (cf. Sanskrit *mām*, *mā* and Gothic *mik*) by contamination with the emphatic *ἐγώ*. Some explain *enos* which occurs in the Early Latin fragment of the Song of the Arval Brothers in the same way (see Sommer *Handbuch der lateinischen Laut- und Formenlehre*³ p. 412). Modern Greek has even *ἐσέ* from *σέ* confused with *ἐμέ*, and

then also ἐσύ. The plural sign -s, which we find in Greek Lesbian ἄμμες, Attic-Ionic ἡμεῖς, Gothic *weis* &c., is due to contamination with nominal forms; contrast Sanskrit *vayam*, Avesta *vaēm*, Old Bulgarian *my*. Greek τίνα (originally *τιν; cf. Sanskrit *kim*, Avesta *čim*) is due to contamination with the consonant stems of the nominal declension. The gen. plur. Homeric ἡμείων (Attic ἡμῶν) is doubtless for *ἡμειο like ἐμειο by confusion with the nominal ending -ων.

(3) *Isolated forms*: μετά is probably from *μετ (cf. German *mit*) by contamination with μεδά, which is now generally agreed to be an accusative of πούς (see Brugmann *Grundriss*² II. ii, p. 863). The Homeric πρίν is a contamination of πρίν and πρεῖν (see the next volume of *The Transactions of the Cambridge Phil. Soc.* 1919); in the same way αὐτοφυχί and ἀναιμωτί are to be explained. Forms like ἐκεῖθι, ἔντοσθι may be due to contamination with the ending of αὐθι, or may simply be -θι added to crystallised forms.

(4) *Verbal*. First, we shall consider simple instances of contamination between the personal endings in the same tense. The dialect ending -ην for the 3rd person plur. aor. pass., as Hom. μῖάνθην, Cret. Epir. διελέγην, Coreyean ἐστεφανώθην, Delphian ἀπελύθην, is clearly due to the regular ending -εν influenced by the -η of the other persons. γεγόναμεν is due to a fusion of γέγαμεν and γέγονα. The contamination of endings of different tenses or classes of verbs seems to have been commoner. The Attic Ionic ἦσαν instead of ἦν (cf. Homeric ἦεν from *ἦσεν; cf. Skr. *āsan*) is due to contamination with the 1st aor. ending -σαν and was perhaps influenced by the purely aoristic use of the tense. We find further, though apparently spasmodic, examples of contamination of the same kind; e.g. μισθωσάντωσαν for μισθωσάντων (imper.) &c. are found on Attic inscriptions from 300 B.C. Similarly in Boeotian we find εἵνιξαν from ἦνικαν contaminated with the ending -σαν. The Homeric 3rd sing. subjunctive ending φέρησι &c. is a good instance of contamination of φέρησι and φέρη (φέρηι). In Old High German there must have been such forms as *beramēs, which shows a confusion of berames and beramē (for the latter cf. Gothic *batráima*). It was suggested long ago that the

3rd plur. perf. ending in *πεφύκῃσι* &c. (cf. Homeric *πεφύκῃσι*) is due to a fusion of *-ᾶτι* and *-εντι*. When we find in Latin the 3rd pers. pl. perf. in *-ērunt*, it represents *-ērunt* affected by *-ēre*. In the Arcadian dialect we find *ἀπυδόας* for *ἀποδοῦς* by contamination with *παύσας* &c. The Latin imperative *fertōte* &c. is a good example of morphological contamination, since it is formed from the imper. singular *fertō* from **fertōd* (in which **-tōd* is a pronoun) by a fusion with the ordinary imperative *ferte*. Whether the curious ending *-τοι*, which occurs in primary tense in Arcadian and Cyprian, as Arcadian *βόλετοι*, *δέατοι*, Cyprian *κείντι*, is due, as some suggest, to a confusion of the primary ending *-ται* and the historic *-το*, it is very difficult to say. It is generally recognised that the Latin passive infinitive ending in *-ier* is some kind of contamination, though to say that it is the form *-ere* put on to the ordinary passive infinitive without any kind of reason is not very helpful. We notice that, so far as we have evidence, the forms *agī* and *agier* are equally old. Two forms were isolated from original declensions of verbal nouns: **agesi* a locative, which became *agere*, and **agai* a dative, which became *agī*; a contamination of these two produced *agier(e)*. Originally then there were three forms of the infinitive, *agere*, *agī*, and *agier*, all quite unconnected with voice. When *agī* was specialised for the passive, *agier* went with it, since it is nearer in form to it than to *agere*. The ending *-μεσθα* in Homer and the poetry of some of the other dialects is generally explained as a contamination of *-μεθα* with the *-σθε* of the 2nd person. This, however, is not very convincing. It seems rather to be a contamination of *-μεθα* and *-μες*, the active ending retained in the West Greek dialects and in Delphian. It may thus be an interesting formal record of the tendency to weakening in the force of the middle voice. We are reminded of the not infrequent occurrence of middle forms in Homer, of which it is not easy for us to discern the exact force in distinction to the active (e.g. the common use of *εἰδόμην* in the Epic). Contamination also occurs in the confusion of forms with different 'ablaut' vowels; for example we find in Arcadian a perfect participle *ἐφθορκώς*, which is clearly due to a confusion of *ἐφθορώς* and *ἐφθαρκώς*. Similarly

we find in Syracusan a perfect *πέποσχα* for *πέπονθα* through contamination with *πάσχω*. Sometimes we find in the literary language a new form produced by a contamination between the current form and the corresponding one in an earlier stratum of the language; e.g. in Menander *ῆσθας*, which is evidently a fusion of *ῆσθα* and the *κοινῇ*-form *ῆς*, and *οἶσθας*.

The foregoing examination of the importance of contamination in morphology is not intended to be exhaustive even for the classical languages, while the space which can be devoted to an article has made it impossible even to touch upon other languages. My object has been merely to call attention to a principle, which has hitherto been somewhat neglected in morphological research.

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ON PORSON'S EMENDATION OF *PERSAE* 321.

In the Supplement which Porson added in 1802 to his Preface to the *Hecuba* he pointed out that *Persae* 321, ὁ τ' ἐσθλὸς Ἀριόμαρδος Σάρδεσι | πένθος παρασχών, not only violates his canon about the cretic ending of the tragic line, but also conflicts with *Persae* 38, where Ariomardos is governor of Thebes: and to dispose of these difficulties he conjectures that a line has been lost, or perhaps more lines than one only, in which the governor of Sardis, perhaps Mitragathes or Arceus¹, was named. At this point Porson stops short, leaving it to the "sagacious reader" to fill the gap as best he may: but "he must see to it that the word which follows Ἀριόμαρδος begins with a vowel." The editor of the edition of 1808, which appeared after Porson's death, explained that after Ἀριόμαρδος Porson himself had added in red ink ἀρδέων Βολαῖσι πιστός, Μιτραγάθης τε. Within the last few months the sublibrarian of Trinity College, C. B. Hurry, M.A., has discovered in one of the locked cases of the library confirmation of the editor's statement. In 1867 Richard Bentley Porson Kidd, son of Porson's friend Thomas Kidd, gave to the College certain books; and one of them was a copy of the *Hecuba* of 1802, copiously annotated by the elder Kidd. With it was a letter from the younger Kidd, dated 9 September 1867, in which he writes:

"There is but one book in which Porson's handwriting occurs, namely his first (*sic*) edition of Eur. Hec. My father went into the Professor's room about 5 o'clock in the morning, and asked how he would manage a passage in the *Persae*, which Hermann had quoted as overthrowing his canon. Porson was unable to hold his pen steadily. My father accordingly held his hand while he wrote what he considered the true text."

The copy of the *Hecuba* of 1802 bears out the younger Kidd's story. After Ἀριόμαρδος and before Σάρδεσι the words ἀρδέων Βολαῖσι πιστός, Μιτραγάθ'. (*sic*) τε have been added in a hand which looks like Thomas Kidd's.

¹ "Arceus" in Porson's text is presumably a misprint for "Arcteus."

H. J.

C. B. H.

NOTES ON PLATO'S *PHAEDRUS*.

238 B. ἡ γὰρ ἄνευ λόγου δόξης ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθὸν ὁρμώσης κρατήσασα ἐπιθυμία, πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀχθείσα κάλλους καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἑαυτῆς συγγενῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπὶ σωμάτων κάλλος ἐρρωμένως ῥωσθεῖσα....

What is ἡδονὴν κάλλους? "Pleasure in beauty"? Surely a very strange expression. Then again this κάλλους clashes with the following κάλλος, nor can we say that the "irrational desire" yearns after *all* beauty and is drawn down by kindred desires to *bodily* beauty, because the only beauty which is not bodily is precisely that which the irrational desire knows nothing about. Moreover we have just heard it described as ἀλόγως ἐλκούσης ἐπὶ ἡδονὰς, and the ἡδοναὶ given as examples are gluttony and drunkenness (238 A). For κάλλους then read καὶ ἄλλως or κἄλλως, "in any case."

249 B. δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ξυνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὼν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον.

Heindorf, Badham, Vollgraf have all tried to mend this sentence, but nobody has laid a finger upon one corrupt spot, λεγόμενον. I see no reasonable explanation of this word; "the form so-called" says Thompson, as if εἶδος were something to apologize for. δεχόμενον seems to me very simple and obvious; man receives the impression arising from the multiplicity of sense-perceptions as a "form" or general notion, combining them into a unity by ratiocination. I should be inclined to accept < τὸ > ἐκ πολλῶν from Heindorf. Cf. Aristotle *de Anima* 429^a 15, where the reason is spoken of as δεκτικὸν τοῦ εἶδους.

250 A. ὥστε ὑπὸ τινῶν ὀμιλιῶν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄδικον τραπόμεναι λήθην ὧν τότε εἶδον ἱερῶν ἔχειν.

τινῶν is unspeakably wretched: either it is a corruption of καινῶν or more likely we should read κακῶν τινῶν ὀμιλιῶν, as κακὴ ὀμιλία is found in *Rep.* 550 B as well as Aesch. *Sept.* 556 and the famous line φθείρουσιν ἥθη χρῆσθ' ὀμιλῖαι κακαί.

261 A. τούτων δὴ τῶν λόγων, ὃ Σώκρατες.

It is usual to read *δεῖ* for *δὴ*, but Richards truly remarks that it "gives quite a wrong sense." Socrates has just professed to hear a number of λόγοι approaching and protesting; we should expect Phaedrus to say τίνων δὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων, ὃ Σώκρατες; on the analogy of 242 B, τίνι τούτῳ; 276 A, τίνα τοῦτον; and any number of similar passages. If τίνων was lost by any accident, δὴ τούτων would then be naturally changed to τούτων δὴ.

263 C. ἢ οἶε ἂν σοι συγχωρῆσαι εἰπεῖν ἂ νῦν δὴ εἶπες περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὥς βλάβη τέ ἐστι τῷ ἐρωμένῳ καὶ ἐρώντι, καὶ αἰθρὶς ὥς μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τυγχάνει;

Editors are slow to expel Platonic glosses; we had to wait for Vollgraf to expunge that most inept τέχνη at end of 260 D. Here καὶ ἐρώντι should go, for Socrates has not said a word about Eros being baneful to the lover. It is true that Lysias has said at 234 B that the lover's friends rebuke him ὥς ὄντος κακοῦ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, but even Lysias does not endorse this himself.

A more gross and palpable interpolation is to be found in 279 A, where Isocrates is spoken of as ἀμείνων ἢ κατὰ τοὺς περὶ Λυσίαν λόγους; the reading is as old as Cicero, but his translation, "cum orationibus Lysiae" defies the Greek. οἱ περὶ Λυσίαν λόγοι cannot mean this; Plato said τοὺς περὶ Λυσίαν for "Lysias and others of his kidney," and some goose added λόγους.

269 A. τὸν μελίγηρυν Ἀδραστον.

Ast was certainly right, I think, in taking this to mean Antipho, but Thompson disputes this. There is a piece of evidence not adduced by Ast: Antipho was Παμνούσιος τῶν δήμων, and Adrastea is "Rhamnusia virgo." Such a play on proper names is very characteristic of Plato, and both Adrastus of Argos and Adrastus the Asiatic are said to have raised temples to Nemesis.

I add a correction of *Republic* 494 D, E: ἐὰν δ' οὖν, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, διὰ τὸ εὖ πεφυκέναι καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς τῶν λόγων εἰς αἰσθά-

νηταί τέ πη καὶ κάμπτηται καὶ ἔλκεται πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν.... Here αἰσθάνηται cannot be fairly construed: αἰσθάνομαι without an object means in the language of the nursery "to take notice" (Theocr. xv 14), and that curious phrase αἰσθανόμενος τῇ ἡλικίᾳ in Thuc. v 26 seems to mean "of an age to understand,"¹ οὐκ αἰσθήσεται in *Frogs* 634 may mean "won't feel," but there it is easy to supply τῶν πληγῶν. I know no other instance of αἰσθάνομαι used absolutely. In the Platonic passage, nothing can be supplied from the context, nor is there any justification for translating "take heed" or anything of that kind. Is it not easier to suppose the word to be the very simple corruption of αἰσχύνηται than to suppose it used by Plato here in a sense which cannot be paralleled from any other passage? It is recognized that Alcibiades is the person referred to: read the account Alcibiades gives of his feelings when listening to Socrates in *Symposium* 216, where he uses the verb αἰσχύνομαι three times to express his state of mind, and see how it supports my proposal.

¹ Cf. i 71, Xen. *Mem.* iv i 1, Aeschines iii 237, in all of which the participle means "men of sense," but this use seems confined to the participle, like "savants."

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THE EARLY ROMAN TREATIES WITH TARENTUM AND RHODES.

(A) *Tarentum*. It is a familiar story that the immediate cause of the war waged by Rome against King Pyrrhus was the sinking of a Roman fleet by the Tarentines, on the ground that the Romans were trespassing on waters closed to them by a treaty which forbade them to sail further East than the Lacinian promontory. The date and occasion of this treaty, however, are matters of dispute, for the only ancient authority which mentions the compact merely says that it was 'of long standing'.

The problem of settling this dispute may be avoided if we adopt the suggestion thrown out by a recent writer², that a compact which figures so scantily in the pages of history perhaps has no historic reality. Unfortunately in this case an argumentum ex silentio is worth next to nothing. The reticence of our chief authorities for the Pyrrhic War, Dionysius and Plutarch, is adequately explained by the marked anti-Tarentine bias which runs through their story. In their anxiety to show up the guiltiness of the Tarentines it is little wonder that they should have overlooked a treaty which went some considerable way to exonerate the culprits. A priori it is far more probable that the Tarentines did not attack the Roman fleet without some excuse for doing so. Had the assault been utterly unprovoked, it would have constituted an extraordinary piece of blackguardism and would have called for instant retaliation on the part of the injured people. As a matter of

¹ Appian, *Samnitica* ch. 7.

² Frank, *Roman Imperialism* pp. 81—2.

fact, the Roman Senate hesitated long before it gave up all hope of an accommodation with Tarentum, and this reluctance to declare war strongly suggests that Tarentum was not without a case against Rome.

It is preferable therefore to accept the treaty as a historical fact, and to face the task of settling its date.

According to Mommsen, the treaty belongs to the same period as one of the Roman compacts with Carthage, viz. 348 B.C., and like this latter act, it is a reflexion of Rome's naval weakness at that period¹.

In favour of this view it may be said that about 348 B.C. the Romans were evidently prepared to submit to restrictions in the use of the sea such as we find in the Tarentine treaty. The contemporary compact with Carthage imposed limitations even more drastic², and it is evident that at this time Rome showed no interest in the freedom of the seas.

On the other hand it is a mere assumption that Rome at this time entered into any sort of agreement with Tarentum, and there is nothing in the political situation of mid fourth century to suggest why these powers should then have been holding diplomatic intercourse. Mommsen's theory therefore remains up in the air, and it is but natural that it has found few adherents.

The date most commonly assigned by modern historians is 303-1 B.C., i.e. shortly after the Second Samnite War³. This date is apparently founded on solid fact, for Livy invites us to infer, while Diodorus actually asserts, that Rome and Tarentum were at war towards the close of the fourth century. According to Livy the Tarentines interfered in the middle of the Second Samnite War with an arbitration proposal and threatened to enter the lists against the party which should refuse their

¹ *Roman History* (4th ed.) II. pp. 41-2.

² This holds true whether we identify the treaty of 348 B.C. with the first or the second of those quoted by Polybius (III. 22, 24).

³ Niebuhr, *Roman History* III. p. 418; Arnold, *History of Rome* II.

p. 315; Niese, *Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten* II.

p. 28; *Grundriss der römischen Geschichte* p. 66; Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* III. pt. 1, p. 563 n.; de Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* II. p. 347; Costanzi, *Rivista di Filologia* 1919 pp. 165-6.

offer. The Samnites fell in with this proposal, but the Romans by way of answer incontinently attacked the Samnites¹. Though Livy does not record how the Tarentines took this rejoinder, his silence might be taken to suggest that events took their natural course, i.e. that the Tarentines carried their threat into effect and declared war upon Rome. According to Diodorus the Tarentines had a war against Rome on their hands in 303 B.C. and invoked the Spartan king Cleonymus to fight their battles against this enemy². As no further mention of hostilities between Rome and Tarentum is made until the outbreak of the Pyrrhic War, there appears to be good reason for assuming that the previous state of war was concluded by an early peace, and that this peace should be dated about 303-1 B.C.

But on further consideration it appears extremely doubtful whether the war on which the alleged peace of 303-1 B.C. depends ever took place. The way in which Livy allows the Tarentines to drop out of his story may just as well be taken to mean that they backed out of their threats as that they enforced them, and his complete reticence about a subsequent state of war between Rome and Tarentum goes a long way to prove that he did not know of any such war³. Moreover, in relating the events of 302 B.C.⁴ Livy records a couple of descents by king Cleonymus upon the east coast of Italy and mentions certain Roman preparations for defence, but he says never a word about Cleonymus' engagements on behalf of Tarentum against Rome. Yet if these two powers had been at war at the time Livy could hardly have avoided a reference to this fact. Thus we find that Livy's evidence tells on the whole against a settlement in 303-1 B.C.

As for Diodorus, this author may be brought forward as evidence against himself. After stating that the Tarentines

¹ 9. 14.

² 20. 104.

³ De Sanctis (*op. cit.* II. p. 315) has thrown doubts upon Livy's story of a Tarentine offer of arbitration, because the battle which Livy describes as its sequel is not mentioned in the *Fasti Triumphales*, and the whole

incident may therefore be regarded as a fiction of one of the later 'patriotic' annalists. In any case, whatever may be the truth about the arbitration offer, Livy's narrative fails to prove that it led to war between Tarentum and Rome.

⁴ 10. 2.

invoked Cleonymus against Rome he proceeds to narrate in some detail the operations which Cleonymus undertook on his arrival in Italy. These operations were directed against the Lucanians, the Metapontines, the Syracusans, the Tarentines themselves and other former allies. The Romans, on the other hand, were left severely alone by Cleonymus and returned the compliment by completely ignoring him! But all this is as good as saying that the war between Rome and Tarentum never took place, and that Diodorus' mention of it is a Diodorism¹.

Thus the war, and with it the peace of 303-1 B.C., dissolves into mist. *A priori*, moreover, the date 303-1 B.C. is improbable. In the first place, a treaty concluded at that time could hardly have been termed 'ancient' in 282 B.C. In the second, the content of the treaty accords ill with the conditions which obtained in Italy after the Second Samnite War. The bargaining power of Tarentum had by then been sadly diminished. The city was barely able to hold her own against her semi-barbarous neighbours in Lucania. The protector Cleonymus, who was suspected of treachery, needed watching carefully. And still greater vigilance was required to avert an attack from the ruthless Syracusan despot Agathocles, whose projects of expansion in the Adriatic might at any time bring him into conflict with Tarentum. On the other hand the Romans had just emerged victorious from a critical war which extended their suzerainty over the greater part of southern Italy; and by the acquisition of territory in Apulia they had gained a new and practical interest in the freedom of the seas, for communications with this new-won land required to be maintained by sea as well as by road². Under these circumstances it is almost inconceivable that the victorious Romans should have

¹ The source of Diodorus' blunder may be found in the measures which the Romans took to protect their allies against Cleonymus' semi-piratical descents upon Italy in 302 B.C. At this time, as Diodorus himself states, Cleonymus had broken with Tarentum.

² For the strategic importance of access by sea to Apulia, witness the

important part played by the Brundisine squadron of the Roman fleet in the Second Punic War. It is noteworthy that 'duoviri navales' were first appointed by the Romans in 311 B.C., i.e. 3 years after the foundation of Luceria, their first colony in Apulia.

tied their hands by a 'foedus iniquum' with the sorely embarrassed Tarentines¹. Of all the dates put forward for the treaty, 303-1 B.C. is open to the most objections.

One recent writer has suggested that the treaty was framed in 315 B.C., as a result of Tarentum's intervention in the Second Samnite War². This date is favoured by the general political conditions then prevailing. The Romans were fully engaged in an uphill fight against an adversary who stood some chance of winning outright and destroying Rome's supremacy in Central Italy. Meanwhile the Tarentines had a free hand, and it was open to them to drive a hard bargain with either belligerent. At this stage of the Samnite Wars it is quite conceivable that Tarentum should have dictated a kind of 'King's Peace' to the Romans. But, as we have seen above, the diplomatic intervention which this theory presupposes is probably nothing more than a patriotic Roman fiction³. Moreover, if we have sufficient faith in the Roman annalists to accept their account of a Tarentine démarche, we ought likewise to accept the sequel of their story, that the Romans, far from accepting the terms imposed, turned them down contemptuously. The basis of fact on which the '315' theory rests is insufficient to support it.

The field now remains to the date 332-0 B.C., which has been put forward tentatively by one or two historians⁴, but has hitherto not received much consideration. In spite of the small favour accorded to it, this date has decidedly the strongest claims. The conclusion of a treaty between Rome and Tarentum at this time is expressly attested by Livy and Justin⁵, and no reason exists for doubting the accuracy of their statements. The terms of the treaty are not recorded by these authors, but the conditions of the compact which the Romans broke in 282 B.C. are such as would stand in accord with the political situation of 332 B.C. The Tarentines at this moment were in the

¹ See Burger, *Der Kampf zwischen Rom und Samnium* (Amsterdam, 1898) p. 54.

² Burger, *loc. cit.*

³ P. 167 n. 3.

⁴ Ihne, *Roman History* p. 490 and n. 5; Täubler, *Imperium Romanum*

i. p. 77 n. 2. Neither Ihne nor Täubler makes a definite choice between 332-0 and 303-1 B.C.

⁵ Livy 8. 17. 10; Justin 12. 2. 12: cum Metapontinis et Poediculis et Romanis foedus amicitiamque fecit (Alexander).

first flush of some sweeping victories gained for them by their condottiere Alexander of Epirus over the Samnites, Lucanians and Bruttians, and they had a favourable opportunity of consolidating their power along the shores of the Adriatic and the Gulf of Otranto. But to achieve this end they required to exercise a monopoly of naval power in these waters and to keep out all rival fleets. Now a few years earlier, in 338 B.C., the Romans had come into possession of the warships of Antium¹, and there was a risk of their using them for more ambitious purposes than the merely piratical expeditions of the Antiates. Under these circumstances the Tarentines had a clear object in restricting Roman rights of navigation to the point where the Tarentine sphere of influence commenced. Conversely the Romans, who as yet had no interests beyond Campania and as a matter of fact made no use of their new-won fleet except to decorate their 'Rostra' with its prows, could cheerfully renounce all access to Tarentine waters, just as in 348 B.C. they had abandoned the 'Spanish main' to Carthage. No other political situation fits the conditions of our treaty so well as that of 332-0 B.C.

This date, too, permits of the treaty being described as an 'ancient' one in 282 B.C. Some fifty years had elapsed since its conclusion, and Rome's expansion into Lucania and Apulia had so altered the balance of power that the treaty besides being old in years was obsolete. 332-0 B.C., therefore, is the date to which the treaty should be assigned.

(B) *Rhodes*. Another problem in Rome's diplomatic history arises out of the alleged conclusion of a treaty with Rhodes in 306 B.C. That Rome was bound from this date by some sort of convention, political or economic, with the Rhodian republic, has been a generally accepted opinion among modern historians². Nevertheless a few critics have raised their voices in

¹ The capture of Antium at this time is confirmed by the Carthaginian treaty of 348 B.C., in which it is mentioned as a prospective enemy of Rome. See Rosenberg, *Hermes* 1919 pp. 164-5.

² The traditional view will be found

in most of the standard general histories of Greece and Rome. It also recurs in special treatises such as Torr, *Rhodes in Ancient Times* p. 14; Van Gelder, *Geschichte der alten Rhodier* p. 106 sqq.; and Colin, *Rome et la Grèce* p. 31.

dissent¹, and the case which they have set up against the treaty is simply overwhelming.

To summarise the main arguments of these sceptics.

(1) It is difficult to understand how Rome and Rhodes were brought into contact in 306 B.C. There is nothing to prove any connexion, military or commercial, between the two republics at this stage of their history. Indeed Rhodes, as is shown by her policy during the wars of the Diadochi, was bent on maintaining a splendid isolation and avoided entangling alliances even with her nearest neighbours, much more so with such distant powers as Rome. Conversely Rome, as is shown by her fourth century treaties with Carthage, professed no transmarine interests even in the western seas. Under these conditions a treaty between the two powers would have been a sheer superfluity.

(2) On none of the many occasions in the second century when either of the contracting powers might have invoked the supposed alliance do we find any mention made of it. Nay more, in the critical days of the Second Punic War, when it was the plain duty of every ally and every 'amicus' of Rome to assist her by active co-operation or at least by friendly neutrality, we find the Rhodians denouncing the Aetolian League because of its alliance with 'barbarians' (211 B.C.) and telling off the Romans for the brutalities of their warfare in Greece².

(3) The text of Polybius from which the existence of the treaty has been inferred says nothing of a compact or even of an informal understanding between Rome and Rhodes. It merely mentions that 'for nearly 140 years (down to 167 B.C.) Rome and Rhodes had been partners in noble and glorious enterprises,' and denies in terms the existence of an early alliance between the two states³.

In face of these objections it seems quite hopeless to main-

¹ Holleaux (in *Mélanges Perrot* pp. 183—190); Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* III. pt. 1, p. 299 n.; Täubler, *Imperium Romanum* I. pp. 204—5.

² These points are brought out with great force by Holleaux and

Täubler.

³ Polybius 30. 5. 6: *σχεδὸν ἔτη μ' πρὸς τοῖς ρ' κεκοινῶς ὁ δῆμος Ῥωμαίους τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων καὶ καλλίστων ἔργων οὐκ ἐπεποίητο πρὸς αὐτοῖς συμμαχίαν.*

tain the traditional view about the early relations between Rome and Rhodes. But what, then, are we to make of the text on which that view used to be based? The scholars who have demolished the received opinion agree in solving this new problem *emendando*. Instead of *σχεδὸν ἔτη μ' πρὸς τοῖς ρ'* (140) they propose to read simply *σχεδὸν ἔτη μ'* (40), and they refer the words of Polybius to the outbreak of Rome's Second Macedonian War in 201–200 B.C.

Judged from a merely historical standpoint, this theory is highly attractive, for it is precisely from the Second Macedonian War that the close connexion between Rome and Rhodes took its start. But palaeographically it is quite unsound. The obelised words are not such as a pedantic copyist could have inserted out of his own superior knowledge, or a careless one could have dittographed from some adjacent passage. Neither does it commend itself on linguistic grounds. From 201/0 B.C. to 167 B.C. is a period of 33 or 34 years, or, in round numbers, about 30. To describe it as 'nearly 40' would be a loose and inaccurate expression.

Thus it is preferable not to tamper with Polybius' text, but to accept 306 B.C. or any adjacent year which can fairly be described as 'nearly 140 years' before 167 B.C. Now the years 305–4 B.C. were among the most memorable in Rhodian history, for it was then that the island republic sustained its famous siege at the hands of Demetrius Poliorcetes, and by its successful resistance restored the balance of power in Greece against the aggressive imperialism of the Antigonid dynasty. Henceforth Rhodes was marked out as the natural protector of the smaller and more peaceable Greek states against the rapacity of adjacent military monarchies¹; and this part she maintained with a singular fixity of purpose until she made way for the all-embracing protectorate of the *pax Romana*. These are the 'noble and glorious deeds' which Rhodes began to perform in 305/4 B.C.

In Roman History the close of the fourth century is not quite so clear a landmark. But the year 304 B.C., in which Rome concluded the Second Samnite War, may be taken as the starting-point of her protectorate over southern Italy, and

¹ Polybius 5. 90. 5: *τῆς Ῥοδίων περὶ τὰ κοινὰ προστασίας*.

it is about this time that Rome came to be known to the Greeks as the greatest peace-enforcing power in the West. From this date onward the expansion of Rome may be regarded as the extension of her *κοινὴ προστασία* until she became the peacemaker of the East no less than of the West. Nay more, it is precisely in this light that Polybius viewed and laboured to explain the growth of the Roman Empire, which to him was a record (though not an unbroken one) of *ἐπιφανέστατα καὶ κάλλιστα ἔργα*¹. The sane imperialism which he detected in the general policy of Rome and Rhodes thus appeared to him as a link between the two republics, and it is on this ground that he described their concurrent policy in the third and second centuries as 'a partnership in noble and glorious deeds.' We need but to remember the standpoint from which Polybius viewed Roman and Rhodian history to obtain for his expression, *κεκοινηκῶς τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων καὶ καλλίστων ἔργων*, a meaning which is linguistically quite obvious and historically quite true.

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¹ See especially Polybius' proems to his first and third books. But Polybius strikes the same note of critical admiration in many individual observations which he has scattered throughout his history, e.g. 6. 58.

1 sqq.; 18. 35; 24. 10. 11—12; 36. 2; 36. 9. 9. His appreciation of Rhodian policy is best revealed in his account of the great earthquake of 227 B. (5. 88 sqq.)

THE LAND LEGISLATION OF JULIUS CAESAR'S FIRST CONSULSHIP.

The agrarian legislation of Julius Caesar in 59 B.C. is a topic on which much uncertainty still exists. The following questions in particular require further discussion:

- A. Did Caesar embody his land legislation in one statute or in two?
- B. What territories came within the scope of his legislation?
- C. For what classes of people did he provide allotments?
- D. By what agency were the assignments carried out?
- E. In what relation does Caesar's legislation stand to the mysterious Lex Mamilia Roscia Peducaea Alliena Fabia?

A. On the question of the number of Caesar's land acts modern authorities have been almost equally divided¹. But neither the 'unitarians' nor the 'dualists' have stated their case in full.

The 'unitarian' theory may be summed up thus:

(1) *A priori* it is unlikely that Caesar, who was a radical reformer and did not as a rule carry out his work in piecemeal fashion, should have taken two bites at his cherry.

(2) Cicero, whose authority as an interested spectator and critic of Caesar's land campaign is unquestionably supreme, does not expressly distinguish two separate statutes.

¹ 'Unitarians': Drumann, *Geschichte Roms* III. pp. 182—191; Merivale, *History of the Roman Empire* I. pp. 173—5; Mommsen, *History of Rome* IV. pp. 508—9; C. Peter, *Geschichte Roms* II. pp. 227—8; Ihne, *Geschichte Roms* VI. p. 317; Watson, *Select Letters of Cicero* pp. 16—17; Tyrrell and Purser, *The Correspondence of Cicero* (1st ed.) I. p. 412; Daremberg-Saglio, s.v. *Leges Agrariae*.

'Dualists': Lange, *Römische Altertümer* III. pp. 272—280; Ferrero, *The*

Greatness and Decline of Rome I. p. 287 n., p. 291; Niese, *Grundriss der römischen Geschichte* p. 204; Heitland, *History of the Roman Republic* III. pp. 127—9, 136—9; Warde Fowler, *Julius Caesar* pp. 109—113; Botsford, *The Roman Assemblies* p. 439; Sihler, *Annals of Caesar* p. 84; Tyrrell and Purser, *op. cit.* (3rd ed.) I. p. 427; Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. *Campanus Ager*; Ed. Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie*, pp. 61—2.

The 'dualist' theory has hitherto rested on the following considerations:

(1) The great majority of our ancient sources refer to Caesar's legislation as 'lèges' or 'νόμοι,' thus indicating a plurality of laws¹. Moreover two writers, Plutarch and Cassius Dio, explicitly mention an earlier and a later law².

(2) In its final form Caesar's scheme was mainly if not entirely concerned with the public domains in Campania³. In his original bill these estates were expressly exempted from assignation⁴. Now this discrepancy between Caesar's earlier and later programme defies explanation if both formed part of one and the same statute, for it is incredible that he should have so transmogrified a bill as to render its earliest and its latest contents mutually exclusive. The fundamental contradiction between the earlier and the later portions of his programme indicates that these cannot be squeezed in under the umbrella of one Protean act: they belong to two distinct integral measures.

These arguments, moreover, may be reinforced by some fresh ones.

(3) In the letters written by Cicero in April 59 repeated mention is made of a land commission whose membership had already been determined⁵. As there is no reason for supposing that Caesar departed from the usual course of procedure in such matters, we must conclude that he did not nominate his commissioners until the measure from which they derived their power had been ratified. In other words, by April 59 one land law of Caesar's already stood on the statute book.

Now in a letter of May 59 Cicero refers to one part of Caesar's programme, viz. the distribution of the Campanian domains, as if it had only just been promulgated⁶. The

¹ Cicero, *Ad Att.* II. 18. 2; Livy, *Epit.* 103; Plutarch, *Caesar* ch. 14, *Pompey* ch. 47; Appian, *Bell. Civ.* II. 10. 35, II. 11. 37, 41—2. The passage in Cicero quotes an official act in which Caesar's legislation is designated as 'leges Iuliae.'

² Plutarch, *Cato of Utica* chs. 31,

33; Cassius Dio 38. 7. 3.

³ Cicero, *Ad Att.* III. 16. 1, II. 18. 2; Plutarch, *Cato* ch. 33; Cassius Dio 38. 7. 3.

⁴ Cassius Dio 38. 1. 4.

⁵ *Ad Att.* II. 6. 2; II. 7. 3.

⁶ *Ad Att.* II. 16. 1.

Campanian scheme therefore must have belonged to a later and quite separate bill.

(4) In a letter commenting on the Campanian project Cicero says: '*habet etiam Campana lex execrationem*'.¹ The word '*etiam*' cannot be taken as a connecting link between two sentences, for the preceding sentence deals with matter altogether disparate. It can only be taken in conjunction with the words '*Campana lex*.' The meaning of the sentence therefore is: 'the Campanian law, *no less than the previous one*, is to be confirmed by oath.' This clearly implies that the Campanian law had a predecessor and was the second in a series.

(5) In the next sentence Cicero goes on to say: '*non dubitant iurare ceteri*; Laterensis existimatur laute fecisse quod tribunatum plebis petere destitit ne iuraret.' This passage shows that the oath required by the '*Campana lex*' was taken cheerfully by all whom it concerned.

Now it is a well-known fact that the oath imposed by Caesar's original law was stubbornly declined by Cato, and that it required a great deal of persuasion before he '*wi*' deeficulty' swore obedience to it. Moreover, Cicero would have been the last man in the world to forget Cato's scruples, for it was he who finally overcame them².

In addition, we are told by Plutarch that when Cato gave way, his '*Sancho Panza*' Favonius remained an obdurate non-juror³.

Here, then, we have clear proof that there were two separate '*execrationes*,' and therefore two separate statutes.

Against the first of the '*dualist*' arguments it has been contended that the term '*leges Iuliae*' does not refer to Caesar's legislation in the Comitia, but to the variety of '*leges datae*' or bye-laws drawn up by Caesar's executive commission in the course of their assignments⁴. But if any supplementary ordinances to the main law were indeed issued by the commissioners, they must, in accordance with the universal custom on this point, have derived their names from the several commissioners

¹ *Ad Att.* II. 18. 2.

² Plutarch, *Cato* ch. 32.

³ *Loc. cit.*

⁴ Tyrrell and Purser (1st edition), *loc. cit.* This objection has been withdrawn in the third edition.

who drew them up, not from the author of the principal law. E.g. supposing that a new colonial charter for Capua had been framed by Pompey, this statute would have been styled 'lex Pompeia,' not 'lex Iulia.' The term 'leges Iuliae' therefore must refer to Caesar's own legislation.

On the other hand the principal support of the 'unitarian' case can readily be demolished. The argumentum ex silentio based on the reticence of Cicero breaks down if it is borne in mind that there is a gap in Cicero's correspondence extending over the first three months of 59 B.C., and that the letters which contain the first references to Caesar's land campaign belong to May¹, by which time that campaign was drawing to its close. The reason why Cicero's extant letters only concern themselves with a 'lex Campana' and make no reference to an earlier law is that by April 59 the time for discussing an earlier law was long past.

Summing up, therefore, we do not hesitate to conclude that *there were two leges Iuliae agrariae, not one.*

B. The lands which came within the scope of Caesar's first law are defined in quite general terms by Cassius Dio, who says that it provided for the assignation of all the residual public domains in Italy, except the ager Campanus, and of any private estates which the owners might be willing to sell to Caesar's commissioners². It is tempting to refer to this law the establishment of colonies at Herdonia, Asculum, Arpi, Collatia, Sipontum, Salapia, Veii and Bovianum, all of which are ascribed in the Liber Coloniarum to a Lex Iulia³. But the Liber Coloniarum is so inaccurate and full of interpolations that its lists of settlements require to be checked by collateral evidence, such as the inscriptions of the places in question, before they can be accepted⁴. In the absence of such evidence it is unsafe to assume that the above-mentioned towns ever received colonies. And even if we believe that they were constituted as colonies by a Lex Iulia, we cannot be sure whether this law does not

¹ *Ad Att.* II. 16. 1.

² 38. 1. 3.

³ Pp. 210, 220, 259.

⁴ Mommsen C.I.L. ix. p. 257.

rather belong to Augustus¹. No particulars concerning the territories of the first law can therefore be given.

The second law, so Cicero tells us, was confined to the 'ager Campanus'. If we follow Cicero further in believing that the territory to be parcelled out only comprised 50,000 iugera (c. 30,000 acres), we must define the 'ager Campanus' in its narrower sense as the former municipal domain of Capua. But as Cicero made his calculation on second-hand data and without the text of the law before him, his evidence on this point is not conclusive.

On the other hand Plutarch states that 'almost the whole of Campania' came under Caesar's scheme³, and Suetonius, whose enumeration of the official acts of the Caesars is based on government records, includes the ager Stellatis on the north bank of the Volturnus in the allotment area⁴. Again, it is mentioned both by Suetonius and other authorities that one class of settlers alone numbered some 20,000⁵. As the territory of Capua, according to Cicero's doubtless correct reckoning, could only provide for 5000 colonists, it is obvious that the distributions in Campania included something more than the ager Campanus in the narrower sense of that term.

A further point to be considered is the number of colonies established under the 'lex Campana.' It is certain that Capua was constituted a colony in 58 or 57 B.C.⁶ The case of two neighbouring towns, Casilinum and Calatia, is not quite so clear. Undoubtedly colonists were settled there at some time or

¹ The colony founded by 'G. Caesar' at Minturnae (*Lib. Col.* p. 235) has been assigned by Mommsen (*C.I.L.* ix. p. 595) to Augustus. The colony at Volturnum, 'iussu imperatoris Caesaris deducta' may be referred to the period of the Second Triumvirate, unless we follow Mommsen (*C.I.L.* ix. p. 357) in rejecting it altogether.

² *Ad Att.* ii. 16. 1.

³ *Cato* ch. 33.

⁴ *Divus Iulius* 20. 3.

⁵ Suetonius, *loc. cit.*; Velleius Paterculus ii. 44. 4; Appian, *Bell. Civ.* ii. 10. Although the number of actual

recipients in this category may not have totalled 20,000, provision must at any rate have been made for that number.

The number of Pompeian veterans requiring allotments has been estimated at 32,000 (Drumann-Groebe, *Geschichte Roms* iv. 486 n. 5) or 40,000 (Kromayer, *Neue Jahrbücher* 1914 p. 160). But it cannot be determined how many of these received land under the second of Caesar's laws.

⁶ Caesar, *Bell. Civ.* i. 14. 4; Cicero, *Pro Sestio* § 19, *Post Reditum* § 29. Beloch, *Campanien* p. 322.

other by Caesar¹, but many if not all of these were old soldiers who cannot have taken possession till after the Civil War². The question therefore arises whether these colonies were not planned in the years of the Civil War and founded under a later statute than the Lex Campana of 59 B.C. But 'leges non sunt multiplicandae praeter necessitatem,' and in this case the necessity does not arise. We are free to suppose that Caesar's veterans were a later draft of *ἐπιοικοι* who reinforced the original settlers of the fifties³. And even if we assume that the settlers went out *en bloc* after the Civil War, this does not preclude us from holding that the colonies were constituted under the law of 59 B.C. This law was certainly still in force in 51 B.C., and there still was at that time some unallotted land in Campania⁴. We may conclude, therefore, that the land of Casilinum and Calatia also came under the scope of the law of 59 B.C.

On the other hand we cannot accept the suggestion that the Leges Iuliae empowered Caesar to make settlements in the provinces⁵. So distinctive a clause as this could hardly have escaped the notice of our ancient authorities, least of all those who, like Cicero and Plutarch, were hostile to Caesar's land policy. Moreover, if Caesar's own laws entitled him to found colonies in the provinces, we fail to understand why he should have received special permission by the Lex Vatinia to colonise Cisalpine Gaul⁶. Such special permission would have been a sheer superfluity. Indeed, this provision in the Lex Vatinia is in itself sufficient to show that the Leges Iuliae did not deal with provincial land.

C. There is a general agreement among ancient writers that two classes of persons were provided for by Caesar's land laws, the veteran soldiers of Pompey and the urban proletariat

¹ Casilinum.—Cicero, *Philippic* II. § 102; Velleius II. 61. 1; Appian III. 40.

Calatia.—Nicolas of Damascus 39. 1 (ed. Didot); Velleius and Appian, *loc. cit.*

² See the passages quoted in n. 1, and Cicero, *Ad Att.* XVI. 8. 1.

³ Capua appears to have received a supplementary draft about 45 B.C.—

See Suetonius 81. 1, which mentions settlers erecting their homesteads shortly before Caesar's death.

⁴ Cicero, *Ad Familiares* VIII. 10. 4.

⁵ Hardy, *Three Spanish Charters*, p. 8.

⁶ The colony of Novum Comum was founded under this law (Suetonius ch. 28 § 3).

of Rome. *A priori* it would be tempting to infer that the earlier law was intended for the benefit of Pompey's men, who had a manifestly prior claim, and the later one for the deserving poor in general. But there is ample evidence to prove that both classes came under the scope of both laws¹.

This brings us back to the question, why did Caesar enact his land programme piecemeal?

One possible explanation is that the execution of the first law broke down in the face of unreasonable demands on the part of the landowners whose estates the commissioners tried to secure by purchase. Profiteering in land built up the fortune of one of the commissioners, M. Crassus², and it need not surprise us if some of the owners whom he and his board approached in 59 B.C. played his own game against him. True enough, Caesar's law stipulated that the properties should be purchased at the prices recorded on the censors' register³. But the assurance which both he and Pompey had given, that the scheme could be handsomely financed out of the windfall which the latter had brought to the Treasury from the East⁴, may have tempted the landowners to stand out for better terms. Now, to say nothing of the principle involved, it would have been bad business for Caesar to conclude so one-sided a bargain with the landowners, for a large number of these would probably be Optimates and his political opponents. Having recently used their wealth to provide Caesar with so inconvenient a colleague as Bibulus, the Optimates could not be allowed to replenish their party funds by holding the Treasury to ransom. It is a strange irony that Caesar's laudable resolve to obtain

¹ *Pompey's veterans in the first law*:—Cass. Dio 38. 5. 1. Note also the obviously interested support which Pompey gave to this law (Plutarch, *Pompey* ch. 47, *Caesar* ch. 14; Appian *ii.* 10).

Proletarians in the first law:—Plutarch *loc. cit.* and *Cato* ch. 31.

Pompey's veterans in the second law:—Cicero, *Philippic* *ii.* § 101. (Cic. *Ad Att.* *xvi.* 8. 1, which Heitland

p. 137 n. 7 quotes in this connexion, refers to old soldiers of Caesar, not of Pompey.)

Proletarians in the second law:—Suetonius 20. 3; Velleius *ii.* 44. 4; Plutarch, *Cato* ch. 33; Cass. Dio 38. 1. 4.

² Plutarch, *Crassus* ch. 2.

³ Cass. Dio 38. 1. 5; 38. 5. 1.

⁴ Cass. Dio 38. 1. 5.

his land by honest purchase and to avoid confiscation should have given his opponents their chance of nullifying his law.

But Caesar still had the means of circumventing the landlords by cancelling the exemption which he had granted to the state lands in Campania under his first act. Once this exemption was withdrawn, Caesar's commissioners would merely have to call in the leases of the sitting tenants in order to have full disposal of the estate. This arrangement, it is true, might bear hard on the dispossessed tenants and would probably not be in the interests of good farming. Indeed we may suppose that Caesar had foreseen this result, and that the reason why he exempted the Campanian domain in the first act was not so much solicitude for the Treasury, which could afford to forego the rents, as for the 'plebs optima et modestissima'¹ which could not afford to be evicted. But Caesar was pledged irrevocably to find land for Pompey's old soldiers, and necessity overrode any scruples which he may have felt about the resumption of the ager Campanus. The practical failure of his first law therefore compelled him to introduce a supplementary one, the *Lex Campana*².

If we accept this explanation of Caesar's second law, we incidentally help to clear up a mystery hitherto inscrutable, the hostility of the Equites to Caesar's second law³. This attitude of the Equites cannot be explained away as the outcome of some momentary impulse, for why should the Equites, who knew best of all Roman political sections how to keep a cool head and to subordinate their passions to their interests, have given way to a sudden and unreasoned fancy? But supposing that the 'lex Campana' was designed to relieve Caesar of a one-sided bargain with the landowners, we can understand why the Equites showed their teeth. In the later years of the Republic the land of Italy had fallen largely into the hands of

¹ Cicero, *In Legem Agrariam* II. § 84. The case which Cicero pleaded for the Campanian tenantry, when their possession was threatened by the *Lex Agraria* of 63 B.C., no doubt made some impression on Caesar, who is generally supposed to have had a hand

in that measure.

² The suggestion that there was a hitch in the execution of the first law was first made by Lange (*op. cit.* p. 280). Ferrero (*op. cit.* p. 288) first brought the landlord into the case.

³ Cicero, *Ad Att.* II. 19. 3.

the equestrian class¹, and, as might be expected, it was regarded by them mainly as an object of commercial speculation². Therefore when Caesar decided not to buy out the landlords at fancy prices, a large section of the Equites were hit in their most sensitive part, their pockets. *Hinc illae lacrimae*.

A further reason for the introduction of a second land law by Caesar is to be found in the enactment of a far more important measure, the Lex Vatinia. By this law Caesar lost the province 'silvae callesque' which a thoughtful Senate had bestowed upon him, and gained the province of Cisalpine Gaul. Now the effect of this was to invest Caesar with an important military command and to place under his charge a force hardly if at all inferior to Pompey's Grand Army. This Caesarian force would in due time have to be pensioned off with land grants, and if Caesar had no land available, he would find himself in the position out of which he was just at that moment extricating Pompey. And the necessity of leaving nothing to chance must have been apparent to Caesar, for the Senate which had left Pompey begging in vain for land might be depended on to have its tit-for-tat with Caesar in the same fashion. Nay more, in 51 B.C. Pompey, who had since become estranged from Caesar, actually endeavoured to put Caesar into difficulties by alienating the then undivided residue of the ager Campanus³. Thus the Lex Vatinia had the effect of compelling Caesar to secure some more land which might eventually be used for allotments to his old soldiers.

Now the date at which the Lex Vatinia was passed is not known for certain, but there are good reasons for placing it near the 1st of March 59 B.C.⁴ In this case it was subsequent to

¹ See the interesting computations of Frank, *Roman Imperialism* pp. 286—293; also *Klio* 1913 pp. 192—3.

² Landowners of this class have been pilloried for us by Cicero in his speeches *Pro Tullio* and *Pro Roscio Amerino*.

³ Cicero, *Ad Fam.* VIII. 10. 4: illud addo ad actiones C. Curionis, de agro Campano; de quo negant Caesarem laborare, sed Pompeium valde velle,

ne vacuus advenienti Caesari pateat. We have seen (p. 178) that part of this land was eventually used for allotment to Caesar's veterans.

⁴ Caesar's proconsulship, as is generally admitted, dated from March 1st 59. The Lex Vatinia obviously cannot have been passed much later. But it probably was not passed much earlier, for it seems to have been an emergency measure arising out of the sudden

Caesar's first agrarian law but previous to his second¹. The second law, therefore, may have been intended for the benefit not only of the plebs urbana and Pompey's army, but for a clientèle in which Caesar was bound to take an even greater interest, his own soldiery.

We need not break our heads over a difficulty which some modern writers have detected in the statement made by several ancient authors that Caesar's legislation made special provision for men who had three children or over². How, it is asked, could Pompey's old campaigners have been the fathers of such considerable families? The answer, of course, is that they couldn't. But then, as we have seen, Caesar's laws were not intended for the exclusive benefit of the discharged soldiers. They also had in view the generality of the plebs urbana. And there is no difficulty in supposing that within this class the fathers of large families received special consideration.

D. Two small problems arise in connexion with the execution of Caesar's laws.

Firstly, were the assignments under the first and the second law made by the same commission? Seeing that the first law was executed by a board of 20³, and the second law likewise by a board of 20⁴, we can hardly doubt that we are here dealing with one and the same body.

Secondly, what was the relation between the board of 20, and a board of 5⁵ which is sometimes mentioned in connexion

death of Metellus Celer, the existing governor of Cisalpine Gaul.

¹ The general probabilities of the case and the ancient texts agree in dating Caesar's first law to the outset of 59 B.C. The second law was introduced in May (Cic. *Ad Att.* II. 16. 1).

² Suetonius 20. 3; Velleius II. 44. 4; Appian II. 10. According to Suetonius, the fathers of large families received their land 'extra sortem.' Presumably Caesar reserved a parcel of land for these, and another parcel for Pompey's men, and, possibly, a further piece for future allotments to his own soldiers.

The residue would then be shared out by ballot, in case the number of applicants exceeded the number of available holdings.

According to Appian, Caesar prepared a special register of men with large families. This also suggests that plots were reserved for this class, else Caesar would hardly have gone to the trouble of ascertaining their numbers.

³ Cicero, *Ad Att.* II. 6. 2; II. 7. 3.

⁴ Varro, *Res Rustica* I. 2. 10.

⁵ Cicero, *Ad Att.* II. 7. 4; *De Prov. Cons.* § 41: me ille (Caesar) ut Vvratum acciperem, rogavit.

with the assignments? It might be conjectured that the Vviri were a managing sub-committee who stood to the rest of the XXviri as the managing directors of a modern commercial company stand to the figure-head directors¹. But this theory is belied by the fact that Caesar offered a place in the Vvirate to Cicero². Seeing that Cicero was notoriously hostile to the land laws, Caesar can hardly have intended to give him an effective share in their execution. His object in asking Cicero to join the board must have been to disarm his opposition, and to increase the prestige of the commission by enrolling on it a man with a great name. Our conclusion is that the Vviri were an ornamental body and that the practical work of the land commission was in the hands of the residual members of the XXvirate³.

E. Among the Roman laws on land tenure there is preserved a fragment of a statute entitled 'Lex Mamilia Roscia Peducaea Alliena Fabia⁴.' One of the extant paragraphs of this measure recurs almost word for word in the Lex Coloniae Genetivae which constituted the charter of Caesar's colony at Ursona, and another paragraph shows a close resemblance to a passage quoted in the Digest from a 'lex agraria, quam C. Caesar tulit⁵.' On these grounds the Lex Mamilia has been identified with one or other of the acts of Caesar's consulship⁶.

Now the similarity of the texts in question is certainly all but complete. But there is one material point of difference between the Lex Mamilia and the statute in the Digest. The former uses sesterces as a means of reckoning fines, the latter uses aurei⁷.

This discrepancy, to be sure, might be explained away if we could assume that the aurei were a later interpolation into

¹ Ed. Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie* pp. 64—66.

² *De Prov. Cons.* § 14 (quoted above).

³ The active members of the commission were probably younger partisans of Caesar who had not yet made their name.

⁴ Bruns, *Fontes Iuris Romani*⁶

pp. 95—6.

⁵ *Lex Col. Genet.* § 104; *Digest* 47. 21. 3 vs. 1—5.

⁶ Bruns, *ad. loc.*

⁷ *Dig.* 47. 21. 3. v. 4: quinquaginta aureos in publico dari iubet. *Lex Mamilia* par 2. v. 7: HS IIII. dare damnas esto.

Caesar's act¹. But this would still leave us face to face with another difficulty. How could a law of Caesar carry the *praescriptio* 'Lex Mamilia Roscia Peducaea Alliena Fabia'? Evidently Mamilius and his colleagues were the formal authors of the statute which stands in their name. But it is equally certain that Caesar did not carry his land acts by proxy, but in his own person. Our ancient authorities agree in saying that Caesar overtly took charge of his own laws, and the official title which they assign to them is invariably 'leges Iuliae.' The only possible conclusion is that the Lex Mamilia is a distinct and separate act.

At the same time it may be regarded as certain that the Lex Mamilia stands in close relation to Caesar's land legislation. The resemblance between it and the law quoted in the Digest can hardly be accidental. Moreover, no less than four of the five authors of the Lex Mamilia bear the same names as certain public men of Caesar's age who are known to have acted as partisans of Caesar. Among the praetors of 49 B.C. who stayed in Italy and entered Caesar's service we find a L. Roscius and A. Allienus. The retinue of Caesar in Gaul included a L. Roscius and a C. Fabius. A Q. Fabius commanded an army in Spain on Caesar's behalf in 46-5 B.C., and a Sex. Peducaeus was governor of Sardinia in 48 B.C.² As a fourfold coincidence in name would be almost miraculous, we are bound to assume that Mamilius' four colleagues are the same persons as Caesar's subordinates, and that the law which they carried in conjunction with Mamilius was brought forward by them in Caesar's interests.

A further point which may be taken for granted is that the Lex Mamilia was subsequent to Caesar's land legislation. As no ancient author mentions any land acts passed in Caesar's own name except those of 59 B.C., and at least one of these measures, the 'lex Campana,' was still in force in 51 B.C.³ and

¹ Aurei were only brought into circulation in 49 B.C., and it is not likely that they immediately displaced the sesterce as the current unit of reckoning. In the Lex Coloniae Genetivae, which was issued about the time of Caesar's death, fines are still com-

puted in sesterces (§ 104 v. 18: HS ∞).

² For the biographies of Roscius, Allienus and the Fabii (nos. 17 and 108) see Pauly-Wissowa. Peducaeus' governorship: Appian ii. 48.

³ Cicero, *Ad. Fam.* viii. 10. 4.

probably remained in operation till Caesar's death¹, we may safely infer that Caesar's own legislation was completed in 59 B.C. On the other hand, of Mamilius' colleagues probably not one held any high magistracy before 49 B.C.², and it is most unlikely that they should have held a position qualifying them to make laws more than ten years previously. Consequently the Lex Mamilia was supplementary to the Leges Iuliae, not vice versa.

The exact relation between the two requires some further discussion. According to one theory of Mommsen's, Mamilius and his colleagues were on the land commission which gave effect to the Leges Iuliae, and their act therefore is a 'lex data' in pursuance of Caesar's main law³. But it is a pure conjecture that Mamilius and his colleagues formed part of Caesar's XXvirate: there is no ancient authority for including them on this board⁴. Moreover, the extant fragments of the Lex Mamilia show that this measure was of too comprehensive a type to be a mere local bye-law. The opening words of its extant portion, 'quae colonia hac lege deducta quodve municipium praefectura forum conciliabulum constitutum sit,' make it plain that we are here dealing with an act of wide scope, and not with the ordinances of an allotment board.

Another suggestion, which also originates from Mommsen and has found some favour among modern authors⁵, is that Mamilius and his colleagues were tribunes in some year after Caesar's consulship, say 55 B.C., and that in this capacity they carried a supplementary act through the Concilium Plebis.

¹ As we have seen (p. 179), the settlements of veterans which Caesar made in Campania after the Civil War were carried out under the 'lex Campana' of 59 B.C.

² C. Fabius was propraetor in Asia in 57-6 B.C. and therefore held the praetorship not later than 58 B.C. But his seniority over Roscius, Allienus and Peducaeus makes it probable that not he but Q. Fabius was their colleague.

³ *Die römischen Feldmesser* II. pp.

223-7.

⁴ Meyer (*op. cit.* p. 65 n.) argues that they cannot have constituted Caesar's Vvirate, because one of the places on the Vvirate belonged to another person altogether, M. Valerius Messalla (C.I.L. VI. 3826). This is inconclusive, for the membership of the board might change from time to time.

⁵ Mommsen, *loc. cit.* Willems, *Le Sénat* I. 498 n. 5. Botsford, *The Roman Assemblies* p. 441.

This theory, too, rests on a very insecure foundation, for there is no more evidence that Mamilius and his colleagues ever held a tribuneship, and held it all in one year, than that they were on Caesar's allotment commission. Again, it is difficult to understand why Caesar's land acts should have needed to be supplemented only three or four years¹ after their enactment. It is not likely that Caesar, who was not in the habit of scamping his legislative work and was not pressed for time in the year of his first consulship, should have left his own land acts so incomplete as to require a new substantive law, and not merely a string of bye-laws, to carry them into effect. Neither is it likely that a new law was required in the middle fifties in order to procure fresh lands for applicants whose claims had not yet been satisfied. The old soldiers of Pompey must have had full provision made for them long before this, for they evidently had a first claim on the allotments, and Pompey, who had a seat on the land commission, can hardly have neglected their interests². The soldiers of Caesar were still on active service in 55 B.C. and as yet had little prospect of being pensioned off. The proletariat of Rome had become legally entitled to gifts of free corn by the act of Clodius in 58 B.C., and, better still, these gifts had materialised in the next years, thanks to the special corn-supply commission of Pompey. Thus in 55 B.C. there cannot have been any urgent demand for new assignments. On the other hand, as late as 51 B.C. some of the land acquired by Caesar's 'lex Campana' was still waiting for distribution³. It is therefore inexplicable why Caesar's acts of 59 B.C. should have required so sweeping a measure as the Lex Mamilia to supplement them at the time under discussion.

We must therefore find some other date for the Lex Mamilia. In what year subsequent to 55 B.C. can the authors of the law have held a magistracy qualifying them to introduce a bill into the Comitia? Fortunately we have sufficient data for an answer. In 49 B.C. Roscius and Allienus are known to have been praetors.

¹ 55 B.C. is the *terminus post quem*, for in 54 B.C. Roscius was with Caesar in Gaul.

² Pompey went to Campania to

supervise the distribution of land to his own men.—Cassius Dio 38. 1. 7.

³ Cicero, *Ad Fam.* viii. 10. 4.

Peducaeus, who was governor of Sardinia in 48 B.C., presumably held a praetorship shortly before. That the year of his praetorship was precisely 49 B.C. may be inferred from the fact that Cicero in the early months of that year made Peducaeus one of his principal advisers as to the course of action he should pursue at the outbreak of the Civil War, whether he should throw in his lot whole-heartedly with Pompey or maintain a passive attitude¹. The anxiety which Cicero displayed to put himself right with Peducaeus can hardly be explained by saying that Cicero was fond of Peducaeus or considered him a man of parts. But if Peducaeus was praetor at the outbreak of the Civil War he could hardly help coming into touch with Pompey and would thus be in a position to inform Cicero of Pompey's prospects and intentions, a point on which Cicero displayed a truly morbid curiosity. 49 B.C., therefore, is the most suitable date for Peducaeus' praetorship. Lastly Q. Fabius, who was consul in 45 B.C., must have been praetor not later than 48 B.C. Of the authors of the *Lex Mamilia* two therefore were certainly, and two others probably, praetors in 49 B.C. It hardly seems rash to assume that Mamilius likewise held a praetorship in that year, and that *the Lex Mamilia was the work of five of the praetors of 49 B.C.*

Against this theory some objections may be brought forward. It may be said that it was unusual to devolve legislative work on praetors rather than tribunes or consuls. But 49 B.C. was in any case an unusual year. Whatever may have happened to the tribunes², the consuls had certainly flown with Pompey, and the praetors perforce encroached on the functions of their absent colleagues. Thus Roscius introduced a law regulating the administration of Transpadane Gaul³, and another praetor, M. Lepidus, usurped the consuls' powers by naming Caesar dictator. In such an annus mirabilis it is quite conceivable that a new land law should have been put in charge of five praetors.

¹ Cicero, *Ad Att.* ix. 7. 2; ix. 10. 10.

² Since only two tribunes, Antony and Q. Cassius, opposed the measures taken by the Senate against Caesar, it may be assumed that the other eight were Pompeians and fled with Pompey

from Italy.

³ See the 'Fragmentum Atestinum' (Bruns p. 101—2) l. 14. This is probably the law by which the Transpadane Gauls received the franchise (see Hardy, *English Historical Review* 1916 p. 375).

Another objection to the date 49 B.C. may be founded on Mommsen's argument that the *Lex Mamilia Roscia Peducaea Alliena Fabia* is identical with a '*Lex Mamilia*' mentioned by Cicero in the *De Legibus*, and that the *De Legibus* was completed by 51 B.C.¹ In this case 51 B.C. is obviously the latest possible date for our law. Now the first part of Mommsen's thesis has been tacitly admitted in this article, which has all along called the *Lex Mamilia*, etc., etc. '*Lex Mamilia*' for short. And nobody will find it strange that Cicero should have saved his ink and time in the same way. But was the *De Legibus* indeed completed in 51 B.C.? A letter written by Cicero in 46 B.C. shows that he was still at work on the *De Legibus* in that year². His reference to the *Lex Mamilia* may perfectly well have been made in or after 49 B.C.

We may therefore fix the date of the *Lex Mamilia* at 49 B.C. It remains to inquire for what purpose the law was then brought forward.

In all probability its object was to find land for Caesar's veterans and to regulate the tenure thereof. Not that in 49 B.C. the soldiers were in sight of their 'ticket.' But a mutiny of the 9th legion which Caesar was called upon to quell on his return from Spain shows that the army was dissatisfied with the rewards which it had received hitherto³. It seems but natural, therefore, that one of the tasks which Caesar set himself during his December stay in Rome was to get ready a pension scheme for his men so as to avert delays and discontents after their demobilisation.

Now, as we have seen, some lands in Campania still stood at Caesar's disposal by virtue of his *Lex Campana* of 59 B.C., and it was no doubt under this statute that his veterans eventually received their allotments at Capua, Casilinum and Calatia. But this residue of *ager Campanus* fell far short of what was required for the multitude of settlers, both military

¹ *Loc. cit.*

² *Ad Fam.* ix. 2. 5. See Schanz, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur* (3rd ed.) i. pt. 2 pp. 346—7.

³ Suetonius ch. 69; Cassius Dio 41.

chs. 26—35; Appian ii. 47. According to Appian the men mutinied because a donative promised to them at Brundisium still remained unpaid.

and proletarian, whom Caesar provided with land after the Civil War, and the greater part of Caesar's later colonies were as a matter of fact established on provincial soil which fell outside the scope of his laws of 59 B.C. Fresh legislation was therefore needed to authorise these settlements. Now the Lex Mamilia, as we have seen, is shown by the wording of its extant paragraphs to have been a regulating act of a comprehensive nature¹. Furthermore, one of its paragraphs recurs almost word for word in the Lex Coloniae Genetivae, which is the charter of one of Caesar's foundations in Spain. The *raison d'être* of the Lex Mamilia is now apparent. *It served as the constitutive act under which Caesar's later colonies were founded*, and it stands to the Lex Coloniae Genetivae as a 'lex rogata' to a 'lex data.'

M. CARY.

¹ The first paragraph provides for the foundation, not only of 'coloniae,' 'municipia' and 'fora,' but also of 'praefecturae' and 'conciliabula.' These last two categories are purely Italian. Unless the 'praefecturae' and

'conciliabula' were included as part of a 'common form' expression, the Lex Mamilia was designed to provide for fresh Italian settlements as well as provincial ones.

ARISTOTLE'S LECTURE-ROOM AND LECTURES.

Read before the Cambridge Philological Society, 4 Nov. 1910.

It is an old story that the philosophical schools of Athens, which were established in the fourth century B.C. and flourished till the sixth century A.D., bore a notable resemblance to our own Colleges. In the eye of the law they were religious foundations (*θείασοι*) for the worship of the Muses: and accordingly they had chapels dedicated to those divinities, *ἱερά*, or, more exactly, *μουσεῖα*, whence our word museum. In the chapel there were statues, not only of divine personages, such as the Graces, but also of the great men of the school. They had lecture-rooms, a hall, a library, chambers for the members of the school, gardens, walks, cloisters. The society consisted of a Scholarch or head, professors, and students. Upon occasion the members of the house dined together at a commemoration feast in honour of their patron saints the Muses. There were endowments, given or bequeathed by pious benefactors, and, after a time, subventions from the State. Tradition adds that Aristotle took his select class in the morning, and that in the afternoon his lectures were open to all. Though he sometimes walked as he talked in the gardens of the Lyceum, whence he was called Peripatetic, we are not to suppose that this was his invariable procedure.

Now it is reasonable to presume that, though in the fourth century B.C. the professor of physics had few instruments, if any, and the professor of biology no lantern, the methods and artifices of the lecturer were not very different from those which are in use among ourselves. So I have been asking myself whether I find in those of Aristotle's writings which I suppose to be records of lectures, evidence that he resorted to any of the devices which I adopt in my own informal discourses. For example I am conscious that, when in the extempore exposition of the lecture-room I want a visible illustration, I am apt to take for the purpose something which is present before my eyes. Thus, some years ago, when a coal-scuttle was a prominent object in my ill-

furnished room, it played a very considerable part in my lectures. When I was explaining that Plato in the period of the *republic* and the *Phaedo* recognized an external immutable idea for every common term, but that he soon saw the necessity of dropping out of his list artificial products, the coal-scuttle served me as a typical example of the *τεχνητά* or *arte facta*. My room is not now warmed by an open fire: so the shabby coal-scuttle has disappeared both from the room and from my artless talk. Again one day I was expounding the doctrine of the categories and I found myself saying something of this sort: "if I say that this is a desk, I predicate under the category of substance," and as I spoke I thumped the desk before me. A blinding cloud of dust arose from it, and I instinctively proceeded: "if I say that the desk is dusty, I predicate under the category of quality." It is of no set, deliberate, purpose that the lecturer does these things. Rather it is psychologically obvious that in informal discourse he will resort for illustrations to things which are familiar to himself and to his hearers, and in particular to things which are at the moment under his eyes and theirs.

Accordingly Aristotle also in his philosophical writings makes full use of familiar illustrations: and I fancy that the study of them may afford information, not indeed important, but for all that not without interest, about the furniture and the fittings of his lecture room. And here I must explain that I have made no attempt to gather up *all* Aristotle's illustrations: I have been content to note those which came in my way, and to examine the references given in the Berlin Index under certain obvious titles. I am not now thinking of the biological writings which are of a different character and may well have been composed before Aristotle began to teach in the Lyceum. Indeed the hypothesis of Professor D'Arcy Thompson (*Hist. Anim.*), that they represent observations made during Aristotle's two years at Mytilene, seems to me both plausible and attractive. I am thinking principally of the *organon*, the *de anima*, the *metaphysics*, the *ethics*, and the *politics*.

Assuming then that Aristotle's illustrations were frequently suggested by objects which he saw before him, I find that inter alia there were in the lecture room:

a three-legged table, 641^a32 :

a sofa (κλίνη) or sofas made of wood, 640^b23 :

a bronze statue, 1013^b6, 724^a23, 984^a24 :

a plaster statue, 1035^a32 :

and a bronze globe, 403^a13.

On the walls there were tabular summaries (διαγραφαί),
first, of the virtues and vices, 1107^a33, 1220^b37,
secondly, of certain logical ἀντιφάσεις, 22^a22,
thirdly, of animal and vegetable species, 642^b12,
and there were also anatomical diagrams, 510^a30.

Further, we may safely conjecture that there was, not a black board, but a white one, a λεύκωμα : for sometimes, e.g. *NE* v 5 § 8 and § 12 and *prior analytics* 52^a16, we have the description of a diagram, and in some instances the MSS. reproduce it. Indeed I think that such diagrams ought to be faithfully reproduced in the texts as a tradition dating from Aristotle himself. And here I may note in passing that when Aristotle delivered his course περὶ ψυχῆς, two members of his class were men of a fair or light complexion, one of them being the son of Diares, the other the son of Cleon : for at 418^a20 we read—I borrow Mr Hicks' version—'what is meant by the indirect object of sense may be illustrated if we suppose that the white thing before you is Diares' son. You perceive Diares' son, but indirectly, for that which is perceived is accessory to the whiteness': and again, 425^a24, "of Cleon's son we perceive not that he is Cleon's son, but that he is a white object, and the fact of his being Cleon's son is accessory to the whiteness." And similarly it would seem that in the class which heard Aristotle περὶ τὸ πρότως ὄν there was a man who was at once lean and fair : for at *metaph.* Z xv 1040^a12 we read : "if any one should define you (σε), he will describe you as a lean, fair animal, or by some other mark which will belong to some one else also." I cannot help fancying that the lean, fair animal must have regretted his notable aptitude for blushing when he was thus personally and pointedly addressed : but the Greek conception of impertinence was different from our own, and I can quite believe that Aristotle regarded this ὕβρις as πεπαιδευμένη.

And now I have something to say about a whole group of

allusions. Just as an English lawyer used to talk about John Doe and Richard Roe as parties to a certain sort of fictitious action, and just as he still, I am told, uses the names of Hugh Hunt and the initials of John Styles, so Aristotle, when he has occasion to speak of a particular human being, takes as his example Socrates or Callias. Of course when Socrates is described as a human being (*ἄνθρωπος*) or as a sage (*σοφός*), there is nothing to suggest that Aristotle has any particular reason for naming Socrates; and when, in the *metaphysics*, Aristotle muddles himself and exasperates his readers by special disquisitions about τὸ *σιμόν*, snubnosedness, camusity, regarded as a quality which by the use of language is inseparable from a particular sort of substance, it is conceivable that he is thinking of *Theaetetus* 143E and 209 BC, where the *σιμότης* of Theaetetus is compared with that of Socrates. But when Socrates is deictically indicated as "this" and Callias as "that," I begin to suspect that Aristotle has before his eyes some sort of representation of Socrates; and when I further observe that he is described as *λευκός*, fair-faced, I fancy that the representation was not a statue or a bust but a picture, and I begin to wonder what the picture was.

Again, when Aristotle wants an instance of a separable accident, he frequently speaks of Socrates as becoming or being *μουσικός*: and Plato's *Phaedo* explains the attribution. At the very beginning of that dialogue Cebes says that Evenus and others had asked him why it was that Socrates, who had never before written poetry, was occupying himself in his prison in versifying the prelude to Apollo and the fables of Æsop: and in reply Socrates bids Cebes tell Evenus that it was not in any spirit of rivalry that he was doing so, but because he had been haunted through life by a dream, in which he always heard the same words: ὦ ΣώκρATES, μουσικὴν ποιεῖ καὶ ἐργάζου. Hitherto he had taken this as an encouragement to proceed with his educational mission, philosophy being music of the highest order: but now it has occurred to him that the dream might mean music in the ordinary sense of the term, and he has satisfied his conscience by composing a hymn in honour of the god whose feast delayed his death and in versifying Æsop's fables. The

Phaedo then was in Aristotle's thoughts. This being so I suspect that there was in the lecture-room a picture representing a scene from that dialogue: for the words *καθήσθαι, καθήμενος*, which describe Socrates' attitude in the *Phaedo*, are again and again used by Aristotle of Socrates. Whence I conclude that there was a picture of Socrates sitting on his bed in the prison and arguing on the last day of his life that the wise man will regard the approach of death with a cheerful confidence. And I fancy that there was another picture, in which Callias the son of Hipponicus was prominent. For he too is constantly used by Aristotle as a lay figure: and unless there was something special to recall his name, it is not easy to see why he should be thought of. There is nothing to suggest that he was in any sort a Socratic. He came of a rich and noble family, but apparently did it little credit. He was remembered chiefly as a lavish patron of sophistry, who on one occasion, as recorded in the *Protagoras*, brought together most of the notable sophists of his time. Now as of Socrates, so of Callias, Aristotle speaks deictically, as though he were pointing to a representation: for example, 1033^b24, 1034^a6. He too is *λευκός*, "white-faced," and partly for this reason, partly because I do not see otherwise how a representation of him could be found at the Lyceum, I conjecture that he was a prominent figure in some scene from the life of Socrates. Now there is one specially important reference to him. In the *prior analytics* 43^a36 we read *φάμεν γάρ ποτε τὸ λευκὸν ἐκείνο Σωκράτην εἶναι καὶ τὸ προσιὸν Καλλίαν*: "we say that that fair-faced thing is Socrates, and that that which approaches him is Callias." Is there then in the story of the sophistical congress at Callias' house any one moment which would give a painter an opportunity of representing Callias approaching Socrates? At 335 c Socrates becomes or pretends to become restive and impatient of Protagoras' continuous discourse, and rises to go, whereupon Callias, their host, intervenes. I borrow the following translation from Wright: "And as I was rising, Callias, seizing my hand with his right hand, and with his left laying hold of the cloak I am now wearing, said: 'We won't let you go, Socrates; for, if you leave us, we shall find our conversation no longer the same thing. I beg, therefore, that you

will remain with us; for I know nothing that I would more gladly hear than a discussion between you and Protagoras. So pray oblige us all.'” This is the one place in which Callias is prominent. When he is mentioned earlier, it is only as one of the listeners who walked beside Protagoras in the front line: and plainly the promenade would not give the painter anything like so good an opportunity as the little scene in which Callias intervenes to reconcile his guests.

So much for the furniture and the fittings of Aristotle’s lecture-room. I turn now to another part of my subject. It has been asked again and again: are the philosophical writings of Aristotle books, or records of lectures? And if they are records of lectures, are they drafts or memoranda prepared by Aristotle himself, or summaries and notes preserved by his hearers? Now I find in Aristotle’s writings certain peculiarities which I should not expect to find either in published works or in the notes of pupils, but which lead me to think that here are Aristotle’s notes for his lectures, or, more exactly, memoranda covering the ground of the lectures which he was about to deliver.

Let us ask ourselves what are the characteristics of the lecturer’s discourse. (1) The MS. of a lecturer may be of all sorts from a complete draft to a few curt jottings: or again, short of a complete draft, it may be a summary, literary in form though not full enough to be read currently. On the other hand his notes, while fuller than a few curt jottings, may be strung loosely together, and yet neither organized nor exactly formulated. Moreover they may be different in character at different times. But (2) it is conceivable that the lecturer should embody in his informal notes paragraphs taken from literary writings. Another point to be observed is (3) that if the lecturer repeats his course and uses his old notes a second time, there will almost certainly be additions and omissions, and in all probability the changes to be made in the delivery of the lectures will be inadequately explained in the MS. For the lecturer is thinking mainly of the impending lecture, and will not trouble himself to record exactly all the alterations which he makes in the delivery. Again (4) when he finds himself on familiar ground, he may either extract paragraphs from another course, or con-

tent himself with brief mentions to be amplified extempore. Then too (5) I find that my notes sometimes take the form of instructions to myself—such as “N.B.,” “Amplify!” “Tell them so and so,” “Dictate!” Yet another characteristic (6) is that the sentences are often flung upon the paper without any attempt to mark their relations to one another: for the notes are meant to suggest the topics, and not to expound or coordinate them. Again (7) the lecturer's sentences will be simple and conversational, and will seldom be complicated either in syntax or in structure. Again (8) the lecturer will allow himself great freedom in the selection of words and the use of technicalities.

Now I find examples of all these things in Aristotle's philosophical writings. That they are neither complete drafts nor yet mere jottings is, I think, obvious: and it is, I think, further obvious that there is more literary quality in some of his writings than in others. For example, the *ethics* seems to me to have more literary quality than the *metaphysics*, from which I derive a good many of my illustrations. As an instance of a literary patch, I may quote *ethics* I viii 7 = 1169^a11. Even in a bald version you will realize that this is something very different from Aristotle's ordinary, ramshackle, discourse.

Like the lecturer, Aristotle repeats himself, corrects, substitutes, adds, omits. The consequence is that his writings sometimes resemble a waste-paper basket: we have not so much one text, nor two texts, nor, as Professor Cook Wilson supposes in *ethics* vii, four or perhaps five. Rather it contains one text together with a host of accretions. For, even if the original text should be preserved intact, it is hardly likely that the revision will be a harmonious and consecutive whole: and it may well be that neither the original text nor the text adopted by the lecturer on subsequent occasions can be disengaged from the agglomerate. So I demur to the phrase “double recension,” which we are familiar with in regard to the *de anima*.

Again he sometimes draws upon his old stores for a few paragraphs, and sometimes contents himself in his notes with a brief mention to be amplified extempore. For example, it is a familiar fact that book M of the *metaphysics* repeats, with

occasional variations and additions, several important pages of book A: and again in A ix 990^b11–15 we have three Platonic arguments and three Aristotelian refutations packed into the compass of four lines: “for, according to the arguments from the sciences, there will be ideas of all things which admit of scientific study: and according to the theory of the one in many there will be ideas also of negations: and, according to the argument from our thought of a thing after it had ceased to exist, there will be ideas of perishable particulars, for the image of them remains.” However subtle the Greek intellect may have been, we may be quite certain that Aristotle could not have trusted either to hearers or to readers to understand so exiguous a statement. He cannot have meant this passage to be anything more than a reminder to himself. It is as if I wrote in my notes “third man!” meaning that I must here insert an explanation of that famous argument. Again, just as I sometimes insert stage-directions for my own use, so in *metaphysics* Λ iii 1069^b35 Aristotle writes *μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος, λέγω δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα*, and again 1070^a4. The intrusion of the *ὅτι* shews that this is a mere reminder, and that the text makes no pretence to be a full exposition. Another point is that the lecturer is apt to be careless in his memoranda in regard to the connexion of his sentences: for as the notes are meant to be amplified, the connexions can best be supplied extempore. Accordingly in *metaphysics* Ζ ii 1029^a9 sqq. in six lines we have six sentences all beginning with *γάρ*. It is true that any explanatory sentence or clause whatever may be introduced by that long suffering particle: but when it is used in this promiscuous way, when no attempt is made to shew what sort of explanation is offered, *γάρ* in no wise helps us to the understanding of the argument. And there are instances in which *δὲ* takes the place of *any* distinctive particle, just as if an English author were to write sentences without any connecting words. Now this is precisely what I expect to find in a lecturer’s notes. Again the lecturer’s sentences will be conversational and will seldom have any complication either of syntax or of structure. Accordingly Aristotle constantly prefers the indicative form of the conditional sentence—“if this is so, the result will be”—

where a historian or an orator, using the optative, would have written "if this were to be so, the result would be." Finally it is notorious that Aristotle sometimes allows himself a large liberty in the invention of unliterary words. A man who can make from the pronoun *ἐκεῖνος*, "that," the adjective *ἐκεῖνινος* on the model of *ξύλινος*, "thaten" on the model of "wooden," can have had *no* scruples. Moreover it is to be remembered that certain phrases which *we* pardon as recognized technicalities—such as *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι* and *τὸ ζῶν εἶναι*—originally belonged not to the language of philosophical literature, but to the jargon of the lecture-room: and accordingly I allow myself in like manner to translate *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι* "the what makes it so," and I think that in so doing I better preserve the flavour of Aristotle's speech than I should do by adopting the conventional phrase "the essential nature." There was a time when I had thought of "quideratity," but even that seemed to me too formal.

Again, I think that a little phrase which has troubled the commentators is purely conversational. In 1072^b22 Aristotle writes *ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων*. Now according to Bonitz with *ἔχων* we must supply *τὸ νοητόν*, and take the sentence to refer to "the supreme mind, since it contains in itself, and is, its own object, not only possessing the faculty of thinking, but also energizing in thought": and I have to acknowledge that the result is not unsatisfactory. But to complete the sentence, do we not want either *τὸ νοητόν*, or at any rate *αὐτό*, or some equivalent, and is not the sentence after all somewhat feeble? On the other hand Krische takes *ἔχειν* to mean the possession of faculty in opposition to *ἐνεργεῖν*, the exercise of it. With Bonitz I think this interpretation impossible in our context: and I cannot see that it adds anything to the argument. Thus far then I declare for Bonitz (and Zeller) against Krische (and Schwegler). But I venture to think that there is another possible interpretation, simple, natural, and idiomatic: and it a little surprises me that apparently no one has suggested it. We all know that *ἔχων* appended to a present indicative "adds the notion of duration to that of present action," *L.* and *S.*, e.g. *τί κυπτάζεις ἔχων*, *τί φλυαρεῖς ἔχων*, and the like. Why should we not give the word this idiomatic meaning, "and it keeps energizing" or "it

energizes continually"? For this notion, that supreme mind is continually operant, dominates the situation, and moves the austere Stagirite to an unwonted enthusiasm when he proceeds to the theological interpretation. "It is wonderful that God should have always an excellence which we have sometimes: that he should have a greater excellence is still more wonderful."

HENRY JACKSON.

TRISTE PROFVNDI IMPERIVM.

Iuu. XIII 49 sq.

nondum *imi* sortitus triste profundi
imperium Sicula toruos cum coniuge Pluton.

I will transcribe first the notes on these lines in my edition of 1905, and then Mr Owen's remarks in J. P. xxxv p. 144.

49 imi*, om. **P**, **aliquis** Ψ , uide Ouid. met. iv 444 *imi tecta tyranni* **50 imperium LO, imperium aut P** Ψ ; at de Neptuno sermonem non esse demonstrat *triste* adiectivum, uide Hor. carm. iii 4 46 *regnaque tristia*, Sen. Med. 11 *dominumque regni tristis*, Stat. Theb. viii 80 *regia tristis*.

'I naturally inferred from Mr Housman's note "**IMI***, om. **P**, **ALIQUIS** Ψ " that his surprising conjecture *imi* for *aliquis* was due to the supposed loss of a word for which *aliquis* found in the manuscripts other than **P** was a stopgap conjecturally supplied. Therefore I showed by examples that the omission of a word such as *aliquis* is a slip common in **P**, and affords no basis for conjecture. But Mr Housman now'—i.e. an. 1915, J. P. xxxiv p. 43—'says that his objection to the text is that "*triste* is applicable to Pluto's empire and inapplicable to Neptune's.'"

When Mr Owen confesses that he 'naturally' behaved in this manner,—naturally left my notes unread, naturally inferred, from having done so, that I, in spite of my record, was a palaeographical emendator like himself,—he lays bare with great simplicity the root of the trouble. That such proceedings are natural to him, and almost unimaginable to me, is a fact which accounts for most of our dissensions; and when he says on p. 142 'Mr Housman is dissatisfied that I disagree with him' his divination is far astray.

But although he has not even yet read my notes of 1905 he has read at least one sentence in my article of 1915, '*triste* is applicable to Pluto's empire and inapplicable to Neptune's';

and he replies that *triste* is equally applicable to either. Because there are occasions when the sea deserves and receives the epithet *tristis*, he thinks that Neptune's empire can be called *triste profundum imperium*. Neither I nor anyone else can explain to Mr Owen that this is not so, and I shall make no endeavour of the sort. The way to refute such reasoning, as Burke said, is not to answer it, but to use it. The sky, as well as the sea, is called *tristis* on appropriate occasions, Sen. dial. i 4 14 'perpetua illos hiemps, *triste caelum* premit,' n.q. iv 4 3 'nivalem diem, cum altum frigus et *triste caelum* est'; and Mr Owen says (J. P. xxxiii p. 252) that *profundum* means the sky in Manil. v 721. Therefore Jove's empire, as well as Neptune's, can be called *triste profundum imperium*. The only one of Saturn's sons whose empire, according to Mr Owen, cannot be called so, is the lord of hell, called *dominus regni tristis* by Seneca.

And why? Because Mr Owen, casting about for something definite to say against my surprising conjecture, discovered, to his relief and joy, that there is no example in the dictionaries of *profundum* meaning the deep of hell. That the adjective *profundus* is attached to *Acheruns*, *manes*, *Dis*, *Erebus*, *Tartara*, that Pluto is called *Iuppiter profundus* and Proserpine *Iuno profunda*, are not considerations which, under the circumstances, would weigh with Mr Owen. Nor, from the fact that *profundum* means the deep of heaven in Manil. v 720, did Mr Owen infer that a fortiori it could mean the deep of hell: quite the contrary. J. P. xxxiii p. 252 'The same word could hardly mean both heaven and hell in so precise a language as Latin. Considering the quantity of theological literature that has been written in this language, if this were so, it would lead to confusing results' (it is horrible to think what confusion must have been caused by using *spiritus*, as theologians did, of both God and the Devil). Now I do not myself care whether the substantive *profundum* occurs elsewhere in the required sense or not; but for Mr Owen's sake I turned to the first author whom I thought likely to furnish an example, and I cited an allusion to Amphiaras' descent into the underworld from Aetn. 578 'septemque duces raptumque profundo.' Mr Owen however says that *profundum* here means merely 'the abyss,'

which is a comparatively shallow affair: hell is too deep to be called *profundum*; and he still requires a passage where the realm of Pluto is unmistakably so entitled. Well, here are two: Sen. Phaed. 147 sq. ‘teneri crede Lethaeo abditum | Thesea profundo’ and Oed. 577 sq. ‘temptari abditum | Acheron profundum mente non aequa tulit.’ But I suspect that Mr Owen will still find my conjecture as surprising as ever, and that his dislike of it is based upon something much more solid than any erroneous opinion about the sense of *profundum*.

At the three other places, III 236 sq., VII 184 sq., I 168, Mr Owen unostentatiously abandons, in deference to my unfair criticism, the attitude which I criticised: this surely is very handsome conduct on his part. I will only add that what he calls on p. 142 ‘the attack which has been made by Mr Housman (J. P. xxxiv 40 foll.) on certain conclusions of mine’ was a reply to an attack which had been made by Mr Owen (J. P. xxxiii pp. 246—55) on certain of my conclusions.

A. E. HOUSMAN.

ANCIENT HISTORIANS AND THEIR SOURCES.

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The object of this paper is to consider an assumption—it may almost be called a dogma—which underlies the greater part of what has been written (especially in Germany) during recent years on the question of the relation between ancient historians and their sources. Students of the politics, the religion, and the economic life of the ancient world have long realised that the greatest caution is required before they venture upon any generalisations whatsoever about ‘Greco-Roman antiquity,’ a period in which are to be found anticipations of almost all the tendencies which have revealed themselves more explicitly in medieval and modern times, and such caution is equally desirable in those who occupy themselves with ancient historiography, the conception of History, its functions and method, held by ancient historians from Herodotus onwards. If generalisations about ‘antiquity’ are possible at all, they must surely be based on such facts as the non-existence in ancient times of railways, telegraphs, and printing; where human nature is concerned, it is not unreasonable to expect an overwhelming amount of evidence before accepting views which imply that the ‘ancients’ were intellectually and morally different from the ‘moderns.’

In spite of much recent criticism¹ the ‘positivist’ view that the object of the ‘scientific’ historian is to discover and illustrate ‘laws’ is far from extinct, though it too often happens that these laws turn out to be merely empirical generalisations, which ought at best to serve as guiding ideas, and which cannot without absolute dogmatism be applied to all the relevant facts.

¹ Croce, *Teoria e Storia della Storiografia* (1917) pp. 265—282; Ed. Meyer, *Kleine Schriften* (1910) pp. 1—78, and *Gesch. des Altertums* 2nd ed. vol. II. p. 182f. Croce’s chapter on

Greco-Roman Historiography (pp. 165—181) takes the view that ancient historians were too ‘pragmatic’ in their standpoint, and were too little interested in the history of ideas.

As it is with a 'law'¹ of this character that the present paper is concerned, I begin by quoting the statement of it given by Nissen some 50 years ago in an article on Pliny's *Histories*². 'It is commonly said,' he declares, 'that the writings of Tacitus are based on thorough investigation of sources, and the exact scientific standards of our day are attributed to ancient writers. These assertions merely raise an incredulous smile on the face of anyone who has submitted any part of Tacitus to exact study. In fact, they contradict all the fundamental conditions of ancient historical writing. The law concerning the use of sources (das Gesetz der Quellenbenützung) which I have laid down in the case of Livy applies to all ancient historians from Herodotus onwards, but more especially to all who described not their own but a past time. They took over from their predecessors not merely their material, but the form given to it, and pulled it about as seemed good to them (um damit nach freiestem Gutdünken zu schalten). The only difference between careful and careless, critical and uncritical, writers is that the one reproduce their source in form and contents more or less slavishly, while the others test (prüfen) and study (sichten) their source, and impose upon it the stamp of their own mind. The Romans had no conception of the study of original documents, such as has been attributed to Tacitus by modern writers.'

It will be noticed that this statement, extreme as it is, does admit that ancient historians sometimes used several sources, and were capable of applying some sort of criticism to them, but modern followers of Nissen wish to drop even these qualifications. Fabia, e.g., in his *Sources de Tacite* (p. 118) says 'Not only had an ancient historian no scruples in borrowing from his predecessors materials already worked up, but among his predecessors there was one whom he considered the best, and whom he takes as his special guide. He plays the part of principal source; the others have only the inferior position of secondary sources. The historian, in other words, does not fuse together

¹ In his *Cäsar's Monarchie u. das Principat des Pompeius* (1919) p. 20, Ed. Meyer protests against the use of this word. 'It is to be wished that

this misleading expression would disappear from all discussions of style.'

² *Rheinisches Museum* vol. xxvi. p. 500.

all previous accounts: he chooses one which serves as base, and completes or corrects it by means of the others, with more or less of continuity and care.' In accordance with these principles, Fabia reduces to a minimum the use made by Tacitus of his secondary sources, and establishes to his own satisfaction that in the *Histories* he practically rewrote Pliny the Elder, and in the *Annals* Aufidius Bassus and Cluvius Rufus.

The same view has been expressed even more strongly by writers on Plutarch's Biographies. Ed. Meyer, e.g., in his study of the Life of Cimon (*Forschungen* vol. II) denies that Plutarch had read any of the numerous writers whom he quotes about, e.g., the Battle of the Eurymedon or the Peace of Callias. His source (Vorlage) was an earlier biographical work from which he merely, not always intelligently, copied the views of previous historians. No modern writer, he says, if called upon to write a short biography of Charles V or Frederick the Great would think of studying contemporary documents; he would simply aim at expressing in an interesting form conclusions established by others. (Surely this is not quite the same thing as the procedure which he attributes to Plutarch.) He considers that Plutarch when writing his Greek Lives had at his disposal a mass of biographical works compiled by Hellenistic writers, and that, in spite of appearances to the contrary, he merely selected from this mass *one* book of which he approved, and rewrote it in his own style, adding nothing of any importance. The same view is accepted in the main by Leo in his *Griechisch-Römische Biographie*¹. He asks, e.g. (p. 176), why in his Life of Demetrius Plutarch quotes hardly any previous writers, while the Life of Demosthenes contains references to more than twenty. 'The essential point,' he says, 'is that in his Demetrius Plutarch paraphrases an author who himself quoted few or no authorities, while in the Demosthenes he uses a biographical writer whose book had a learned character.'

A similar attitude is adopted (possibly with rather more justification) by many writers on Plutarch's Roman Lives. Peter²,

¹ *Die Griechisch-Römische Biographie nach ihrer litt. Form* (Leipzig, 1901).

² *Die Quellen Plutarchs in den Biographien der Römer* (Halle, 1865) p. 11.

e.g., combating the view of a previous writer that the Life of Coriolanus was based on the study of several authorities, continues: 'In such a way may Pliny have worked but never Plutarch. Rather while he was writing he can scarcely have had even Dionysius before him. He had read him carefully through, perhaps made some short extracts, and then wrote out his biography quite freely from memory.' Though the Life of Cicero seems to bear traces of the use of several sources—it quotes Cicero's pamphlets *De consulatu* and *De consiliis*, his letters and speeches, the Memoirs of Augustus, and Tiro's Life of his master—Leo and Schwartz will not allow that Plutarch set eyes on any of these writings. Leo¹ says that the biography is directly derived from an author who made use of the above sources and also of the historians of the period (Sallust and Livy). Schwartz² makes a similar assumption, describing Plutarch's source as 'a well read pedant who composed a lively mosaic from the writings of Sallust as well as from the literature of pamphlets and gossip': he suggests that he was the obscure Fenestella 'a learned compiler who despised no trifling and piquant detail'³.

In spite of the unanimity with which this general principle seems to be accepted, the writers whom I have quoted occasionally show signs of feeling a little uncomfortable about it. Ed. Meyer, e.g., says 'It is natural that Plutarch got hold of the most detailed history available, and, when possible, added extra material'⁴. A passage in the Life of Cimon concerning the Cimon and Thucydides, which he, with much probability, traces back to Didymus, seems to him to be of this character, i.e. an addition by Plutarch from his own reading. But why, if Plutarch's reading included Didymus, should it not have included other writers, the references to whom, according to Meyer, are derived from his *Hauptquelle*? Leo, again, says 'If he is provided with a convenient summary of the essential facts,

¹ *op. cit.* p. 165.

² *Hermes* vol. xxxii. (1897) p. 554: 'Die Berichte über die catilinarische Verschwörung.'

³ Similarly, in dealing with Appian,

Meyer assumes that he had only one source. v. *Kl. Schriften* p. 399, *Cæsar's Monarchie* p. 609; cf. Schwartz's v. Appianus in Pauly-Wissowa vol. ii.

⁴ *Forschungen* ii. p. 66.

he can easily add characteristic details from his own collections¹. If, however, one admits the existence of such 'collections,' there seems to be no reason to assume that only 'characteristic details' were derived from them.

I propose in considering this question to confine myself to Tacitus and Plutarch; they were practically contemporaries, and both wrote of the early Roman Empire, though unfortunately of Plutarch's *Lives of the Caesars* only those of Galba and Otho survive. In the first chapter of his *Life of Alexander* Plutarch lays stress on the distinction between history and biography, but he only does so in order to justify himself for emphasising certain aspects of his subject. There seems no real basis for the common assumption that in antiquity the historical was quite distinct from the biographical tradition, and that biographers used entirely different sources from historians. Indeed, one of the commonest criticisms of ancient historians is that they occupied themselves too much with 'great men,' and too little with movements and tendencies². Few historians are so impersonal as Thucydides, and no biographer could concern himself with *ἡθῆ* to the exclusion of *πράξεις*. It may well be the case that the general view which I am combating is more true of Plutarch than of Tacitus, but it is convenient to treat together two authors who represent the same period of antiquity, and whose works, at first sight at least, give the impression that they are based on a careful survey of the available material.

In dealing with Tacitus I start with the letter of the younger Pliny³ in which he replies to Titinius Capito, who had urged him to write history. 'Tu tamen iam nunc cogita quae potissimum tempora aggrediar. Vetera et scripta aliis? Parata inquisitio, sed onerosa collatio. Intacta et nova? Gravis offensae, levis gratia.' The words 'Parata inquisitio, sed onerosa collatio' have naturally been treated as of crucial importance to students of ancient historiography. What view of historical method do they imply? Some critics (e.g. Fabia) see in them a statement that ancient historians felt themselves under no obligation to consult sources which had been used by a predecessor. But

¹ *op. cit.* p. 162.

³ v 8.

² e.g. Croce, *Storiografia* p. 171 f.

do they mean more than that it is convenient if the relevant material has been collected by an earlier worker? What modern writer on, say, the Athenian Empire fails to benefit from Busolt's footnotes, but the recognition of an obligation to him does not imply that no direct use is made of the *Corpus* or Thucydides. Indeed, the following words 'onerosa collatio' make it clear that a comparison of earlier writers is considered to be requisite. How can a critical 'collatio' of sources be made without some reference to the authorities on which the rival versions are based? I fail to see what justification Schwartz has for saying that 'such a comparison was limited to comparatively few points which seemed to be of special importance.' Some ancient (and some modern) historians have dealt with their sources in a careless and uncritical way, but the point is that Pliny's words seem to imply the existence of a standard, and that it was regarded as the duty of an historian to compare his sources and not merely to select and rewrite one of them.

Other letters of Pliny provide much information about Tacitus' method of work. Not only do we find that Tacitus asked for the fullest details about the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 (VI 16, 20), but Pliny goes out of his way in writing about an event which happened under Domitian to say 'quanquam diligentiam tuam fugere non possit, cum sit in publicis actis' (VII 33). In the face of this clear evidence Fabia is driven to say that the principles which he applies to the *Annals* and the extant part of the *Histories* are not applicable to the lost later books, in which Tacitus was dealing with what were, in Pliny's words, 'intacta et nova.'

Again, while admitting that Tacitus was more of an artist and less of a student than the elder Pliny, we are perfectly entitled to use the well-known account given by the younger Pliny of his uncle's method of work¹ to throw light on the question of the degree of conscientiousness expected in an historian of this period. 'Avunculus meus' he says elsewhere² 'historias et quidem religiosissime scripsit.' The material included in the 160 note-books which the uncle left to the nephew must have been to a large extent collected for his

¹ *Ep.* III 5.

² *Ep.* V 8.

historical works. In the extant *Historia Naturalis* (III 1) we read 'Quapropter auctorem neminem unum sequar, sed ut quemque verissimum in quaque parte arbitrabor,' and there seems to be no reason to think that, when writing history, Pliny adopted a different method. The application to him of the epithet 'religiosus' goes to prove that a standard of historical scholarship existed at that time, and makes it difficult to believe that a great reputation as an historian could have been acquired by a writer who fell far short of it.

It is commonly said that ancient, and particularly Roman, History was seriously injured by its association with Rhetoric, and it is easy to find passages which show that great, perhaps excessive, importance was attached to 'eloquentia,' e.g. Cic. *de Oratore* II 15 Videtisne, quantum munus sit oratoris historia? Haud scio an flumine orationis et varietate maximum; Tac. *Annals* IV 34 Titus Livius eloquentiae ac fidei praeclarus in primis; *Agric.* 10 Livius veterum Fabius Rusticus recentium eloquentissimi auctores; Quintilian x 1. 31 Est historia proxima poetis, et quodammodo carmen solutum; *id.* 101 Livius...supra quam enarrari potest eloquens. Most of the historians of the early Empire began their careers as barristers, e.g. Servilius Nonianus (diu foro, mox tradendis rebus Romanis celebris, *Ann.* 14. 19), Cluvius Rufus (eloquentia clarus *Hist.* 4. 43), and, of course, Tacitus himself. But the importance of these considerations, as it seems to me, has been greatly exaggerated. Do the passages quoted do much more than prove that a good style was appreciated in an historian? For they do not stand alone. In the letter which has been so often quoted Pliny says that he shrinks from writing history *because* his training at the bar to some extent unfits him to do so: 'Orationi et carmini parva gratia, nisi eloquentia est summa: historia quoquo modo scripta delectat.....Habet quidem oratio et historia multa communia, sed plura diversa in his ipsis quae communia videntur.' In the *De Oratore*¹ Cicero puts into the mouth of Antonius an account of the function of an historian which is far from treating history as a mere rhetorical exercise: 'Quis nescit primam esse historiae legem, ne quid falsi dicere audeat? deinde ne quid

¹ II 15. 62 f.

veri non audeat? ne quae suspicio gratiae sit in scribendo? ne quae simultatis? Haec scilicet fundamenta nota sunt omnibus, ipsa autem exaedicatio posita est in rebus et verbis: rerum ratio ordinem temporum desiderat, regionum descriptionem; volt etiam, quoniam in rebus magnis memoriaeque dignis consilia primum, deinde acta, postea eventus expectentur, et de consiliis significari quid scriptor probeat, et in rebus gestis declarari non solum quid actum aut dictum sit, sed etiam quomodo, et cum de eventu dicatur, ut causae explicentur omnes vel casus vel sapientiae vel temeritatis hominumque ipsorum non solum res gestae, sed etiam, qui fama ac nomine excellent, de cuiusque vita atque natura.' This is a programme which certainly involves a critical treatment of evidence.

Lucian¹ again, in the true spirit of Polybius, holds that the two essential qualifications for an historian are *σύνεσις πολιτική* and *δύναμις ἑρμηνευτική*. In style he is to aim primarily at clearness, and should avoid the tricks of the rhetorician. He is to collect his facts with care, and select the informants least likely to be partial. 'And here comes the occasion for exercising the judgement in weighing probabilities²'. Finally, Livy, the most 'eloquent' of ancient historians, tells us in his Preface that the history of Rome has been written frequently: 'dum novi semper scriptores *aut* in rebus certius aliquid allaturos se *aut* scribendi arte rudem vetustatem superaturos credunt.'

Passages such as I have quoted discredit the idea that there is any fundamental difference between the conceptions of the function and method of History held by enlightened thinkers in ancient and in modern times. It is not only in antiquity that historical works have been written whose object is rather 'rudem vetustatem superare' than 'certius aliquid afferre.' For the life of Cicero, for instance, 'parata inquisitio,' all the relevant material has long ago been studied by scholars; what a modern writer can do is what Pliny expresses by the word 'collatio'—he can criticise the views of his predecessors, and deal with the familiar material from a new standpoint. On the other hand, there are even in Ancient History periods which

¹ πῶς δὲ ἱστορίαν συγγράφειν §§ 34, 43, 47.

² κἀνταῦθα ἤδη καὶ στοχαστικός τις καὶ συνθετικός τοῦ πιθανωτέρου ἔστω.

are still relatively 'intacta ac nova,' and an historian of these may be fortunate enough to have at his disposal material hitherto unpublished or quite inadequately discussed, and thus 'certius aliquid afferre.'

It seems then probable that the importance which the ancients admittedly attached to style in historical composition did not blind them so much as has often been supposed to the need of sound and critical judgment in an historian. There were in antiquity historians who were mere plagiarists (e.g. Diodorus) and others who fall short of the highest standards of scholarship (e.g. Livy), but the important fact is that the faults of such writers were recognised as faults. As Lucian says¹, the standard was set once for all by Thucydides, and the view may be, and has been², held that modern historians too may take him as a model.

To return to Tacitus, the most superficial reading of his works gives the impression that he had before him several sources. Like every historian, he had to make a selection, and it is a false assumption that he was ignorant of facts which he does not happen to mention; if footnotes had existed in antiquity, he might have given us some of the information which we get from Suetonius and Dio. He probably did not live up to the principle which he lays down 'Nos consensum auctorum secuturi quae diversa prodiderint sub nominibus ipsorum trademus' (*Ann.* XIII 20), and very likely rejected stories which seemed to him improbable without stating his reasons in the text of his work. We know, for instance, that there were several versions of the death of Tiberius (Suet. *Tib.* 72 f.), while Tacitus only gives one; but there is no need to follow Fabia³ in thinking that he made no use of the authors in whom the other versions appeared.

The following are a very few of the passages which seem unfavourable to the view that Tacitus followed only one authority:

Hist. I 41. Extremam eius vocem, ut cuique odium aut admiratio fuit, varie prodidere.

¹ *op. cit.* § 42.

³ p. 411.

² e.g. Meyer, *Kl. Schr.* p. 67.

id. II 37. Invenio apud quosdam auctores...dubitasse exercitus, num posito certamine vel ipsi in medium consultarent, vel senatui permitterent legere imperatorem.

id. II 101. Scriptores temporum qui potente rerum Flavia domo monimenta belli huiusce composuerunt, curam pacis et amorem reipublicae, corruptas in adulationem causas, tradidere.

id. III 28. Hormine id ingenium, ut Messalla tradit, an potior auctor sit C. Plinius, qui Antonium incusat haud facile discreverim.

id. III 29. Inter omnes auctores constat.

id. III 51. Celeberrimos auctores habeo.

id. IV 83. Origo dei nondum nostris auctoribus celebrata: Aegyptiorum antistites sic memorant.

Ann. I 81. De comitiis consularibus...vix quicquam firmare ausim: adeo diversa non modo apud auctores sed in ipsius orationibus reperiuntur.

id. III 3. Matrem Antoniam non apud auctores rerum, non diurna actorum scriptura reperio ullo insigni officio functam.

id. IV 10. In tradenda morte Drusi quae pluribus maxime fidei auctoribus memorata sunt rettuli.

id. IV 53. Id ego, a scriptoribus annalium non traditum, repperi in commentariis Agrippinae filiae.

id. VI 7. Nobis pleraque digna cognitu obvenere, quamquam ab aliis incelebrata.

id. XIII 20. The rival views of Fabius Rusticus, Cluvius Rufus, and Pliny are quoted. 'Sane Fabius inclinat ad laudes Senecae, cuius amicitia floruit.'

id. XIV 2. Cluvius and Rusticus quoted again. 'Sed quae Cluvius eadem ceteri quoque auctores prodidere, et fama huc inclinat.'

id. XVI 6. Quamvis quidam auctores tradant.

In *Ann.* I 69 Pliny and in xv 61 Fabius Rusticus are quoted for details which do not appear in the other sources.

In the face of this evidence, to which must be added the passages from Pliny quoted above to prove the 'diligentia' of Tacitus, how is it possible to hold the view that the narrative of the *Histories* and the *Annals* is not based on a careful study of earlier historians, and to some extent of documentary sources,

such as the 'acta diurna' and the 'acta senatus'? Apart from *a priori* considerations, the critics of Tacitus seem to rely mainly on the remarkable verbal resemblances which have been noted between the first two books of the *Histories* and the writings of Plutarch and Suetonius on the same subject. As these resemblances have been collected by Fabia and by Hardy (*Studies in Roman History*, First Series, pp. 295 f.), I content myself with one instance.

Tac. *Hist.* I 41. Extremam eius vocem, ut cuique odium aut admiratio fuit varie prodidere. Alii suppliciter interrogasse, quid mali meruisset, et paucos dies exsolvendo donativo deprecatum: plures obtulisse ultro percussoribus iugulum: agerent ac ferirent, si ita e republica videretur.

Suet. *Galba* 20. Sunt qui tradant, ad primum tumultum proclamasse eum: Quid agitis, commilitones? ego vester sum, et vos mei! donativum etiam pollicitum. Plures autem prodiderunt, obtulisse ultro iugulum, et ut hoc agerent ac ferirent, quando ita videretur, hortatum.

Tac. *Hist.* I 41. De percussore non satis constat: quidam Terentium evocatum, alii Laecanium; crebrior fama tradidit Camurium quintae decumae legionis militem impresso gladio iugulum eius hausisse.

Plut. *Galba* 27. ἀπέσφαξε δὲ αὐτόν, ὡς οἱ πλείστοι λέγουσι, Καμούριός τις ἐκ τοῦ πεντεκαίδεκάτου τάγματος· ἔνιοι δὲ Τερέντιον, οἱ δὲ Λεκάνιον ἱστοροῦσι, οἱ δὲ Φάβιον Φάβουλον.

The theory which has been based on such certainly very striking resemblances is that Tacitus, Suetonius, and Plutarch alike are drawing from one writer, from whom they select the incidents which interest them, rewriting them in their own style, without troubling, except very occasionally, to 'verify the references' or to add anything of their own. Stress too has been laid on the discrepancies which have been noted between the account of the relations between Nero, Otho, and Poppaea given in *Ann.* XIII 45 and that which is found in *Hist.* I 13; it has been supposed that in the former case Tacitus is reproducing Cluvius Rufus, the 'source' of the later books of the *Annals*, and in the latter Pliny the Elder. The difficulty raised by the passages where Tacitus says, e.g., invenio apud quosdam

auctores is removed by the simple expedient of saying that 'behind the indeterminate plural is concealed the single name of the common source' (Fabia p. 115).

Now it is quite certain that the Lives of Suetonius¹ did not appear till at least 15 years after the publication of the early books of the *Histories*, which it is clear from Pliny's Letters had an immediate success, and it is perfectly impossible to date Plutarch's *Galba* and *Otho* with any exactness, so that it appears not to be impossible that both Suetonius and Plutarch made, at any rate, some use of Tacitus, though he cannot have been their only source. But even if we hold that Plutarch and Suetonius are not directly dependent on Tacitus (and this seems on the whole to be probable), are the resemblances which have been noted between their accounts much greater than one might expect to find between three writers dealing with the same subject, in about the same space, and using, naturally to some extent the same authorities? Do 'quidam auctores' and 'scriptores temporum' simply mean 'C. Plinius'? If, as Fabia tries to prove, only one continuous history of the year 69 existed in the time of Tacitus—that of Pliny in his continuation of Aufidius Bassus—the theory of one source may be approximately true of this part of his work, though even Fabia admits that he consulted Messalla, and Mommsen² and Peter consider that Cluvius Rufus dealt with the year of the Four Emperors. But, in any case, it seems unfair to make general statements about the method of Tacitus on the strength of conclusions drawn from his treatment of a period for which *ex hypothesi* only one satisfactory source existed. We know that for the reign of Nero Tacitus had at his disposal at least three sources, Cluvius, Rusticus, and Pliny. Why is it necessary to assume that one of these was the *Hauptquelle*, and that the others

¹ It seems unlikely that Suetonius would content himself with one authority if the account of him given by Peter (*Gesch. Lit.* vol. i. p. 124) is at all correct. 'Kein Schriftsteller der späteren Jahrhunderte lässt sich auch nur annähernd mit ihm vergleichen, keiner hat den Umfang seiner Wissens

und seiner Gelehrsamkeit, seinen Forschungstrieb, seine Gründlichkeit, seinen unermüdlichen Fleiss wieder erreicht; man kann ihn den Varro seiner Zeit nennen, einen dritten Varro hat es nicht gegeben.'

² *Hermes* iv. p. 318 f.

were only occasionally consulted? Tacitus undoubtedly compared their accounts of certain rather unimportant matters; what reason is there to suppose that he did not do so throughout? He states himself that he is going to follow a 'consensus auctorum' (*Ann.* XIII 20), and only very strong evidence should make us take this definite statement to be a deliberate falsehood. I do not deny that Tacitus may occasionally have taken a reference from one of his authorities without checking it, especially if he had at his disposal a work of such a careful compiler as Pliny. He may not have thought it necessary to look up the exact authorities for the name of the murderer of Galba, or for the different accounts of his last words. But this is a very different thing from the procedure which is attributed to him and other historians by the writers whom I criticise. Tacitus is not above criticism as an historian, indeed, in many respects he falls short of the ideal, but the evidence which has been adduced to prove that he was an uncritical plagiarist is totally inadequate¹.

I turn now to a brief consideration of Plutarch. Most of the numerous studies of his Biographies start with the assumption that he had read at any rate a large proportion of the authors whom he quotes, and on whose merits and defects he often comments. It is supposed e.g., that for his fifth century Lives he had read not only Herodotus and Thucydides, but Ion, Stesimbrotus, the Attic comedians, the Atthidographers, Ephorus, Theopompus, and the various Peripatetic and Alexandrian writers whom he mentions in the course of his narrative. A writer who is known from his *Moralia* to have been a well-read man has naturally been supposed to have read the works to which he refers. Before dealing with the criticism which has recently been brought against this supposition, I quote, as in the case of Tacitus, a few examples of the passages which seem strongly to support it.

Nicias 1. Since then it is impossible to pass over in silence those actions of Nicias which Thucydides and Philistus have recorded, especially such as indicate his manners and disposition, we shall give an abstract of what appears necessary, lest we

¹ I am glad to note that Boissier (*Tacite* p. 74) takes a similar view.

should be accused of indolence and negligence. As for other matters not generally known, which are found scattered in historians or learned from ancient dedications or decrees, we shall collect them with care, not to gratify a useless curiosity, but to enable men to understand his character and disposition. (This reference to *ἀναθήματα* and *ψηφίσματα* is of great importance, and supports the view that Plutarch made a free use of Craterus' *συναγωγή ψηφισμάτων*.)

Them. 27. Thucydides and Charon of Lampsacus say that Xerxes was dead, and that the relations of Themistocles were with his son, while Ephorus and Dinon and Clitarchus and Heraclides and many others say that he came to Xerxes himself. But the view of Thucydides seems to fit in best with the chronology, though this is not absolutely settled.

Cim. 13. Callisthenes says that no definite agreement was reached, but that the battle of the Eurymedon prevented the Persians from sending their fleet into the Aegean. But this treaty is included in Craterus' collection of psephismata, as though it were historical.

Per. 28. Duris the Samian makes a melancholy tale of it, accusing Pericles and the Athenians of great cruelty, of which no mention is made by Thucydides, Ephorus, or Aristotle. Duris indeed often goes beyond the limits of truth, even when not misled by interest or passion, and therefore is more likely to have exaggerated the sufferings of his country in order to put the Athenians in an odious light.

Them. 2. Yet Stesimbrotus says that Themistocles heard the lectures of Anaxagoras, and frequented Melissus the physicist, which is quite impossible chronologically; for Melissus commanded against Pericles, who was much younger than Themistocles, at the siege of Samos, and Anaxagoras was his associate.

Pomp. 10. But the evidence of Oppius must be taken with caution, when he speaks of the friends or enemies of Caesar¹.

Passages such as these establish the fact that *someone* used

¹ Similar passages are *Solon* 19, *Crassus* 13, *Caesar* 8, *Cicero* 49. It is very probable, however, that Plutarch

took some of his quotations from Latin writers second-hand. He was not very familiar with Latin.

several sources, was capable of recognising prejudice and inaccuracy, and appreciated to some extent the value of documentary and epigraphical evidence. Is it necessary to suppose that Plutarch took both his facts and his criticism second-hand, and to follow Leo¹, who says 'It is important to realise that the biographical writer never claims even relatively to draw from primary sources, but always prefers that someone else should provide him with a reservoir and a pipe'? How is this statement to be reconciled, e.g., with the passage from the Life of Nicias quoted above?

In his study of the Life of Cimon² Ed. Meyer declares that the great mistake which has been made by modern students of Plutarch (and Nepos) consists in not drawing a sharper distinction between historians and biographers. 'They search for the sources of Nepos and Plutarch as though these writers were in the same position as Livy, Trogus, Diodorus, and Arrian, instead of treating them in this matter like Diogenes, Marcellinus, and the biographies in Suidas. Although it is clear that they made no use of Herodotus, Thucydides, or Xenophon, and that Plutarch never opened the *Ath. Pol.* of Aristotle, writers speak of Ephorus, Theopompus, etc. as the sources of Plutarch and Nepos, assume that they extracted long passages from these and similar authors, and even imply that the quotations made by Plutarch from the most obscure authors were collected, at least to a large extent, by himself, and that the learning which he displays is his own. These are all fancies which are quite inconsistent with the facts.' The view which Meyer himself favours is that Plutarch and Nepos drew from what he vaguely calls 'die gelehrte biographische Tradition,' which incorporated the labours of scholars of the Peripatetic school and the Alexandrian age, and that the apparent learning of later writers was simply plagiarism.

It has been urged above that there is no good reason for accepting this sharp distinction between History and Biography, and that, on the contrary, the ancients did not adequately distinguish between the two. There are certainly long passages in Plutarch's Lives which are naturally studied in exactly the

¹ *op. cit.* p. 165.

² *Forschungen* II. p. 67.

same way as if they occurred in the writings of Diodorus, Appian, or Dio. But this point does not greatly concern the main question; writers whom I have quoted in connection with Tacitus take the same view of the method of 'historians' as does Meyer of the method of 'biographers.'

Again, if we admit, as is indeed necessary, that Plutarch inherited a great amount of scholarly work on the subjects of his biographies, does it follow that he only consulted one of his predecessors in each case? One generally looks in vain in the writings of his modern critics for the names of the authors of which he made special use. He used 'eine möglichst ausführliche Vorlage,' but he is not allowed to have consulted any of the greater writers of the Hellenistic age, e.g., Hermippus, to whose researches we undoubtedly owe much of the information contained in the *Lives of Solon and Lycurgus*.

The implication seems to be that because Plutarch is an interesting writer, not devoid of literary merit, he cannot also have possessed any of the instincts of a student, and as great an emphasis is laid on the distinction between historian and scholar as on that between historian and biographer. It is supposed that historians and biographers alike, at least in Plutarch's day, thought only of picturesqueness and of moral lessons, leaving to others all the drudgery of research. It seems to be forgotten that Livy, the writer to whom this theory is more applicable than to most, declares that the function of the historian is not merely 'rudem vetustatem superare' but 'certius aliquid afferre.'

The view which I am combating has gained considerable support from the belief that Wilamowitz¹ has established that Plutarch had never read the *Ath. Pol.*, and that his quotations from that work are all second-hand. It is therefore worth while to consider the main points which Wilamowitz makes. (1) In the *Life of Themistocles* there is no reference to the statement of the *Ath. Pol.* that he was concerned with the fall of the Areopagus, though this assertion has a bearing on the date of his flight to Asia, in connection with which many other writers are quoted. (2) In the *Life of Solon* the constitution of Draco

¹ *Ar. und Athen*, i. 299 f.

is not mentioned; the date of the institution of the Areopagus is discussed without any reference to the statement of the *Ath. Pol.*¹ that it existed before Solon. Now such arguments from silence are notoriously weak, and it is remarkable that two of the points which Plutarch fails to mention—the connection between Themistocles and the fall of the Areopagus, and the constitution of Draco—are almost certainly points on which Aristotle is wrong. When Ed. Meyer² is speaking of Plutarch's source (not of Plutarch himself) he says that he shows great critical insight in simply ignoring, e.g., Ephorus' impossible account of the battle of the Eurymedon. Apparently when Plutarch's source leaves things out he shows a critical sense, but when Plutarch does so, it is because he knows nothing about them. It is impossible not to suspect some confusion of mind in those who have championed the extreme view.

To return to Wilamowitz—he has to face the fact that in Plutarch's Lives there are several direct references to the *Ath. Pol.*, e.g., *Nicias* 2—The best statesmen of the fifth century were Thucydides, Nicias, and Theramenes; *Them.* 10—The generosity of the Areopagus in the year of Salamis; *Cimon* 10—Cimon gave free meals only to his own demesmen; *Per.* 9—Pericles bribes the people out of public funds on the suggestion of Damonides of Oa. In support of his view that these quotations were all second-hand Wilamowitz draws attention to the fact that they mostly occur in what he calls a 'nest of quotations' along with references to other authors, e.g., in *Cimon* 10 the main narrative seems to go back to Theopompus (v. fr. 94) while details are added from Aristotle, Cratinus, Gorgias, and Critias. Again, in *Them.* 10 we find the quotation from Aristotle in close proximity to a reference to Cleidemus and a decree of the Troezenians, probably taken from Craterus. Wilamowitz concludes that all the quotations, including those from Aristotle, were drawn from some learned predecessor of Plutarch or from scholia. But many of Plutarch's quotations do not appear in groups, and the source of these 'nests of quotations' may just as well have been his own notes as a work of a learned predecessor. In any case, the arguments by which Wilamowitz

¹ Ch. 2. 6.

² *Forschungen* II. p. 20.

tries to prove his point seem to me quite insufficient for the purpose.

Various views have been held as to the extent of Plutarch's historical reading. Wilamowitz, though he will not allow that he was acquainted with the *Ath. Pol.*, says that he certainly consulted Ion, Stesimbrotus, Craterus, Panaetius, Didymus, and Theophrastus, and that many traces of the last are visible in his theoretical views on political matters. Busolt¹ thinks that he used Ion, Stesimbrotus, and Callisthenes directly, but took other references from a biographical source or from scholia. 'It is not easy to draw a line between his own work and that of others, but it is probable that' (when writing the Life of Cimon) 'he had before him a biography which was based on the work of Theopompus and other sources.' Indeed, the theory that he used only one source must be associated mainly with the names of Meyer, Leo, and Schwartz, though there seems to be a general desire to minimise his erudition.

Meyer² is particularly anxious to prove that Plutarch was not acquainted at first hand with the writings of Callisthenes, who is quoted in the Life of Cimon for the name of the Persian commander at the Eurymedon, and as denying the historicity of the Peace of Callias. According to Meyer, Callisthenes can only have dealt with this period in a digression contrasting the vigorous anti-Persian policy of fifth century Athens with the Spartan policy which led to the Peace of Antalcidas. If this is so, it is almost incredible that he denied the reality of the Peace of Callias, on which fourth century writers were so fond of enlarging; he probably stated that after the Eurymedon Persia felt too weak to send ships into the Aegean, and that later, after the death of Cimon, she concluded a definite agreement not to do so. If this reconstruction is correct, there has certainly been a misunderstanding somewhere, and Meyer holds that, in view of this, Plutarch cannot have read Callisthenes himself, apparently on the ground that he would have been incapable of such a piece of carelessness. But in that case the mistake must have been committed by his source, of whom elsewhere Meyer speaks with respect as a representative of 'die

¹ *Gr. Gesch.* III. i. p. 36.

² *op. cit.* p. 2.

gelehrte biographische Tradition,' who must either have misunderstood Callisthenes himself, or have reproduced someone who did. Someone must have read the original work of Callisthenes in order to misunderstand it, and, if there is a misunderstanding, it seems more consistent to attribute it to Plutarch, who is *ex hypothesi* a mere literary man and moralist, than to his source, who is elsewhere assumed to have embodied the results of learned investigation.

It was pointed out above that Meyer and Leo are willing to admit that Plutarch added a certain amount from his own reading to the material which he derived from his source. But such a concession seems to me to make it perfectly impossible to establish their general position, for, in view of the fact that perhaps not a single one of what are taken to be Plutarch's *Hauptquellen* has come down to us, how are we to determine what are his own additions? If we study, for instance, the account given in the Life of Aristides of the operations at Plataea, we note that apart from a great deal of information clearly derived, directly or indirectly, from Herodotus, there is a fair amount of material which must be attributed to another source. The popular view is that the Herodotean and non-Herodotean passages were taken by Plutarch from Idomeneus of Lampsacus (of whom, incidentally, he speaks with disrespect in one place¹). But is there any objection to supposing that, when Plutarch was preparing to write his Life of Aristides, he ran through the account of Plataea in Herodotus, with whom he was of course familiar, looked at any later accounts on which he could lay his hands, noting—I think we must be prepared to admit—mentions of variations in detail without always verifying them, and then wrote the Life in his own style, embodying in it the material which he considered relevant from his memory and his notes?

A similar account may be given of the method in which the Life of Nicias was composed; it seems probable that it is adequately and truthfully described in chapter I, quoted above². Thucydides is followed closely when Plutarch is dealing with

¹ *Per.* 10.

² v. Heidingsfeld, *Quomodo Plutar-*

chus Thucydide usus sit in componenda Niciae vita (Liegnitz, 1890).

subjects like the operations at Pylus and the Peace of Nicias, for which he was obviously the best authority. On the other hand, the account of the Sicilian Expedition differs in so many details from that of Thucydides, that it seems reasonable to ascribe most of it to Philistus, to whom Plutarch refers in the introductory chapter. Again, there is no reason to assume that Plutarch is misleading us in saying that he has added to what he derived from the two historians a considerable amount of material from other sources. Why should the quotations from, e.g., the *Ath. Pol.* and the comedians not be due to his own reading?

It is not my purpose to claim for Plutarch the title of critical historian; I do not even wish to assert that he always verified his references. He did not always think it necessary to state the source of his information (though he might have done so had footnotes existed in antiquity). The inscriptions which he quotes are probably derived from some such handbook as that of Craterus, and it is possible that his numerous quotations from the Attic comedians were found by him in some collection of passages of historical interest. The scholars of Alexandria must have produced works similar to those which nowadays enable the essay of a beginner to sound like the work of a learned student. Although Plutarch is quite capable of recognising prejudice or exaggeration in his authorities, he was probably too little alive to the desirability of weighing their relative merits, and preferring a Herodotus to an Idomeneus.

But all this may be admitted without accepting the views of Meyer and Leo. Plutarch was certainly a well-read man. I imagine that, like the elder Pliny, he took copious notes. When he was writing his Lives he very likely referred to these rather than to books. This would explain why certain passages in extant works to which we would expect him to refer are not mentioned; when he was reading the book he had not realised their importance. He may sometimes have trusted to memory and thus given an inaccurate quotation. He may have taken 'parallel passages' without always looking them up (books were not easily procured before the days of printing). He may have forgotten to what authority he owed a piece of information.

But this is very different from doing what Meyer and Leo attribute to him, sitting down with an earlier biography of the same man in front of him, copying out without acknowledgment not only the narrative, but the judgments and the controversial passages, and contributing, apart from the style, only a very occasional fact from his own reading. He may not have been a critical historian, but he was probably an honest man, and it is difficult to believe that the ancient and modern standards of honesty in an historian were as different as is implied by the theory which I have criticised. There seems to be no justification for applying to either Plutarch or Tacitus the name of plagiarist¹.

G. H. STEVENSON.

¹ Since writing the above I have read the discussion of the sources of Tacitus in Schanz, *Geschichte der röm. Litteratur* II ii (1913) pp. 315—321, and am glad to find an almost complete agreement with the views which I have expressed. Apparently the "Ein-

quellenprinzip" has been attacked by E. Groag and A. Gercke in *Fleckeeis. Jahrb. Supplementbd.* 22—3 (1896—7). Schanz, while holding that Tacitus used numerous sources, considers that it is impossible to specify them accurately.

CLAUSULAE AND PLATONIC CHRONOLOGY.

As I hope to show, there are three rhythmical types that are characteristic of Plato's later works only; and in their application students of Plato have, what has hitherto been lacking, an adequately objective criterion for dating some of the most important of his dialogues. But since the rhythm of Greek prose is still, comprehensibly enough, a subject that does not come within the ken of the average classical scholar, I must first of all deal with its general aspect before coming to its effect on the chronology of Plato's works.

Rhythmical movement in prose is a subject that may be variously conceived. To guard against misunderstanding, I must necessarily try to define my position, though clear-cut distinctions on such a matter should not be expected to give the whole truth satisfactorily. I shall deal with the consecution of syllables in certain works of Plato, and to be more explicit, with such consecution only in the endings of sentences, that is in the clausulae, but I shall disregard the rhythms produced by the arrangement of phrases and of clauses and of sentences themselves.

Examination of the rhythms of Greek and Latin prose authors is a fairly recent development, and hitherto most of the work done has been with orators or with markedly rhetorical writers, so that there is a tendency to confine rhythm only to those authors who may be supposed to have arranged their word-effects deliberately in order to strike the popular ear. Indeed, this tendency has gone so far, that, to name a scholar whose word carries great weight, U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff¹ treats the possibility of rhythm in the Platonic dialogues very summarily. In a general survey of rhythm in Greek prose he relegates Plato to a brief footnote, dismissing him on the ground of style as a writer who stands apart from the rhythmical ten-

¹ *Hermes* 35, p. 35.

dencies of his contemporaries and who cannot be brought into connexion with them in this respect. But the trend of his article (he is dealing primarily with the later Atticist and Asiatic writers) shows that like others he is too much influenced by the artificial rhythms of the later rhetorical writers, who intentionally stereotyped their rhythmical endings. Plato stands on a different level; though no orator he might nevertheless have concluded his periods rhythmically out of mere force of nature. Cicero, indeed, distinctly asserts the rhythmical 'conclusio' to be a human invention—*post inuenta conclusio est, qua credo usuos ueteres illos fuisse, si iam nota atque usurpata res esset; qua inuenta omnes usos magnos oratores uidemus.* (Cic. Orator 169.) That Gorgias of Leontini first showed the way to balance phrases and clauses, can be maintained, and Cicero's statement may stand in this respect if 'conclusio' is confined to the structural rounding off of the periods; but the rhythm of the syllables and of the words depends on the individual and peculiar music that the best prose writers have on all subjects and in all languages, and this rhythm is usually innate and not acquired.

The most interesting and sententious writer on the rhythm of prose in antiquity is Aristotle (Rhet. iii 8); practically every word in the chapter is repeated and amplified to wearisome length in the works of later rhetoricians. The main guiding principle that Aristotle inculcated is that the style must be rhythmical, but not metrical—*τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως δεῖ μήτε ἔμμετρον εἶναι μήτε ἄρρυθμον* (Γ. 8). The rhythm must not be made up of metrical feet in any regular sequence, else the prose will be turned into verse, or rather into a medley of catch-phrases, with the reader or listener ready to give the inevitable refrain. When we consider Plato in particular, we shall find his rhythms in his last works predominating with such startling certainty as one would barely think possible in prose, and thus, when he is weighed in Aristotle's scale, he is found somewhat wanting in this respect. And this is true not only of the *Laws*, where Plato might be thought to have paid attention to his rhythm, considering that the periods in that work are constructed on an elaborate scale, but also of the *Philebus*,

where the disjointed formlessness of composition and the rugged harshness of style are clear evidences of the form being completely overmastered by the matter in the mind of the author. In this circumstance we have a strong argument against the theory that rhythm in prose must always be premeditated. The truth is that rhythm may be intentional, but it is primarily not. I could point to a peculiarity in the construction of the Sophist that is another indication of Plato's unconsciousness of his own rhythms, but to mention it at this stage would only complicate matters. It seems that to subscribe to the opposite theory is to imply that Plato in his last years as it were of malice prepense and to his own detriment narrowed his fine feelings down to helpless subservience to three rhythmical cadences. Rather, I should think that he was so much under the spell of these cadences and so oblivious of his enslavement that he never noticed how frequently he was using them.

Aristotle then proceeds to consider each metrical foot for the purposes of rhythm in prose; he rejects the dactyl as too epic, the iambus as too much belonging to ordinary conversation and the trochee as too light and tripping. In thus differentiating iambs and trochaics in prose, Aristotle has fallen into a strange error. He justifies his stigma on the trochee by referring to tetrameters, thereby showing that he is influenced by the poetical usage of these metres; but it passes the wit of man to tell whether in an alternate succession of long and short syllables in a piece of prose we are to begin with the long or with the short. It is just as absurd to distinguish in prose between a dactyl and an anapaest in the body of a sentence. Now that these metres have proved unsatisfactory, Aristotle says *λείπεται δὲ παιάν, ᾧ ἐχρῶντο μὲν ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρξάμενοι*. These words might easily have been perverted by Cicero¹ to imply that prose rhythm commenced with Thrasymachus, but Aristotle says no such thing. All that the words legitimately convey is that in Aristotle's opinion the first man to use the paeon as a rhythmical cadence, whether consciously or not, was Thrasymachus; and there is no need to foist on Aristotle the views of Cicero and his modern followers.

¹ Orator 175.

It is well known that the ancients considered the end of the sentence, that is the clausula, the rhythmical pivot of the whole sentence, and this was true for palpable reasons. For us prose is written, not to be spoken, but to be read, and to be read in paragraphs, which mould the rhythm to a large extent, and all our teaching on the writing of prose depends on the vital importance of the paragraph. In the best Greek prose, however, and to an obviously especial degree in the Platonic dialogues, the paragraph does not play so important a part, and if some modern texts are divided into paragraphs, it is mostly for convenience' sake. The chief divisions of the written page that the Greeks knew were the grammatical—sentences (*περίοδοι*) and clauses (*κῶλα*); these divisions forced themselves, not upon the eye as with us, but upon the ear, which was clearly influenced most by the parts of the sentence that stood out in relief, the beginning of the sentences and clauses and the end. But the impression created by the initial part of the period was materially diminished by the mass of words that filled the body of the sentence, and so it came about that the early part was much less important, from the standpoint of oral reading, than the unencumbered clausula. Still, it is wrong to think that the clausula is the only part of the sentence that has any rhythm. This blunder is avoided by Quintilian and Hermogenes¹. Aristotle recognises a distinct rhythm for the beginnings of sentences; in deciding for the supremacy of the paeon, which is infrequent in poetry, as the basis of the rhythm, he does not restrict its use only to the clausula, but advises its cultivation in initial positions too. In particular, he says that it is better to employ the first paeon (— ∪ ∪ ∪) for the beginning and the fourth paeon (∪ ∪ ∪ —) for the clausula. Curiously enough, it is this very cadence, the paeonic, that forms the main rhythm in Plato's last works; the first example in the clausulae of the

Laws is *δικαιότατον γεγονέναι*. Examination of the peculiarities of this paeonic rhythm shows that frequently an extra syllable

¹ Cf. Hermog. *περὶ ἰδεῶν* i, p. 260 (Rabe)=Spengel, p. 301, ἡ ἀνάπαισις ἢ ποῖα μετὰ τῆς συνθήκης τῆς ποῖως τὸν

ῥυθμὸν ἀπεργάζεται; and Quintil. ix 4, 61 sqq.

or two is added after the paeon¹, and that it is merely a variation of the type, and nothing more, to say μετὰ ῥαστώνης

διαπερᾶναι (Laws i 625 b) or πολέμιον διανοητέον (Laws i 626 d).

In any figures² that I shall give I must be understood to be speaking only of clausulae; for my object has been primarily the value for the chronology of Plato's later works that the discovery of his rhythms has, and since of all the parts of the sentence the clausula is the most important in point of rhythm, in all applications of his rhythm the clausula must hold the chief place. Yet in the whole of the twelve books of the Laws, in the Philebus, in the Politicus and in a part of the Sophist the rhythms that make up the body of every sentence are not a bit different from the clausulae, and it is remarkable, nay bewildering, to watch the almost unbroken continuity and the unimaginable frequency with which the few rhythmical forms occur. To quote examples is childish when every page in the works mentioned teems with them; Laws ix 853c καὶ τούτων ἀποτροπῆς τε ἔνεκα καὶ γενομένων κολάσεως τιθέναι ἐπ' αὐτοῖς νόμους, ὡς ἔσομένους, ὅπερ εἶπον, αἰσχροὺν μὲν τινα τρόπον³ is extreme only in so far that the main type of the three, namely

¹ Though there may be no ancient authority for allowing such an addition of syllables, the statistics of the Laws, the Philebus and the Politicus are, I think, quite decisive. The percentages of ~~~~ | ≈, averaging 10·3%, are so remarkably high that their connexion with the main paeonic type seems undeniable. Again, on comparing ~~~~ | ≈ with ~~~~~≈ and ~~~~ | ≈ with ~~~~~≈, we find that in 23 out of the 28 cases the types that have a paeon before the last two syllables have percentages that are at least three times higher than the percentages of the types that have no paeon before the last two syllables; these non-paeonic types have the higher percentage only in 1 case out of the 28.

² I know only two attempts to elicit the rhythms of Plato's later years.

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Mr W. Kaluscha deals with the clausulae of the later dialogues in the *Wiener Studien* (26, 1904); he has not convinced scholars. His presentment is in many ways unsatisfactory—he treats (for instance) the rhythms of the Sophist as homogeneous. I have made no use of his figures, but have myself worked over the later works. The remarks of Prof. Campbell in the introduction to his edition of the Sophist and the Politicus are those of an observant empiricist groping in the dark. I know the work of A. W. de Groot (*Handbook of Antique Prose Rhythm*, 1918) only from reviews published after this paper was written.

³ The (short) vowel of τε is elided; the long vowel of τεθέναι is counted short, as I hope to show soon.

υυυυ¹, is used to the practical exclusion of the other two. The latter are --υυ and ---υ. The main type, with its variations, occurs in clausulae on the average about thirty-eight per cent.; in the third and the sixth books of the Laws it reaches a total of forty-four per cent. The second type (--υυ) occurs about twenty-five per cent.; in Laws xi it has thirty-seven per cent., but this is abnormal. The average of the third group is about fifteen per cent., so that the three together make up seventy-eight per cent. of all the clausulae that are to be found in the Laws and in the works that accompany it. I have taken care to use one text throughout, that by Burnet, and have followed his punctuation and readings always, in order that my readers should have no occasion for impugning the trustworthiness of my results. I shall later on point out instances where the rhythm shows that Burnet's readings are in all probability wrong, but in tabulating my figures I have followed Burnet's text faithfully and have disregarded the evidence of the rhythms, although if I had made simple changes² the seventy-eight per cent. would have been increased.

As to the method, I have counted the clausula of every sentence, but have omitted the endings before colons. Since I have concentrated upon the clausula as the most important and the most tangible part of the whole sentence, I have similarly restricted myself to the most important class of sentence-divisions, the full-stop. If I had included the colon endings the result, I need not say, would have been just the same, but the work would have been greater. Moreover, once you overstep the bounds of the full-stop you are drawn in strict logic beyond the colon to the clauses that make up the period, for the Greek colon often represents an English comma merely; and the vista

¹ I have throughout taken the last syllable to be anceps.

² I.e. by the proper insertion and omission of *nu ephelkustikon* (about which I shall say something shortly) and by the avoidance of hiatus. With regard to the latter subject the statistics of the rhythms confirm (what is already well known) that Plato in his later works avoids hiatus. When in cases

of hiatus the first vowel is short, in order to obtain the correct rhythm (i.e. one of the three types) elision is necessary in four cases for every one in which non-elision would produce a good rhythm. But when the first vowel is long or a diphthong, elision does not take place; the long vowel is counted short (see p. 232, note 2).

of work thus opened is indeed frightful. It will be seen that I have left nothing to caprice; the only sentences that I have omitted are the formal questions and answers that take up half a line at most, such as ἀληθέστατα, ὃ ξένε, λέγεις (Laws i 627 d) and τὸ δὲ πῶς χρῆν ἡμᾶς λέγειν (ib. i. 630 d) and θαῦμα καὶ ἀκοῦσαι (ib. ii 656 d), which it would have been intolerable to count, though even here it is noteworthy how the shortest collocation of words contains one or other of the two chief rhythms.

Vowels before stops (or mutes) followed by a liquid remain short and we thus obtain evidence from a prose author of the length of such syllables in the ordinary conversation of Greeks towards the close of the classical period. In the breathed stops followed by a liquid (πρ, τρ, etc.) I find after careful counting in the whole of the Laws that for every case in which the lengthening of such syllables would produce an ending belonging to the second and the third chief rhythms¹ there are at least three cases in which such a lengthening would change the best rhythms (υ υ υ ≈ with its variations) into very bad rhythms. For γρ see σύντασιν ἀγρίαν ποιεῖ (Phil. 46 d), where the main type υ υ υ — is followed by an appendage of two syllables; also τιθασῶ καὶ ἀγρίῳ (Polit. 264 a), πολιτείας ὑπογράφειν (Laws v 734 e), and κηρύγμασιν ἀγρίοις (ib. xii 953 e). Obviously to consider the syllable long in these cases would destroy the rhythm, and the same is the case with vowels followed by δρ, as οὔτω καταδραμεῖν (Laws vii 806 c), καὶ σφόδρα σαφεῖς (ib. v 745 b), αὐ σφόδρα πένης (ib. 743 c), τὰς σφοδροτάτας (Phil. 63 d), ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ σφόδρα κεχρημένοις (Laws iv 717 c), τινων σφόδρα γυναικῶν (ib. i 639 b), and καὶ σφόδρα φανήσεται (ib. v 733 a)². If the vowel before the mute in the case quoted before the last is considered to be lengthened, the ending would be that of an hexameter, which is the rhythm that is most avoided of all by Plato in these works. I can quote only Polit. 300 c and Laws vi

¹ Such lengthening of course never produces an example of the first rhythm (υ υ υ ≈ with its variations). If the third chief rhythm (— — — ≈), which has the least percentages of the three, is excluded from the reckoning, the proportion will be, not three to one, but five to one (i.e. the figures will be not

35 : 12 but 35 : 7).

² Since hiatus is avoided by Plato in his later works, τῶν σφόδρα ὀλίγων (Phileb. 52 b) and ἔοικας σφόδρα ἀποκνεῖν (Laws vi 780 d) may be added as confirmatory examples. On the other hand, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἔχοντα ἄγρια (Polit. 264 a) must be added as an adverse case.

769 b as instances that would make for the view that the vowel before the voiced stops followed by a liquid is lengthened¹; but in this matter the majority must undoubtedly be followed, so that it seems certain that such syllables are short. Long vowels or diphthongs at the end of a word followed by a vowel in the beginning of the next word are shortened, as in Homer; of this too there is no possibility of doubt. The instances that can be quoted are so many that it is really futile to go to the extremity of enumerating them singly²; so that we have very important evidence of the ordinary Greek feeling on the matter, as opposed to the Roman tendency of elision.

It is noteworthy that the type $\cup \cup \cup \approx$ is of the same metrical length as the last three syllables of the type $-- \cup \approx$ and that both have a short syllable in the penultimate position, so that the three types may be two only after all; but I have not allowed such speculations to interfere with my presentment of the statistics.

To put the great differences in rhythm between the later and the earlier dialogues in their proper light, I ought to add figures for earlier works; this I shall do later on, in the case of one dialogue (the Timaeus) and a part of another (the Sophist), which I have worked through³.

¹ Before βλ it seems from ὑπόδικος τῷ ἐθέλοντι βλάβης (Laws xi 932d) and from δὲ βλέπεις (ib. iv 715d) that the vowel is lengthened, or to speak more strictly, that the vowel and the following consonants make a long syllable. In this Plato agrees with old Comedy, see Kühner-Blass i i, § 75, p. 306 fin.

² In the Laws against every four instances in which such shortening makes the rhythm of the best type ($\cup \cup \cup \approx$ and its variations), only one instance of any of the three main types can be adduced in favour of the vowel remaining long. If cases, in which the least important rhythm of the three is produced, are excluded, the proportion is then seven to one (i.e. 64:9 as against 64:14).

³ Mr W. Kaluscha's article in the *Wiener Studien* (26, 1904) deals with

the earlier as well as with the later works of Plato. To judge from the figures adduced there, the three rhythms characteristic of the later dialogues never total more than 40% or 50% in the earlier. Hexameter (about 7%) and iambic and trochaic (about 14% together) endings are constant in the earlier dialogues, but these types and the rest appear in such equable proportions that it is desperate work to try to arrange the single dialogues themselves. Mr Kaluscha produces nothing definite with regard to the earlier works. There is a peculiarity in the rhythms of the Phaedrus that he does not seem to have observed. The rhythms of the speech of Lysias are different from those of the speeches of Socrates; the speech of Lysias has the dispondeo 32%, whereas the speeches of Socrates

		Laws													
		Polit. Phileb.		i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
(i)	>	14.2	17.1	16.2	14.0	22.8	18.8	23.5	21.8	19.7	17.4	22.4	17.5	15.5	18.6
	>	8.7	11.0	9.3	11.5	8.8	9.1	10.8	12.4	8.4	10.7	9.6	10.4	6.3	7.7
	>	3.7	4.4	3.8	2.0	8.0	6.6	8.3	4.9	5.5	6.2	6.9	6.3	6.3	7.7
	>	6.6	6.2	4.1	3.0	4.4	4.6	0.6	5.3	5.5	5.0	4.1	4.9	1.2	5.0
	>	33.2	38.7	33.4	30.5	44.0	39.1	43.2	44.4	39.1	39.3	43.0	39.1	29.3	39.0
Total of (i)															
(ii)	>	21.2	23.5	21.3	20.1	21.7	27.4	22.3	22.3	23.4	23.6	25.0	30.5	37.4	24.9
(iii)	>	16.3	16.0	14.2	23.2	11.6	12.2	10.8	13.6	13.9	18.6	16.8	11.1	11.5	13.6
Total of (i, ii and iii)															
	>	70.7	78.2	68.9	73.8	77.3	78.7	76.3	80.3	76.4	81.5	84.8	80.7	78.2	77.5
	>	8.1	4.4	7.9	8.5	5.2	5.6	5.1	5.3	6.5	5.6	5.0	3.7	7.5	6.8
	>	4.1	2.9	5.2	4.5	2.8	2.0	0.6	1.5	2.5	4.5	2.7	3.0	2.9	2.7
	>	3.5	3.8	4.9	2.5	1.6	5.1	3.8	3.4	2.2	3.4	0.9	1.9	3.5	2.7
	>	3.3	2.1	3.0	4.0	4.8	0.5	1.3	1.1	2.2	0	1.4	3.0	1.7	3.2
	>	2.4	1.0	1.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	0.6	1.5	1.9	0	0.9	0.8	1.7	1.4
	>	1.3	1.4	1.9	1.0	1.6	0	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.1	0.5	0.8	1.2	0.9
	>	5.8	5.3	6.0	2.0	3.2	5.6	8.3	4.1	6.1	2.8	3.2	4.2	3.5	5.0
	>	1.1	0.8	1.1	1.5	1.2	0.5	2.6	1.1	0.9	1.1	0.9	2.2	0	0
	>														

have it only 6.5%. Again, the Socrates speeches have iambic and trochaic rhythms 25%, but the speech of Lysias has no instance of them. Too much should not be concluded from this great dissimilarity; the speech of Lysias is very short and therefore does not afford

a reliable basis for a study of its clausula rhythms. But the figures seem to make against the opinion, which is easily refuted on other and sounder grounds also, that Plato himself is the real author of the speech of Lysias.

It does not take long to see that the rhythms of the first two books of the *Laws* are nearer to those of the *Politicus* than to those of the *Philebus*, and that in strict logic the *Philebus* should have been connected in the table with one of the middle or of the later books of the *Laws*; for the differences are too glaring to admit of doubt. Furthermore a steady growth in the total of the three rhythms is noticeable, but when they reach the seventy-eight per cent. mark they fluctuate slightly. One cannot expect mathematical precision in a matter that depends so much on personal feeling. In the almost total elimination of hexameter endings Plato seems to be acting of set purpose; but this does not imply premeditation in his adoption of his principal rhythms. There are indications that Aristotle had predecessors who touched upon the subject of rhythm in prose, so that there is nothing remarkable if Plato became influenced by the new theory, that the hexameter ending should be excluded from prose.

Before I enter upon the chronology proper and the very interesting rhythms of the *Sophist*, I must first point to some new lights shed by the rhythms on important matters that cannot be neglected. I shall exclusively base my remarks on the clausula rhythms, whenever they afford decisive indications, but indeed the rhythms of the rest of the sentence, which are the same, are practically on the same level as regards grammatical questions, so that with care more evidence, which I think will be confirmatory, can be dug from the mine that has been opened up. Phil. 59a settles a vexed question once for all; the form that Plato used, in the later works at least and presumably also in the earlier, is *συντεταμένως* (read by the corrector of Ven. 189), not *συντεταγμένως*, which the Bodleian has. Similarly the form of the dual is *τούτω τὸ γένηι*¹ (Polit. 260b), not *γένεε*, which is read by nearly all the MSS. but which makes the rhythm as bad as the iambic rhythm of *συντεταγμένως*. On the issue between *σ* and *ξ* in compounds of *συν*, the instances in favour of the *σ* outweigh those on the other side both in

¹ The reading may be *γένη*, which Burnet prints. To judge from Kühner-Blass i i, § 123, p. 432, *γένεε* in Attic

prose seems to be merely an error of the manuscripts.

number and in importance; contrast πάντα συνορῶντα (Laws xii 965 b) and ταῦτα συνέπεσθαι (Phil. 24 d), which would be the exceedingly rare hexameter ending if ξ be read, with Laws vii 793 b and 813 e, iv 709 b, v 727 c, and Polit. 275 e, which would only produce the third and least important rhythm (---≡) if ξ be substituted, and consider also that in Laws i 640 d, iii 681 b and 687 c, and Polit. 261 c the main rhythm (∪ ∪ ∪ ≡) would be destroyed and (in all the cases except the last) iambic cadences put in its place if ξ be read, and there can be no hesitation as to the verdict. I need not point out that in applying the main rhythms to the elucidation of intricate and hitherto almost insoluble problems we are going beyond the vagaries of manuscripts right up to, it may in all truth be said, Plato's own ear for rhythm. Even if the numbers on both sides would be equally balanced, there is still a very strong probability in favour of the spelling or reading that agrees with the chief rhythms.

Many bad clausulae may be put straight by simply omitting or inserting the nu ephelkustikon. Rhythm, it has been repeatedly said, prescribes the presence or absence of this letter, and now that we have the rhythm, with no possibility of any doubt, much of the difficulty of its usage disappears. In χαίρουσιν δὲ παρ' αὐτοῖς (Laws ii 656 a), τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν νέμοντα (ib. iv 718 a), ἀπειλήσουντές τισιν νόμοις (ib. vi 783 d), ὑψηλοῖς τισιν λόφοις (ib. iii 682 c), θύμασιν καὶ εὐχαῖς (ib. x 888 c), ἔμπροσθεν πρότερον (Polit. 296 b), ἀπώλεσεν μέρη πολλὰ (Laws xi 935 b) and in other cases the simple and necessary omission of the nu would correct the rhythm. In making up my figures I counted these examples as they stand, for the reason that I have given. Similarly many instances can be added to the second chief rhythm (---∪≡) and to the third (---≡) by merely putting in the missing nu; e.g. ἔμπροσθε κεῖται (Phileb. 41 d), ἐστὶ καὶ θεοῖς (ib. 65 b), γράμμασι μανθάνει (Laws vii 819 b), δόξειε λέγειν (ib. ix 859 e), and ἐστὶ φύσει (Polit. 302 a).

In punctuation and in textual matters the rhythm can be of considerable help. In Laws ix 854 b the full-stop should be at παντὶ σθένει and a colon or a dash should be put after εὐλάβεια,

μαθέ and thereby you prevent the *ὅταν* clause disfiguring the text with its asyndeton. In Phil. 15 c, ταῦτ' ἔστι...ἀπάσης ἀπορίας αἵτια μὴ καλῶς ὁμολογηθέντα καὶ εὐπορίας ἂν αὐ καλῶς, omit the ἂν with Badham and the rhythm also is put right; to understand εἷη is extremely harsh, and the passages quoted in Bury's note (Theaet. 186 d and Aristoph. Clouds 5) stand on quite a different footing. Phil. 36 b ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις ἀλγεῖν has now the rhythm also against it; the ending in question occurs only 4·4 % in the Philebus. Badham suggests omitting τοῖς χρόνοις, which would make a better rhythm but this very unsatisfactorily leaves ἐν τούτοις hanging in the air. In Phil. 31 c ἁρμονίαν ἐτίθεις, the Bodleian's reading, is condemned by the rhythm and ἐτίθεσο is rightly read; similarly in Phil. 22 e μαχουμένη κείται, given by most MSS., gives a far inferior sense and rhythm to μαχομένη. In the third book of the Laws (678 b) the reading of the first hand in the Vatican, προελήλυθεν ἅπαντα, makes a far better rhythm than the πάντα of the Paris manuscript A and it should therefore be read. And in Laws ix 857 c there can be no question that ἐν τῷ νῦν παραπεπτωκότι λέγειν is the correct reading and that παρόντι, read in the margin of the MSS., is wrong. In Polit. 285 b πρὶν ἂν...οὐσία περιβάλλεται, περιβάλλεται (read by the Bodleian) is contrary to rhythm as well as to grammar.

Of the chronology of the Laws there is little to say. The rhythms show it to be a homogeneous whole, written probably in the order in which we have it. There can be no doubt raised as to its genuineness, and even Zeller, who questioned its authorship in a pamphlet written while he was young, abandoned his scepticism later in life. But it may be worth while to recall one of his objections. He stigmatised the language of the Laws as extraordinarily forced in some places¹, but if we consider the question of the rhythm, probably we shall find this to be the fundamental reason for the unnaturalness. In the eleventh book of the Laws Plato is speaking about a wife that is mad or that has some other mental or bodily malady; he expresses himself in curious language—μαινόμενα

¹ See E. Zeller, *Platonische Studien*, p. 93 f.

κηδεύματα ἀναγκάζοντος λαμβάνειν ἢ δεινὰς ἄλλας σωμάτων ἢ

ψυχῶν συμφοράς (926 b). Such a phrase as *γυναικα μαινομένην... συμφοράς ἔχουσαν* could not usually enter into his style when he wrote the Laws; and so it is with most of the other peculiar phrases emphasised by Zeller, e.g. *παίδων δὲ ἰκανότης ἀκριβῆς*

ἄρρην καὶ θήλειαν (xi 930 c), *ἔργων ἀποτελοῦντες γένεσιν ἔμμι- σθον* (xi 920 e), and *χειμώνων τε ἀνυποδησῆσαι καὶ ἀστρωσῆσαι* (i 633 c). There is another peculiarity in the later style of Plato that the rhythms help us to understand, namely his increasing use of the Ionic dative plural in *-σι* in the A and O stems; cf. *ἐπομένοισιν ἑτέραν* (Polit. 304 e), *ἀξίαισι σχολαῖς* (Laws vii 820 c) and *ἁρμονίαισιν μέλη* (ib. ii 660 a). It is true that not all examples of the Ionic dative can be explained by the rhythm, but note in the second instance quoted firstly how an iambic rhythm is avoided and secondly how unerringly Plato's rhythmical instincts asserted themselves in not admitting the Ionic form in the noun also; for in the second chief rhythm (*- - ∪ ∞*) no extra syllables are added, as is shown by the low percentages of the form *- - ∪ - ∞*.

Now that I have dealt with those problems of technical detail that have been put in a clearer light by the recognition of Plato's rhythm, there remains still the most important question of all, chronology. I shall speak about the Sophist, the Politicus, the Philebus and the Timaeus. These dialogues all bear the unmistakable features of style that belong to the later phases of Plato's career, and there is no possibility of drawing chronological inferences within this group on this score. They are written from the standpoint of rigorous philosophical speculation, and little power is displayed in such matters as dramatic form or characterisation. Plato has definitely degenerated from the manner of his greatest literary works, where the philosophy is subordinated in our view to the beauty of the composition and to the delicate irony of the delineation of character. He now pursues the question on hand with the utmost seriousness and intentness. The monotony of abstruse argumentation is no longer broken by the amusing relief of

interludes that have no vital appropriateness to the matter under discussion. In the *Politicus* the myth is presented with no dramatic effect and solely for the better comprehension of the context, and in the *Sophist* the crude banter on the general profession of the sophists is but a pale reflection of the searching satire with which Plato portrays particular sophists in the earlier dialogues, *Gorgias*, *Protagoras*, *Thrasymachus* and *Polus*.

The *Sophist* and the *Politicus* have these characteristics in common with the other dialogues of this group, but they have another peculiarity that is not found with any similar distinctness in any other dialogue of the Platonic corpus. This lies in their being primarily attempts to define the sophist and the statesman by means of the method of dichotomy. This method of definition by means of division is found not only in these two dialogues¹, but it is the length to which the method is carried and the concentration upon division into two parts only that give the dialogues their singularity. Elementary definition indeed is inseparable from any form of proper thought, and in the references to the subject in the *Republic* little appreciable advance beyond this natural and general stage is discernible. For instance, in *Rep.* 454a ff. a presumed difference in the treatment of men and women on the ground of difference in sex is set aside as a verbal quibble (*κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα*) due to a division that is not *κατ' εἶδη*. But in the *Phaedrus* (265 a ff.) the subject receives lengthier treatment at Plato's hands. Socrates shows that madness is a notion that can be divided into two parts; firstly the ordinary kind of madness (*ἡ ὑπὸ νοσημάτων ἀνθρωπίνων*) and secondly the madness that is a divine emancipation from the burden of convention (*ἡ ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων γιγνομένη*). Of these two divisions the latter is subdivided into four—prophecy, the ecstasy of rites of initiation, poetry and love. Furthermore, some theoretical rules on the subject are adumbrated, and the object of the dialectician is declared to be twofold. He has first to take a synoptic view of many scattered particulars and to gather them under one *ἰδέα* in order to obtain a clear definition of the term in question,

¹ It is practised also in the *Euthyphro* and in the *Gorgias*, but without being emphasised.

and secondly he must be competent to use the reverse process of analysis, to divide κατ' εἶδη, but the divisions must be at the natural joints, else he will cut across them as a butcher does with meat. In these dialogues, as Professor Jackson has pointed out¹, the method of divisions does not reach the level of the Politicus and of certain parts of the Sophist, for it is still only a subsidiary means of maintaining the discussion by determining the precise meaning of debatable terms that arise during its course.

Though the method of διαίρεσις, especially by dichotomy, is common to both the Sophist and the Politicus, marked differences in the application of the method are distinguishable in various parts of them. Remark has frequently been made on the trivial and even fallacious character of many of the dichotomies in the early part of the Sophist, and some scholars, recalling how profound and penetrating Plato shows himself to be in other dialogues of the same period but ignoring the indubitable penetration of certain sections of the Sophist and of the Politicus that can come from only Plato and that are worthy of him alone, have been led by consideration of these imperfections to cast the whole of both dialogues under a ban of spuriousness. Socher has gone even to the length of calling the Sophist a Megarian criticism of Platonism. But to cut the knot of the dilemma in this way is now discredited and the rhythmical results that I shall apply will, I hope, give it the death-blow. The differences that exist will be seen to be not the work of different authors but of Plato in the different stages of his thought on the dialectical method, as it is called.

The Sophist, after a short and formal introduction, plunges at once into the dichotomous method. Plato does not propound any guiding principles about it, nor does he justify its worth as a means of scientific inquiry, but confidently assumes the method to be adequately laid down. Yet in the Politicus he is far more cautious and not only formulates with emphasis certain regulations for the true application of the method of divisions, but also makes great exertions to put these rules into practice. And even in the Sophist itself, in a later part, a more

¹ I am indebted to his article in the *Journal of Philology* xv 285 ff.

serious view is taken of the subject than in the beginning. Investigation of the rhythm gives the true answer to this strange fact. The Politicus was written later than all the Sophist and in a far later stage than the early part of it. That the Sophist, for explanatory purposes, falls into two parts, has long been recognised. The profound discussion centring round the possibility of the existence of Not-Being stands apart from the rest of the dialogue. In the course of the argument the sophist is declared to be an image-maker who makes falsity seem reality; this definition involves us abruptly (the transition is very forced) in an intricate inquiry as to whether our quarry, the sophist, entangled in our dialectical net and brought to bay, might not retort on us that falsity ($\tau\acute{o}\ \psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\omicron\varsigma$) has no Being and cannot therefore be an object of attack. This new inquiry is not decided until more than half of the dialogue is spent on it, and then with startling suddenness the discussion reverts to the classification of the sophist. Emphasis must be laid on the complete dropping of the practical application of the method of division by dichotomies throughout this disproportionately long digression; the penetrating discussion, or rather exposition, for discussion it may only be called by courtesy, is concentrated mainly on the possibility or the impossibility of the existence of $\tau\acute{o}\ \mu\grave{\eta}\ \delta\upsilon$. The result is to show that some conceptions have intercommunion with others ($\kappa\omicron\iota\nu\omega\nu\acute{\iota}\alpha\ \tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \gamma\epsilon\nu\acute{\omega}\nu$), and that, since negative notions are not really contrary to positive notions, Not-Being is not the contrary of Being but only different from it; it has relative existence and cannot therefore become an object of thought.

The results of the clausula rhythms give the reason for the peculiar arrangement of the Sophist¹. They show quite clearly that Plato first wrote the part before the digression and the part after it, and then at a much later stage he inserted the digression, and then wrote the Politicus. In fact the rhythms of the digression are the same as those of the Politicus, except

¹ There has been great disagreement among scholars upon the question, whether the main purpose of the Sophist lies in the method of *διαίρεσις* or

in the digression. The fact that the Sophist so strangely falls into these two halves was the cause of the disagreement.

that they are not quite so pronounced as being earlier, while those of the rest of the Sophist are of a totally different character and akin to the rhythms of the Timaeus, which, as I hope to show, was written much earlier than people at present assume. But that does not imply any contemporaneity in the composition of the earlier parts of the Sophist and of the Timaeus; for the rhythms of the works that precede the Laws group (the Laws, the Philebus, the Politicus and the digression of the Sophist) are curiously jumbled, and thus little comparative chronology can be deduced from similarity in rhythms between the Timaeus and the earlier portions of the Sophist. At present it is enough to demonstrate that these parts of the Sophist did precede the digression in their time of composition, and I am only connecting them with the Timaeus because I shall deal with that work later on and because the rhythms of both are different from those of the later works. For comparative purposes I add the Politicus.

	Sophist excluding Digression	Timaeus	Sophist Digression	Politicus
	%	%	%	%
(i) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~	9.0	12.0	15.1	14.2
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~	6.0	6.4	9.9	8.7
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~	1.6	2.9	2.0	3.7
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~	3.8	3.1	6.4	6.6
Total of (i)	20.4	24.4	33.4	33.2
(ii) - - - ~ ~	17.6	12.6	18.9	21.2
(iii) - - - ~ ~	10.8	8.6	13.5	16.3
Total of (i, ii and iii)	48.8	45.6	65.8	70.7
- - - - ~ ~	6.8	5.5	5.8	8.1
- - - - ~ ~	8.3	10.1	5.8	4.1
- - - - ~ ~ }	14.1	16.1	8.1	6.8
- - - - ~ ~ }				
- - - - ~ ~	3.0	3.1	1.3	2.4
- - - - ~ ~	3.3	1.8	2.6	1.3
- - - - ~ ~ }	9.8	12.4	7.7	5.8
- - - - ~ ~ }				
- - - - ~ ~	5.8	5.2	3.2	1.1
Total of the other types	51.1	54.2	34.5	29.6

The figures tell their own tale both in the aggregate and singly. The digression of the Sophist is seen to be distinct not only in subject matter but also in the time of its composition from the rest of that dialogue; and it may be of some significance in this connexion that in two places in the *Politicus* (in 284 c and 286 b) Plato refers expressly to the digression of the Sophist as though it were a part well-marked for him. Again, the mere fact that Plato allowed himself to interpolate a whole section in a work that was written before and that shows palpable differences in rhythm demonstrates Plato's complete obliviousness of any changes in his rhythm.

The limits of the digression can be defined with tolerable accuracy. At 260 a the main rhythms that mark the preceding pages break off and till the end of the dialogue the rhythm is precisely the same as that of the pages before the digression, the beginning of which I have placed at about 236 c. But this *terminus a quo* is not to be taken too strictly; for Plato would naturally have had to recast at least some part of what is to us the end of the old before he could interpolate the new, and the rhythms show that this was so. For a page or two before the beginning of the digression, as I have fixed it, the rhythm shows somewhat more of the later types than would be natural if we should suppose them to have been left untouched; but this applies only to the couple of pages immediately preceding the digression, and the main body of the old work has been left apparently in its original state. Yet it would be absurd to be mechanical about such a matter and to exclude minor verbal alterations altogether, and although the rhythms fix the close of the digression undoubtedly at 260 a, that does not preclude Plato from having smoothed down inequalities that would have made the transitions noticeable.

It ought to be barely conceivable to find anybody maintaining the contemporaneity of both parts of the *Sophist* in spite of the manifest evidence of the rhythms, but I fear that some people will do so. They will argue, I suppose, even if it is true, as it undoubtedly is, that for the hundreds of pages of the *Laws* Plato did keep conspicuously to three rhythmical cadences, without the slightest interruption, and even if he did

keep to the same rhythms in the Politicus and in the Philebus and in the digressive portion of the Sophist, again without the least break, what is to hinder us from permitting him to write the other parts of the Sophist with quite another rhythm at the very same time? What indeed, except common sense? If they think that such a striking rhythm is a garment to be donned and doffed at will, there is perhaps nothing to find fault with in their catholic outlook; but I shall not be so generous, and shall assign one rhythm to one period and another to an earlier period, and I shall find reason on my side in other respects too.

The Sophist, as I have said, opens with no theoretical justification or explanation of the dichotomous method. After proposing the *ἀσπαλιευτής* as an easy example to apply, the Eleatic Stranger at once asks whether we are to look upon the angler as a man who has an art or as one who has not, and when the answer is given in the affirmative, he proceeds, as if none could question it, *ἀλλὰ μὲν τῶν γε τεχνῶν πασῶν σχεδὸν εἶδη δύο* (219a)—production and acquisition. This leading statement gives rise to the series of classifications that Plato lays down in the earlier part of the Sophist. By incomplete differentiations and assimilations and by disregard¹ of the metaphorical element in language the sophist Proteus-like is transformed into a huntsman of young men of wealth and distinction, a manufacturer of and a merchant and a retail trader trading in intellectual merchandise, a dialectical athlete, a purger of obstructive notions and finally a maker of false images (see 231 d ff. for most of these seven conclusions). When the discussion is resumed after the definition of the angler, Plato implies without much warrant that the sophist, like the angler, is also a hunter (221 d ff.) and by far-fetched combinations he gathers under the class of hunting such conceptions as war, tyranny, forensic pleading, political

¹ Of course much of this looseness of logic in the early part of the Sophist must not be taken seriously, but must be attributed to the satirical element that undoubtedly exists in that part. Yet there remains a sufficient residuum

of seriousness that in point of comprehension of the dichotomous method compares unfavourably with the view taken of the method in the digression of the Sophist and in the Politicus.

haranguing and love-making (see 222 c ff.); indeed the general is a hunter just as the vermin-killer, and the physician and the bathman are purifiers both. By an inference peculiarly characteristic of Greek he identifies *στάσις* and *νόσος* apparently without suspicion that the identification is based only on a metaphor ingrained in the Greek mind (see 228 a). In fact the divisions in the early part of the Sophist are on the same level as those in the Phaedrus¹, the difference being only in the emphasis that is laid in the Sophist on division into two parts only. But in the later part of the Sophist, in the long digression that I demonstrate to have been composed later, Plato evinces a far higher conception of division into categories². He points out that certain *εἴδη* admit of intercommunion and thereby concludes that in dialectical combination and separation *ἐπιστήμη* is needed to show *ποῖα ποίοις συμφωνεῖ τῶν γενῶν καὶ ποῖα ἄλληλα οὐδέχεται* (253 b); and that to divide according to classes without confusing the Same with the Other is the work, not of the sophist, but of the philosopher (*τῷ καθαρῶς τε καὶ δικαίως φιλοσοφοῦντι*). This treatment of the subject is summarised in the following sentence:—‘Isolation of concepts is utter annihilation of all reason’ (*τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν* Soph. 259 e). I see in this summary of the previous arguments a confirmation of the break at 260 a disclosed by the results of the rhythms. The next sentence may now be seen to have been inserted in order to bridge over the gap yawning between the old and the new (*σκόπει τοίνυν ὡς ἐν καιρῷ νυνδὴ τοῖς τοιούτοις διεμαχόμεθα* κτλ.) and such hints as are found afterwards referring to the digression are easily explained as indispensable for the proper rounding off of the discussion. But such necessary insertions had no appreciable effect on the rhythm of the eight pages or so that form the conclusion of the dialogue, and this rhythm, as well as the bulk of the subject matter, is not

¹ In connexion with the dichotomies of the early part of the Sophist Prof. Jackson rightly points out that Plato is interested mainly in the value they

have for the elucidation of debatable terms.

² H. Jackson, *l.c.* p. 287.

that of the digression but of the part of the dialogue that precedes it. Question should be raised as to how it was possible for Plato to leave the earlier part of the Sophist as it stands, in light of the new outlook revealed in the digression. When once logical differentiation is seen to be the philosophic method *par excellence*, it seems to us a blunder to combine the empiricism of the earlier part of the Sophist with the deep theories of the digressive and later part. But I think that we should not try to force on Plato our keener perceptions on the subject. Practice and theory do not always go hand in hand and this is much more the case when a bold thinker is forging far ahead in advance of his age along a new line of inquiry. Aristotle probably would never have developed his logical method were it not for Plato, but we should not expect Plato to comprehend Aristotle and future thinkers within himself also. It is quite conceivable that the digression that we now have has ousted a part of the original Sophist dialogue that contained a less advanced stage of Plato's thought and that was therefore intolerable to him in the flush of his new ideas. He was profoundly interested in establishing the truer theory on the matter, but mastery over the practical application of it came slowly, if ever at all.

The treatment in the Politicus is significant in all respects. His broadened outlook is presented by Plato in an exceedingly clear light by a pointed instance. After it has been shown that a ruler is comparable to a herdsman of gregarious animals (p. 261), the younger Socrates is asked by the Stranger how he would divide *ἀγελαιοτροφική* into two, and in the simplicity of his heart the youth answers very readily, that the division should be between men and animals. In refutation of this unscientific division the Stranger points out very carefully how wrong it is to assume a part (*μέρος* or *μόριον*) taken from a whole class or species (*εἶδος*) to be always of necessity an *εἶδος*. A species, the speaker proceeds, is always a part, but the converse proposition that a part is always a species, is not necessarily true. It is praiseworthy, no doubt, to discriminate anything separately by itself apart from the others, but this must be done properly, otherwise the result will be but a bit of

hair-splitting. It is safer to dissect in the middle¹, and in this way you obtain species, as opposed to truncated portions of species. (See Polit. 262 b and 263 b.) The Stranger further stigmatises the unreasonableness of the distinction set up by the younger Socrates by comparing it with the equally senseless division of mankind into Greeks and barbarians, which is made on the assumption that just because the latter are designated by a single title they therefore form a distinct class. This instructive diversion is made by Plato almost at the opening of the discussion after he has given a few instances of careful demonstration of the affinities between various concepts. The method to be followed in the search for πολιτική is distinctly stated at the outset. It must be marked off apart from all other classes, and these are not opposites of it, but only different—ἄλλο (258 c). Here we get a very clear reference to the argument of the digression in the Sophist², and further indications are furnished by the distinctions immediately forthcoming. The ruler is not confined exclusively to the theoretical class of sciences; all that Plato now says is that he belongs more (οἰκειότερον 259 d) to it than to the practical, and that he can help little with his hands or with his body towards holding his kingdom *in comparison with* what he can do with his intellect. And so further on (260 e) the kingly art is 'mixed' in the same class with the arts of the interpreter, the boatswain, the prophet, the herald, etc., which all carry out the function of commanding (αὐτὸν σύμπασαι τό γ' ἐπιτάττειν ἔχουσιν and cf. πρὸς ἀρχὴν 259 b for the point of affinity between a king and a householder). Throughout the Politicus this growing power in the use of the analytical method is manifest. Though the divisions are generally still dominated by the idea of dichotomy, question is beginning to be raised as to its appropriateness in all cases, and in one specific case at least Plato is forced to

¹ διὰ μέσων δὲ ἀσφαλέστερον λέγειν τέμνοντας and so δεῖ μεσοτομεῖν ὡς μάλιστα 265 a. In the earlier part of the Sophist there are two very casual references to the same principle. In 223 d ἡ καπηλική is called σχεδὸν ἡμισυ μέρος of ἡ

μεταβλητική and in 229 b we have εἰ πη κατὰ μέσον αὐτῆς τομὴν ἔχει τινά. There is no emphasis in either case nor does the point affect the main thesis.

² Campbell *ad loc.*

divide into seven parts *κατὰ μέλη*. Dichotomy is seen to be impossible in this case and therefore one more link is forged by Plato in the logical chain by his restricting the division to the fewest number of parts possible (*κατὰ μέλη τοίνυν αὐτὰς οἶον ἱερεῖον διαιρώμεθα, ἐπειδὴ δίχα ἀδυνατοῦμεν. δεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸν ἐγγύτατα ὅτι μάλιστα τέμνειν ἀριθμὸν αἰεί* 287 c). The complexity of his subject has taught Plato to discard practically all numerical limitations to analysis.

This is not the place to go deeply into the many details of the method of *διαίρεσις* to be found in the *Politicus* and in the *Philebus* and to see how it influenced Plato's later views on ontology. My aim has been only to put the mental operations of the earlier part of the *Sophist* in a clearer perspective and to show the gradual evolution that the methods of thought received at Plato's hands in the whole of that dialogue and in the practical application of them in the *Politicus*. Though for ordinary purposes Plato avails himself in the *Politicus* of the use of the common metaphors of speech, he is completely conscious of their being only metaphors. It is true that in the early part of the dialogue he speaks of the ruler as a herdsman, yet in 275 b (*κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα*) he displays full knowledge of the value of the comparison and indeed soon afterwards by pointing out clearly the far more comprehensive sphere of activities belonging to the statesman he almost destroys the comparison, in generalising our conception of his functions from 'rearing' collectivities of creatures (*ἀγελαιοτροφική*) to 'tending' them (*ἀγελαιοκομική*).

A whole section of the *Politicus* is taken up with elaborating the differences and similarities subsisting within the single *εἶδος* of wool-weaving and in this we have another indication of the deeper levels to which the analytical method now penetrates. Whereas in the *Sophist* Plato had been satisfied with looking at the sophist in seven different ways, he now takes up one path and by a process of logical elimination or differentiation and by attempting to grasp *all* the similarities and dissimilarities belonging to the various members that we provisionally assume to be of one class (see *Polit.* 285 b) he tries to get the one view about the matter on hand that must be the true view.

Plato had come to be deeply conscious that in the method there lay something vastly more important than a means to gain 'consistency in the use of debatable terms,' as Professor Jackson puts it very succinctly. The Platonic method of *διαίρεσις* as conceived in the digression of the Sophist, in the Politicus and in the Philebus is the true prototype of our modern system of scientific classifications, and this view of the matter is put beyond cavil by a well-known fragment of a contemporary comic poet, Epicrates¹. We get there a satirical picture of the pupils of the Academy under Plato's direction absorbed in 'dividing' a *κολοκύνθη*, and since satire falls flat unless there are elements of truth in the caricature, it is not fanciful to connect it and what we know from the later dialogues of Plato with the Aristotelian investigations in natural history.

The unsatisfactory character of the definitions in the earlier part of the Sophist has hitherto been explained on the ground that they are a travesty of a new phase of thought, just as in the Cratylus he plays at etymologising and in the Phaedrus at rationalistic mythologising in mockery of certain foibles of the day. It has also been urged that they are provisional and that the method is purposely meant to develop by stages. These two suggestions² are both very lame. That when Plato had reached the exalted views of the digression in the Sophist and of the Politicus he deliberately and with little purpose descended to inculcate truth by means of inaccuracies is hardly believable. That he should play his adversaries' game and speak inaccurately in scorn is a feature that would be quite conceivable in Plato, but not when he does not give the least indication of *such* a satirical drift. The satire, that there undoubtedly is in the early part of the Sophist, is to be seen in the direct hits at the whole tribe of sophists. When he was depicting the all-powerful sophist to be from various points of view just a common artisan or tradesman, he had a satirical vein underneath it all and he intended to humble his pride by the vulgar identifications. But it is idle to imagine that Plato is secretly poking fun at the

¹ See Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.* 2, p. 287 (the fragment is preserved in Athenaeus ii 59c); the very word used is *διαίρειν*.

² See Campbell, *Sophistes and Politicus*, vii ff.

method of *διαίρεσις* itself¹. Rather, when he wrote the earlier part of the *Sophist* he had not yet seen the full value of the method, though, as the enthusiasm of the *Phaedrus* about generalisations and distinctions proves, it was already established as a method of some value. He had unearthed a treasure-trove of wisdom (*ἡσθεὶς ὥς τινα σοφίας εὐρηκὼς θησαυρόν* Phil. 15 e) and he turned it about on all sides in the fulness of his pleasure; and the point of his new lance was directed full tilt against the false followers of truth, Isocrates and his whole tribe. To think otherwise would ascribe to Plato too fiendish a trick played on his readers; nowhere does he intimate that in the early part of the *Sophist* he is really making an exhibition of how not to divide. However finely strung and gifted with true genius we recognise Plato to have been, and though we must always keep far from attempting to fix bounds to his penetrating intellect, we should be deluding ourselves with a vain phantom in maintaining such a view in the face of the clear evidence of the rhythms and of Plato's procedure elsewhere. He never had any difficulty in showing the smile lurking in his face—the *Euthydemus* is a case in point—and we should be doing him an injustice in imagining a smile at which he does not hint.

I shall now endeavour to show how the rhythm and the language² agree in requiring for the *Timaeus* an earlier date than is usually ascribed to it.

The rhythmical results give for the *Timaeus* unequivocal response. The three chief rhythms characteristic of Plato's last phase occur in it 45·6 %, in the digression of the *Sophist* 65·8 %, in the *Politicus* 70·7 %, and in the *Laws* the totals run up to 80 % in some cases and even beyond that. It cannot be thought that the *Timaeus* has these rhythms to any considerable extent; for 45·6 % is a paltry total in this connexion and indicative only of the equability of rhythm which the *Timaeus* has in common with the *Republic* and with all the other dialogues of the earlier

¹ Apelt (I now find) takes the same view that the satire is not directed at the method (see his ed. of the *Sophist*, p. 31).

² The question, whether there is anything in the subject matter of the

Timaeus that militates against placing its composition before that of the digression of the *Sophist*, the *Politicus* and the *Philebus*, will be decided by others, who are more competent than I to deal with it.

periods. Assuming that each kind of rhythm (of a standard number of syllables, e.g. four or five) had an average percentage, the three main types with their variations would amount to 50%, since they make up half of the possible permutations. But in this case they would not be prominent at all and would not stand a bit above their fellows, so that when we find a total of 45.6 % for them in the case of the *Timaeus* they are appreciably below the average. The rhythms that are remarkable in the *Timaeus* are $\text{—} \cup \text{—} \cup$ (10.1 %) and $\text{—} \cup \cup \cup$ and $\cup \text{—} \cup \cup$ (16.1 %); and these have extraordinarily low percentages in the *Laws*, so that we may confidently deny them any connexion with the later rhythms. Even if we were to take the second part of the last percentage, namely $\cup \text{—} \cup \cup$, and we were to go so far as to consider the last three syllables as outside the rhythm, we should still not be able in this last resort to get any considerable number of cases fitting in with the principal rhythm of the *Laws* group. There is no escape. The *Timaeus* has nothing to do with the rhythms of the *Sophist* digression, the *Politicus*, the *Philebus* and the *Laws*. Rhythm puts its composition earlier than that of all these works; for I presume that nobody will venture to put it later than that of the *Laws*.

The substance of the numerous recent treatises on Plato's language is serviceably given in Mr Lutostawski's book 'The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic' (chap. iii). Taken as a whole the statistics he has accumulated (accurately I suppose), especially those dealing with the later dialogues, give the impression of an imposing and solidly-grounded structure, but in fact very many of the five hundred characteristics enumerated collapse under the slightest foot-fall, and while some of them afford a steady hold, not all of these are to our present purpose. The work of Prof. Campbell¹, the pioneer in the method, lay in comparing nouns, verbs and adjectives in various dialogues, especially in the *Sophist*, in the *Politicus*, and in the *Philebus* with those occurring also in the dialogues that by a natural *petitio principii* he presumed to be indubitably the latest, the *Timaeus*, the *Critias*, and the *Laws*; it has no significance with

¹ See his *Introd. to Sophistes and Politicus* and his essays in Jowett and Campbell's ed. of the *Rep.* vol. ii.

regard to the relative position of the *Timaeus* and of, for instance, the *Philebus*.

Of the *ἅπαξ λεγόμενα* and very rare words occurring in the *Sophist*, as enumerated by Prof. Campbell, 80 % are adjectives and nouns formed from adjectives ending in *-ικός*, whilst in the *Politicus* there are 60 % of such formations; the vast majority of these 'peculiarities' in the *Sophist* occur in the dichotomous part that I have shown to be the earlier. Surely we can allow Plato that freedom of vocabulary that we allow Herodotus, Thucydides and even Xenophon, a writer incomparably more circumscribed in his style and genius. If¹ *ἰσχίον*, *γαργαλίζω*, *διαθερμαίνω* and *διαχωρεῖν* occur only in the *Phaedrus* and in the *Timaeus* in the whole body of Platonic writings, the reason is as clear as crystal. In both works medicine is touched on, directly in the one and indirectly in the other, and the only medical terms possible must be used there and everywhere else in Greek in the same connexion. And so it is with the words in the *Sophist* and in the *Politicus* that deal with spinning and hunting; pure accident or manifest coining has made them *ἅπαξ λεγόμενα*. The important dialogues each deal for the most part with one or two particular subjects and, as is quite natural, each has its own quota of appropriate terms. According to the table in Mr Lutostawski's work (p. 92 last column), the *Phaedrus* has in proportion nearly as many words occurring nowhere else in Plato as the *Laws*, the *Philebus* has only about a third of the proportion of the *Politicus* (which is equal in length to it), while the *Timaeus* and the *Critias* together exceed that of the *Laws* by about 50 %. To take the number of peculiarities proportionately according to the number of pages in each dialogue is no irreproachable procedure, but for comparative purposes it is much more sensible than leaving the size of the dialogues altogether out of consideration. Statistics such as these, derived mechanically from totalling up *ἅπαξ λεγόμενα*, can have small bearing on chronological questions, but rather they indicate how luxuriantly prolific Plato's vocabulary was on all the subjects

¹ So Campbell says (*Rep.* ii, p. 54). there is the noun, *γαργαλισμός*, in
But *γαργαλίζω* occurs *Phil.* 47a, and *Symp.* 189a.
seemingly not at all in the *Timaeus*;

with which he dealt. The *Phaedrus* teems with poetical words, such as γάννυμαι, γλανκόμματος, μελίγηρς, and at whatever time of life he was, if Plato wished to enthrall his readers with a dithyramb in prose, he naturally had to import into his diction a rich stock of poetical words. It is absurd to conceive that in his youthful days he had no such command of language as the *Phaedrus* displays, or that in later years his quarrel with the poets entered so far into his artistic being as to hinder him from employing their language for his own purposes. The *Timaeus* deals with highly technical subjects of wide range; the *Laws* comprises a comprehensive code of regulations on most of the matters that affect the generality of mankind; the *Sophist* and the *Politicus* develop a scheme of dichotomies that, if anything, lends itself to new coinages in language; and the *Philebus* is extremely restricted in its subject and offers no scope for Plato to trick out elegantly the one or two ethical and metaphysical speculations it concentrates upon. Prof. Campbell himself concedes¹ that the *Philebus* cannot be expected to have a high proportion of 'peculiar' words "in consequence of the dry abstractedness of the discussions"; the other dialogues have equally cogent reasons to explain their respectively high or low percentage of strange words. We can therefore treat as misleading this method of dealing with Plato's language. The *Timaeus* is no more written later than the *Philebus* because it passes rapidly from subject to subject, than the *Philebus* is written earlier because it deals with only a few subjects of a confined range of vocabulary.

It would be hasty to condemn all methods of examining Plato's language, because one method of approach is unsuccessful. To get at the essential worth of such investigations we must have recourse not to misleading catalogues of words used according to the general requirements of Greek vocabulary, but to those idioms that may with fitness be called characteristic of Plato's style. Fortunately some of these have been investigated. In estimating the relative force of a number of instances of a particular idiom in the later dialogues, we must remember that the *Philebus* is exactly as long as the *Politicus*, that the *Timaeus*

¹ Rep. ii, p. 53.

is 25% greater than either, and that the *Laws* is about five times the *Philebus* or the *Politicus*. Plato's use of adjectives in *-ειδής* and *-ώδης* is a marked feature of his style. The results of P. Droste's research¹ show that these adjectives are frequently used and boldly formed in the *Phaedo*, the *Republic*, and the *Timaeus*, whilst in the *Politicus*, the *Philebus* and the *Laws* they are rare. Consider these instances of adjectives in *-ειδής* used first (apparently) by Plato: *Phaedo* 21, *Rep.* 24, *Tim.* 8, *Polit.* 1, *Phil.* 1, *Legg.* 1². The usage is undoubtedly significant, and not dependent upon the subject of any dialogue. There is nothing here to prove that the *Timaeus* is to be dated just before the *Laws*; rather everything points to its being separated by a long interval. I am bringing forward these statistics, not as being by themselves conclusive, for this they cannot be—the element of chance is present—but because they have been thoughtlessly bandied about for the last twenty years, when a little care would have shown the direction in which they point. The really important characteristics of Plato's later style hitherto investigated are not numerous, and it would be helpful to point them all out; but it must be remembered that the *Timaeus* is much larger than the *Philebus*. In his later works Plato adopted the use of *καθάπερ* for *ὥσπερ*, *ὄντως* for *τῷ ὄντι*, *σχεδόν* for *σχεδόν τι* and *τὰ νῦν* for *νῦν*; all these idioms seem to be colourless and not confined to any particular subject, so that they may be called indicative.

		Timaeus	Polit.	Phil.	Laws
<i>καθάπερ</i>	occurs	18	34	27	148 times
<i>ὄντως</i> (for <i>τῷ ὄντι</i>)	„	8	11	15	50 „
<i>σχεδόν</i> (for <i>σχεδόν τι</i>)	„	9	13	14	122 „
<i>τὰ νῦν</i>	„	5	5	9	79 „
<i>πέρι</i> (after its noun)	„	15 0/0	21 0/0	32 0/0	29 0/0 of all instances of the preposition ³ .

I have given all the characteristics of Plato's later diction that can be considered valuable and incontestable; it cannot be said that I have chosen only such instances as suited my

¹ *Lutos*, pp. 111—117.

² *ib.* p. 115. The figures for *-ώδης* (*Crat.* 10, *Phaedo* 4, *Rep.* 14, *Tim.* 9, *Polit.* 1, *Phil.* 1, *Legg.* 11) are nearly

as conclusive.

³ *ib.* p. 103 (*καθάπερ*), p. 120 (*ὄντως*), p. 124 (*σχεδόν* and *τὰ νῦν*), and p. 131 (*πέρι*).

purpose, for all these and no more have been accepted by recent scholars. Though the *Timaeus* is larger than either the *Philebus* or the *Politicus*, it nevertheless has considerably less of the linguistic peculiarities of Plato's later days than the one and, with one exception, than the other also; and in this the stylistic method, such as it is, adds its quota of confirmation to the overwhelming evidence of the rhythmical tests.

	Epinomis	Ep.vii	Ep.viii	Ep.ii	Ep.iii	Ep.xiii
	‰	‰	‰	‰	‰	‰
(i) ~ ~ ~ ≡	25.6	18.6	14.7	13.0	10.0	4.7
~ ~ ~ - ≡	11.4	11.1	5.9	9.2	5.0	7.0
~ ~ ~ - ~ ≡	1.3	5.8	2.9	9.2	2.5	4.7
~ ~ ~ - - ≡	5.4	2.1	5.9	3.7	15.0	0
Total of (i)	43.7	37.6	29.4	35.1	32.5	16.4
(ii) - - ~ ≡	23.5	24.3	26.5	14.8	17.5	13.9
(iii) - - - ≡	14.1	10.1	17.6	18.5	22.5	11.6
Total of (i, ii and iii)	81.3	72.0	73.5	68.4	72.5	41.9
- - - - ≡	5.4	7.4	5.9	7.4	7.5	7.0
- - - - ≡	0.7	2.1	5.9	3.7	0	4.7
- - - - ≡ } - - - - ≡ } - - - - ≡ }	6.7	5.2	0	3.7	10.0	14.0
- - - - - ≡	0.7	3.7	5.9	0	0	2.3
- - - - - ≡	0.7	2.1	0	3.7	2.5	0
- - - - - ≡ } - - - - - ≡ }	2.7	5.2	8.8	11.1	5.0	23.2
- - - - - ≡	2.0	2.1	0	1.9	2.5	7.0
Total of the other types	18.9	27.8	26.5	31.5	27.5	58.2

The rhythms of the *Epinomis* are precisely those of the *Laws*; the main type (~ ~ ~ ≡ with its variations) occurs 43.7 ‰, the second type (- - ~ ≡) 23.5 ‰ and the third (- - - ≡) 14.1 ‰—a total of 81.3 ‰ altogether. The most considerable of the *Epistles*, the seventh, which must have been written after 353 B.C., also shows the rhythms of the *Laws* very markedly; 37.6 ‰ for the first type, and 24.3 ‰ for the second. In considering the other *Epistles* the value of the rhythms as a criterion is diminished for the simple reason that they take up so little space and there is consequently something to be

reckoned on the score of pure chance. In most of the cases the half a page or so admits of no possibility of talking of its rhythmical clausulae; but the second, the third, the thirteenth and perhaps the eighth Epistles may appear sufficiently long. The most trivial letter of this lengthier group, the thirteenth, has the Laws types altogether only 41·9 %; most people have considered it spurious and the rhythms seem to confirm this view. In the second and the third Epistles the three Laws types occur 68·4 % and 72·5 %, respectively, so that there is a strong support in this for considering them genuine. There is a curious anomaly in the composition of the first type in the third letter; the variation on it produced by the addition of two syllables is found more times than the primary type itself, $\cup \cup \cup - | - \asymp$ occurring 15 % against only 10 % for $\cup \cup \cup \asymp$, but this is probably mere accident. Whether anybody is disposed to accept the evidence of the rhythms as conclusive of the genuineness of the *Epinomis*, the seventh, the eighth (which also has the Laws rhythms), the second and the third Epistles, depends upon how far he is influenced by subjective considerations. It is conceivable that an imitator, immersed in the later works of Plato, should have quite unconsciously picked up his rhythms, but we should have expected him to make some fatal slip that would betray him at once. But no such significant blunder can be discovered; the hexameter endings are almost as rare as in the Laws, and so it is with the trochaic and iambic endings. The great factor that militates against considering these works genuine is the subject matter, except in the case of the seventh and the eighth letters; the style of the *Epinomis* is mediocre and lacks the pointedness that Plato displays even in the Laws, while the second and the third letters contain things that one hesitates to ascribe to Plato. The seventh letter, with which the eighth is inextricably bound, cannot reasonably be considered spurious, though grave doubt may be raised as to the short digression on philosophical matters in the middle of the narrative. Cobet, whose authority is unquestioned on such a matter, declares the style of the seventh letter to be most emphatically Plato's—*Platonis ipsius esse hanc epistulam et argumentum et stilus clamant* (*V.L.* p. 235), and the study of

H. Raeder¹ shows that the letter avoids hiatus, and that it falls in line with the later Platonic works in the use of *καθάπερ* for *ὥσπερ*, *ὅντως* for *τῷ ὄντι*, *σχεδόν* for *σχεδόν τι*, and *τὰ νῦν*. I have really no doubt as to the genuineness of the seventh and eighth epistles, except for the necessary proviso on the doubtful passage; they are worthy of Plato and throw trustworthy light on Plato's political activities, which can be substantiated on the theoretical side almost verbally from the teaching of the *Laws*. In this fine apologia pro vita sua Plato shows how constantly he restrained himself from plunging into the whirlpool of a political career. He embarked on his episode with Dionysius II only under great constraint, despite his consciousness of the fickleness of youth, and only to avert the reproach of dastardy to his own philosophy, which would surely be cast on him if he would reject a splendid opportunity of realising the political doctrines to which he had devoted so much of his time. His piercing view and independent spirit are visible throughout the narrative, and command our sympathy for his attempt to act honourably in the troubled waters of Syracusan politics².

L. BILLIG.

¹ *Rhein. Mus. f. Philol.* 61 (1906); where he has also in a very painstaking way sufficiently defended many statements in the narrative part of the seventh letter against captious critics.

² I am indebted for various suggestions to Prof. J. A. Platt, Prof. A. C. Clark, Mr E. Harrison and Mr F. M. Cornford.

A NEW SUPPLEMENT TO THE BERNE SCHOLIA ON VIRGIL.

The Berne Scholia (published by Hagen in *Jahrbücher für Class. Phil.*, 4th Supplement, 1867, pp. 749 ff.) together with the kindred collections printed in Hagen's *Appendix Serviana* (the *Explanatio in Bucolica Vergilii* preserved in two versions and wrongly attributed in the MSS. to Philargyrius, and the *Brevis Expositio* of Geo. I and II) are generally regarded as extracts from a 'variorum' commentary compiled by an Irishman, perhaps Adamnan Abbot of Iona, from sources which go back to Servius and Donatus¹. The grounds for identifying the compiler with the Abbot of Iona are far from strong², but the name 'Adamnan,' which is mentioned in the *Explanatio* (I) on *Ecl.* 3, 90, provides a convenient title for the commentary, and the evidence at least consists with the Abbot's date. I hope to show reason for believing that further extracts from the same commentary are to be found in the Abstrusa glossary (*C. G. L.* iv 3—198, the unbracketed portions) and in other Latin glossaries which borrowed them from Abstrusa. The Berne Scholia extend only to the *Eclogues* and *Georgics*, the other collections not so far; but beyond that fact there is nothing to suggest that the full commentary did not cover the *Aeneid* as well³: probably the makers of these extracts had access only to its first volume. In the glossaries we have much material which is clearly derived from scholia on the *Aeneid*, and some which can be referred to the *Appendix Vergiliana*. Now in the *Eclogues* and *Georgics* the connection between the glossary and the commentary is beyond doubt, and we have no evidence of any other such source on which the compiler of Abstrusa drew or could have drawn.

¹ Thilo, *Rh. Mus.* xv 119; Mommsen, *ibid.* xvi 442; Funaioli in Pauly-Wissowa, vii 857, *Rh. Mus.* lxx 84; Barwick in *Comm. Phil. Ien.* viii 2 (1909).

² See Manitius, *Lat. Lit. des Mit-*

telalters, i 239.

³ Philargyrius, who was Adamnan's principal source for the *Eclogues* and *Georgics*, had commented on the *Aeneid* also. See Barwick, *l.c.* p. 95.

I conclude therefore that in the glossary material we have a relic of Adamnan's complete commentary. In the light of this material I hope later to deal with the question of the authorship of Virgil scholia, the recovery of Donatus and the origin of Daniel's additions to Servius.

§ 1. It has been remarked by Professor Lindsay (*C. Q.* xi 121 ff.), though without full investigation, that the *Abstrusa* glossary is rich in Virgil glosses which have every appearance of being derived from the marginal notes of some copy of the poet's works, and differ from the Virgil glosses of *Abolita* in that they do not represent the brief explanations of some monastery teacher, but often coincide with comments of Servius and Servius 'Danielis' and with the Irish 'variorum' scholia of Hagen's *Appendix Serviana*. A glossary-compiler drawing material from marginal notes would begin by copying out his items as they occurred in the MS. Alphabetical arrangement would follow, and thus the glosses would cease to stand in the same order as the scholia stood in the MS. A further complication enters if the glossary was drawn from more than one source (*e.g.*, *Abstrusa* drew also on marginal interpretations of a Biblical text), since the glosses from different sources would become mixed up. *Abstrusa* has advanced to a considerable degree of alphabetical arrangement: throughout large parts of it account is taken of the first three, and in some sections of the first four letters of the lemma. But in spite of this some groups of Virgil glosses still persist, standing together in the glossary precisely in the order of the Virgil lines.

Thus on page 28 (CA-) we have no. 24 cantus, *Geo.* 1, 403; 25 casum, *Aen.* 1, 221; 26 carere dolo, *Aen.* 2, 44; 27 Charybdis, *Aen.* 3, 420; 28 carpitur, *Aen.* 4, 2; 29 candentes (read 'candentis'), *Aen.* 4, 61; 30 Caucasus and 31 cautes, *Aen.* 4, 366 and 367. Other groups are (CON-) 40, 23 concurrere, *Geo.* 1, 318; 24 concilias, *Aen.* 1, 79; (24^a conderet, *Aen.* 1, 5); 25 conspexere, *Aen.* 1, 152; 26 <conticuere>, *Aen.* 2, 1; 27 conversi, *Aen.* 2, 73; 28 congregi, *Aen.* 2, 397: (EX-) 68, 9 extulit, *Aen.* 1, 127; 10 excludit (excudit), *Aen.* 1, 174; 11 expediunt, *Aen.* 1, 178; 12 experti, *Aen.* 1, 202; 13 exempta, *Aen.* 1, 216; 14 exacta, *Aen.* 1, 309: 68, 51 exuberat, *Geo.* 1, 191; 52 exitium, *Geo.* 3, 503; 53 exitiale, *Aen.* 2, 31; 54 exoptat, *Aen.* 2, 138 (-atum); 69, 1 exutus vinculis, *Aen.* 2, 153;

3 excisa, *Aen.* 2, 637; 4 exul, *Aen.* 3, 11; 5 extorris, *Aen.* 4, 616: 70, 17 expromere, *Aen.* 2, 280; 18 exhalantem, *Aen.* 2, 562; 19 expedior and 20 expeditus, *Aen.* 2, 633; 21 exta, *Aen.* 4, 64; 22 excetra, *Aen.* 6, 287; 23 exhaustum, *Aen.* 9, 356. Even where there is more intrusion of non-Virgilian glosses, the Virgil items often preserve the order of the lines from which they were taken: e.g. (PER-) 141, 9 perfidus and 10 perfidiosus, *Ecl.* 8. 91; 11 percussus, *Geo.* 2, 476; 13 pernix, *Geo.* 3, 93; 16 peresum, *Geo.* 3, 561. The presence of these groups proves that the glossary drew upon notes on Virgil.

The following instances will illustrate the connection with Servius and Servius 'Danielis':

10, 14 admonet: rogat. Serv. *Aen.* 10, 153 ('admonet inmiscetque preces') partim rogat, partim admonet hoc solacium esse vitae humanae tutissimum. 10, 27 adspirat: favet (pavet, pabet *codd.*)=Serv. *Aen.* 2, 385. 11, 32 aequora: maria vel campi, ab aequalitate dicti. Serv. *Aen.* 2, 69 aequora vero modo maria, alibi campos...dictum est ab aequalitate. 27, 20 caulem: fruticem. Serv. 'Dan.' *Aen.* 12, 413 caulem autem medium fruticem, qui vulgo thyrsus dicitur. 28, 28 carpitur: consumitur. Serv. 'Dan.' *Aen.* 4, 2 carpitur autem paulatim consumitur. 29, 31 canoris: chordis. Serv. *Aen.* 6, 120 ('fidibus canoris') bene sonantibus chordis. 51, 17 despicens: deorsum aspiciens aut contemptui habens. Serv. *Aen.* 1, 224 deorsum aspiciens, sicut suspiciens sursum aspiciens. 58, 46^a dum: donec, quamdiu. Serv. *Aen.* 1, 5 ('dum conderet urbem') aut enim Troiam dicit quam, ut primum in Italiam venit, fecit Aeneas...dum enim haec fieret, ab agrestibus propter vulneratum cervum regium mota sunt bella: aut Laurolavinium, et significat 'dum' donec; tam diu enim dimicavit quamdiu ad tempus faciendae civitatis veniret. 72, 31 phalera<e>: ornamenta equorum=Serv. *Aen.* 9, 359. 74, 30 (in an Abol. section of *Vat.*, but given also by the pure Abstrusa MSS.) phalanx: legio lingua Macedonum, and 77, 18 phalanx: exercitus. Serv. 'Dan.' *Aen.* 2, 254 phalanx lingua Macedonum legio. et est a parte totum, hoc est synecdoche; significat enim totum exercitum. 76, 20 fingens: componens=Serv. *Aen.* 4, 148. 97, 32 inrigat: infundit=Serv. 'Dan.' *Aen.* 1, 692. 98, 27 instar: similitudo=Serv. *Aen.* 6, 865. 105, 13 latex: aqua quae latet in venis. Serv. *Aen.* 1, 686 latex proprie aqua est, ab eo quod intra terrae venas lateat. 112, 28 macte: magis aucte (autem *codd.*)=Serv. *Aen.* 9, 641. 115, 44 mene: me ergo. Serv. *Aen.* 1, 37 'ne' non vacat, significat enim 'ergo.' 120, 36 mucro: teli cuiuslibet acumen. Serv. *Aen.* 11, 817 hinc apparet mucronem esse cuiuslibet teli acumen. 124, 20 nequa: non. Serv. 'Dan.' *Aen.* 3, 453 nequa pro non aut nulla. 131, 22 ocreas: tibialia. Serv. *Aen.* 8, 624 ('leves ocreas') nitida tibialia. 132, 11 olli: illi aut cui vel tunc. Serv. *Aen.* 1, 254 olli modo 'tunc'...alias tamen olli 'illi' significat. Cf. *Aen.* 4, 105 olli, aut illi aut tunc. 152, 31 puer: filius Graece. Serv. 'Dan.' *Aen.* 3, 339 filius, quia Graeci παῖδας etiam filios dicunt. 157,

15 quatit: concutit. Serv. 'Dan.' *Aen.* 2, 611 concutit, conmovet. 158, 28 quis: quantus, quam magnus. Serv. *Aen.* 9, 36 ('quis globus?') id est quantus; admirantis enim est, non interrogantis. 160, 41 recusso: concusso=Serv. *Aen.* 2, 52. 162, 37 rependens: compensans=Serv. *Aen.* 1, 239. 172, 18 sine mente: sine voluntate=Serv. 'Dan.' *Aen.* 5, 56. 172, 19 sine: permitte=Serv. *Aen.* 10, 598. 179, 23+24 summissus: inclinatus. summissi: supplices. Serv. 'Dan.' *Aen.* 3, 93 ('summissi') utrum corpore an anima? an quia supplices rogamus? an, quod verum est, inclinati? 184, 19 tibia: symphonia. Serv. *Aen.* 11, 737 ('curva tibia') symphoniacorum. 184, 22 Tiberis a Tiberi<n>o rege. Serv. *Aen.* 3, 500 alii volunt non Thybrim cecidisse sed Tiberinum, regem Albanorum, a quo Tiberis dictus est. 185, 8 tollere: erigere. Serv. *Aen.* 1, 66 nam qui potest mulcere potest et tollere, id est erigere in tempestatem. 195, 22 volutans: cogitans. Serv. *Aen.* 1, 50 et modo ait 'volutans,' id est cogitans.

The glossary presents the scholia in an abbreviated and often fragmentary form, and the cutting down is sometimes unintelligent; but Abstrusa clearly differs in character from Abolita, for though resemblances occur between Abol. items and notes of Servius or Servius 'Danielis,' they are not such as to indicate that the glosses originate in the commentaries¹.

A hint, though not a proof, that the Virgil glosses of Abstrusa were derived from a 'variorum' commentary may be found in examples like 47, 17 and 18 coturno: supercilio aut fastu. coturno: genus calciamenti (*Ecl.* 8, 10); 75, 18 and 19 ferox: asper, inmitis. ferox: inplacabilis, inmitis (*Aen.* 1, 263 etc.); 82, 35 and 36 Geta: Gothus. Getae: Gothi (*Geo.* 4, 463); 103, 40 and 41 lacessit: provocat vel iniuriis agit. lacessere: provocare aut irritare (*Geo.* 3, 233); 105, 11 and 12 latices: aquae [quae et nymphae], laticum: aquarum (*Aen.* 1, 736); 106, 13 legio: numerus militum, a legendo. legio: VI milia sunt (*Geo.* 2, 280) and many others. Now we find many cases in which the glossary coincides in a more or less striking manner with the Berne Scholia and the kindred collections. I give here a complete list of these glosses, arranged in two groups according as they do or do not also coincide with Servius or Servius 'Danielis.'

(1) 13, 17 age: incipe vel dic. *Ecl.* 3, 52, SCHOL. BERN. dic, propone quicquid velis, incipe dicere. 14, 13 alvus: venter=SCHOL. BERN. *Geo.* 3, 80.

¹ Cf. Weir, *C. Q.* XII 28.

24, 15 baccare: herba iocundi odoris (baccane herba iocundior *codd.*). *Ecl.* 4, 19, SCHOL. BERN. genus herbae florisve iocundi odoris. EXPLAN. id est baccas id est *boadin*, genus herbae floris et odoris iocundi. 29, 22 carchesia: genus poculorum=SCHOL. BERN. *Geo.* 4, 380. (SERV. carchesia autem poculorum sunt genera.) 31, 5 cana mala: lanuginem habentia, id est Cydonia. *Ecl.* 2, 51, SCHOL. BERN. cana mala: candida poma vel genus hirsutum. tenera lanugine: id est lanuginem habentia. (SERV. mala dicit Cydonea quae lanuginis plena sunt.) 44, 46 corylos: avellanas vel nuces. *Ecl.* 1, 14, EXPLAN. arbor nucis avellanae. (SCHOL. BERN. corylos arbores nuciferas appellant.) 45, 14 corymbi: hederarum baccae. *Ecl.* 3, 39, EXPLAN. id est baccas hederarum. (SERV. uvas hederarum.) 46, 41 cunabula: initia vel rudimenta. *Ecl.* 4, 23, EXPLAN. and SCHOL. BERN. initia generis. 47, 14 cum: quando=SCHOL. BERN. *Ecl.* 3, 10. 58, 42 dumosa: spinosa [aut loca silvestria]. *Ecl.* 1, 76, SCHOL. BERN. spinosa. EXPLAN. id est drisidi, quod capra cum pascitur <in> spinosa <rupe> pendet. 63, 4 en: ecce=SCHOL. BERN. *Ecl.* 1, 12. EXPLAN. id est ecce. 63, 17 enodis: sine nodo. *Geo.* 2, 78 SCHOL. BERN. enodes: sine nodo. 75, 17 feraces: fertiles=BREV. EXP. *Geo.* 2, 79. SCHOL. BERN. *Geo.* 4, 114 (reading 'tenaces') alii 'feraces,' id est fertiles. 85, 45 Erebi: inferni= SCHOL. BERN. *Geo.* 4, 471. 87, 36 honos: honor=SCHOL. BERN. *Ecl.* 5, 78; EXPLAN. *Ecl.* 2, 53. 97, 5 inprobus: inportunus. *Ecl.* 8, 49 SCHOL. BERN. inoportunus. EXPLAN. puer inprobus: id est amore Iason inopportunus. 109, 4 ligustra et vaccinia: florum genera crocei coloris. *Ecl.* 2, 18 EXPLAN. ligustra, id est meli gabur, id est flores vel herba. vaccinia, id est derce roig, violae purpureae, vel subi criib, quia usui sunt, vel genus floris crocei coloris, vel nigrae. Cf. Lindsay, *C. Q.* XI 123. 113, 43 mares: masculi (cf. 114, 3 mas: masculus). *Geo.* 3, 64 SCHOL. BERN. masculos. 123, 12 nectare: melle. *Geo.* 4, 164 SCHOL. BERN. liquido nectare: melle. 125, 4 noram: noveram. *Ecl.* 1, 23 SCHOL. BERN. per syncopam noveram. EXPLAN. id est pro noveram. 131, 16 ocus: citius vel velocius. *Ecl.* 7, 8 SCHOL. BERN. citius, velocius. 131, 17 occursare: saepius occurrere. *Ecl.* 9, 25 EXPLAN. id est occurrere. 135, 15^a Padus (Pagus *codd.*): fluvius. *Geo.* 2, 452 SCHOL. BERN. fluvius Italiae. 139, 35 Poeniceo: rubeo=SCHOL. BERN. *Ecl.* 7, 32. EXPLAN. I id est rubeo. 141, 13 pernix: velox [vel percitus]=SCHOL. BERN. *Geo.* 3, 93. 144, 17 Pleiades: stellae. *Geo.* 1, 138 BREV. EXP. Pleiades sunt stellae in cauda Tauri etc. 161, 17 redimitus: coronatus=SCHOL. BERN. *Geo.* 1, 349. 167, 1 satius: melius [vel utilius]. *Ecl.* 2, 14 SCHOL. BERN. id est melius mihi fuerat. 173, 17 solum: terra. *Ecl.* 6, 35 SCHOL. BERN. terrae. 193, 22 virus: venenum=SCHOL. BERN. *Geo.* 1, 129. 194, 53 umquam: aliquando. *Ecl.* 1, 67 SCHOL. BERN. en umquam: aliquando. EXPLAN. I umquam, id est aliquando. II en umquam, id est ecce aliquando.

(2) 14, 49 alnos: nunc populos. *Ecl.* 6, 63 SCHOL. BERN. alnos pro populis. EXPLAN. alnos, id est ferna, pro populis posuit. SERV. 'DAN.' et quidam alnos poetica consuetudine pro populis accipiunt. 22, 51 aulaeum:

velum. *Geo.* 3, 25 SCHOL. BERN. and SERV. aulaea autem dicta sunt ab aula Attali in qua primum inventa sunt vela ingentia. 28, 30 Caucasus: mons Scythiae. *Geo.* 2, 440 SCHOL. BERN. and BREV. EXP. mons Scythiae pro quolibet monte. SERV. mons Scythiae; est positus pro quibuslibet asperimis montibus¹. 33, 27+28 cerasus: arbor. cerasia: poma. *Geo.* 2, 18 BREV. EXP. and SERV. arbor cerasus, pomum cerasium dicitur. SCHOL. BERN. arbor cerasus, pomum autem cerasum dicitur. 34, 59 cylindrus: lapis volubilis. *Geo.* 1, 178 SCHOL. BERN. cylindro: lapide rotundo in modum columnae, qui volubilitate nomen accepit. SERV. lapide tereti in modum columnae etc. 35, 23 cycni: poetae=EXPLAN. and SERV. *Ecl.* 9, 29. SCHOL. BERN. poetae Mantuani. 44, 48 coacta: collecta. *Ecl.* 6, 31 SCHOL. BERN. collecta, coniuncta. EXPLAN. I id est collecta vel coniuncta. SERV. id est quemadmodum coactae et collectae atomi per magnum inane fuissent origo ignis etc. EXPLAN. II id est collectae materiae creaturarum de atomis minimis, ut gentiles putant. 58, 25 Doris: mare vel mater Nereidum aut nympha. *Ecl.* 10, 5 SCHOL. BERN. fluvius Doris, mater nympharum et maritima nympha. ex nomine itaque eius mare appellatur. EXPLAN. id est dea maris, id est mater nympharum. Doris nympha maritima: ex nomine itaque etc. SERV. mater nympharum est, quam pro mari posuit. SERV. 'DAN.' vel Doris Oceani filia, coniunx Nerei. 64, 26 equidem: ego quidem. *Ecl.* 1, 11 SCHOL. BERN. non equidem: non ego quidem. *Geo.* 1, 193 SERV. DAN. bene autem ait 'equidem,' quod multi pro 'ego' accipiunt, id est 'ego quidem.' 73, 13 (=73, 49) fascēs: honores. *Geo.* 2, 495 SCHOL. BERN. id est honores. SERV. honores qui a populo praestabantur. 84, 38 hactenus: huc usque. *Geo.* 2, 1 SCHOL. BERN. adverbium temporis, et significat 'hucusque.' BREV. EXP. ut multi volunt, una pars orationis est et adverbium significans 'hucusque' (=SERV.). 88, 22 iactet: gloriatur, magnificet. *Ecl.* 6, 73 SCHOL. BERN. gloriatur (=SERV. 'DAN.'). 122, 2 navita: nauta. *Geo.* 1, 137 BREV. EXP. navita pro nauta sicut Mavors pro Mars (=SERV.). 123, 20 nequidquam: sine causa=SCHOL. BERN. *Geo.* 1, 96. BREV. EXP. <neque> nequiquam, id est non sine causa (=SERV.). 149, 27 propter: iuxta=SCHOL. BERN., EXPLAN., SERV. *Ecl.* 8, 87. 159, 50 rapidus: velox=SCHOL. BERN., SERV. *Geo.* 3, 114, 186, 5 trapetae: molae olivae. *Geo.* 2, 519 SCHOL. BERN., BREV. EXP. trapetis: molis olivariis. SERV. molis olivaribus.

¹ When a word occurs at several places in Virgil, commentators no doubt often repeated the same (or practically the same) note. Servius provides numerous examples of this. In the extracts a note of this kind may be preserved at one line and not at another: e.g. *Explan. Ecl.* 2, 53 (honos)=*Schol. Bern. Ecl.* 5, 78. And

it may have been taken into the glossary from a different line again. Thus although *Abstr.* 28, 30 is here compared with *Geo.* 2, 440, its position in a group of CA- words (see p. 258) points rather to *Aen.* 4, 367 as the place in Adamnan's commentary from which it was taken. Servius at that line has the note 'mons Scythiae inhospitalis.'

This evidence shows that Abstrusa stands in direct connection either with Adamnan's 'variorum' commentary or with his immediate sources, and got its Servian glosses through that channel. Of the two alternatives, it is less easy to suppose that the glossary-compiler drew independently from the same sources as Adamnan, though if he did the interest of his material for us is still the same: and we shall see that there are other links connecting glosses directly with Adamnan's compilation (see p. 271). Nor is this view negatived by a consideration of the dates involved. Adamnan of Iona (though not he but some earlier Adamnan may be our compiler) was born in 623 or 624 and died in 704. The glossary, so far as we can judge on very slight evidence, was constructed in France¹. Now the oldest existing copy, *Vat. lat. 3321*, is an Italian MS. of the eighth century². It contains the composite Abstrusa-Abolita, which was put together in Spain³. Is there time for the commentary to reach France, for the glossary to be compiled, to pass into Spain, to be reduced and combined with Abolita, and to pass thence into Italy? All this need not take so very long. Though we can no longer with Thilo⁴ think of the different collections of extract scholia as notes made by different pupils of Adamnan, we shall not date from his old age, and in the seventh century a copy of the commentary might reach the continent quite early. Once the glossary was made, a work so useful in a monastery would be likely to spread rapidly.

If then we accept Adamnan's commentary as one source of Virgil glosses in Abstrusa, is it the only source? That it is at least the only source of glosses which are derived from ancient commentators is likely on general grounds, and there is no trace of any other similar quarry having been used. In any case the value of the glosses remains unaltered, for there cannot be much doubt that most if not all of the new material which has any interest comes ultimately from Donatus; but in the absence of any sign to the contrary we may assume that all of it found its way into the glossary through Adamnan. Thus if we identify

¹ Lindsay, *C. Q.* xi 121.

² *Journ. of Phil. l.c.*

³ *Journ. of Phil.* xxxiv 268, *C. Q.*

⁴ *Rh. Mus.* xv 133. Barwick, *l.c.*

and extract the Virgil glosses and rearrange them in the order of the lines to which they apply, we shall have another abstract of the commentary which (at least for the *Eclogues* and *Georgics*) Adamnan compiled from Gaudentius, Philargyrius and (for the earlier part of *Geo.* 1) Gallus, all of whom depended closely on older sources. As we know that Philargyrius commented on the *Aeneid* also, we may assume that here too, as in the other poems, he was Adamnan's principal source; and further, as Gaudentius is a mere epitomator of Servius, we may ascribe to Philargyrius all the non-Servian material which seems to come from an ancient commentator, except that Gallus is a possible source principally in *Georgics* 1¹. It is true that the notes have been much reduced in order to fit them for glossary-form; though, as we shall see, the glossary itself has undergone a process of curtailment which can to some extent be reversed. It frequently happens also that there are several places in Virgil to which a gloss might be referred; but where the alphabetical arrangement has not advanced too far, it is sometimes possible to fix the reference of such a gloss with high probability by the help of those which precede and follow it. An instance of this has already been given (p. 262 n.). We can claim too glosses which were taken from scholia although the lemma is not itself a form of any word which occurs in Virgil. Of this class the following are examples (1) where the gloss can be traced to a known scholium, (2) where it appears to come from a scholium which is lost:

(1) 79, 40 furvum: nigrum. SERV.² DAN.' *Aen.* 2, 18 (on 'furtim') nam et furtum ideo dicitur quod magis per tenebras admittatur; unde fures qui quasi per furvum tempus, hoc est nigrum, aliquid surripiunt.

133, 22 opobalsamum: lacrima balsami. BREV. EXP. *Geo.* 2, 119 (on 'balsama') opobalsamum dicit; in India quaedam arbores sunt e quibus lacrimae emanant, quod balsamum nominatur.

137, 8 Pan: Incubus. SERV. *Aen.* 6, 775 (on 'castrum Inui') id est

¹ Cf. Barwick's conclusions, in which he follows Mommsen, on the respective shares of Gaudentius, Gallus and Philargyrius in the Berne Scholia etc., *l.c.* pp. 63 ff., 77, 119 f. Funaioli, *Riv. di Filol.* XLVIII 214. In the Berne

Scholia the name of Gallus appears only in the early part of *Geo.* 1, but there is evidence that he was quoted more widely by Adamnan, though very much less than the two others. Funaioli, *Riv. Indo-Greco-Italica*, 1281.

Panos, qui illic colitur. Inuus autem latine appellatur, graece Πάν: item Ἐπιάλης graece, latine Incubo.

(2) 10, 2 adrumavit: rumorem adtulit (marked *Virg.* in *Lib. Gloss.*). Perhaps from a scholium on *Ecl.* 6, 54 'ruminat.' (SERV. ruminatio autem dicta est a rumine, eminente gutturis parte.)

79, 26 funus imaginarium: tumulus sine cadavere. *Aen.* 6, 510 ('funeris umbris'). SERV. sepulturae meae umbris, nam funus illic esse non potuit ubi ne cadaver quidem fuerat.

103, 13 carinantes: inludentes vel inridentes. *Aen.* 8, 361 ('carinis') SERV. 'DAN.' alii quod ibi Sabini nobiles habitaverint, quorum genus invidere et carinare solebat. carinare autem est obtrectare. Ennius 'contra carinantes verba atque obscena profatus,' alibi 'neque me decet hanc carinantibus edere chartis.'

§ 2. The Abstrusa glossary, however, as it appears in the extant MSS., is not complete. The tendency to curtail was almost universal among transcribers of glossaries: space was generally to be economised; time too, no doubt, in many cases where copying was done during a visit to a monastery not one's own; there was the desire to preserve the symmetry of a page, tending to lop off any surplus; and to reduce glosses to the simplicity appropriate to a dictionary. The process can be seen in the MSS. of Abstrusa whose readings are reported by Goetz in *C. G. L.*¹ For

(1) *Vat. 3321* sometimes curtails a gloss which appears more fully in some or all of the others, e.g.

33, 40 caerula: nigra, a cerae colore tractum. puto est autem nox pallore suffusa. The second sentence is found only in *c* and *d*.

60, 49 aeger: aegrotus vel tristis aut infirmus, *Vat. 3321*. aeger dicitur animo verum tristis, *a*. aeger dicitur animo, aegrotus corpore, *c d*. The full gloss was 'aeger dicitur animo tristis, aegrotus corpore infirmus' (cf. SERV. *Aen.* 1, 208). *Vat. 3321* has curtailed it stupidly.

65, 49 Aetna: mons in Sicilia semper occultis ignibus ardens et nonnumquam flammarum globos evomens, *a b c d*. *Vat. 3321* has only 'Aetna: mons in Sicilia ardens.'

127, 42 obiectant: obiciunt aut opponunt. obices: qui opponuntur, *a c d*. *Vat. 3321* omits the gloss on *obices*.

c and *d* (the 'pure Abstrusa' MSS.) commonly save space by omitting *vel* or *aut* between different interpretations. They lack some glosses which appear in the composite MSS., but there is a possibility that these items really belong to Abolita.

¹ *Vat. lat. 3321*, *Vat. lat. 6018* (*b*), *Cass. 439* (*a*), *Par. lat. 2341* (*c*) and *7691* (*d*).

(2) *Vat.* 3321 often omits altogether a gloss which other MSS. preserve, e.g.

- After 32, 56 caelicolae: dii caelestes vel qui caelum colunt, *c d.*
 „ 39, 21 cometes: stella quae quasi comam habet, *a b c d.*
 „ 40, 24 conderet: constitueret, *a b c d.*
 „ 58, 46 dum: donec, quamdiu, *a c d.*
 „ 103, 3 casses: retia, *a c d.*
 „ 103, 26 labyrinthum: aedificium tortuosum mechanica arte constructum a Daedalo, ubi sine adiutorio cuiuslibet voces resonabant, et si quis in eo ingrediebatur egredi nequaquam sine filo foris ligato valebat propter ambages. [anfractus ambago circuitus] anfractus tortuosus vel domus Minotauri cuiusdam monstri, *a* (curtailed in *c d*).
 „ 116, 5 moenia: aedificia murorum, *a c d.*
 „ 137, 7 pandum: flexum, curvum, *a c d.*
 „ 137, 28 parentat: umbris vel tumultus mortuorum frequenter paret, id est obsequitur aut ministrat, *a c d.*
 „ 158, 16 quin etiam: quin aliquando significat etiam, ergo, quod, quia, immo aut vero, *a c* (*d* not available).
 „ 183, 23 teretes: rotundi, *a c* (*d* not available).

But we can go beyond the MSS. of *Abstrusa*. For this glossary was freely drawn upon by others, in particular by *Affatim* and others in vol. iv of the *Corpus Glossariorum*, and in vol. v by the 'English' group (First and Second *Amplonian* and *Corpus*), the *Liber Glossarum* and the glossary represented by *Par. lat. nouv. acq.* 1298¹. This fact is easily established by a comparison of the items on almost any page of these glossaries with *Abstrusa*:

(1) <i>Aff.</i> 471, 3=	<i>Abstr.</i> 19, 10	471, 38=	5, 43	471, 45=	16, 8
8=	3, 7	39=	6, 35	46=	16, 46
13=	22, 53	40=	6, 36	47=	17, 15
14=	7, 18+40	41=	7, 29	48=	18, 10
26=	15, 42	42=	7, 38	49=	18, 20
34=	18, 24	43=	13, 22		
36=	3, 23	44=	14, 7		

(2) <i>Sangall.</i> 253, 2=	<i>Abstr.</i> 105, 15	253, 9=	105, 34 ^a	253, 39=	105, 39
4=	105, 6	13=	105, 1	43=	104, 8
5=	105, 5	14=	105, 16	46=	105, 10
6=	104, 2	23=	105, 14	50=	105, 31
8=	103, 25	31=	105, 13	52=	109, 20

¹ Hereinafter called *Par.*

(3) Ampl. I 344,	6=Ampl. II 261,	16=Corp. A 252=Abstr.	7, 25
	17	A 247	7, 26+47
	18	A 251	7, 27
	19	A 260	7, 28
343, 57	20	A 244	9, 51
	22	A 185	7, 30
	23		7, 31
344, 2	24	A 248	10, 2
8	28	A 188	7, 34
9	29	A 178	7, 38
	30	A 255	7, 41
10	31	A 257	7, 42
11	32	A 215	7, 43
348, 15	270, 15	B 29	24, 17
31	26	B 41	24, 14
40	271, 10	B 81	24, 43
49	24	B 123	25, 35
349, 4	272, 1	B 158	26, 18
10	39	B 217	26, 35 ^a
11	35	B 219	26, 33 ^a
(4) Lib. Gloss. 161, 28=Abstr. 6, 41	162, 48=	9, 45	163, 35= 10, 25
162, 6=	5, 37 ^a	163, 27=	9, 47
45=	10, 29	28=	10, 30
46=	14, 47	29=	7, 34
			37= 11, 35
			38= 11, 48
			48= 11, 47
(5) Par. 105, 3=Abstr. 78, 42	107, 26=	84, 47	128, 14=139, 21
7=	78, 48	28=	84, 51
107, 14=	84, 34	29=	84, 45
23=	84, 46	30=	84, 55
24=	84, 50	128, 10=135, 10	20=135, 26
25=	84, 44	11=135, 14	

TABLE I.

	Abstr.	Aff.	Ampl. II	Sangall.	Lib. Gloss. ¹	Par.
Ab and Ac sections	96	43	16	22	25	
L section	163	119	62	49	23	28
Ma and Me sections	78	55	15	14	22	14

¹ The figures for *Lib. Gloss.* are taken from the complete glossary, not

from the extracts printed by Goetz in *C. G. L. v.* They include only glosses

In Table I, the first column gives the number of glosses contained in our Abstrusa, the remaining columns give the number of these glosses which is also found in the other glossaries.

Now one or more of these glossaries frequently exhibits an Abstrusa gloss in a fuller form than do any of our Abstrusa MSS. The greatest number of such cases occurs in the *Liber Glossarum*, which is least affected by the tendency to abbreviation. The following examples are all possibly Virgil glosses:

ABSTR. 3, 16 ab imo: deiosum. AMPL. II 259, 32 deiosum (*detiosu cod.*) vel funditus.

ABSTR. 5, 39 acalanthis: cardellus. LIB. GL. 161, 27 + 26 cardellus, alibi carduelis, avis vepribus adsueta (*Lindsay, Class. Phil.* XIII 2).

ABSTR. 6, 1 accisis: circumcisis. LIB. GL. 162, 10 consumptis, circumcisis.

ABSTR. 9, 52 adamans: lapis durus. LIB. GL. 162, 28 lapis durus qui ferro dividi non potest nisi sanguine hircino dividi <tur>.

ABSTR. 13, 9 agmen: multitudo. LIB. GL. 164, 48 ordinata multitudo, id est exercitus ambulans.

ABSTR. 16, 5 amaracus: genus floris. LIB. GL. 165, 38 genus floris unde et amaracinum unguentum fit.

ABSTR. 18, 15 antes: extremi ordines vinearum. LIB. GL. 167, 6 extremi ordines vinearum sive arborum.

ABSTR. 20, 45 arvina: caro ferina. AFF. 484, 48, AMPL. II 267, 26 caro pinguis ferina. LIB. GL. 169, 3 caro pinguis ferina vel mappa interius (*interioris? Goetz*) sanguinis.

ABSTR. 21, 52 asilum: tabanum. LIB. GL. 169, 17 quem Graeci oestrum, rustici tabanum appellant.

ABSTR. 22, 55 augur: qui aves colligit (*colit?*). AMPL. II 269, 36 qui aves colit, qui per auspicia <divinabat, id est> avium voces. But this is perhaps a combination of two glosses. Cf. AFF. 485, 55 and 52.

to which the source-mark *De Glosis*, *De Gls.* etc. (*i.e.* 'taken from glossaries') is attached in the margin. The question whether the source-mark applies only to the individual gloss or to all that follow it up to the next source-mark is a difficult one. Goetz (*prae*f. p. xxii) seems to make this assumption, and his extracts include many items of this kind. Between the two MSS. which he used (*Par. lat.* 11529/30 and *Vat. Pal. lat.* 1773, repre-

senting different classes) there is relatively little disagreement in the source-marks. It cannot be safe to assume that no mistakes have been made. But it is a fact that large numbers of the unmarked glosses which follow *De Glosis* items belong to Abstrusa: *e.g.* in the Ab and Ac sections, if we include these, the number of *known* Abstrusa glosses rises from 25 to 71.

ABSTR. 39, 21^a cometes : stella quae quasi comam habet. LIB. GL. 182, 2 stella est noxia quae quasi comam habet, in cuius ortu pestilentia oritur.

ABSTR. 47, 19 curulis sella : a curru quia equi de curru curules dicuntur. AMPL. II 283, 3+4 quia et equi de curru curules dicuntur, velocissimi vero a sedendo sellares dicuntur. Cf. AMPL. I 351, 53. CORP. C 392 has 'velocissimi vero ad currendum.'

ABSTR. 56, 23 discerniculum : ornamentum capitis. AMPL. II 285, 61, CORP. D 313 ornamentum capitis virginalis ex auro.

ABSTR. 63, 38 eoo : orientali aut matutino vel solem, *Vat.* 3321, *a.* eoo : orientem solem, *c d.* There were originally two glosses, (1) eoom : orientem solem, (2) eoo : orientali aut matutino. In the archetype of our Abstr. MSS. the first lemma had been corrupted to the form of the second. *Vat.* and *a* exhibit an attempt to combine the two; *c* and *d*, or their parent, omitted one of them. LIB. GL. 164, 3 and 4 preserves both, along with the corruption of the first lemma.

ABSTR. 73, 13 fascēs : honores. LIB. GL. 198, 30 honores sive dignitas consularis.

ABSTR. 73, 18 phalanx : exercitus. AFF. 516, 27 multitudo militum, id est exercitus. Cf. AMPL. II 293, 19. LIB. GL. 197, 33 id est exercitus, alias legio, alibi militum multitudo, alibi ordo militum.

ABSTR. 81, 6 galeros : calamaucos. LIB. GL. 204, 14 calamaucos pelliceos.

ABSTR. 90, 44 inclytus : invictus, gloriosus. LIB. GL. 210, 18 invictus aut gloriosus aut sublimatus.

ABSTR. 117, 19 Minotaurus : monstrum quod capite taurino [hab]et pars alia corporis homo fuit. AMPL. II 310, 63 monstrum quod capite tauri, altera parte corporis homo fuit, a Minoe[t] rege [qui Minos] dictus est et a tauro, quia ex utroque mater semen fertur suscepisse. Cf. SANGALL. 258, 32.

ABSTR. 138, 35 peculatus : furatus de peculio. AMPL. I 380, 4 furatus de peculio publico.

ABSTR. 143, 31 pila : hasta. Servius, *Aen.* 7, 664 says 'Pilum proprie est hasta Romana, ut gaesa Gallorum, sarissae Macedonum.' The second and third parts of this note appear in AMPL. I 362, 49 gaesa : hasta Gallorum, and 389, 20 sarissae : hasta Macedonum. Cf. CORP. G. 37, S 48¹.

ABSTR. 177, 26 subnixa : subiecta vel supposita. PAR. 153, 26 subiecta vel supposita sed melius suffulta vel subfirmata.

ABSTR. 183, 27 tesserarius : praepositus cursorum. (This gloss is apparently not in *c d*, but it stands at the head of an Abol. section in *Vat.*, and may belong to Abstr. It refers to *Aen.* 7, 637.) AMPL. I 398, 13,

¹ For the way in which the parts of a scholium may become scattered cf. Serv. on *Aen.* 7, 16 'ruditus autem proprie est clamor asinorum, sicut grunnitur porcorum, ranarum coax,'

with *Sangall.* 280, 48 ruditus : asini clamor; *Lib. Gloss.* 206, 13 grunuitus porcorum est; *Cass.* 402, 556, 47 ranarum : coax.

CORP. T 111 praepositus cursorum qui bella nuntiant (currorum *codd.*, *corr. H. Bradley*). Cf. SANGALL. 291, 43.

ABSTR. 185, 47 transtra: sedilia nautarum. LIB. GL. 250, 16 sedilia nautarum sive medias partes navium.

ABSTR. 189, 14 vastum: inmensum vel grand[e]. AFF. 576, 59 inmensum vel grande vel profundum.

ABSTR. 191, 1 verbenae: sacrae frondes. LIB. GL. 252, 26 sacrae frondes, ut laurus, olea, myrtus. poeta aut ...alibi 'verbenae' inveni.

ABSTR. 197, 1 vulgus: populus diversus. AFF. 580, 36 populus diversus vel vilis. AMPL. II 336, 47 vilis populus vel diversus.

These fuller items presented by other glossaries are not such as to suggest later additions made to glosses which had originally been shorter; indeed in some cases (*e.g.* Abstr. 20, 45; 138, 35; 183, 27) they preserve an essential part of the scholium. And as we have seen evidence of abbreviation in the MSS. of Abstrusa themselves, we may conclude that these glosses were derived from a copy or copies of Abstrusa in which there was less curtailment than in any we now have. Moreover, just as we found one Abstrusa MS. omitting items which others preserve, it is probable that all our Abstrusa MSS. have omitted glosses which still survive in some of these other glossaries.

This suspicion is confirmed by the fact that very many items in these glossaries (most of all in Lib. Gloss.) show striking affinity with non-Servian elements in the Berne Scholia etc. I quote here only a few examples.

LIB. GL. (not in *C. G. L.*, but see *Thes. Glos. s. v. alcyon*) alchione: avis marina quae pelago nidum medio facit, cuius partus (partu *Mai*) tertia die pullamina excluduntur, quarto cibo foventur, septimo volatui ostenduntur. SCHOL. BERN. *Geo.* 1, 399 nam novem diebus quibus fetus in mari faciunt nulla aura nullusque ventus consurgit...tertio die pullamina excluduntur, quarto foventur, quinto plumis vestiuntur, sexto alis emoveantur, septimo volatui ostenduntur. quod in glossematibus inveni. These 'glossemata' are mentioned again at *Geo.* 4, 151 and 232, and Barwick¹ regards all three notes as interpolations because that at 1, 399 is not represented in *Brev. Exp.*,—surely a very weak reason, especially as *Brev. Exp.* extends only to the first two books.

LIB. GL. 243, 26 scrobibus: scrobes sunt fossae ubi vites ponuntur. SCHOL. BERN. *Geo.* 2, 50 scrobibus: scrobes fossae ubi vites ponuntur (preceded by a Servian note on the gender).

¹ *L.c.* p. 118.

LIB. GL. 239, 20, PAR. 141, 16 rastrum: ferramentum culturæ; aut a radendo terram aut a raritate dentium rastros dicimus: et est generis masculini pluraliter, hi rastri et hos rastros, his rastris. et aratra dicuntur rastri. SCHOL. BERN. *Ecl.* 4, 40 rastros: aratra. *Geo.* 1, 155 rastris: raritate dentium dicti.

LIB. GL. 166, 15, AMPL. II 265, 8, CORP. A 540 amurca: faex olei = SCHOL. BERN. *Geo.* 3, 448.

LIB. GL. 180, 16 Codrus nobilissimus pastor significatur et poeta quem Vergilius elegis laudat, shows the same mistake ('Vergilius' for 'Valgius,' cf. Serv. 'Dan.' and Schol. Veron., *Ecl.* 7, 22) as the Berne Scholia. And LIB. GL. 245, 22 spiram: spira proprie funis nauticus tortus. <funis> generis feminini secundum Homerum, may be put beside those puzzling references in the Berne Scholia where for 'Homerus' Hagen proposed to read 'Verrius'¹.

AMPL. II 294, 25 ferrugine: <ferri> obscuritate aut ferri [aut] colore aut ferr[ar]i rasura. BREV. EXP. *Geo.* 1, 467 proprie ferri scabies, purpura nigrior Hispana, obscuritas ferri aut ferri rasura. (SERV. ferrugo autem est purpura nigrior Hispana.)

AFF. 539, 47, AMPL. II 311, 57 muscus: genus herbae mollissimae. SCHOL. BERN. *Geo.* 4, 18 musco: genus herbae mollissimae.

AMPL. I. 353, 39 cavani: ululae aves. CORP. C 119 cauanni: ulae. SCHOL. BERN. *Ecl.* 8, 55 ululae aves de ululatu dictae...quam avem Galli cauannum nuncupant.

SANGALL. 243, 50 Hesperus: stella quae primo vespere apparet = SCHOL. BERN. and EXPLAN. *Ecl.* 10, 77.

AFF. 544, 10, AMPL. II 316, 70, AMPL. I 376, 29, CORP. O 238 orge: occide, recalls the Irish glosses of the Berne Scholia etc., for 'orge' is Irish = 'kill.'

These coincidences with the Berne Scholia and their kindred occur in glossaries which we know to have borrowed largely from Abstrusa. Of those which occur in the Liber Glossarum some actually bear the source-mark *De Glosis*. We have seen that Abstrusa even in its present form exhibits many similar coincidences. We may reasonably claim therefore that these glosses were copied from Abstrusa in an earlier and fuller edition.

§ 3. How then can we identify glosses which have disappeared from our Abstrusa but survive elsewhere, when the scholia do not help us? All the glossaries which I have men-

¹ See C. Q. xiv 90, *Jahrb. f. Class. Phil.* 4th Suppl. p. 716, Barwick, l.c. p. 99 n.

tioned contain Abolita as well as Abstrusa items¹. But the amount of known material which they draw from these sources is not uniform. I have already shown the actual number of known Abstrusa glosses which reappear in certain sections of the other glossaries. Affatim, for example, in Ab and Ac repeats 44·8 % of our Abstrusa; in L, 73 %, in Ma, Me, 70·5 %. But of our Abolita it has in these sections only 16·4 %, 12·6 %, 11·8 %. The Second Amplonian glossary has in Ab, Ac 16·6 % of our Abstrusa, in L, 38 %, in Ma, Me, 19·2 %: of our Abolita 12·6 %, 11·7 %, 9·2 %. The following table shows the proportion which the known Abstrusa and Abolita material in these glossaries bears to the rest of their contents. In counting the total number of glosses in the case of the Liber Glossarum and Par., those which belong to the collection of glosses with citations from authors are omitted; in Par. also those which Goetz marks with an asterisk as being elsewhere ascribed to Placidus.

TABLE II.

	Total number of glosses			Known Abstr. per cent.			Known Abol. per cent.		
	Ab, Ac	L	Ma, Me	Ab, Ac	L	Ma, Me	Ab, Ac	L	Ma, Me
Affatim	123	216	118	35	55	46·6	12	12	11·9
Ampl. II	112	218	96	14·3	28·5	15·6	8	12	11·5
Sangall.	105	181	86	21	27	16·3	7·6	7·2	5·8
Par. n. a. 1298	—	100	83	—	28	17	—	15	17
Lib. Gl. ²	132	133	171	18·9	17·3	12·9	20·4	11·3	11

It appears, so far as we can judge by a comparison with our Abstrusa-Abolita MSS., that Abstrusa bulks much more largely

¹ Goetz is mistaken in saying (*C. G. L. iv praef. p. xiv*) that Abstr. glosses passed into Lib. Gloss. 'non contaminatae cum altero glossario,' if he means that Lib. Gloss. has no Abol. items: and (*Der Lib. Gloss. p. 62*) that Par. has none either.

² Items marked 'De Glosis' only. Counting also the unmarked items which follow these we get for Ab, Ac a total of 396 glosses, of which 18 % are known Abstr., and 12·8 % known Abol.

in these glossaries than does Abolita, especially in Affatim; and Abstrusa (but not Abolita) is a much larger constituent of Affatim than it is of the other glossaries. Are we then to look for new Abstrusa items particularly in Affatim? Against such an assumption is the fact that Affatim, like our Abstrusa MSS., presents its glosses in abbreviated form. Far more *long* glosses are found in Lib. Gloss., while the English group stands mid-way. This is borne out by the examples of fuller Abstrusa items already quoted from these glossaries on p. 268, which were chosen simply because they seemed to be Virgil glosses. In 14 of these cases the longer gloss is found in Lib. Gloss. Ampl. II has 6 cases, while Affatim has only 2. There are two others where Affatim and Ampl. II are fuller than our Abstrusa MSS., but less full than Lib. Gloss. It is also significant that we find the same relation between these glossaries when we consider their coincidence with the Berne Scholia etc.¹ Of this agreement there are at least 58 cases in Goetz's extracts from Lib. Gloss., 28 in different members of the English group, only 6 in Affatim. It seems likely therefore that Lib. Gloss. may preserve many a long gloss which belonged to the original Abstrusa and has not found its way into the other glossaries; and that to a less extent the same may be true of the Amplonian glossaries.

Of other sources used for these compilations, though we can identify some, we have unfortunately nothing like complete knowledge; and a study of the manner in which their materials are arranged does not give us much help. Lib. Gloss. has, with few exceptions, a strict alphabetical arrangement, so that items from an uncertain number of glossaries are irretrievably mixed. We can separate out those which belong to the collection of glosses with citations², which seems to have been a distinct source, though even here the line is sometimes difficult to draw; and if we limit our view to Virgil glosses there are many others which can be excluded or neglected. In Affatim and the glossaries of the English group we can trace, besides Abstrusa and Abolita, one distinct source in marginalia from an English MS. of Virgil. These are merely the notes of some monastery

¹ Glosses which are not found in
our Abstrusa.

² Goetz, *Der Lib. Gloss.* p. 63.

teacher, and show no sign of the use of learned scholia¹. In spite of its peculiar form of alphabetical arrangement, in which regard is paid not to the letters as such but to the first letter and first following vowel of the lemma, Affatim retains large blocks of Abstrusa glosses; but this is simply due to the great number which it has borrowed in proportion to its other contents. Some Abolita sections of Vat. 3321 are entirely unrepresented, but here and there we do come on small groups of Abolita items. When, therefore, we find that Aff. 533, 10-24 and 26-27 are from Abstrusa, we cannot affirm that 25 is from the same source. There are many such Abstrusa groups with gaps of a single item between: e.g. 534, 2-4, 6-10, 12-17, 19-22. But the intervening gloss may belong to Abolita: e.g. 533, 28 (Abol.) between two Abstrusa pairs, or 535, 23 (Abol.) between 17-22 and 24-29 (Abstr.). Or it may come from another source which we do not know. The Second Amplonian glossary professes to be a combination of two, but both sources might be composite, so that we cannot ascribe to Abstrusa-Abolita everything which does not seem to come from the English teacher's notes. The two which we do know are to some extent kept separate, and there are considerable groups of known Abstrusa and Abolita items: e.g. 259, 18-28 and 31-35 are from Abstrusa. But there has been some mixing also². In the Corpus glossary the same items are generally more scattered. The First Amplonian has two constituents which are kept distinct, the first peculiar to it with Corpus, the second shared also by Ampl. II³. Par. contains at least, like Lib. Gloss., items from Abstrusa and Abolita, the glossary with citations and Placidus. In Lib. Gloss. the first two classes bear alike the mark *De Glosis*, the third *Plac.* Par. does not specify the sources, but the Placidus glosses are placed at the end of each alphabetical section. All the other material, however, is arranged together in an order which regards the first three letters of the lemma. In some parts we can trace fairly compact groups of known Abstrusa items, but even these groups contain intruders at least from Abolita and from the glossary

¹ Mrs Dall, *C. Q.* XII 171 ff.

² Mrs Dall, *l.c.* p. 175.

³ Lindsay, *The Corpus, Epinal,*

Erfurt and Leyden Glossaries (Phil. Soc. Publications).

with citations. In none of these glossaries, therefore, could the position of a gloss be used except perhaps under certain conditions to confirm a claim which had other support; and indeed we get no help in this way. In the St Gall glossary, the arrangement is for the most part by the first two letters only, so that there should be more chance of Abstrusa glosses keeping together; but in fact its use of Abstrusa appears to have been capricious and we do not find groups so well marked as in the glossaries already described.

As many possible Abstrusa glosses are common to several of these glossaries, we must try to determine whether they all borrowed independently, in which case their evidence for the reconstruction of Abstrusa will be of much greater value than if some of them took the material at second hand from others. The fact that each of them has some known Abstrusa glosses which are absent from the others is not decisive. It seems clear in the first place that they fall into two distinct classes, (1) Affatim with the English glossaries and Sangall., (2) Lib. Gloss. and Par.

(1) Affatim and the English group both draw upon a collection taken from the English MS. of Virgil described by Mrs Dall. Affatim and Ampl. II agree in showing some Abstrusa glosses combined: *e.g.* Aff. 471, 14, Ampl. II 261, 2 = Abstr. 7, 18 + 40; Aff. 483, 36, Ampl. II 261, 17 = Abstr. 7, 26 + 47. On the other hand, as we have seen, Affatim is nearer to our Abstrusa MSS. in the abbreviated form of its glosses, while Ampl. II supplies far more long items. Ampl. II is arranged by the first two letters of the lemma; so is the first part of Abstrusa. Now we find glosses standing in the same order in both, *e.g.* Ampl. II 259, 21 = Abstr. 3, 3, 22 = 5, 23 = 6, 24 = 7, 25 = 8, 26 = 10, 27 = 11, 28 = 12, 31 = 15, 32 = 16, 33 = 17, 34 = 18. If Ampl. II had taken these from Affatim, with its arrangement by the first letter and first following vowel, they would have stood in a different order,—21, 24 (Aba-), 20 (Abe-), 23, 25, 31, 32, 33 (Abi-), 22, 34 (Abo-), 26, 27, 28 (Abu-). Nor did Affatim borrow from Ampl. II. At 524, 45 + 46 the compiler of Affatim records the loss of four leaves from an exemplar, and there follows a large gap in the series of known Abstrusa items; whereas Abstrusa

items which appear in the corresponding part of Vat. still appear in Ampl. II. In fact the compiler of Affatim used a pure Abstrusa MS. This might have been suggested by the very small proportion of Abolita items which we found in it, as compared with its Abstrusa items, along with the fact that the borrowing from Abolita is apparently more uniform. But it is clear from the presence of Abolita items in large numbers in the gap where Abstrusa was not available: *e.g.* Abol. 90, 45 = Aff. 525, 38; 90, 48 = 526, 7; 90, 52 = 525, 62; 91, 3 = 525, 64; 91, 5 = 525, 29; 91, 6 = 530, 14; 91, 8 = 529, 52; 91, 9 = 528, 24; 91, 11 = 529, 6; 91, 12 = 531, 7; 91, 13 = 530, 44; 91, 44 = 527, 43; 91, 45 = 528, 59; 91, 47 = 531, 30; 91, 51 = 526, 49; 91, 57 = 528, 12; 92, 10 = 529, 53. So here we have more than the usual borrowing from Abolita to make up for the loss of Abstrusa¹.

Sangall. like Ampl. II has Abstrusa items which belong to the portion which Affatim lacked. That Ampl. II did not borrow from Sangall. we see from their different treatment of the gloss 'Bracata Gallia: Gallia quae incolas suos bracatos habet,' Ampl. II 272, 17 + 19 contrasting with Sangall. 210, 49². This equally indicates a connection between Sangall. and the source or archetype (whatever it was) from which Ampl. II derived the gloss. But the question of the independence of Sangall. is of little importance for our purpose, for it often combines in one item glosses from two different sources, or adapts the one to the other³, so that we cannot rely upon it for replacing lost Abstrusa glosses. We may say that in Affatim and the English group we have two independent witnesses to Abstrusa.

(2) Lib. Gloss. and Par. are linked together by their use of the glossary with citations and of Placidus, and by a series of glosses in which Donatus is mentioned as authority. They are distinguished from Affatim and the English group by their lack

¹ The portion of Vat. which corresponds to the gap extends from about 86, 40 to about 99, 20. The Abstrusa glosses here number 312, which would give 39 to each page of the copy used by Affatim: a number which is probably too large for a single-column

page, but too small for a page of double columns (like Corp.). Our suspicion that Affatim drew from a copy of Abstrusa which was fuller than our MSS. is therefore confirmed.

² See Lindsay, *C. Q.* xi 190.

³ *Ib.* p. 185.

of the glosses derived from the English Virgil. Nor does Lib. Gloss. get its Abstrusa glosses from Sangall. The mistake of our Abstrusa MSS. at 141, 35 (pergenuat: *per* genibus pergit) appears also at Lib. Gloss. 232, 32, while Sangall. 271, 31 shows the correct form. The latter makes only one contribution to our list of known Virgil glosses of Abstrusa which are preserved more fully elsewhere than in our Abstrusa MSS. But it often makes additions to Abstrusa items where Lib. Gloss. agrees with Vat. 3321 etc. Sangall. 256, 6 is a combination of two actual and one possible Abstrusa gloss, all of which occur separately in Lib. Gloss. (Abstr. 110, 43; 111, 1. Lib. Gloss. 219, 7, 8 and 9).

It remains to ask whether Lib. Gloss. and Par. are independent of each other. It is at least clear that the latter is not derived from the former. For Lib. Gloss. is nearly always strictly alphabetical, while the other in each section falls into two parts, of which the first, containing the Abstrusa and Abolita glosses and the glosses with citations, is arranged by the first three letters, the second, containing the Placidus glosses, regards only the first two letters. On the contrary Goetz argues¹ that Lib. Gloss. drew from an earlier copy of the glossary which Par. represents, and in which the distinct sources must have been indicated. His grounds are (1) the common elements already mentioned; (2) the fact that the Placidus glosses exhibit a similar form in both glossaries and evidently belong to the same 'recension': e.g. Lib. Gloss. (*C. G. L.* v 82, 8) = Par. 114, 30 is a combination of two glosses which stand together in the Vatican Placidus (v 29, 38 and 39); (3) the fact that the Abstrusa items in both glossaries also show a common 'recension,' which is nearer to Cass. 439 than to Vat. 3321. So much coincidence, Goetz holds, can hardly be ascribed to chance. Many indeed of the Placidus items of Par. are not ascribed to Placidus in Lib. Gloss., but bear different marks, often *De Gls.* or *Cic.* (i.e. *Synonyma Ciceronis*, a title which does not imply any direct connection with Cicero²): and these, if genuine, might or might not indicate separate sources. Certainty is probably unattainable, but at least in regard to the other classes there is no evidence

¹ *C. G. L.* v praef. p. xiv; *Der Lib. Gloss.* p. 62 f.

² Cf. *Der Lib. Gloss.* p. 5.

to weaken Goetz's conclusion, provided it is not taken as the whole truth. The archetype of Par. which was used by Lib. Gloss. would probably contain only a selection from Abstrusa and Abolita; but there is some reason to think that Lib. Gloss. used another selection, or a complete copy, as well. Of the large number of Virgil glosses which are preserved more fully in Lib. Gloss. than in our Abstrusa MSS., none appears in Par. In Lib. Gloss. we sometimes find *both* the shorter and the longer form: *e.g.* Abstr. 20, 45 with Lib. Gloss. 169, 1 and 3; 21, 52 with 169, 16 and 17; 30, 22 with 175, 19 and 20; 104, 33^a (omitted by Vat.; longer in *a* than in *c d*) with 215, 17 and 18; 106, 26 with 217, 18 and 19; 110, 33^a with 219, 1 and 2¹. Such instances seem to imply the use of two copies, one more complete than the other. The compiler of Lib. Gloss. did not aim at saving space, and had no objection to entering the same item in both its forms. Further, in Abstrusa glosses which reappear in Lib. Gloss. but not in Par., Lib. Gloss. does seem as near to Vat. as to Cass. 439 (*a*) if not nearer; often it shows much more affinity with one or both of the Paris MSS. of Abstrusa (*c d*); and sometimes it preserves a right reading where all our Abstrusa MSS. have the same mistake.

ABSTRUSA	LIB. GLOSS.
5, 7 abiure furare <i>Vat. a</i> abiure furate <i>b c</i> (at 4, 12 abiurac furatae <i>omnes</i>)	161, 4 abiurate furate
13, 35 agitator ventilator iubernator vel auriga <i>Vat.</i> agitator gubernator ventilator aut auriga <i>a</i> agitator ventilator vel movetur <i>c</i>	164, 46 agitator ventilator gubernator 47 agitur ventilatur vel movetur
51, 8 dedecoratio inhonesta dedonestatio <i>Vat. a</i> (inonestas <i>a</i>) dedecoratio inhonestius <i>c d</i>	188, 9 dedecoratio dehonestatio 10 dedecoratio inhonestatio 11 dedecoracius inhonestacius

¹ These cases are quite different from those in which Lib. Gloss. makes two or more items out of one Abstrusa

gloss, *e.g.* Abstr. 51, 8, Lib. Gloss. 188, 9 and 10; Abstr. 105, 39, Lib. Gloss. 216, 5 and 6.

ABSTRUSA

LIB. GLOSS.

63, 7	euhermis sine arma vel sine mensura <i>Vat.</i> emermis sine mensura <i>a d</i> inormis sine mensura <i>c</i>	211, 2	inermis sine arma alias nu- dus
104, 11 (106, 4 ^a)	oculis morsis <i>omnes</i> asculis mordacibus <i>a</i>)	215, 10	oculis mordacibus
106, 9	lecticulos <i>a d</i> lectulos <i>Vat. c</i>	216, 10	lectulos
106, 21 ^a	liptis filius patris <i>a</i> leptis filius fratris <i>c d</i>	216, 30	leptis filius fratris
107, 21 ^a	levigabis dealbabis <i>a</i> levigabis linibis vel deal- babis <i>c d</i>	217, 12	levigabis linibis vel deal- babis
109, 8	aqua <i>Vat. a d (om. c)</i>	218, 20	aquatica
109, 11	linicindelia <i>Vat. a d</i> limicicindelia <i>c</i>	218, 30	lini cicendelia
109, 38	unde et elixare habilis dici- tur <i>Vat.</i> unde et alixare dicitur an- uillis <i>a</i> unde et elixari dicitur. <i>Ly.</i> in utile <i>d</i>	218, 40	unde et elixare dicitur
110, 33 ^a	<i>in c d; om. Vat. a</i>	219, 2	
111, 22	<i>(om. c; def. d)</i> lupercalia gentilium cultor <i>Vat.</i> lupercalia gentilium cultus <i>a</i>	219, 28	lupercalia gentilium cultor
111, 27	fratre mariti <i>Vat.</i> fratrem mariti <i>a</i> frater mariti <i>c</i>	220, 2	frater mariti
118, 44	modestus et modestus et placidus unum est <i>Vat.</i> modestus moderatus placi- dus unum est <i>a</i> modestus et moderatus unum est <i>c</i>	223, 12	modestus et moderatus unum est
125, 5	morio cuius uxor necatur <i>Vat.</i> maritus cuius uxor ne- catur <i>a</i> morio cuius uxor mecat <i>c d</i>	226, 16	murro cuius uxor mechat
135, 15	pactorium plantatorium <i>Vat. a</i> pactorio plantatorio <i>d</i>	229, 40	pacatorio plantatorio 43 pacturio plantatorio

While therefore the archetype of Par. was one of the glossaries used by Lib. Gloss., the latter had also another source of Abstrusa items, which was not only fuller but better than any of our existing copies.

§ 4. We have then, as independent witnesses to Abstrusa, Affatim, the English group, Lib. Gloss. and Par. All these glossaries borrow from Abolita as well as from Abstrusa, but to a much smaller extent, and Mr Weir's article (*l. c.*) shows that a Virgil gloss which suggests an ancient comment as its source is not likely to belong to Abolita. Other than Abstrusa we know of no similar source which is common to these glossaries. In particular, other collections of Virgil glosses which we can trace (the English collection, the items taken by Lib. Gloss. from Virgil MSS. and marked *Virg.*, the Glossae Vergilianae) are much less widespread and, like those of Abolita, are of a different character. In view then of the affinities shown by the Abstrusa Virgil glosses and of the relation to Abstrusa of these other glossaries, we may restore to Abstrusa items which fall under one or more of the following classes. Those which run over into different classes will have all the greater probability.

I. Glosses which show affinity with the Berne Scholia and their kindred. Examples of this class have already been cited (p. 270).

II. Glosses which show affinity with Servius or Servius 'Danielis,' *e.g.*

LIB. GLOSS. 192, 28 elices: sulci ampliores (dulcis in maribus *codd.*) per quos aquae <e>liciuntur. AMPL. I 342, 5, CORP. A 718 aquilici: scrutatores aquarum. AMPL. I 364, 37 harinulcaes (harimulces): repertoires aquarum = CORP. H 18 (harinulces). SERV. 'DAN.' *Geo.* 1, 109 elicit: ab eliciendo. et apud antiquos et hodieque in aliquibus provinciis elices appellantur sulci ampliores ad siccandos agros ducti, unde poeta ipso verbo uti voluit: nam et scrutatores vel receptores (*leg.* repertoires?) aquarum aquilices dicuntur. † barinulas dixerunt (*or* barinulcis, *see Thilo, app. crit.*). LIB. GLOSS. 212, 10 Inporcitore deum pagani habebant agricolae. 228, 28 Occatore, Insitore, Obaratore, Subruncinatore, Satore vel actore (Vervactore *Schoell.*), Aratore (Repar-?), hos homines agricolae pagani deos habuerunt. SERV. 'DAN.' *Geo.* 1, 21 Fabius Pictor hos deos enumerat, quos invocat flamen sacrum Cereale faciens Telluri et Cereri: Vervactorem, Reparatorem, Inporcitem, Insitorem,

Obaratorem, Occatorem, Sarritorem, Subruncinatorem, Messorem, Convectorem, Conditorum, Promitorum. LIB. GLOSS. 174, 36 calones: qui ligna militibus portant. SERV. *Aen.* 1, 39 classis enim dicta est ἀπὸ τῶν κάλων, id est a lignis, unde et calones dicuntur qui ligna militibus portant, et καλοπόδια. AMPL. I 400, 15, CORP. U 199 virga: quod vi sua regat. SERV. 'DAN.' *Aen.* 4, 242 virga vero insigne potestatis est...dicta quod vi regat.

III. Glosses which are supported by the agreement of two or more independent witnesses, especially the agreement of Lib. Gloss. (or Lib. Gloss. and Par.) with one or more of Affatim and the English group or Sangall., and which seem to point back to an ancient comment, *e.g.*

LIB. GLOSS. 165, 36 alveus: quidquid aquam recipit, canales fluvii. AFF. 473, 49 canalis fluvii (*Aen.* 6, 412). LIB. GLOSS. 241, 16 (39) ruscum: lignum foliis spinosum. AMPL. II 329, 31, AMPL. I 387, 53, CORP. R 253 (*Ecl.* 7, 42). LIB. GLOSS. 230, 18 palmes pars vitis est ubi uva nascitur, quasi palma. Cf. PAR. 128, 30. AMPL. I 382, 55, CORP. P 135 pars vitis unde uva nascitur (*Geo.* 2, 364). LIB. GLOSS. 191, 12 dolones: tela abscondita. AFF. 508, 21, AMPL. II 287, 47, SANGALL. 230, 19. Cf. CORP. D 351 (*Aen.* 7, 664).

IV. Glosses which are not presented by more than one witness, but which seem to be derived from a learned source, *e.g.*

LIB. GLOSS. 176, 20 caverna cava: [a]ut grata <m> gratia <m> aut rauca <m> ravim (ruua, rava *codd.*, *corr. Goetz*) et laetam laetitiam Plautus dixit. (*Aen.* 2, 53.) LIB. GLOSS. (in *Thes. Gloss.* s.v.) Manes: dii mortuorum habere (ab aere? *Goetz*) quia manus id est rarus (clarus? *Goetz*) est. Cf. GLOSS. NON. *C. G. L.* v 651, 5 manum clarum et unde manes dicti. (*Geo.* 4, 489.) LIB. GLOSS. 198, 26 Paraetoniae syrtes extra Libycas alias esse ait Lucanus. Syrtes vero Libycae austro flante siccantur. (*Aen.* 1, 111.) LIB. GLOSS. 207, 38 hibernas: magnas et turbidas. hoc Vergilius. Plautus enim 'increpui <hi>bernum.' (*Geo.* 4, 235.) LIB. GLOSS. 206, 37 [h]aruspicina: quam Aruns (arun, arum *cx codd.*, *corr. Goetz*) primo Tuscus invenit, cuius domus fulmine cremuit (!) (*Geo.* 1, 484?)

Sometimes a gloss of this kind in Lib. Gloss. is confirmed by the occurrence of a shorter and a longer form (cf. p. 278) *e.g.*

LIB. GLOSS. 246, 2 stiva: manubrium aratri. 246, 4 stiva velut manubrium est aratri quod manu tenet (tenens? *Goetz*) arator aratrum sistit ut dirigat sulcum. (*Geo.* 1, 174.) LIB. GLOSS. 180, 15 Codrus nobilissimus pastor et poeta fuit. 180, 16 Codrus: nobilissimus pastor significatur et poeta quem Vergilius elegis laudat. Cf. SCHOL. BERN. *Ecl.* 7, 22, and see p. 271.

Two kinds of glosses call for special remark here.

(1) There is a considerable number in which Donatus is cited, and in which it seems clear that the reference must be to his commentary on Virgil: *e.g.* Lib. Gloss. 174, 10; 175, 13; 176, 36. They occur only in Lib. Gloss. and Par., but a few of them are supported by the Berne Scholia etc.

LIB. GLOSS. 175, 13 characteres: modi elocutionum. dicit esse Donatus quos Graeci *χαπακτῆρας* vocant, *ισχνός* (*scinos codd.*) qui tenuis, *μέσος* (*melos codd.*) qui moderatus, *ἀδρός* (*adros codd.*) qui validus intellegitur. Cf. EXPLAN. I (*App. Serv.* p. 1) tres modi locutionum sunt, quos characteras Graeci vocant, *ισχνός* qui tenuis, *μέσος* qui moderatus, *ἀδρός* qui validus intellegitur: and the remarks on bucolic poetry which follow the life of Virgil in the Berne MS. 172 (*Jahrbücher f. Class. Phil.* 4^{te} Supp. p. 742, § 58) 'aut cum tres modi sint elocutionum' etc.

LIB. GLOSS. 244, 10 (Par. 149, 2) *sensa*: nota pro sensu[s] corporis *sensa* dici. Donatus ait 'Epicurus ostendit omnia comprehendere posse *sensa* corporis.' This gloss would seem to belong to the glossary with citations, but like some others of its kind it may have been derived from a note in the 'variorum' commentary with which we are concerned; a quotation from Donatus in which there was the mistake *sensa* for *sensu*. We may perhaps find support for this claim in the Berne Scholia at *Geo.* 2, 246 (on 'at *sapor* indicium faciet' etc.): *v* genera saporum sunt, visus, auditus, odoratus, tactus, gustus,—for this may well be a fragment of a note in which the Epicurean doctrine was mentioned.

On the other hand it is remarkable to find Donatus cited by name in the glossary. Servius mentions him, but our glosses are not from Servius. Adamnan did not use Donatus directly: his immediate sources, according to the Berne Scholia, were Gallus, Gaudentius and Philargyrius. Their names never appear in the glossary, nor, with very few exceptions, those of authorities cited by them. In the Berne Scholia we have many names, but that of Donatus only twice; once in a reference to his grammar (*Geo.* 1, 67) and once in a note which comes from Servius and must probably on that account be attributed to Gaudentius (*Geo.* 2, 4). In the *Brevis Expositio* there is one other occurrence at *Geo.* 2, 514, also from Servius. But there are in these scholia undoubted references to Donatus even though the name is not given: *e.g.* at *Ecl.* 8, 17 ('*nascere praeque diem veniens age*, Lucifer, almus') Philargyrius' note in Schol. Bern. is "*Almus: lucidum. almus tria genera significat, ut 'lux alma' id est can-*

dida, et 'parturit almus ager' id est fertilis, et 'alma parens' id est sancta." Now Explan. II has the same note, but there the lemma is 'praeveniens Lucifer almus,' indicating that in the full commentary there was a reference to the mistake of Donatus, who took *almus* with *Lucifer*. Cf. Lib. Gloss. 219, 10 Lucifer genere neutro dicitur, ut Donatus. At *Geo.* 1, 425 ('lunasque sequentes') Servius says 'Donatus dicit lunas noctes accipiendas, sed male, non enim signa, quae dicturus est, ex nocte, sed ex luna colligimus.' In the Berne Scholia stands the note 'lunas: noctes.' Again at *Geo.* 2, 4 we have in the Berne Scholia 'O Lenae: Lenaeus Liber pater dictus quod leniat. O Lenae: ἀπὸ τῆς ληνός, id est a lacu dicitur. nam quod Donatus dixit ab eo quod mentem deleniat, [propriū Libero patri Lenaeus] non procedit; nec enim potest Latinam etymologiam Graecum nomen accipere.' The second note is Servius word for word, and it shows that the first is Donatus, though without his name. It is clear that Adamnan's commentary contained quotations from Donatus. These quotations, including our Donatus glosses, do not come from Gaudentius, for they are not in Servius; nor, probably, from Gallus. Even the quotations existing in the Berne Scholia are spread over a wider area of Virgil's text than the known extracts from Gallus, and the scanty remains of his notes do not suggest anything of the kind. Mommsen's view¹ that Gallus represents a 'Servius auctus' holds the field, but there is no indication that he enlarged Servius by quoting Donatus where Servius had not already done so. We are left with Philargyrius, whose note on *Ecl.* 8, 17 I have already quoted in connection with a Donatus gloss. Barwick has shown² that Donatus was an important source of Philargyrius' commentary. The latter may have mentioned him by name in much the same way as Servius does,—chiefly where he had occasion to differ from him; and the general character of the glosses is consistent with this view. The Berne extractor seldom names *both* the commentator and his authority; on the other hand it is easy to imagine that the compiler of the glossary was more interested in Donatus than in Philargyrius and his brethren; for he had doubtless been

¹ *Rh. Mus.* xvi 447; Barwick, *l.c.*
p. 95.

² p. 121. Cf. Funaioli, *Riv. di Filol.* xlviii 228 ff.

nourished on Donatus' grammar, but to judge from appearances his studies had not extended far beyond it.

(2) One main source of the *Liber Glossarum* was Isidore¹, extracts from whom were marked *Isidori*, *Isid.*, etc. It is hardly to be expected that the marginal indications of source have always been rightly preserved in the MSS., and the question arises in connection with several classes of items. How, for instance, are we to deal with a gloss marked *De Gls.* which coincides strikingly with Isidore, or with a gloss marked *Isid.* which does not seem to have been taken directly from him, or cannot be traced in him at all? We know that Isidore made a large use of ancient commentators on Virgil², and in particular he very often repeats Servius word for word; so that where a *De Gls.* item coincides not only with Isidore but with Servius we may assume that the source-mark is correct. Glosses which have this mark and agree with Isidore but not with Servius we may also adopt with confidence; for presumably Isidore copied other commentators as faithfully as he did Servius. The use of a common source (probably Donatus) is shown by a coincidence like that of *Lib. Gloss.* 254, 14 *uligine: sordes limi aut aquae* (*De Gls.*) with *Isid. Etym.* xvi 1, 5 *uligo sordes limi vel aquae sunt*. Such cases are found also in our *Abstrusa MSS.*, e.g. *Abstr.* 145, 22 *poculum: calix vel scyphus vel omne vas in quo bibendi est consuetudo*, with *Isid.* xx 5, 1 *poculum a potando nominatum; est enim omne vas in quo bibendi est consuetudo*. Sometimes the coincidence extends also to the *Berne Scholia*, e.g. *Lib. Gloss.* 239, 20 *rastrum: ferramentum culturae; aut a radendo terram aut a raritate dentium rastros dicimus*; with *Schol. Bern. Geo.* 1, 155 *rastris: raritate dentium dicti*; and *Isid.* xx 14, 6 *rastra quoque aut a radendo terram aut a raritate dentium dicta*. Contrast Servius *Geo.* 1, 94 *rastra dicta quia terram radunt*. In fact unless a *Lib. Gloss.* item is clearly derived from Isidore, the coincidence may be taken as a proof that we are dealing with an ancient comment.

¹ Chiefly the *Etymologiae*, but other works also. See Goetz, *Der Lib. Gloss.* p. 46.

² See Philipp, *Die historisch-geo-*

graphischen Quellen in den Etymologiae des Isidorus von Sevilla, Berlin 1912, 1 pp. 35 ff.

On the other hand Lib. Gloss. sometimes credits Isidore with a gloss which is only in part, or not at all, to be found in his works. The explanation of this seems to lie in the fact that Lib. Gloss. used a compilation by Julian of Toledo, who worked over some of Isidore's writings and was himself apparently known as 'Isidore Junior'.¹ So a gloss marked *Isid.* which suggests an ancient source but does not appear to be derived from Isidore may really come from Julian, who may have taken it from Donatus. Again, the actual mention of Isidore in the Berne Scholia does not prove that he was used by Adamnan or by any of Adamnan's sources; for Funaioli² has pointed out that these citations seem to have been introduced into the Berne MSS. from a compilation of a similar nature to that used by the Lib. Gloss., and which exists in a Basel MS. under the name of Isidore (Junior). These facts, along with the detailed study of the very numerous coincidences between Isidore, the glossary and the Berne Scholia, make it unnecessary to adopt with Barwick³ the somewhat difficult assumption that Isidore wrote a commentary on Virgil which has been lost. The genuine coincidences with works of Isidore are accounted for by the use of a common source, and we know that in his *Etymologiae* and *Differentiae* Isidore did draw largely from commentaries on Virgil.

Lastly, there are cases in Lib. Gloss. where Goetz prints the source-mark *Isid.* in error: e.g. 214, 39 labrusca: vitis silvestris, dicta quod in labris ruris (rubi *codd.*) nascuntur. This gloss has no mark in the MSS., though the last preceding mark is *Isid.*, and it does not come from *Etym.* xvii 5, 3 'labrusca est vitis agrestis quae in terrae marginibus nascitur: unde et labrusca dicta, a labris et extremitatibus terrae' (from Servius on *Ecl.* 5, 7), for this item also appears in the glossary. Our gloss finds its real double in Adamnan: silvestris vitis, ideo quod in labris ruris id est in saepibus nascitur (*Explan.*, *Ecl.* 5, 7. Cf. *Schol. Bern.*, from Philargyrius). Similarly 218, 1 licini (*i.e.* lychni): cicindelia lucernae, and 218, 30 lini: cicindelia lucernae, are marked *Isid.* by Goetz though they have no mark in the MSS.

¹ References in Teuffel⁶, III p. 540. ence, 1914, p. 77.

Goetz, *Der Lib. Gloss.* p. 77.

³ *L.c.* p. 118.

² *Schol. Vat. Reg. ad Verg.* Flor-

Isidore (*Etym.* xx 10, 2) says 'licinius autem quasi lucinius; est enim cicindela lucernae,' and this too occurs in the glossary, with the source duly indicated. The other two glosses are one, and reproduce Abstr. 109, 11. The double item may be due to the use of two copies, one of which had the mistake *lini* in the lemma; but such a 'cross-reference' where a mistake has been corrected is quite common. The last example (218, 1 along with the Isidore gloss) illustrates a phenomenon which occurs frequently in Lib. Gloss.,—two closely similar glosses, of which one is derived from Isidore, the other evidently from his source: and in many cases that source is clearly a non-Servian commentary on Virgil.

H. J. THOMSON.

ST ANDREWS.

THE IBIS OF OVID.

In 1894, when my recension of the Ibis had been published in Postgate's *corpus poetarum Latinorum*, I intended to put together a paper discussing various problems which the poem presents, and in particular defending and explaining my alterations of its text. From this design I was led away by other interests, and the editors of Ovid were left staring at a set of very puzzling objects,—conjectures which I had proposed because I had read the Ibis with attention, and whose cause and aim were obscure to those who had not. Within the last few years I have published two articles upon some of my proposals: one in this Journal, xxxiv pp. 222–38, on my transposition of certain distichs, the other in the *Classical Quarterly*, ix pp. 31–8¹, on my correction of verse 512. I will now take leave of the poem by adding a series of remarks, general and particular, upon matters which may still seem to need explanation or discussion. But first I will correct one error in my text, and mention four other places where I should now alter it.

praesidio in 283 is a slip of the pen for *subsidio*. In order to force myself to think about every detail, I made a manuscript copy of the whole poem, which I sent to the printer; and this is one of those errors of transcription which are caused by anticipating a coming word, here *praesens*.

In the same verse, knowing what I now know of the MSS (see pp. 291 sq.), I should write *praesens sit* for *sit praesens*; in 284 I should write *nihil* instead of *nil*, for the reason which I gave in the *Classical Review* xxxiv pp. 57 sq.; in 415 I should write *Achaemenidis* for *Achaemenidae* (see p. 314); and in 470 I should write *Dexithoes* or rather *Dexitheae* for *Dexiones* (see pp. 300–4).

¹ In this paper, on p. 32 (where I twice wrote 'Autonoe' by mistake for 'the Sibyl'), the *ire uiro* which I restore

at Sil. xiii 800 may be supported by the *ire sorori* of xv 327.

I.

The first editor to furnish the *Ibis* with an apparatus criticus was Merkel in his recension of 1837. His collations, 18 in number, are mostly derived from the unpublished papers of Heinsius, among them the collation of F, called C in his edition; V, called A in his edition, was collated by Moriz Haupt; the rest of the 18 MSS are without importance.

Ellis in 1881 gave, or rather professed to give, collations of 10 MSS, including F (as he chose to call it, though Merkel had attached this letter to another MS) and V (as he chose to call Merkel's A). Only seven of them are worth anything: FG (again a letter to which Merkel had given a different meaning) H (another yet) PTVX. As for the remainder, M is merely a copy of H, and neither Vat.¹ nor Parm. contains anything of merit which is not to be found in one or more of the seven.

The same is true of certain excerpts from a Florentine 'exemplar ex Marcia bibliotheca' made by Politian in the Bodleian copy of the ed. Parmensis 1477. The Zamoscianus saec. XV adduced by R. Foerster in *Rhein. Mus.* 1900 p. 453 contains only verses 1-37 and in them nothing of importance or even of interest except the *audiat* 27 which it shares with G. The corrupt and corrected Bodleian cod. Canonicianus 20, of 1500 or thereabouts, collated by Mr Winstedt in *Class. Rev.* 1899 pp. 395 sq., has one lection of note, *thaleceae* 502 for the *paphegee* etc. of the other MSS; but this only shows that some scholar of the renaissance had anticipated Heinsius in conjecturing *Phalaeceae*.

The florilegia excel the complete MSS in two readings, 109 *calidus* Atr. Par. Brit. Bodl. for *clarus*, and 135 *iaziges* Atr., *iatiges* Par., for *iapiges* and worse. The repertorium uocabulorum exquisitorum of Conradus de Mure preserves *astacide* at 515, where the MSS have various corruptions, and slightly excels them in *theudocus* 466 and *Euenus* 513. The late MSS and early editions provide many corrections: 36 *quem*, 84 *chao*, 145 *nolim*, 178 *egypti*, 229 *imbuerunt*, 249 *accedent*, 256 *armati...inermis opem*,

¹ A possible exception is the *nichil arcei* of Vat. in 284, which is nearer than the *nil rethei* of most MSS to the true reading *nihil Hercei*; but it may be merely a corruption of a correction.

272 *Demodoci*, 284 *ercei*, 323 *Aleuas*, 348 *Tisameni*...*Calliuros*, 357 *facit*, 366 *foris*, 391 *sex bis ut*, 412 *cercionea*, 434 *Threicius*, 463 *cygneius*, 466 *Theudotus*, 483 *Hypsipyles*, 500 *quae*, 545 *Harpagides*, 569 *acerno*, 571 *Anaxarchus*, 573 *Psamathes*, 600 *Orpheos*, 616 *obstructo*. But the MSS on which we depend for the tradition of what Ovid wrote are the seven which I selected in my recension of 1894.

F = Francofurtanus. G = Galeanus, in Trinity College, Cambridge. H = Holkhamicus. P = Phillippicus, now at Berlin. T = Turonensis. V = Vindobonensis. X = Parisinus. The date of one or two is not settled, and is not worth settling: none is much earlier than 1200, and none perhaps much later than 1300.

An apparatus criticus constructed by Ellis is never complete and never completely intelligible. This I already knew when I undertook to edit the *Ibis*, and even if I had not known it I should have begun to learn it in the course of my task. But I did not yet know, what subsequent experience taught me, that he never in his life collated a MS nor even grasped the meaning of the word *collation*. I consequently supposed that he knew the readings of his MSS even where he did not report them, and that his reports themselves were true except where they were self-contradictory; and I contented myself with asking him to supplement them or to clear them up. Sometimes he could, sometimes he could not. 418: text *qui*; note (wrong end foremost, as often) '*que* FHMPVX, *quē* Vat., *qui* G Conr. bis.' What has T? I asked him, and he said *que*. 137: text *mollia pabula*; note '*mollia pabula* FTV Paris. Atrebat., *pabula mollia* PX, *mitia pabula* G.' What has H? I asked him, and he could not tell. 345: text *Dryantiadae*; note '*driantides* P, *driantide* TV, *drianthide* Conr. bis, *driantiade* G unde *Dryantiadae* scripsi cum Riesio et ed. Rubei.' What have FHX? I asked him, and he replied 'no entry for HF: *driantide* X: *Dry(!i)antiadae* may be inferred for F.' 362: text *sua uel Pterelae*; note '*sua* GPVX, *tua* FT Conr., *tibi* M. *pterele* P, *pterere* Vat., *pteleri* F, *sterole* T, *terele* HV, *cherele* X, *cerele* M, *terei* G, *therele* Conr.' What has H for *sua*? I asked him, and he said *tibi*, and he added (contradicting his own note) that it had *cerele* for *Pterelae*, which is not true.

The defects which my enquiries revealed in Ellis's knowledge of F and V I could repair, or thought I could, from the apparatus criticus of Merkel: to repair the defects in his knowledge of H, which were most conspicuous, I applied to Lord Leicester's librarian, Mr A. J. Napier. But no defects, or hardly any, were perceptible in Ellis's knowledge of the best and most important MSS GPT; and there I thought I might trust him. Trust however was not encouraged when Chatelain in 1894 published a photographic reproduction of the first page of V, which furnished the following additions to Ellis's apparatus: 2 *carmen*] *tempus*. 10 *manus*] *meas* corr. in *manus*. 17 *meae* om. 24 *melius* (after *nostras*) expunged. 29 *at*] *ft*. 30 *quod licet hei*¹. And mistrust was so confirmed by the progress of my acquaintance with Ellis's publications that I have now thought it advisable to ascertain for myself the readings of the two most important MSS G and T. G is in the library of my own college, and of T I possess photographs given me by Prof. D. A. Slater. To these I have added the much less important H, which I have been able to examine, by the kindness of Lord Leicester, in the Cambridge University Library. The following corrections or additions (I omit a few mere trifles) are to be made in Ellis's reports of these three MSS.

21 *profugae*] *nostre* H. 24 *noluit* (not *uoluit*) T. 42 *et*] *aut* H. 49 *nondum ferro*] *ferro nondum* T. 60 *iudicii*] *inditii* G. 65 *calendis* H. 84 *chao*] *chori* T. 95 *ibin* T. 99 *ades*] *adest* G. 107 *annis*] *pontus* T. 120 *quum*] *cum* GHT (and doubtless FPVX). 137 *molliā pabula* H. 141 *tunc* G (Ellis contradicts himself), *tum* T. 142 *mores* H. 177 *quaeque*] *atque* H. 189 *monimenta* G. 194 *aves* H. 198 *aut*] *et* GHT (also F according to Merkel, and very likely PX in spite of Ellis's silence). 220 *ibi* T. 233 *uinxerunt* or perhaps *iunxerunt* H. 247 *disces*] *disce* T. 259 *amintorides* H. 272 *ut*] *et* H. *Demodoci*] *democri* H, *demophodi* (not *demodofi*) T. 275 *melior tumidis* H (Ellis contradicts himself). 277 *sollertique* H. 280 *aquis* (misprint)] *equis* GH. 283 *sit praesens*] *praesens sit* HT. 290 *humor* H. 294 *immensum*] *inmensum* if not rather *immersum* G. *proiciare*] *praecipitere* H. 331 *euridamas* H. 345 *driantide* H. 350 *tideus* H. 351 *uenerem iunxit*] *iunxit*

¹ But at 22 the reading is *ipse*, as *ille*, as Merkel states and as I stated it should be from Ellis's silence, not in reliance on him.

(or *vincxit*) *uenerem* H. 359 *thesti* H (Ellis contradicts himself). 362 *sua*] *tibi* H. 383 *Therodomanteos* T. 388 *ut*] *aut* T. 389 *penus* H. 391 *ycaridos* H. 407 *cum* H. 418 *qui*] *que* T. 426 *conficiare*] *destituare* H. 454 *frigios* H. 467 *Abdera*] *addera* G (which Ellis cites from X). 471 *martertera* G. 488 *driops* H. 497 *eadem*] *eadem et* G. 500 *quod* GT. 510 *cressia* T. 515 *As-tacidaeque*] *Tacide quo* G, *Hycacideque* T. 546 *caesus*] *scelus* (not *sectus*) H. 549 *utue*] *utque* H. 552 *habent*] *habet* T. 571 *anaxarnis* (not *-arrus*) H. 581 *frs* H. 596 *dilaniet*] *dilaceret* H. 606 *sic tua uirus*] *corpora uirus* G. 611 and 612 are not omitted by G. 611 *tuis laedaris*] *datus ladaris* G (whence Ellis would have conjectured *dati*s if he had noticed it). 615 *lumine*] *limine* G. 617 *Mineruae*] *diane* G. 628 *eat*] *erat* corr. in *erit* G. 639 *sint* H. 641 *dii* H. 643 *post modo* H.

These errors and oversights¹, however discreditable to Ellis, have done little harm to Ovid; and there are only four verses on which it is necessary to make any remark. In 49 the order of words

sic ego te ferro nondum iaculabor acuto,

preferred by Heinsius, conforms to Ovid's usual practice of balancing substantive and adjective in the verse, and now that T as well as FP is found to support it the contrary evidence of GHVX for *nondum ferro* is not superior: there may however be some force in what Merkel says, or rather seems struggling to say in his usual inarticulate fashion, that the latter lays the right stress on *nondum*. In 283 the rhythm of

nec tibi subsidio praesens sit numen, ut illi

¹ Mr Owen's report of H in the *tristia*, though he says 'contuli diligentissime,' appears to be no more accurate. I have checked it by the MS for book II, and I find that the following additions or corrections are needed. 61 *quid*] *quod*. 65 *illic*] *illis*. 67 *fit*] *sit*. 111 *patrio*] *toto* with *uel patrio* superscript. 113 *ut...nec*] *et...et*. 114 *sit*] *fit*. 122 *non*] *tamen*. 137 *in illo*] *ab urbe*. 143 *honeratam*] *hornatam*. 150 *continuasse*] *continuisse*. 175 *et*] *es*.

176 *dimidio*] *dimidioque*. 203 *ister*. 213 *pectora*] *numina*. 226 *metum*] *metu*. 235 *non*] *nec*. 251 *submouimus*] *sūmouimus*. 261 *genitrix*. 262 *genetrix*] *genitrix et*. 291 *adoranti*] *adorande*. 379 *indicio*] *iudicio*. 397 *tetrice*] *tretrice*. 411 *qui*] *quod*. 419 *monimentis*. 433 *Memmi*] *memi*. 447 *tibulus*. 476 *deceat*] *deceat et*. 493 *hic* (misprint)] *his*. 495 *describentibus*] *describentibus*. 523 *uarios uenerisque*] *ueneris uariosque*. 547 *credas opus*] *tempus credas*.

is more Ovidian than *sit praesens* and was preferred by Merkel and Riese; but from the silence of Ellis's apparatus it appeared that the *sit praesens* of his text was in all his MSS.¹ It is in G, but it is not in T nor H, and we must now doubt whether it is in any other of the seven, for Merkel certainly implies that F and V have *praesens sit*: this reading therefore I should now adopt. In 500

dixerat inuiso *quod* mala uerba deo,

now that Ellis's report of G is found to be false, there is no authority for *quae* in any good MS; but I still prefer it, as Heinsius and Merkel did. Similarly in 198

inde ego pauca canam, frondes ut siquis ab Ida
aut summam Libyco de mare carpat aquam,

aut is better than *et*, even though it proves to have less authority.

After my corrections and supplements to Ellis's reports of GHT, the text of these three MSS is at length fully known to the public, but not the text of any of the other four. As regards F and V there are contradictions between Ellis and Merkel; and although, when two scholars in succession report upon a MS, the second usually keeps the report of the first before his eyes, and means his own report, where it differs, to be taken as correcting the other, this is not what happens when the second scholar is Ellis; and on occasions when I called his attention to discrepancies between Merkel's apparatus and his own, it appeared that he had not previously noticed them. As regards P and X we have no witness but Ellis, and what that means we know by this time. But though a fresh examination of these MSS would certainly disclose omissions and errors in his report of them, I do not suppose that here, any more than in GHT, the corrections would render any appreciable service to the text of Ovid. I do not intend to collate the MSS myself, nor do I urge any other scholar to that undertaking, unless he thinks he can find nothing better to do.

I subjoin a list of the changes and additions required in my apparatus criticus by my present knowledge of the MSS; I also

¹ The other editors subsequent to Ellis have overlooked this, and are lucky in their oversight.

repair three errors (404, 470, 540) and two omissions (61, 431) of my own, and I add at 211 a lection which perhaps deserves to be recorded.

22 *ille* GHVX] delete V. 49 *fer. non.* FP] add T. 61 *qui* PVX] add F ex sil. Ell. et Merk. 98 et 99 *ades* GX] G in 99 has *adest.* 107 add '*amnis. pontus* T, *potus...unda* F.' 198 add '*aut* V, et FGHT, de PX siletur.' 211 add '*non. nec in* FTV.' 256 after *inermis opem* insert ς . 281 delete '*redemi* C bis' on the authority of Anton Meyer, *Die quellen zum Fabularius des Konrad von Mure* p. 119. 283 add '*praesens sit* HT et ex Merkelii silentio FV, *sit praesens* G, de PX siletur.' 348 *cal-lirices* C] *callirces* teste Meyero. 351 *iun. uen.* TV] add H. 383 *Therodomanteos* GHV] add T. 388 add '*ut* GPX, *aut* FHTV.' 404 *temporibus* GHTV] delete HV and add PX¹. 431 *repetas* H] add V on Merkel's authority. 434 delete '*tu cereique* C' and add C after *tu tereique*. 470 delete '*sicut coni.* Kinkel.' 497 et om. GH] delete G. 500 *quae* G, *quod* cett. (de TX siletur)] *quae* ς , *quod* O (de X siletur). 515 *Tacideq.*] *Tacide quo.* 540 fort. *urbis*] *urbis* ς . 572 add '*tritaq. (al. circaq.)* C.' 596 *dilaceret* FV] add H. 611 sq. om. G] delete. 617 add '*diane* FG.'

The relations of the seven MSS to one another may be represented thus:

G...XP..T..F.H.V

The nearest akin are X and P; next in closeness is the tie between H and its two neighbours F and V; T stands more apart, and G still more. G and V are the most unlike to one another, and G's next neighbour X is further away from it than are the next neighbours of other MSS from them.

Before asking which is the best MS we must determine what we mean by goodness. The MS whose readings are oftenest right is P: both Ellis and I, though our texts² differ in more than 80 places, follow P more frequently,—I only a little more frequently,—than any other MS. Second, by the same test, comes T; then

¹ *temporibus* has the better authority, but *diuersis vulneribus* is more expressive, and resembles met. v 141 '*matre sator una diuerso vulnere fudit.*'

² Of the other editors since 1881,

Guethling (1884) generally follows Ellis, and Mr Owen (1915) generally follows me; Merkel's text of 1884 is more independent but less satisfactory than either.

begins divergency, and G compares very differently with our two recensions; tried by Ellis's it is third or fourth, tried by mine it is seventh.

Ellis	Housman
1. P	1. P
2. T	2. T
3. {F G	3. V
5. V	4. F
6. X	5. X
7. H	6. H
	7. G

But if the best MS is that which oftenest is right when all the rest are wrong, or nearer the truth when all the rest are further away, then P descends to the third place, and the first and second are occupied respectively by G and T according to Ellis, by T and G according to me.

There is one place where, beyond all question, G alone of the seven MSS is right, 488 *iuuit*. There are three where, though not certainly right, it is preferred to the rest by all the latest editors, from Ellis onwards, 139 *tecum bella geram*¹, 443 *aut*, 470 *Dexiones*; and five more where it is preferred by most of those editors, 27 *audiat*, 30 *qua*, 159 *colubre*, 293 *ethreclides*, 625 *uisceera*. There are six where only a minority prefers it, 16 *uiui*, 211 *illuxit*, 285 *a*, 316 *ossa*, 365 *uestigia*, 434 *tu Teleique*; one where nobody prefers it but Ellis, 492 *nomine fecit* (though Merkel builds a conjecture on this reading); and one, 173 *uocabere*, where nobody prefers it but Merkel. Altogether Ellis prefers it in thirteen places, I in eight (now seven only), and three of my seven are places where Ellis does not prefer it.

The places where I prefer T alone to the six other MSS are thirteen: 76 *netis*, 85 *canentur*, 135 *iapiges*, 142 *exanguis*, 233 *uinxerunt* (but here H perhaps agrees), 293 *uictus*, 329 *leneus*, insertion between 338 and 339 of 439 sq. and 461 sq. without 637 sq., 366 *membraque*, 380 *quos*, 387 *demisit*, 449 *et*, 472 *ut*. Of these places there are seven where all recent editors share my preference, 76, 135, 233, 329, 387, 449, 472; two more, 142 and 293, where I am in the majority; and yet two more, 366

¹ Calp. buc. i 50 *secum bella geret*.

and 380, where one other editor agrees with me. Ellis prefers T in eight places out of my thirteen.

The two MSS therefore compare as follows :

G

preferred by all in 4 places
preferred by most in $4 + 5 = 9$

T

preferred by all in 7 places
preferred by most in $7 + 2 = 9$

But now let us turn from their peculiar merits to their peculiar faults. These are so much more numerous that it is impossible to give them all ; but out of each MS I have made what I hope is a fair and representative collection of readings somewhat conspicuously different from those of the other MSS and rejected by the consent of recent editors.

G : 24 *non sinit*, 34 *gelido tepidus*, 58 *quamvis non soleam*, 61 *nondum quis sis*, 65 *festo*, 103 *mortales*, 110 *lumina*, 126 *deserat* (for *torqueat*), 131 sq. om., 153 *erit*, 174 *impia*, 189 *monimenta*, 191 *credas*, 205 *tot ue tibi uenient misero*, 264 *clarus...sumptus*, 267 *postquam*, 308 *matre parante*, 311 *gratissima*, 325 *roma*, 362 *terei*, 375 *artis*, 407 *de*, 409 *in humum*, 420 *sepe*, 437 *perille tuo*, 439 *ore*, 459 *ne penam*, 538 *oculos*, 606 *sic tua...corpora*, 637 *sciticas*, 641 *tibi*, 644 *sub*.

T : 56 *quoque*, 98 *precor*, 201 *inhorreat*, 275 *tumidi tibi sit melior*, 276 *uise*, 287 *yrioni*, 355 *necem miseris*, 385 *rapax*, 406 *ipse...urbe*, 430 *consternati*, 443 *utque*, 493 *ad*, 555 *fauniadum*, 586 *et...ut*.

These readings are not all necessarily false, and a partisan of either MS could cram a good many of them into the text. But readings certainly false are much commoner in G than in T, and T has none so bad as some of G's, 103 *mortales*, 205 *tot ue tibi*, 325 *Roma*, 362 *Terei*, which are deliberate interpolations.

In our preferences of P there is little disagreement between Ellis and me and the other recent editors. All of us regard it as right or nearest the truth in five places, 256 *armatis*, 362 *pterele*, 502 *paphegee*, 545 *arpacides*, 560 *aniti* (though in 256 and 502 its superiority is very slight), and most of us in one more, 335 *ypomenida*. Further in 30 *et* it is preferred by two editors, in 181 *qui distat summus* by Ellis alone.

Its singularities are universally rejected in 12 *suo*, 15 sq.

post 18, 28 *potior*, 30 *quam*, 48 *uelitis*, 54 *dicta*, 98 *rogo*, 408 *una*, 457 *magnae subito*, 523 *que om.*, 562 *tua* (for *sic*); but two of these, 12 and 457, are possibly or even probably true. It thus has fewer errors peculiar to itself than any other of the seven MSS, and, as I have said, it is the MS with which modern texts most closely agree; only it has less singularity in merit than T and G.

The remaining MSS are singly assigned preeminence in the following places:

F: by all in 272 *ut*, 461 *Cassandreus*, 615 *obstructus*, 631 *Rutulo*; by most in 190 *manibus* and 551 *derepta*.

H: by all in 200 *cylissa*, 470 *ypponoo*, 539 *conditor...tardae*, 525 *utque*, 555 *Potniadum*; by most in 515 *decisa*.

V: by all in 199 *nascantur*, 256 *uulnus*, 270 *thelemus*, 511 *aleue*, 531 *licophrona*; by most in 444 *fati* and 478 *Thaso*.

X: by all in 99 *ades* and 391 *sexus ut*.

They are single in somewhat conspicuous errors, or readings deemed erroneous by the editors, as follows: F in 12 places, H in 18, V in 23, X in 16.

The upshot of these investigations is that T emerges as the best MS on the whole, while the next best is P or G, according as general correctness or singularity in merit is the more esteemed. I was trusting too much to memory and impression when I said in J. P. xxxiv p. 223 that the order was roughly TGXPV FH. This puts X a good deal too high: in spite of its affinity to P and G it is much less correct than the one and much less important than the other.

II.

Consideration of a question which concerns the poem as a whole, and affects the criticism or interpretation of several verses, may take its start from the couplet 291 sq.

utque parum $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{mitis} \text{ GHPTVX} \\ \textit{fidus} \text{ F} \end{array} \right\}$, sed non inpune, Prometheus
aeris uolucres $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{sanguine} \text{ GPTX} \\ \textit{corpore} \text{ FHV} \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{fixus alas} \text{ PT} \\ \textit{pasce tuo} \text{ FGHV} \end{array} \right\}^1$.

¹ The reading of X is not given by Ellis and cannot be inferred from his silence; he told me he had 'no entry.'

The same thing is said over again in 543 sq.

fixus et in duris carparis uiscera saxis
ut cui Pyrrha sui filia fratris erat;

and the earlier distich was condemned by Saluagnius and Bentley. Schrader in lib. emend. c. XIII, approving its deletion, takes occasion to say on p. 230 'in his Diris poeta bis idem non dicit,' and again on p. 233 'Ovidius iisdem exemplis in breui carmine non utitur.' Merkel on the other hand, professing to contradict him, says on p. IX of his edition of 1884 'fabularum argumenta aliquot mutata paulum elocutione iterata esse a poeta nemo dubitat.' Assertion and counter-assertion are equally wanting in precision: I will show what Ovid's practice actually was; and it will prove to be just what might have been expected, the practice of a reasonable man.

He would not have been reasonable if, after saying at 347 'may you run mad like Hercules,' he had scrupled to say at 605 'may you be consumed by venom like Hercules,' or if anywhere he had shrunk from mentioning one person twice in connexion with two of his misfortunes. But he would have been unreasonable and indeed ridiculous if he had twice imprecated on his enemy the same misfortune of the same person; and he has not done so.

The persons whom he twice mentions or unmistakably signifies are the following. Adonis: 503 as killed by a boar, 565 as expiating by death an incestuous origin. Astyanax: 496 as hurled from a height, 563 as witnessing the fall of his city. Hercules: 347 as plagued with madness, 605 as consumed by venom. Lycaon: 431 as setting human flesh before Jove, 473 as struck by lightning. Macareus: 357 as having an incestuous sister, 562 as bereft of his love. Orestes: 348 as plagued with madness, 527 as killed by a serpent. Thyestes: 359 as having an incestuous daughter, 429 as frightening away the Sun. Ulysses: 277 as shipwrecked, 567 as killed with the sting of a ray. There is no repetition, not even in the case of Adonis; for the stain of his birth might have been expiated by many other deaths than the death which he actually died.

But the two imprecations in 291 sq. and 543 sq. are identical:

not only is the same person mentioned but he is mentioned for the same reason. This is not merely absurd but unique in its absurdity, and is therefore to be got rid of. Which of the two couplets is spurious nobody can doubt, and the cause of its interpolation is not obscure. In this long catalogue of pains and penalties the interpolator could find no reference, such as anyone would expect, to the famous sufferings of Prometheus, whom he did not recognise under the title of 'Pyrrha's paternal uncle.' He therefore wrote 291 sq. somewhere in the margin: in most of our MSS the couplet stands after 290, but in H after 288, and it was absent from Saluagnius' 'membranae San-Victorianae'.¹

At any rate repetitions ought not to be imported by conjecture; and Ellis's conjecture at 327 will import one. The MSS have

quaeque in *Adimantum Phillesia* (*Phylesia* sim.) regna tenentem
a Ioue uenerunt te quoque tela petant.

Nothing is known of Adimantus² or his kingdom, but that is no reason for altering a verse in this poem, much less for altering it into '*Aphidantum Phylacesia* (or *Phyllesia* or *Phialesia*) regna tenentem' and explaining it of Lycaon; for Lycaon is instanced as struck by lightning in 473 sq.

ut ferus Aeolides, ut sanguine natus eodem,
quò genita est liquidis quae caret Arctos aquis.

I at least cannot interpret this couplet otherwise than Sanctius and Desselius did, 'like Salmoneus, and like his cousin, who was Callisto's father' (the genealogy is Zeus, Hellen, Aeolus, Salmoneus; Zeus, Pelasgus, Lycaon). I do not see how *quo* can be referred to *eodem* and *natus* made to signify a brother of Callisto's, for all her brothers, or all with one exception, were struck by

¹ In what form the verses were written by their author, and whether in any of the various forms which they wear in the MSS, is another and a minor question. *sanguine* (*corpore*) *fixus alas* in the pentameter is not so bad as *sanguine* (*corpore*) *pasce tuo* with its impossible imperative; and in the hexameter *fidus* is evidently no

more than an attempt to amend *mitis*. I suppose that *parum mitis* is a rendering of Aesch. Prom. 944 τὸν μικρῶς ὑπέρπικρον.

² The fiction of Mr C. Zipfel must be sought on pp. 51 sq. of his dissertation 'quatenus Ovidius in Ibide Callimachum...secutus sit,' Lips. 1910: I will give it no further publicity.

lightning, and it will be necessary to write *eodem sanguine nati* with MSS of no authority.

That there is no repetition involved in the mention of Lycaon at 431 for one reason and at 473 for another I have already said; and bearing this in mind let us approach the verses 617 sq.

illius exemplo uioles simulacra Mineruae

Aulidis a portu qui leue uertit iter.

Of the three who sailed from Aulis and profaned an image of Athena, neither Ulysses nor Diomed could be indicated by '*leue iter*': this is Ajax Oilei, who tore Cassandra from the goddess's statue, and who appears in Homer's catalogue of the ships as small and nimble and lightly armed, 'Οἰλῆος ταχὺς Αἴας, | μείων, οὗ τι τόσος γε ὅσος Τελαμώνιος Αἴας, | ἀλλὰ πολὺ μείων· ὀλίγος μὲν ἔην, λινοθώρηξ. And it is no hindrance to this interpretation that Ajax recurs at 341

utque ferox periit et fulmine et aequore raptor,

since punishment for the violation of the statue might take many other forms than death by thunderstroke and drowning.

The same holds good of 447 sq., upon which there is more to be said.

et quae *Penthides* fecit *de fratre* Medusae

eueniant capiti uota sinistra tuo.

penthides FV, *pentides* GHPX, *pentelides* T.

de fratre FHTV, *fraterque* GPX.

Saluagnius, apparently in ignorance of the variant *de fratre*, explained *frater Medusae* as Eurystheus; but his statement that Eurystheus '*multa uota sinistra in Herculis exitium fecit*' is an impudent and comical fiction: antiquity never heard of these vows, and would have laughed at the notion; Eurystheus himself would have laughed at it. Even if we had to abandon the distich without hope of explaining it, *de fratre* would be preferable to *fraterque*, because it is more likely that Ovid defined the vows of one person than that he left the vows of two persons undefined. Nothing has ever been made of *Penthides*; but in a scholium on 577 (Ellis p. 97) *ponthei* appears as a corruption of *Pitthei*, and here Saluagnius '*cum aliquibus editionibus*' proposed *Pitthides* (though he spelt it *Pittheides* because he knew no better, like

the modern editors who give *Tereides* in 434). This conjecture will draw support from *de fratre Medusae*, and in its turn will confirm that reading against *fraterque*. We know at least of one imprecation uttered by Theseus with terrible consequences: its object was Hippolytus, and Hippolytus by one account was *frater Medusae*. Medusa was daughter of Phorcus, and Phorcus according to Servius at Verg. Aen. v 824 was 'Thoosae nymphae et Neptuni filius'; Neptune therefore was the common grandfather of Medusa and Hippolytus, and Hippolytus was her *frater patruelis*, in which sense the simple *frater* is used at met. XIII 31 and her. VIII 28. The far-fetched description is quite in the manner of this poem, and it has its purpose, since the curse of Theseus on Hippolytus was fulfilled by Neptune, the ancestor whom he shared with Medusa; and Theseus, in keeping with this allusion, is called *Pitthides* and not *Aegides*. This reading and interpretation meet with no obstacle in 577 sq.

utque nepos Aethrae Veneris moriturus ob iram
exul ab attonitis excutiaris equis;

for the imprecation of Theseus on Hippolytus was not that he might be thrown from his chariot, and it could have been fulfilled in many other ways: there is no more repetition here than in the two introductions of Ajax Oilei at 341 and 617 or of Adonis at 503 and 565.

This is also the place to consider two distichs on which much light has fallen since 1894. •

469 sq.

aut Iouis infesti telo feriare trisulco

ut satus Hipponoo {*Dexithoes*}
 {*Dexiones*} que pater

dexithoes HT, *dexitoes* P, *desithoes* X, *dexithoos* F, *desithoos* V, *dexiones* G.

475 sq.

ut {*Macelo*} rapidis {*iacta est*}
 {*Macedon*} {*ictus*} cum coniuge flammis

sic precor aetherii uindictis igne cadas.

macelo FT, *machelo* G, *macedo* HPV, *macedon* X.

iacta est FGHPV, *ictus* TX, *icta est* 5.

To clear the way, I had better begin with the *Dexiones* of G in 470, adopted, though doubtfully, by Ellis and all succeeding editors. *Dexiones pater* is supposed to be Aesculapius, a notable example of death by lightning, and not elsewhere mentioned in the Ibis. But the statement in Ellis's note 'Dectionen siue Dexionen nomen tertiae Aesculapii filiae esse recte intellexit Kinkel Lycophr. p. iv' is false¹, and 'sicut coni. Kinkel' in my note is an expansion of the falsehood. Kinkel is there commenting on etym. magn. 434 15 sqq., where Aesculapius is said to have had a wife named Ἡπιόνην, ἐξ ἧς αὐτῷ γενέσθαι Ἰάσωνα, Πανάκειαν· Δεκτίων ἐν ὑπομνήμασι Λυκόφρονος, and what he says is simply 'Dectionem hunc nullum esse uocabulumque hoc nomen tertiae Aesculapii filiae expulisse, inter uiros doctos iamdudum constat': that is, the true reading may be something like Ἰασὼν, Πανάκειαν, Ἀκεσώ (or Αἰγλην)· ὥς Θέων ἐν ὑπ. Λυκ. All that can be said for *Dexiones* in Ib. 470 is that the name of a daughter of Aesculapius would be appropriate, and that in etym. magn. 434 15 sq., where we expect the name of a daughter of Aesculapius, we find a word beginning with Δεκ.

The scholia on the Ibis, which are much more fabulous than the poem itself, inform us that *satus Hipponoo* (in whom they do not recognise Capaneus) was named Demeus or Procrustes. This does not prepare us to believe them when they proceed to say that *Dexithoes* or *Dexiones pater* was one Pantacrita (or Acrita or Pactama or Pauacurta), struck by lightning for no fewer than three reasons, (1) 'pro nequitia sua,' (2) as 'contemptor deorum,' (3) 'quia filiam suam interfecerat quia Iouem cum ea concubuisse audierat.' But two of them agree on another story: P 'Telchinum princeps fulmine periit cum tota sua domo excepta filia cuius erat Iupiter usus hospitio,' Conradus de Mure 'Telchinon princeps periit cum tota familia eius fulminatus excepta *Dexithoe*, a qua Iupiter quadam uice fuerat hospitatus.'

This legend reappears in a scholium cited at 475 sq. by

¹ Equally false in his statement 'Sophocles, teste eodem Etymologo 256 6, cum Aesculapium hospitio excepisset, post mortem ἡρώφῃ sub nomine Dexionis colebatur, quasi filius ac

Dexiones frater.' The words of the etym. magn. are ὠνόμασαν αὐτὸν Δεξιῶνα ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ Ἀσκληπίου δεξιώσεως· καὶ γὰρ ὑπεδέξατο τὸν θεὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ οἰκίᾳ.

Saluagnius in his edition of 1661: 'Nicander dicit *Macelon* filiam *Damonis* cum sororibus fuisse. harum hospitio Iupiter susceptus, cum *Thelonios* (i.e. *Telchinas*), quorum hic *Damo* princeps erat, corrumpentes uenenis successus omnium fructuum, fulmine interficeret, seruauit eas. sed *Macelo* cum uiro propter uiri nequitiam periit. ad alias seruatas cum uenisset *Minos*, cum *Desitone* concubuit, ex qua creauit *Eusantium*, unde *Eusantiae* fuerunt.' Otto Schneider at *Nicand. fr.* 116 in 1856 and at *Callim. fr.* 504 in 1873 corrected *Desitone* to *Dexitheia*, *Eusantium* to *Euxantium*, and *Eusantiae* to *Euxantiadae*, comparing *Apollod. bibl.* III 1 2 Μίνως...παῖδας μὲν ἐτέκνωσεν...ἐκ δὲ Δεξιθέας Εὐξάνθιον and *schol. Apoll. Rhod.* I 185 Εὐξαντίου τοῦ Μίνως, passages which make it clear that the scholium is no mere figment. Next, in 1876, Rohde on p. 506 of his *Griechische Roman* brought this *Macelo* into relation with *Nonn.* *Dion.* XVIII 35-8 Ζῆνα καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα μὴ ξείνισσε Μακελλῶ | (here there is a verse or more wanting) καὶ Φλεγύας ὅτε πάντας ἀνερρίζωσε θαλάσση | νῆσον ὅλην τριόδοντι διαρρήξας Ἐνοσίχθων | ἀμφοτέρας ἐφύλαξε καὶ οὐ πρήνιξε τριαίνη. Ellis in 1881 printed scholia resembling that of *Saluagnius* from *P* (which corrects *Thelonios* to *Telchinas*, as Rohde had conjectured) and from *Conr. de Mure*: the former has *Macedo filia Damonis*, the latter *Macedon Dānethis filia*; the former *Dexione*, the latter *Dexithoe*; the former does not say that 'Macedo' was destroyed, the latter says that 'Macedon' was destroyed because 'successus omnium fructuum inuidia corrūpīt.'

At this stage the question stood as follows. There was no evidence, except some MSS and scholia at this verse 475, that any person named *Macelo* had ever been struck by lightning, nor even that *Macelo* was the name of any person. A person with the similar name of *Macello* was mentioned by *Nonnus*, but mentioned, as was pretty clear despite the mutilation of the passage, not as incurring punishment but as exempted from punishment incurred by her folk. On the other hand *Macedon* was at any rate a Greek name, and death by thunderstroke might conceivably have befallen either the Μακεδόνα γηγενῆ of *anon. descr. orb.* 620 in *Muell. geogr. Gr. min.* I p. 220 or τὸν εἰκημάχον Μακεδόνα cited from *Caesarius Mign. bibl. Gr. patr.*

uol. 38 p. 993 by Lobeck Agl. p. 575 and Ellis p. 181. It therefore seemed to Guethling and me that the safest course was to accept provisionally the lections *Macedon*¹ (or *Macedo*) from HPVX and *ictus* from TX.

But then came the successive publication of Bacchylides in 1897, Pindar's Paean in 1907, and, more important than either for these verses of the Ibis, some 90 lines of the aetia of Callimachus in 1910. These furnished the following evidence.

Bacchyl. I (for Argius of Ceos) 3-17 Μίνως...βαθύζωνον κόραν Δεξιθέαν δάμασεν...δεκάτω δ' Εὐξ[άντι]ον [μηνὶ τέ] κ' εὐπλόκ[αμος νύμφα], 73 [Μακ]ελὼ δὲ...[φιλ]αλάκατος (Blass).

Pind. Paean. (Oxyrh. pap. v 841) IV (for the Ceans) 40-5 (Euxantius speaks) τρέω τοι πόλεμον Διὸς Ἐννοσίδαν τε βαρύκτυπον· χθόνα τοί ποτε καὶ στρατὸν ἀθρόον πέμψαν κεραυνῶ τριόδοντί τε ἐς τὸν βαθὺν Τάρταρον, ἐμὰν ματέρα λιπόντες καὶ ὅλον οἶκον εὐερέα.

Callim. aet. (Oxyrh. pap. VII 1011) 64-9 (Xenomedes wrote the history of Ceos) ἐν δ' ὕβριω θανατόν τε κεραύνιον, ἐν δὲ γόητας | Τελχίνας μακάρων τ' οὐκ ἀλέγοντα θεῶν | ἦλεὰ Δημόνακτα γέρων ἐνεθήκατο δέλτοις | καὶ γρηῖν Μακελὼ μητέρα Δεξιθέης, | ἃς μούνας, ὅτε νήσον ἀνέτρεπον εἵνεκ' ἀλιτρῆς | ὕβριος, ἀσκηθεῖς ἔλλιπον ἀθάνατοι.

This settles the reference and reading of Ib. 470. The man there signified as struck by lightning is the father of Dexitheia of Ceos, whose name, it appears from Callimachus, was Demonax; and the *dexithoes* etc. of the MSS should be corrected, as Jurenka at Bacchyl. I 5, following Otto Schneider's hint, proposes, to *Dexitheae*. Δεξιθέα is evidently ἡ δεξαμένη θεοῦς (Ζήνα καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα Nonn.), and Δεξιθή would be meaningless. That the error is not Ovid's but the scribes' I infer from what happens to the similar name Λευκοθέα in Latin MSS. Ovid. fast. VI 501 and 545 *Leucothea* codd. opt. aliique, -oe dett., Ciris 396 *Leucothea* A¹R, -toa H, -thoe A² dett., Stat. Theb. VI 12 *Leucothea* P

¹ The form *Macedon* derives no strong support from X, in which the words are transposed *ut Macedon ictus rapidis*; but *Macedo* is a form which Ovid would not use. Horace used it,

though not as a proper name, and Seneca might have used it; but in Ovid there are 40 examples certified by metre of Greek nominatives in -*ōn*, and not one of the Latin form.

(saec. ix) ceterique, ix 402 *Leucothean* idem, -*oan* man. rec. in P, Cic. n. d. iii 39 *Leucotheam* V (saec. x) aliique, -*toe* Harl. (saec. xv), 48 *Leucothea* omnes: I omit writers like Seruius and Hyginus. On the other hand the MSS of Propertius, being late and bad, give *Leucothoe* ii 26 10 and *Leucothoen* 28 20, and so do the earlier if not better MSS of Ovid met. iv 542, but there the scribes were fresh from the *Leucothoe* of verses 196, 208, 220, who is a different person, like the Aurelia *Leucothoe* of C. I. L. ii 1694: *Leucothoe* in Claud. nupt. Hon. 156 may be Claudian's own mistake. Such forms as *Leucothee* and *Dexithee* in Latin have neither authority nor probability.

But at 475 sq. increase of knowledge has brought no diminution of perplexity. Macelo is now a person, not a mere name, but the more we learn about her the less does she fit this place. Far from being struck by lightning, with or without her husband, she escaped the stroke which slew him and all her people excepting only her daughter *Dexithea*. Perhaps the best way out of the trouble is to trust yet further those scholia which have been shown to deserve at least some trust. Nicander, whom they give as their authority, may have told the tale otherwise than Callimachus and Nonnus: to him Macelo may have been, as the scholiasts call her, the daughter and not the wife of Damon (or *Demonax*), and she may have perished 'cum uiro propter uiri nequitiam,' whoever her husband was.

Either way, there is no repetition in 469 sq. and 475 sq.: *Dexithea*e pater and *Macelonis cōiunx* are not the same person. If we believe Callimachus, the Macelo whose husband was *Dexithea*'s father did not perish with him by lightning: if we believe the Nicander of the scholia, the husband with whom Macelo perished by lightning was not *Dexithea*'s father but her brother-in-law.

III.

My correction of *uiro* to *Iouis* in 512, and my transposition of the verses 135-140, 181 sq., 203 sq., 409 sq., and 459 sq., as I said on p. 287, are defended elsewhere; so I will now proceed to the other verses on which I have remarks to make, and I will take them in their numerical order.

11, 12.

ille relegatum gelidos Aquilonis ad ortus
non sinit exilio delituisse meo.

This couplet is cited by Eutyches G. L. K. v p. 475 in the following form :

ille relegatum *gelidas* Aquilonis ad *oras*
non sinit exilio delituisse *suo*.

Although Eutyches and even his MSS are much older than the MSS of the Ibis, these divergencies from our text are of little weight, because his sole concern is with the conjugation of *relego*, and grammarians do not trouble to be exact in such particulars as are foreign to the matter they have in hand. *oras* is less exquisite than *ortus*, and as two of Eutyches' best MSS give *legidos* and *agelidos*, it may be that *ortus* is what Eutyches himself had written. But the *suo* of Eutyches is the reading also of P and several inferior MSS in the Ibis; and this agreement between two independent authorities is noteworthy and may be significant. Though Ovid speaks of himself, the pronoun of the 3rd person in this sentence is not impossible nor even incorrect.

25—28.

huic igitur meritas grates, ubicumque licebit,
pro tam mansueto pectore semper agam.
audiet hoc Pontus. faciet quoque forsitan idem
terra sit ut propior testificanda mihi.

In this text of most MSS and editions the sense of *audiet hoc Pontus* is 'audiet me grates Augusto agentem'; and quite good sense it is if you read no further. But if you do, Ovid is found hoping for the day when he will 'call to witness' some region less remote than Pontus; and what is the point or meaning of that? he has said nothing of calling Pontus to witness anything, nothing of any *testificatio*. The missing notion is supplied by the jussive *audiat hoc Pontus* of G and two inferior MSS: that is 'audiat hoc quod modo dixi, grates me semper acturum esse.' In these words he 'testificatur Pontum'; and he hopes that some day Augustus will transfer him to a region nearer home,

and enable him to say, for instance, 'audiat hoc Phrygia,' when he repeats his declaration.

audiat was first adopted by Guethling and Merkel in 1884, but I doubt if they understood its necessity or were moved by anything but the same heedless partiality for G with which they accepted its highly inappropriate *uiui* for *miseri* in 16. There is no similar doubt about Mr Ehwald: when he writes in Burs. Jahresb. vol. 43 p. 262 'ich halte den Conjunctiv hier für ebenso unpassend wie *sentiat* trist. 1 1 14 und *experire* Ibis 250 (248),' he shows that he has no apprehension of the problem.

131, 132.

et prius hanc animam, nimium tibi saepe petitam,
auferet illa dies quae mihi sera uenit.

saepe, still more *nimum saepe*, is at variance with Ovid's account of the circumstances. Ibis had shown him no enmity before his banishment, and since his banishment he can hardly have found opportunity for *frequent* attacks: what he did, according to verses 11—22, was to bring a lawsuit against Ovid laying claim to some of his property. I have therefore accepted Heinsius' conjecture *saeue*, so that *nimum* belongs to *petitam*. The two words are confused at Mart. xiv 211 2, Stat. Theb. xi 379, and elsewhere; and the vocative is like 29 *uolente*, 40 *improbe*, 130 *perfade*.

187—190.

noxia mille modis lacerabitur umbra, tuasque
Aeacus in poenas ingetriosus erit.
in te transcribet ueterum tormenta uirorum:
omnibus antiquis causa quietis eris.

uirorum in 189 is not merely a vague but an inappropriate word; the *reorum* of Heinsius is accepted by Merkel and Riese and supported by the following parallels: Sen. H. f. 579–81 'qui fronte nimis crimina tetrica | quaerunt ac *ueteres* excutiunt *reos* | deflent iuridici Threiciam nurum,' Claud. in Ruf. ii 494 sq. 'dum lites Stygiiue negotia soluit | dura fori *ueteresque reos* ex ordine quaerit,' Drac. Orest. 499 'non sat erunt quaecumque *reis tormenta* paratis.' It may have shrunk to *rorum* and then have been expanded to *ui-rorum*, or perhaps *deorum* was the

corruption and *uirorum* its correction. At Prop. III 5 39 'sub terris sint iura deum et tormenta gigantum,' where the last word is hardly apposite and the Neapolitanus omits it, I proposed *tormenta reorum* in J. P. XXI pp. 165 sq.

In 190 almost all MSS have *omnibus* and almost all editors *manibus*, the reading of F. This is not, like *uirorum*, inappropriate, but it is still somewhat vague, and we have no assurance that it is more than a conjecture. Heinsius' conjecture *sontibus* is nearer to *omnibus*, and *ueterum...reorum* supports and is supported by *sontibus antiquis*. Perhaps it is worth while to quote Sen. H. f. 1222 sq. 'inferorum carcer et *sonti* plaga | decreta turbæ' and Claud. in Ruf. II 478 '(Minos) iustis dirimit *sontes*.'

It may not sound credible, but it is true, that Mr Owen defends *uirorum* by citing ex Pont. I 3 61 sq. 'i nunc et ueterum nobis exempla uirorum, | qui forti casum mente tulere, refer,' and *omnibus* by citing Rutil. Nam. II 57 'omnia Tartarei cessent tormenta Neronis.' The former of these citations helps to show that the *uirorum* of Ib. 189 is corrupt, and the latter lends support to *sontibus* in 190.

217—220.

lux quoque natalis, nequid nisi triste uideres,
turpis et inductis nubibus atra fuit.
haec est, in fastis cui dat grauis Allia nomen,
quaeque dies Ibin, publica damna, tulit.

The last couplet is thus punctuated by most editors, and is interpreted accordingly by such commentators as do interpret it. It means then 'this (the birthday of Ibis) is the dies Alliensis and the birthday of Ibis' This nonsense would be converted into sense if *haec est* were changed to *est eadem*; but there would remain the absurdity of *publica damna* in apposition with Ibis, who was nothing of the sort: the meaning of the phrase may be seen from cons. Liu. 200 cited by Ellis, 'consulis erepti publica damna.'

That Heinsius punctuated the distich otherwise,

haec est, in fastis cui dat grauis Allia nomen;
quaeque dies Ibin publica damna tulit,

is probably a fact of no significance; for he often used the semicolon instead of the comma (as in 579 sq. 'propter opes magnas ut perdidit hospes alumnum; | perdat ob exiguas te tuus hospes opes'), and omitted the commas which serve to indicate apposition (as in 81 'uos quoque plebs superum Fauni'). But his punctuation nevertheless is right, and answers to the true construction. The pentameter means 'eaeque dies, quae Ibin tulit, publica damna tulit' and repeats in another form what has been said in the hexameter, that the birthday of Ibis and the dies Alliensis are the same: compare rem. 220 'damnis Allia nota suis.' The *haec est* of the hexameter resembles trist. iv 10 11-4 'Lucifer amborum natalibus affuit idem; | una celebrata est per duo liba dies. | *haec est* armiferae festis de quinque Mineruae | quae fieri pugna prima cruenta solet.'

221—226.

qui simul inpura matris prolapsus ab aluo
 Cinyphiam foedo corpore pressit humum,
 sedit in aduerso nocturnus culmine bubo
 funereoque graues edidit ore sonos.
 protinus Eumenides lauere palustribus undis
 qua caua de Stygiis fluxerat unda uadis.

Ovid causes Ibis to be born in Africa, the native continent of savage beasts and venomous reptiles, and in the region most infested by serpents, *Cinyphiam humum*, the neighbourhood of the Syrtes. The exact spot is near a *palus*¹ and a river which issues from the world below; and this spot can be identified by comparing the following passages. Apoll. Sid. carm. 15 6 *Cinyphio Tritone*. Strab. xvii p. 836 ἔστι δὲ ἄκρα λεγομένη Ψευδοπενιάς, ἐφ' ἧς ἡ Βερενίκη τὴν θέσιν ἔχει παρὰ λίμνην τινὰ Τριτωνιάδα, ἐν ᾗ μάλιστα νησίον ἐστὶ καὶ ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἐν αὐτῷ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ λιμὴν Ἑσπερίδων, καὶ ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλει Λάθων. Luc. ix 347-56 'torpentem Tritonos...paludem...quam iuxta Lethon tacitus praelabatur amnis | *infernis*, ut fama, trahens obliuia uenis.' Solin. 27 54 'circa extimum Syrtium cornum Bernicen ciuitatem adluit

¹ The *palus* is recognised as lake Tritonis by Mr A. Rostagni, Contr. al. sc. dell' antich. vol. iii. pp. 21 sq.

Lethon (*Leton* Plin. n. h. v 31) *amnis inferna*, ut putant, *exundatione* prorumpens.’

‘illa uerborum constructio, *Eumenides lauere palustribus undis qua caua unda de Stygiis uadis fluxerat*, plane est inelegans’ says Saluagnius. The repetition is hardly worse than 627 sq. *agebat...acta* and others which can be cited from Ovid or at least from Ovid’s MSS; but if any change were to be made I should think Saluagnius’ *paludibus undis* less likely than *palustribus antris*. The MSS of Claudian 12 35 are divided between *antris* and *undis*, and some of Ovid’s have *undis* for *antris* at met. II 269 and *antris* for *undis* at v 48; *antra* means valleys in Prop. I 1 11, 2 11, IV 4 3, and perhaps also in Sil. II 59 sq. ‘Phorcynidos *antra* Medusae | *Cinyphiumque* Macen,’ since the Gorgons are not usually represented as dwelling in a cave.

282.

a duce Puniceo.

Here I said ‘*Puniceo* non Ouidianum.’ *punicus* is used in both senses, ‘red’ and ‘Carthaginian’; but the only other example of *puniceus* in the latter which Lachmann could produce at Lucr. II 829 was from the lex Thoria; and though Georges cites *Punicea religio* from ‘Liv.’, what I find in Liu. XXII 6 12 is *Punica religione*. There is however one other place in Ovid where this form seems to have this meaning, met. v 536 ‘*puniceum* curua decerpserat arbore pomum’; for although the adjective might describe the colour of the pulp of the pomegranate, it cannot easily be dissociated from the name *punica malus*, which indicates the country whence the fruit came to Italy. But the *Cinyphio* (*cinifeo*, *cinyphis*, *cenifeas*, *cinisso*) of a few late MSS, though probably no more than a conjecture, may yet be a true one; for this epithet is extended to things Carthaginian in Stat. silu. IV 3 90 sq. ‘qualis *Cinyphius* tacente ripa | *Poenos* Bagrada serpit inter agros,’ and to Iuba, who has less right to it, by Ovid himself in met. xv 755.

365, 366.

ut iuuenes pereas, quorum fastigia uultus
membraque Pisaeae sustinuere fores.

365 *fastigia* FHPTX et corr. in *uestigia* G, *proiecta cadauera quorum* V.

366 *membraque* T, *brachia* FGH, *oraeque* V, *quorum* PX; *olim* 5.

fores FGHPTVX, *foris* 5.

Saluagnius Heinsius and Burman printed *fastigia...olim...foris*, Merkel and Riese *proiecta cadauera quorum | oraeque...fores*, both of which may be set aside as disregarding the best MSS: Ellis's '*quorum uestigia, uultus, | brachia...fores*,' though accepted by Guethling, may be set aside for another reason, that Oenomaus was not at all likely to nail up the *feet* of his victims; and Ellis himself in his note is evidently repentant. That *fastigia* should be kept is certain: the chief question is what should be read at the beginning of the pentameter. *quorum* is impossible and seems to be only an accidental repetition from above, but either *bracchia* (with asyndeton) or *membraque* would satisfy the sense. I have preferred *membraque* because both *brachia* and *oraeque* would arise much more easily from (*mem*)*braque* than it could arise from either of them, or than either of them could arise from the other. *membra* may be compared with Luc. II 162-5 '*scelerum non Thracia tantum | uidit Bistonii stabulis pendere tyranni, | postibus Antaei Libye, nec Graecia maerens | tot laceros artus Pisaea fleuit in aula*.' I doubt however if this completes the restoration of the couplet: Ellis indeed says '*ut ad fores brachia (membra), ita uultus in fastigiis merito proponendi erant*,' but to me this separation is artificial and surprising, especially in view of fast. I 557 '*ora super postes affixaque brachia pendent*' and Verg. Aen. VIII 196 sq. '*foribusque adfixa superbis | ora uirum...pendebant*,' and I think that *foris* is a true correction. Ovid has half-a-dozen examples of the singular in the sense of the plural, such as fast. II 738 '*custos in fore nullus erat*.'

379, 380.

ut qui Bistoniae templo cecidere Mineruae,
propter quod facies nunc quoque tecta deaest.

380 *quod*] *quos* T, Conr. de Mure. *tecta*] *torta* HT.

This couplet alludes, it is generally agreed, to the history told in Iust. xx 2 3—5 'Metapontini cum Sybaritanis et Crotoniensibus pellere ceteros Graecos Italia statuerunt. cum primum urbem Sirim cepissent, in expugnatione eius *Li iuuenes amplexos Mineruae simulacrum* sacerdotemque deae uelatum ornamentis *inter ipsa altaria trucidauerunt.*' The Minerua of Siris, according to Strabo vi p. 264, had been brought from Troy: if Ovid calls her *Bistonía* or Thracian it may be because of some story connecting Siris in Italy with Siris in Paeonia, which lay on the Thracian side of the Strymon and not very far from the Bistones, or with the Σίρες (Σίρες Lobeck) ἔθνος Θράκης ὑπὲρ τοὺς Βυζαντίους of Stephanus Byzantius. But this goddess did not veil her face at the murder and sacrilege; she closed her eyes: Lycophr. 988 γλήναις δ' ἄγαλμα ταῖς ἀναιμάκτοις μύσει, schol. διὸ ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ ὀργισθεῖσα ἔμυσεν, Strab. vi p. 264 τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τῆς Ἰλιάδος ξόανον..., ὅπερ καταμῦσαι μυθεύουσιν ἀποσπωμένων τῶν ἱκετῶν...δείκνυσθαι δὲ καὶ νῦν καταμῦθον τὸ ξόανον. I believe therefore that the *quod facies* and *quos facies* of Ovid's MSS arise from *quofacies*, that is

propter quos acies nunc quoque tecta deaest.

Compare Gratt. 97 *caecas aciem* A, *caeca faciem* B, Ouid. met. iv 464 *omnes acie* meliores libri, *omnes facie* deteriores, Val. Fl. iii 502 *Perses faciem* V for *Perses aciem*; Cic. n. d. ii 142 '*acies ipsa, qua cernimus, quae pupula uocatur, ...palpebrae, quae sunt tegumenta oculorum,*' Ouid. her. xxi 199 '*tecto simulatur lumine somnus.*' And this, *quos acies*, appears to have been read by the scholiast of P, who is the best scholiast: '*quos ne Minerua uideret, fecit sua lumina operiri*' (see Iuu. vi 433 '*oculis bilem substringit opertis*')¹.

395—398.

ut quos Antaei fortes pressere lacerti
quosque ferae morti Lemnia turba dedit,
ut qui post longum, sacri monstrator iniqui,
elicit pluuias uictima caesus aquas.

¹ Some of the other scholiasts seem to have had before them the *torta* of HT, which they try to interpret with 'oculos suos retorsit,' 'ultu retorto,'

'facie uersa.' *torta* is not capable of these senses: it might mean, as Ellis says, 'distorta.'

The principal verb of the sentence, which extends from 365 to 412, is *pereas* in its first verse. At 396 Ellis was unusually attentive, and enquired 'unde hic Lemniades?' The victims of Antaeus go before, the first victim of Busiris follows after; the context is full of deaths inflicted by violent oppressors and suffered in turn by themselves; and the wives of Lemnos, as they steal in on tip-toe to murder their husbands in their beds, are incongruous intruders. The epithet *Lemnía* carries my mind to a person who would be more at home in this verse and who actually appears in a couplet not far away, 405 sq., 'ut pronepos, Saturne, tuus, quem reddere uitam | urbe Coronides uidit ab ipse sua.' This is Periphetes the son of Hephaestus, called Corynetes from his club: Apollod. bibl. III 16 2 (Θησεύς) Περιφήτην τὸν Ἡφαίστου καὶ Ἀντικλείας, ὃς ἀπὸ τῆς κορύνης ἦν ἐφόρει Κορυνήτης ἐπεκαλεῖτο, ἔκτεινεν ἐν Ἐπιδαύρῳ. πόδας δὲ ἀσθενεῖς ἔχων οὗτος ἐφόρει κορύνην σιδηρᾶν, δι' ἧς τοὺς παριόντας ἔκτεινε. ταύτην ἀφελόμενος Θησεὺς ἐφόρει, Plut. Thes. 8 1 ἐν τῇ Ἐπιδαυρίᾳ Περιφήτην ὄπλῳ χρώμενον κορύνη καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Κορυνήτην ἐπικαλούμενον, ἀπτόμενον αὐτοῦ καὶ κωλύοντα προάγειν συμβαλὼν ἀπέκτεινεν· ἡσθεῖς δὲ τῇ κορύνῃ λαβὼν ὄπλον ἐποίησατο καὶ διετέλει χρώμενος...τὴν κορύνην ἐπεδείκνυνεν ἡττημένην μὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, μετ' αὐτοῦ δὲ ἀήττητον οὔσαν, Diod. IV 59 2 ἀνεῖλε τὸν ὀνομαζόμενον Κορυνήτην, χρώμενον τῇ προσαγορευομένῃ κορύνῃ, ὅπερ ἦν ὄπλον ἀμυντήριον, καὶ τοὺς παριόντας ἀποκτείνοντα, Paus. II 1 4 Περιφήτην Ἡφαίστου νομιζόμενον κορύνη χαλκῇ χρώμενον ἐς τὰς μάχας, Æuid. met. VII 436 sq. 'tellus Epidauria per te | clauigeram uidit Vulcani occumbere prolem.' That his victims should be first mentioned in 396 and then he himself in 405 sq. is like the mention of Diomed's victims in 381 sq. and Diomed in 401 sq., or the Minotaur's in 373 sq. and the Minotaur in 408. *turba* then I take to be a corruption of *claua*. The change could be traced through changes of letters from *claua* to *truba* and so to *turba*; but I should rather suppose that *turba* is due to the frequency of this noun with an attendant epithet at this place in the pentameter: *noxia turba* 174, *Cresia turba* 510, *ebria turba* 612, *barbara turba* her. VIII 12, rem. 594, fast. VI 374, trist. V 10 28, and so forth. *Lemnīus* is Vulcan in met. IV 185, and here *Lemnía* is *Vulcania* as

Amphrysia is *Apollinea* in Verg. Aen. vi 398 *Amphrysia uates* and as *Paphia* is *Veneria* in Stat. silu. v 4 8 sq. *Paphia lampas*.

407.

ut Sinis et Sciron et cum Polypemone natus.

That this verse must contain a mention of Procrustes was always pretty clear from the similar passages her. ii 69 sq. and met. vii 433-45; and a comparison of Paus. i 38 5 *ληστήν Πολυπήμονα ὄνομα, Προκρούστην δὲ ἐπὶ κλησιν*, Plut. Thes. 11 1 *Δαμάστην τὸν Προκρούστην*, Apollod. epit. 1 4 *Δαμάστην, ὃν ἔνιοι Πολυπήμονα λέγουσιν*, appeared to show that Procrustes was the person here called Polypemon. But then arose the question, who could be meant by Polypemon's son. Sinis is his son in Apollod. bibl. iii 16 2 and Sciron in Prob. ad Verg. georg. i 399, but nothing was known of any other. This difficulty however is now removed, and the verse is elucidated by Bacchyl. xviii 27-30, with which I compared it in the Athenaeum of Dec. 25, 1897: *Πολυπήμονός τε καρτερὰν σφῦραν ἐξέβαλεν Προκόπτας, ἀρείονος τυχὼν φωτός. cum Polypemone natus* means 'Procrustes and his father Polypemon.' Although Pausanias regards the two as one, and although Procrustes (whom Bacchylides calls Procoptes and others Damastes) is said by Hyginus fab. 38 to have been the son of Neptune, it is evident that Bacchylides and Ovid followed another story.

415-418.

qualis Achaemenides Sicula desertus in Aetna,
Troica cum uidit uela uenire, fuit.
qualis erat nec non fortuna binominis Iri,
quique tenent pontem, quae tibi maior erit.

In editions earlier than mine these four verses have no construction. The punctuation here given, which is that of Saluagnius, Heinsius, Burman, and Ellis, is not improved nor even really altered by Merkel and Riese and Guethling when they place a colon instead of a full stop at the end of 416. For the two distichs are simply a pair of relative clauses dangling

from the sky: when the apodosis ought to arrive, there arrives in its stead a third and subordinate relative clause, *quae tibi maior erit*. This was perceived by Schrader, who proposed to delete 417 sq. and assume the loss of a couplet before 415, and after him by Merkel, who marked 418 as corrupt. Ellis, who marked as corrupt the single and probably genuine word *maior*, perceived nothing of the sort, and it would have been strange if he had, for in his text of the Ibis there are some 40 passages with no more construction than this; passages not ungrammatical in themselves, but rendered so by his punctuation.

Corruption however is not here confined to verse 418, and before I approach the main difficulty I will deal with another. The construction, so far as it goes, is 'qualis fuit Achaemenides, nec non qualis erat fortuna Iri (qualis)que (est¹ fortuna eorum²) qui tenent pontem.' But the destitution foretold to Ibis, if it resembles the destitution of Irus and of beggars on the bridge, will resemble the destitution of Achaemenides, not Achaemenides himself. *Achaemenides* therefore should be a genitive depending on *fortuna*, which should be supplied from below as the subject of *fuit*; and the words should be written and punctuated thus:

qualis Achaemenidis³, Siculo desertus in Aetna

Troica cum uidit uela uenire, fuit,

qualis erat nec non fortuna binominis Iri etc.

Such alterations by copyists who cannot stay an instant to learn the construction of a word are very frequent: in Catull. 64 136 sq. 'nullane res potuit *crudelis* flectere *mentis* | consilium?' the scribe has written *crudeles...mentes* without even waiting for the next line.

¹ For *est* thus supplied from *erat* compare e.g. trist. i 5 78 'illum Neptuni (premebat ira), me Iouis ira premit.'

² For the omission of *eorum* compare e.g. Nep. x 9 5 'quam...sit...miseranda uita (eorum) qui se metui quam amari malunt.'

³ As I said in J. P. xxxi pp. 249 sq., there is no metrical evidence to determine with certainty whether a poet

would write *Achaemenidis* or *Achaemenidae*. In my edition I printed *Achaemenidae*, and that is the gen. of the patronymic; but as to the proper name the mss of the poets, Hor. epist. ii 2 184 and Pers. v 180 *Herodis*, Phaed. iv 23 20 *Simonidis*, bear out, so far as they can, the statement of Priscian G. L. K. ii p. 246 that the termination *-is* was usual.

In 418 the MS reading is *que*, for the *qui* of G is merely an accommodation to the gender of *pontem*. This is the one word which must be altered; there is no other word which need. To restore a construction and a sense without regard for likelihood is easy enough: for example, '*uel tibi peior*¹ erit,' that is 'talīs, uel peior, tibi fortuna erit'; or '*uae*, tibi talīs erit².' But *maior*, since *fortuna* in this passage means *opes*, possessions³, is too appropriate an adjective to be altered without necessity; and change should be confined if possible to the one word which neither sense nor construction admits. These would be satisfied by '*nec tibi maior erit*,' that is 'talīs, nec maior, tibi erit fortuna'; but a much lighter alteration, considering how often *p* and *qu* are confused, is '*spe tibi maior erit*': 'such beggary as that of Achaemenides, of Irus, of mendicants on the bridge, shall be more wealth than you can hope for.' The scruple which I feel about this is that *spe maior*, to judge from the general use of *spe* with comparatives (met. VII 648 *spe...maiora*, trist. I 11 36 *inferiora*, fast. IV 606 *citius*, Sall. Jug. 75 8 *amplior*, hist. II fr. 79 Maur. *celerius*, Liu. I 53 4 *lentius*, II 3 1 and XXVI 26 4 *serius*, III 38 13 *frequentior*, XXI 6 5 and XXXV 45 7 and XLIV 28 16 *celerius*), should mean 'greater than expectation' rather than 'too great for hope.' But as Ovid himself often says *res fide maior* (met. III 106, 660, IV 394, VII 648, XII 545, XIII 651, fast. II 113) in the sense of '*maior quam ut ei fidem habeas*,' there seems to be no reason why he should not say *spe maior* in the sense of '*maior quam ut eam speres*.' Still one would perhaps expect *quae* rather than *qualis* in 415 and 417.

539, 540.

conditor ut tardae, laesus cognomine, Myrrhae,
orbis in innumeris inueniāre locis.

In 1883, in J. P. XII p. 167, I explained this couplet as an

¹ *peior* Heinsius; and this word is corrupted to *maior* in most MSS at trist. I 1 26.

² This improbable conjecture has also occurred to Mr Owen, who has put it straight into his text.

³ That Ellis should explain *fortuna*

Iri as '*ut mendices et a fortiore aliquo pugnīs caesus humi inpingaris*' is quite in the natural order of things. It was easier for him to write these words, or any number of words, than to consider the context for one instant of time.

allusion to the fate of the poet C. Heluius Cinna. This appeared to involve an error on Ovid's part, since it was then believed that the poet lived on later than 44 B.C. and ought not to be identified with the tribune torn to pieces at Caesar's funeral. But Kiessling in 1887, in comment. Mommsen. p. 353, showed that this belief had no sufficient ground; and Schanz and the successors of Teuffel in their histories of Latin literature agree in regarding the poet and the tribune (ποιητικὸς ἀνὴρ Plut. uit. Brut. 20 4) as one.

When in my recension I suggested *urbis* for *orbis*, I had not observed that it was cited from two MSS by Heinsius and Merkel. I do not think it necessary, but it is favoured by parallels in the neighbourhood, 533 '*lacer in silua manibus spargare tuorum*' and 535 '*perque feros montes tauro rapiente traharis*.'

IV.

Who was Ibis? Nobody. He is much too good to be true. If one's enemies are of flesh and blood, they do not carry complaisance so far as to choose the dies Alliensis for their birthday and the most ineligible spot in Africa for their birthplace. Such order and harmony exist only in worlds of our own creation, not in the jerry-built edifice of the demiurge. Nor does man assail a real enemy, the object of his sincere and lively hatred, with an interminable and inconsistent series of execrations which can neither be read nor written seriously. To be starved to death and killed by lightning, to be brayed in a mortar as you plunge into a gulf on horseback, to be devoured by dogs, serpents, a lioness, and your own father in the brazen bull of Phalaris, are calamities too awful to be probable and too improbable to be awful. And when I say that Ibis was nobody I am repeating Ovid's own words. In the last book that he wrote, several years after the Ibis¹, he said, ex Pont. IV 14 44, '*extat adhuc saucius ore meo*.'

It appears from trist. I 6, III 11, IV 9, and V 8, that Ovid had, or pretended to have, more enemies than one. In IV 9 the

¹ The Ibis, with its '*lustris bis iam* than A.D. 12, and is not likely to be
mihi quinque peractis,' cannot be later so late.

enemy's offence is left unknown, 'nomen facinusque tacebo,' and probably neither it nor he existed; in v 8 it is vaguely described by the phrases 'casibus insultas' and 'nostra laetere ruina.' The two other passages are more precise. In i 6 some person or persons have tried to lay hands on Ovid's property and have been defeated by his wife and friends: 7 sq. 'tu facis ut spoliū non sim nec nuder ab illis | naufragii tabulas qui petiere mei,' 13 sq. 'mea nescioquis, rebus male fidus acerbis, | in bona uenturus, si paterere, fuit.' In iii 11 the enemy is an orator and his offence is speech: 19 sq. 'est aliquis qui uulnera cruda retractet | soluat et in mores ora diserta meos.' These two characters are put together to make Ibis: 13 sq. 'uulneraque inmitis requiem quaerentia uexat | iactat et in toto nomina nostra foro' (232 'latrat et in toto uerba canina foro'), 18 'naufragii tabulas pugnat habere mei,' 20 sq. 'praedam medio raptor ab igne petit. | nititur ut profugae desint alimenta senectae.' But they do not make him black enough; and therefore, whereas one of them is 'nescioquis,' i 6 13, and Ovid says of the other, iii 11 69 sq., 'fieri quod nunquam posse putauī, | est tibi de rebus maxima cura meis,' Ibis is represented as a person bound to Ovid by ties of duty, 19 'qui debuerat subitas extinguere flammās.'

The two halves of the poem, 1—250 and 251—644, derive their origin from two quite different motives. In the poems of his exile Ovid often laments the monotony of his theme. But in iii 11 and iv 9 and v 8 he hit on a new subject, remonstrance with a persecutor; and it proved no bad variation, for iv 9 contains some of his best lines. A longer effort, treating the same matter in another vein, was a promising enterprise; for the vein itself, though new to Ovid, was congenial to the Roman fibre, and Roman poets had excelled in it. The 91st poem of Catullus and the 5th and 17th epodes of Horace, however little accordant with modern fashions, are masterpieces without which no anthology of Latin poetry is complete or representative. And the first 250 lines of the Ibis are another masterpiece: Ovid has written no passage of equal length which has equal merit.

From that point onward the poem is merely a display of

erudition. Ovid, at the date of his exile, was bursting with information rather recently acquired. In his young days he had been by no means a learned poet; and Propertius, in the season of their sodality, must often have exhorted him to lay in a larger stock of those examples from mythology with which his own elegies are so much embellished or encumbered. But by the time he was fifty he had at his disposal more examples from mythology than he knew what to do with. His studies for the metamorphoses and some of his studies for the fasti (notably in the aetia of Callimachus) had furnished him with a far greater number of stories and histories than could be crowded into those two poems; and he felt the craving of the *ὀψιμαθής* to let everyone know how learned he had become. Here was his chance: history and mythology alike are largely composed of misfortunes as bad as one could wish for one's worst enemy; and he could discharge a great part of his load of knowledge through the channel of imprecation.

There is no reason to think that he took any of these examples from the Ibis of Callimachus, and there is some reason to think that he took none. All he says about imitating that poem is this, 55—60 'nunc quo Battiaades inimicum deuouet Ibin | hoc ego deuoueo teque tuosque modo. | utque ille historiis inuoluam carmina caecis, | non soleam quamuis hoc genus ipse sequi. | illius ambages imitatus in Ibide dicar | oblitus moris iudiciiue mei.' The new Ibis, like the old one, is to be an imprecation wrapped in obscurely worded allusions to history or legend: no further likeness is 'professed. And when in 448—50 he says 'eueniant capiti uota sinistra tuo...quibus exiguo uolucris deuota libello est | corpora proiecta quae sua purgat aqua,'—that is 'may Callimachus' imprecations on his Ibis fall upon you,'—this will constitute a tautology if he has translated those imprecations in other verses of his poem; and so Otto Schneider has remarked in his *Callimachus* vol. II p. 274.

A. E. HOUSMAN.

ON THE *HIPPIAS MAJOR*.

The position of the dialogue *Hippias Major* is clearly matter for debate. The more recent editors have tended to reject it from the Platonic canon, though Apelt (*Platonische Aufsätze*, 1912) argues for retaining it along with the *Hippias Minor*, and insists on grouping the two closely together. If genuine, the dialogue would on grounds of style and atmosphere be most naturally placed within the early "Socratic" group; yet it stands apart even from these, both in manner and in matter. On the other hand, if spurious, it is a remarkably good piece of imitation or parody; and it contains elements which appear to forbid placing it later than Plato's own later work.

Bosanquet has pointed out (*History of Aesthetic*, p. 52) that the way in which the problem of pleasure is here treated, implying an elementary recognition of "aesthetic" pleasure (τὸ δι' ὀψέως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ) as distinguished from "non-aesthetic," shows an advance on the position taken in the *Gorgias*, but comes short of the full analysis given in the *Philebus*. He remarks that the dialogue, "if spurious, is interesting as showing a growth of definite ideas on this point." F. W. Röllig (in *Wiener Studien*, 1900, p. 18 ff., reviewing E. Horneffer's treatise on the dialogue) also concentrates attention on the ethical position, and suggests that the *Hippias Major* belongs to the Platonic period, coming later than the *Gorgias* but earlier than the *Philebus*, and is the work of a pupil of Plato.

This seems to me probable; but from a different point of view. The ethical element in the dialogue is slight; there is another element, stronger and of special interest, which has been somewhat overlooked. Alone among the rejected or debatable dialogues, the *Hippias Major* seems to have distinct metaphysical implications. Editors have either ignored its metaphysical statements or dismissed them as merely absurd in themselves, though useful to disprove its authenticity. I suggest that on the most tenable theory of its origin the *Hippias Major* can be given an

intelligible position in relation to the development of Plato's ontology.

The ostensible subject of the dialogue is τὸ καλόν. The search for a definition carries us beyond the usual Socratic limits, and brings in an obvious reference to the theory of Ideas, with some phrases which appear to be copied from the *Phaedo*. On the other hand, mystical feeling and the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις are entirely absent; moreover on grounds of style and treatment (to be considered presently) the dialogue can hardly be supposed a genuine work written by Plato later than the *Phaedo*.

At the outset of the search for τὸ καλόν (286 E ff.) the formula αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν is introduced and accepted; and Socrates, speaking for his alleged questioner, puts Hippias through a catechism on the analogy of δικαιοσύνη δίκαιοί εἰσιν οἱ δίκαιοι, arriving (by way of σοφία and ἀγαθόν) at the statement τὰ καλὰ πάντα τῷ καλῷ ἐστὶ καλὰ (287 C). (The formula recurs with τὸ ὑπερέχον (τῷ πάντα μεγάλα) at 294 B.) This is clearly the language of *Phaedo* 100 D, E. A significant phrase is presently added (289 D) —αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ᾧ καὶ τὰλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ καλὰ φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴν προσγένηται ἐκείνο τὸ εἶδος. Here, as soon as the safely-ambiguous instrumental dative is supplemented by a more precise statement, confusion begins. The material sense of προσγενέσθαι is at once taken up by Hippias, who declares that gold is τὸ καλόν, because it when "added" makes all things beautiful. This closely resembles the passage in *Euthydemus* 301 A ff. where παραγενέσθαι is played with: παρέσστι...ἐκάστω αὐτῶν κάλλος τι. Ἐὰν οὖν, ἔφη, πᾶραγένηταί σοι βούς, βούς εἶ; The ambiguity of παρῆναι is also recognised in *Lysis* 217 C ff., where the distinction is made between παρουσία of a concomitant and παρουσία of a quality.

Socrates presently (292 D) makes another attempt with προσγενέσθαι—τὸ καλόν αὐτό..., ὃ παντὶ ᾧ ἂν προσγένηται, ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλῷ εἶναι—followed by a list of examples, culminating in πρᾶξις and μάθημα (cf. *Symposium* 211 B), with which χρυσός can have no possible relation. (We may note, by the way, that ἐκείνο is here made to refer to the particular, in spite of general Platonic usage—surely a bit of careless writing.) This time προσγενέσθαι is passed over without remark; and the

same is true of *παραγενέσθαι* and *παρεῖναι*, introduced (294 A, c) in reference to *τὸ πρέπον*, which is shown not to be *τὸ καλόν*.

Later in the dialogue a fresh set of phrases appears (300 A ff.). The definition *τὸ δι' ἀκοῆς τε καὶ ὄψεως ἡδύ* having been suggested, we begin a search for the *κοινόν*, the common element implied under this compound expression. The terms used here are first those of predication; 300 A, *τὸ κοινὸν τοῦτο...ὃ καὶ ἀμφοτέραις αὐταῖς ἐπεστι κοινῇ καὶ ἑκατέρα ἰδίᾳ*. But confusion soon appears; 302 C, *τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῇ ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα ἐπομένῃ...ταύτη δεῖν αὐτὰ καλὰ εἶναι, τῇ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ἕτερα ἀπολειπομένη μὴ... ἄρα ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὰς καλὰς οὐχὶ καὶ ἀμφοτέραις γε αὐταῖς ἔπεται καὶ ἑκατέρα*; 302 E, *...τοῦτό γε τὸ πάθος ἀμφοτέραις μὲν ἔπεται ἑκατέρα δ' οὐ*. Other phrases follow: 302 E, *ἔπεται ἑκατέρῳ*, 303 A, *τὰ...οὕτως ἐπιγινώμενα ἑκάστοις*, 303 E, *τὸ καλὸν τὸ ἐπ' ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς ἡδοναῖς*.

Here in one passage we have *κοινόν*, *οὐσία* and *πάθος* (cf. a confused phrase, *πάθος ἢ οὐσίαν*, at 301 B) applied to the essential characteristic which is being sought for; the favourite preposition is the "predicative" *ἐπί*, which however is followed variably by the accusative or dative; the verbs used are *ἐπεῖναι*, *ἐπιγίγνεσθαι* and *ἔπεσθαι*. The instrumental dative (as in *Phaedo* 100 D) also reappears. The use of *ἐπὶ* with a dative to convey a general definition may be paralleled from *Sophist* 218 C and *Parmenides* 174 D; Aristotle's formula is *ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν*. I cannot find a parallel for the accusative as used here.

It seems impossible to evolve order and consistency out of the confusion of this passage. Taken along with the earlier section examined (286 E ff.) it appears to me to convey strikingly the difficulties of an attempt to combine metaphysical with logical values—which is precisely the attempt made by the theory of Ideas as it is applied in *Phaedo* 100 B ff.

Another point arises at 300 A ff. The difficulty connected with epithets applicable to "each" and "both" proves a puzzle to Hippias, and is seriously attacked and disposed of. In *Theaetetus* 184 E ff., on the other hand, the problem is referred to (occurring in relation to these same terms *ἀκοή* and *ὄψις*), and is passed over as presenting no trouble.

It is generally agreed that the opening chapters of the *Par-*

menides contain a criticism of the theory of Ideas in its earlier form. (The view that the earlier theory belongs to Socrates and not to Plato has, I think, been sufficiently answered by Mrs Adam in the *Classical Quarterly*, July 1918¹.) Professor Stewart, following Natorp, argues strongly (*Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*) that the "young Socrates" represents "someone, probably a pupil of the Academy, who took up the doctrine of Ideas exactly as Aristotle took it up," and whose misconceptions demanded a reply and led to a re-statement. Now if we regard Socrates as hitherto Plato's spokesman, he may quite consistently here represent Plato's earlier theory, now to be superseded; but it is hardly conceivable that a "Socrates" should at any stage stand for *somebody else's erroneous views* about Plato's meaning. Further, it is extremely difficult to regard the "later" theory of Ideas as merely an amplification of principles that are to be accepted as implicit and fundamental all the time in the "earlier"; and it is, in Professor Stewart's treatment, made possible only by setting aside altogether the view that the Ideas are οὐσίαι, and regarding the whole theory as a study in methodology. It seems reasonable to adhere to Professor Jackson's view that the opening chapters of the *Parmenides* contain Plato's own criticism of his theory of Ideas in its earlier form, and prepare the way for the restatement which he gives in the later dialogues.

But a point which seems interesting is the resemblance between some phrases used in the early chapters of the *Parmenides* and some of these crudities of expression which have been noted in the *Hippias Major*. At *Parmenides* 131 B, while the vague μετέχειν and μεταλαμβάνειν are kept to express the relation between particular and Idea, the use of ἐπὶ is introduced in the comparison with a sail covering several men, and becoming ἐν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς... ὅλον. The use recurs at 132 C, in a more obviously logical and less material sense—(νόημα) ἐνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόημα ἐπὶ νοεῖ, μίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ἰδέαν... αἰεὶ ὃν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν. At 132 A, B the instrumental dative recurs as in *Phaedo* and *Hippias Major*—ὅ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα ἔσται. The conclusion that none of the Ideal οὐσίαι ἐν ἡμῖν

¹ See also L. Robin in *Rev. Études Grecques*, 1916.

is the result of a series of ἀπορίαι rising out of the crudely material view of the αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό. The whole of the argument which follows about relativity between several Ideas and between several particulars, but *not* between Idea and particular, seems designed again to combat a too concrete interpretation of the εἶδος. It is, in fact, exactly the sort of absurdity found in the *Hippias Major*, and due apparently to the over-literalising of phrases and conceptions found in the *Phaedo*, that is here in the *Parmenides* seriously taken up and applied to a revision of the whole theory of Ideas.

I suggest that we have in the *Hippias Major* an exercise upon various of the logico-metaphysical terms of the *Phaedo*, bringing its ontology to a *reductio ad absurdum*. The dialogue appears to have been written soon after the *Phaedo* and earlier than any of the "later" dialogues, and to be at least partly responsible for Plato's reconsideration of his metaphysical theory, and perhaps also for his restatement of the doctrine of pleasure in the *Philebus*.

If we feel that the author has not done his work with perfect success, an examination of the dialogue on the literary and linguistic side may be useful. I believe that internal evidence tends to prove it the work of a young student of the Academy.

The little work is distinctly clever, lively and interesting; the style is uneven in merit; the vocabulary is unusual, and, I think, significant. The chief feature of the dialogue as a work of art is the characterisation of Hippias. He is here given his head in the argument (contrast his subordinate position in the *Hippias Minor*); and his portrait comes out pretty clearly, and in much more lively colours than in *Protagoras* 337 C—338 B. The language assigned to him in the *Protagoras* is undistinguished, except for two metaphors in rapid succession towards the end of his speech—338 A, χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις, and πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα, οὐρία ἐφέντα, φεύγειν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος τῶν λόγων, ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν. Both these figures are Platonic (cf. for the former *Laws* 701 C, and for the latter *Symposium* 210 D, also the τρικνμία figure in *Euthydemus* 293 A and *Republic* 472 A). The language of Hippias in the *Hippias*

Minor (whether authentic or not) is quite ordinary. Here, on the other hand, Hippias uses a number of curious expressions; several appear to be mock-tragic, others colloquial. Since there seems to be no reason for crediting the real Hippias with very exuberant diction, and especially since the same kind of language is here given to Socrates also, we may suppose that the writer himself is responsible for choosing it.

The conceit and the stupidity of Hippias are drawn in equally broad line. He enters with a flourish of trumpets, and continues to boast without shame—e.g. 282 E, 284 C. He is openly rude at least twice: 285 D, *περὶ ποίων, ὄγαθέ, ἀρμονίων καὶ γραμμάτων*; and 293 A, *βάλλ' ἐς μακαρίαν*—a quite unplatonic fervour of abuse. He is no dialectician when confronted with Socrates; see at the outset (287 D, E) his failure to distinguish between *καλόν* and *τὸ καλόν*: his absurdly-overdone perplexity about the “each” and “both” question (300–301): and again (289 D) his readiness to apply *προσγίγνομαι* in a literal and material sense. Like Simmias in *Phaedo* 63 A, he is apt to seize on the last point, and to narrow down a general argument to a particular case; 289 C, *καὶ δὴ πρὸς γε θεοὺς ὅτι οὐ καλὸν τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος, ἀληθῆ ἔρεϊ*. He is unphilosophically ready to support any point in his favour, and naïve enough to confess the fact; 285 B, *συγχωρῶ ταῦτα· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τὸν λόγον πρὸς ἐμοῦ λέγειν, καὶ οὐδέν με δεῖ αὐτῷ ἐναντιοῦσθαι*. This kind of broad caricature seems to go beyond even the earlier manner of Plato; and he had certainly modified his methods of satire before the period of the *Phaedo*.

Style. The style, at its best, markedly resembles that of Platonic work; but on examination it proves very uneven. At 302 B, C there is a passage which opens well, making a logical point with some skill and maintaining its good style in spite of confused thought and terminology. 299 D, E, 303 B, C and the conclusion, from 304 E, are also good pieces of writing. Those phrases which closely recall passages in the genuine dialogues all suggest imitations by another writer rather than cross-references within Plato's own work. Some points of style may be looked at in detail.

(1) *Echoes of Platonic Phrases.* 286 A. ἔστι γάρ μοι περὶ αὐτῶν παγκάλως λόγος συγκειμένος. Cf. *Protagoras* 347 A (Hippias speaks), ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη, καὶ ἐμοὶ λόγος περὶ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἔχων. Here is either a copying of Plato's phrase, or possibly a slightly varied repetition of what was known as a favourite phrase of Hippias' own. So he is made to use *παγκάλως* again, 296 B.

287 cff. This passage has been already mentioned as recalling *Phaedo* 100 D, E. The writer seems to be well drilled in his *Phaedo*, and brings out plenty of examples on the analogy of τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ καλὰ.

297 B. ...τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ ἔκγονον σπουδαστόν ἐστιν, τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ κινδυνεύει ἐξ ὧν εὐρίσκομεν ἐν πατρός τινος ἰδέα εἶναι τὸ καλὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. This looks like a rather perfunctory borrowing from two passages in the *Republic*, 506 E and 508 B, C.

(2) *Plays on Words.* Another affinity with Plato's work is found in several assonances and plays on words; but here again the manipulation is sometimes faulty.

286 C, E. καὶ γάρ με εἰς καλὸν ὑπέμνησας. ...νῦν οὖν, ὃ λέγω, εἰς καλὸν ἥκεις, καὶ με δίδαξον αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὅ τι ἔστιν. The repeated *εἰς καλόν* is clearly meant to bring in the *αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν* which at once follows. Compare 281 A, Ἰππίας ὁ καλός τε καὶ σοφός. The use of *καλός* here at the very outset of the dialogue seems intentional. Again at the end, 304 E, Plato's favourite phrase *χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ* is neatly brought in.

281 D. εἰ ὁ Βίας ἀναβιφῇ. This is in Plato's manner; compare his play with the name of Polus, *Gorgias* 463 A, and (in a different mood) *Phaedo* 80 D, τὸ ἀειδὲς...εἰς...τόπον...οἰχόμενον ἀειδῇ, εἰς Ἀιδον ὡς ἀληθῶς.

292 C. διθύραμβον τοσούτον ἄσας οὕτως ἀμούσως πολὺ ἀπῆσας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐρωτήματος. Not simply "you have sung out of tune with our question," but rather "in your singing you have wandered away from our question." I cannot find a parallel instance with *ἀπάδω*, but cf. Hdt. 6. 129, ἀπωρχήσαό γε μὲν τὸν γάμον.

(3) *Peculiarities in Style and Syntax.* Certain passages may be here mentioned as unworthy of Plato, and as suggesting immaturity in the writer.

286 c. Socrates' alleged questioner is a bit of stage machinery employed to introduce the problem of τὸ καλόν, which could easily have been worked in by reference to the words παγκάλως, πάγκαλα used by Hippias just before.

298 B. The reference to Socrates in the third person is effective in its way, but is not like Plato. Both this passage and 286 c suggest an attempt at dramatic effect.

294 D, E. οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε τὸ φαίνεσθαι.... The style of this paragraph is laboured in its effort after clearness. The argument emerges well, but at the expense of ease and grace. The same is true of some other passages, e.g. 302 c—E.

295 c—E. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὅλον σῶμα.... A curious sentence, in which repeated asyndeta produce a very jerky effect.

299 A. ἂν ἴσως φαίη—a strange inversion of the usual order, with no obvious reason.

290 E. οὐκ ἂν... τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐστιᾶσθαι ἄνευ ὄψου πάννυ γενναίου ποιήσειεν. This seems an unparalleled extension of the use of ποιῶ with certain prepositions (ἐν, ἐπὶ, ὑπὸ, ἐς) in the sense of putting into a position. Is it due to a careless reading of *Republic* 372 c?

Vocabulary. The unusual words here found come under three main classes, not always easily distinguished:—

(1) Epic or tragic, producing here a burlesque effect.

(2) Otherwise strained or violent, suggesting slang, either made or in the making. Several of these words do not recur in literature except in late authors; we may perhaps infer that at this period they were part of the spoken, but not yet of the written, vocabulary.

(3) Terms suggesting the philosophic slang or jargon of a school.

All these sorts of words—burlesque, slang, lecture-room phrases—would seem to indicate the young student.

(1) *Poetic (or burlesque) words and phrases.* 293 A. δύσφημον. Poetic—not in Plato.

295 A. ὀχληρός, “troublesome, vexatious.” Plato uses the word once (*Republic* 569 A, μετὰ ὀχληρῶν συμποτῶν), but in its other sense of “turbulent.” For the present meaning, cf. Eur. *Hel.* 452, ὀχληρὸς ἴσθ' ὦν.

295 A. *ᾶ μὴ μέγα, ὦ Ἱππία, λέγε.* The whole phrase suggests burlesque. *ᾶ* is epic and tragic; this is the only prose instance given by L. and S. For *μὴ μέγα λέγε* cf. *Phaedo* 95 B, where it is used playfully with reference to *βασκανία*.

296 D. *τοῦτ' ἦν ἐκείνο...ὃ ἐβούλετο ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ εἰπεῖν—*“This it was that our soul was fain to utter.” This seems a reminiscence of tragedy. Cf. 300 C, *πολλά γέ μοι προφαίνεται τοιαῦτα πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς*. *προφαίνομαι* also (cf. 303 C) is chiefly epic and tragic.

290 E. *μέρμερος πάνυ ἐστίν—*“a fearsome fellow.” *μέρμερος* is found in epic, in Eur. *Rhes.* 509 (*μέρμερον κακόν*) and in late prose; not in Plato.

292 D. *οὐδέν σοι μᾶλλον γεγωνεῖν δύναμαι ἢ εἴ μοι παρεκάθησο λίθος, καὶ οὗτος μυλίας.* *γεγωνεῖν* is epic and tragic, with one or two instances in late prose. The meaning here is clearly “make myself heard.” (Cf. O. Apelt, *Platonische Aufsätze*, p. 231 n.)

291 E. *τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὐ τυγχάνομεν.* (Cf. 287 A, *εὖ...λέγεις... εἰ χειρωσόμεθα τὸν ἄνδρα*.) *τυγχάνω* in this literal sense of hitting a mark is chiefly Homeric, though in Homer it usually has an accusative of the personal object.

292 A. *ἂν τύχη βακτηρίαν ἔχων...εὖ μάλα μου ἐφικέσθαι πειράσεται.* This looks like slang, and tempts to the translation “He’ll jolly well try to come down upon my back”; but the language seems to have a poetic origin. *ἐφικνούμαι* occurs chiefly in Homer, orators and late prose; not in Plato. With the meaning here cf. Soph. *O. T.* 809. The introduction of the *βακτηρία* is violent and unlike Plato.

The two last examples suggest a burlesque use of Homeric words, passing over into slang.

287 A. *μή τι κωλύω μιμούμενος ἐγὼ ἐκείνον;* This may be added here as a clearly affected variant (apparently unique) on the ordinary impersonal use of *κωλύω*.

(2) *Colloquial words and phrases.* 285 E. *ἀληθῇ λέγεις.* The sense seems to be “No doubt, if you say so”—a polite, but not hearty, acquiescence by Socrates.

286 E. *φαῦλον γὰρ ἂν εἴῃ τὸ ἐμὸν πρᾶγμα καὶ ιδιωτικόν.* This use of *πρᾶγμα* is not quite like any other instance of the

sense "profession"; here it is rather "my show," "my turn-out." Cf. 301 C, τοιαῦτα, ὃ Ἰππία, τὰ ἡμέτερά ἐστιν.

287 D. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τί μέλλει;—"What is he after?"

287 E. εὐδόξως ἀπεκρίνω—"You have answered famously." This is the only instance of the adverb given by L. and S.

288 D. οὐ κομψὸς ἀλλὰ συρφετός—"a vulgar person." The common use of συρφετός is collective; cf. *Gorgias* 489 C, συρφετὸς δούλων. For this application to an individual cf. perhaps *Iliad* 12. 212, οὐδὲ ἔοικεν | δῆμον ἐόντα παρὲξ ἀγορευμένον, and *Hor. Ep.* 1. 1, 59, plebs eris. Compare also the dialect use (see Wright's *Dictionary of Dialect*) of "trash" (Yorkshire) and "rubbish" (Cheshire) with reference to an individual.

290 A. ὃ τετυφωμένε. The perfect passive in this sense ("blown out with pride"—cf. ἵπποτυφία) is used by Demosthenes and later writers; not by Plato. If this dialogue is of Plato's period, we have here perhaps a bit of slang not yet adopted into the literary language.

291 A. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα φύρεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον—"to mix with the fellow." Plato uses φύρεσθαι at *Laws* 950 A in the reciprocal sense—"to be mixed together"; but this seems to be the only instance with πρὸς.

300 C. πάνν ἐτοίμως παροράς—"Plainly enough you don't see straight." ἐτοίμως in this sense is without parallel. (Cf. ἀσφαλέως in the slang sense of "easily"—*Theocr.* 24. 137, ἀσφαλέως κε φυτοσκάφον ἄνδρα κορέσσαι, and *Anth. Pal.* 5. 183, χοῦς γὰρ ἔνεισι δύ' ἀσφαλέως.)

293 A. βάλλ' ἐς μακαρίαν. Aristophanes has βάλλ' ἐς κόρακας, and once ἄπαγ' ἐς μακαρίαν, *Eq.* 1151. But this particular phrase seems to be unique, and nothing like the imprecation is found in Plato.

304 A. κνίσματα and περιτμήματα. Both otherwise late words; perhaps at this time part of the colloquial spoken language.

(3) *Philosophic slang or jargon.* 296 D. ἀπλῶς.—ἐκεῖνο μὲν τοίνυν οἷχεται, τὸ δυνατόν τε καὶ χρήσιμον ἀπλῶς εἶναι καλόν. In this sense of "without qualification" Plato normally uses ἀπλῶς οὕτως or οὕτως ἀπλῶς. His only instance of ἀπλῶς alone, *Parmenides* 163 C, corresponds to Aristotle's use; cf. the

definition in *Top.* B. 11. 115^b 29, τὸ δ' ἀπλῶς ἐστίν, ὃ μηδενὸς προστεθέντος ἐρεῖς ὅτι καλὸν ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον. Note that Aristotle there takes καλὸν as his example.

300 C. λέξεις.—πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν μ' ἔχοι ἀπειρία...τῆς τῶν παρόντων λέξεως λόγων. This seems to mean either "manner of speaking" or "signification"—a purely verbal noun from λέγω in either of its meanings. This use, with a genitive, does not occur in Plato, and is not cited by L. and S.

301 B. κρούετε δὲ ἀπολαμβάνοντες τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κατατέμνοντες. With κατατέμνω here compare Plato's frequent use of κατακερματίζω, but the combination with κρούω mixes the metaphor. Plato uses κρούω literally, e.g. *Protagoras* 310 B, of knocking at a door; *Lysis* 209 B, of playing an instrument. This sense of tapping in order to sound is not found in Plato, but suggests a philosophic slang.

301 B. οὕτω μεγάλα ὑμᾶς λανθάνει καὶ διανεκῇ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας πεφυκότα. (Cf. 301 E, διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας.) Several points arise in this perplexing sentence.

Grote (who assumes the dialogue to be genuine) has made the chief attempt to deal with the meaning of the passage (see his *Plato*, I. 384). He sees here a conflict between the Rhetor and the Dialectician; and he makes διανεκῇ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας πεφυκότα correspond to "the logical term *Concrete*, opposite to *Abstract*." Even supposing that we could plausibly attribute such a distinction to Plato or his circle, what is the point of μεγάλα, and how are the words quoted to be actually construed?

σώματα τῆς οὐσίας can hardly be "objects as they exist in nature" (G. Smith). This would in any case need the article with σώματα, and such a use of οὐσία is surely not only unplatonic but quite unphilosophic.

I would suggest reading σώματα <τὰ> τῆς οὐσίας (assuming τὰ easily lost in this position), and construing τὰ τῆς οὐσίας λανθάνει ὑμᾶς οὕτω μεγάλα καὶ διανεκῇ σώματα πεφυκότα. τὰ τῆς οὐσίας may then mean something like "the sum of all that exists"; cf. 301 E, where Socrates parodies Hippias with διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας, "a continuous account of being in general."

We are still left with *σώματα*. Plato uses *σῶμα* in the obvious material sense, as correlative with *ψυχή*. *σῶμα τῆς πίστεως*, Ar. *Rhet. A.* 1. 1354^a 15, seems to be a figurative use of the same meaning, "substantial, material body." The general meaning "mass," "body," clearly came in later; cf. Cic. *Att.* 2. 13, hoc totum *σῶμα* (sc. collection of speeches) curabo ut habeas. Apelt (*Plat. Aufsätze*, p. 231) considers *σώματα* impossible here, and proposes to read *σχήματα*, comparing Ar. *Pol.* 1322^a 31, τετάχθαι ἐν μείζονι σχήματι.

διηνεκής and its adverb are found in epic, tragedy and late prose; once in Plato, *νόμοι διηνεκείς*, *Laws* 839 A. Its use here accords with the tendency, already illustrated, to bring in poetic words. The Doric form *διανεκῇ* is given by every MS except Cod. Vindob. 55. If the general reading is to be accepted, we may possibly have here a word preserved by tradition as a favourite with Hippias himself, put in his mouth as he would use it in his own Doric, and parodied in the same form by Socrates at 301 E.

303 B, C. *ἄρρητα*)(*ῥητά*—"irrational")("rational." These are mathematical terms, used by Plato only at *Republic* 546 c, in the passage on the Nuptial Number. Hippias is a mathematician (cf. 285 c ff.); but his mathematics are faulty here, for a number of *ἄρρητα* can *not*, on the strict use of the words, become *ῥητά* by addition. Is this illustration reminiscent of an ill-understood lecture?

303 D. *τῶν ἀδυνάτων τι παρέχεται*—"It gives an impossible result." This is another mathematical phrase (cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 6. 1. 28), and may have a similar origin.

If I have fairly interpreted the above instances of style and language, it seems a possible theory that we have in the *Hippias Major* a bit of work, clever in spite of its limitations, from the pen of a young student of the Academy. He was, as the substance of the dialogue shows, interested in the earlier theory of Ideas (as expounded by Plato in the *Phaedo*) on its logical side, without caring about its mystical or transcendental elements. He developed, starting from certain phrases used in the *Phaedo*, some of the difficulties involved in the confusion of logic with meta-

physic. In the style of his work he naturally conformed mainly to Plato's manner and the formulae of the school; but he also let himself go in his caricature of Hippias, and in committing to writing many pleasing examples of his own student slang and jargon. The human interest of the dialogue is obvious, if the Platonic student, εὐστοχος νεανίας τῶν ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας τις, here stands self-portrayed. Its philosophic interest is also worth considering, if we take the view that Plato was prompted partly by this, and perhaps by other similar exercises of his students, to make that revision of his earlier theory of Ideas which is begun in the *Parmenides*.

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AESCHYLEA.

Persae 425. φυγῇ δ' ἀκόσμως πᾶσα ναὺς ἡρέσσετο,
 ὅσαιπερ ἦσαν βαρβάρου στρατεύματος·
 τοὶ δ' ὥστε θύννους ἢ τιν' ἰχθύων βόλον
 ἀγαῖσι κωπῶν θραύμασιν τ' ἐρειπίων
 ἔπαιον ἐρράχιζον.

It is worth while to picture clearly to the mind this statement. The Persian ships broke and fled in disorder; the Greeks pursued smiting and cleaving asunder—what? the ships or the men?—with broken oars and fragments of wrecks. If they struck the ships with these weapons it was a futile operation; they ought to have rammed them with their beaks. If they struck the Persian soldiers and sailors with them the proceeding is just as silly; fancy trying to kill the men on another ship by lunging at them with broken oars instead of either boarding the ship or running her down! And why did they use broken oars and bits of wreckage? Why not spears or *whole* oars? Were *all* their own oars broken or did they pick up those of the enemy for the purpose? And bits of wreck!!

Aeschylus wrote something like this:

ὅσαιπερ ἦσαν βαρβάρου στρατεύματος·
 (ῥῶχουντο δ' ἄνδρες ἐν σάλῳ στροβούμενοι)
 ἀγαῖσι κωπῶν θραύμασιν τ' ἐρειπίων·
 τοὶ δ' ὥστε θύννους κτλ.

But perhaps several lines have been lost, of which 428 is a fragment.

Ag. 1079. ματεύει δ' ὧν ἀνευρήσει φόνον.

ἀναζητεῖ, says the scholiast, εἰ γέγονεν ἐνθάδε παλαιὸς φόνος. This is apparently an explanation of the Medicean reading *ἄν* (= *ἐάν*) *εὐρήσῃ*! But where does *ἐνθάδε* come from? And what does *ὧν* mean in the text? If it means “seeks *whose* blood she may find,” it ought to be *ὅτων*, and besides she does not seek *whose* blood she may find, but whether she can find *any* blood. The text can only fairly be construed “seeks those whose blood she will find,” and that is absurd. I conclude that the scholiast’s *ἐνθάδε* is a relic of a time when the text read *ἐνθ’* for *ὧν*.

ARTHUR PLATT.



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